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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC-UTILITY AND AREA-PRICE METHODS OF 
FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS OF NATURAL GAS
CHAPTER I
REGULATION OF THE FIELD SALES OF NATURAL GAS AS AN ISSUE 
IN PUBLIC POLICY FORMATION
The Supreme Court in 195^ decided that the field sales of gas 
for resale in interstate commerce by independent producers of natural 
gas were under the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission. That 
decision set in motion the search for a method of regulating these gas 
sales in a satisfactory way. This search was still in progress at the 
end of 1962, over eight years later. The process of policy formation 
in the intervening period had offered an absorbing study in government 
regulation of industry. The development of the regulation of independ­
ent producers of natural gas was especially interesting because it came 
during a period of relative stability in government-business relations.
The issues in government regulation of industry which had excited 
public and academic interest in the prewar period had been mostly settled 
by the end of World War II. Public-utility regulation had become some­
what standardized. The Supreme Court decision in the Hope Natural Gas 
Company case disposed of the last major policy issue in 19^ by settling
the question of the value of the investment upon which return was to be 
2
earned. The reforms of the New Deal period had brought the stock market,
P^hillips Petroleum Company v. Wisconsin, 3^ 7 U.S. 672 (193^ )* 
(Hereinafter referred to as the Phillips case.)
2
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Company, 320 U.S.
591 (1944). (Hereinafter referred to as the Hope case.)
utility holding companies, commercial and investment banking industries, 
the aviation industry and business advertising and competitive practices 
under the surveillance of government. The regulatory agencies were for 
the most part established and settled in their operations by this time. 
Administrative problems abounded, but policies were generally under­
stood and accepted.
The rapid development of the natural gas industry following World 
War II created problems in policy formulation which were distinctly 
different from the traditional concerns of regulation. Determination of 
the appropriate price for natural gas in the field was a new departure 
for regulation. The public policies toward business activity current 
when the regulation of the gas industry was initiated generally were for­
mulated with either the problem of monopoly or of the special relationships 
of an industry affected with the public interest in mind. The frame of 
reference with which gas field price regulation was first approached 
reflected these same points of departure. Yet, along with the matter of 
income distribution, regulation of the gas production industry required 
decisions on the allocation of the depleting quantity of gas both over 
time and among alternative uses. These extended effects of public policy 
action were not reflected in most of the literature on gas field sales 
regulation.
Studies of the field market for natural gas have been highly 
selective and with few exceptions have been limited to traditional regu­
latory issues. Considerable legal research has centered on whether the 
FPC had authority under the Natural Gas Act to control the independent 
producers of natural gas. The income distribution effects of rising gas 
prices in the field and the direct control of the end use of gas have 
been studied by interested groups. The adequacy of present and potential 
supplies of natural gas has been explored. Various specific problems in 
application of particular regulatory methods have been examined. Most 
of the economic studies undertaken have emphasized specific problems, 
such as the extent of competition at the field sales level and the ade­
quacy of specified rates to fulfill the criteria of public utility 
regulation. While these studies of gas regulation have contributed to
the understanding of industry problems, they have not provided a base 
from which conclusions on field sales regulation can be drawn.
The Federal Power Commission, including both the Commissioners 
and the Staff, has examined gas field price issues both in the more gen­
eral Natural Gas Investigation and in connection with specific cases.
The Natural Gas Investigation was limited to issues which existed or were 
in prospect during the early postwar period. As a result, the problems 
of the rapidly expanding postwar industry were cast in terms of an exten­
sion of the prewar industry with its different problems and its different 
economic organization. The specific rate cases considered by the Com­
mission were limited both in subject matter and in frame of reference.
The problem of regulating a given company was not approached from the 
level of appropriate policy for an entire industry, hence no industry 
policy has evolved from the regulatory process. Despite the magnitude 
of the regulatory efforts, then, the basic issues in natural gas field 
price regulation had not been adequately treated, nor had a satisfactory 
policy been enunciated, by the end of 1962. One of the major purposes of 
this work is to provide an analytical framework capable of examining the 
issues in gas field sales regulation so that social goals can be formu­
lated and alternative methods of attaining those goals evaluated.
The Administration of Regulation
The Federal Power Commission is the independent regulatory com­
mission assigned the task of administering the Natural Gas Act, the 
legislation under which federal regulation of the natural gas industry
3
is authorized. The FPC, under the applicable statutes, is the adminis- 
trative link between the Congress and the natural gas industry. Most 
natural gas regulation on the federal level, including both transportation 
and field sales for resale, must pass through the FPC machinery.
5^2 Stat. 821 (1938); 15 U. S. C. 717-71? w. (Hereinafter re­
ferred to as the Natural Gas Act.)
4For sake of brevity the Federal Power Commission will frequently 
be referred to as the FPC.
The independent regulatory commission has been exposed to a re- 
evaluation during the postwar period. This administrative device was 
originally conceived of as a means of joining the benefits of expert 
knowledge of particular aspects of a regulated industry with social con­
trol under strict legislative mandate. The complexity of regulation, 
the absence of clear-cut goals, and the dynamic nature of the industries 
regulated have more and more forced the regulatory commissions into 
policy making, as well as administrative, roles. The refusal to recog­
nize the existence of these disparate roles has been blamed, along with 
the growth in the regulatory task, for the breakdown of regulation that 
some critics have charged has typified the operations of the commissions 
during the last decade. The experience of the FPC is instructive in 
this regard.
The FPC was established to regulate water power site development. 
Its tasks were first enlarged to include regulation of interstate trans­
mission of electric energy. In 1938 the control over interstate gas 
transmission was added. In the postwar period the FPC was required to 
exercise jurisdiction over some field sales of natural gas as well as 
over the greatly expanded gas transmission industry. These later expan­
sions of authority came under the same basic legislative and adminis­
trative machinery set up in 1938. Other commissions have experienced 
similar expansions of responsibility and economic shifts in the industries 
regulated. Whether or not the commission device as originally conceived 
was suited to its earlier role, the changes in operations and scope which 
have come since the establishment of the regulatory agencies in their 
present form have made the need for a reappraisal of their adequacy 
apparent. The record of performance similarly reflects the need for a 
close examination of individual commissions. The FPC is particularly 
well suited for such a study because, as Dean Landis stated in his study 
of the regulatory commissions for President-elect Kennedy,^  "the Federal
U^.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee 
on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Report on Regulatory Agencies 
to the President-Elect, Prepared by James M. Landis, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess., 
I960, p. 54.
Power Commission without question represents the outstanding example in 
the Federal Government of the breakdown of the administrative process.
The complexity of its problems is no answer to its more than patent 
failures."
The FPC and Gas Field Sales Regulation
The choice of the FPC regulation of the gas industry as a case 
study in regulation by independent regulatory commissions was motivated 
by factors relating both to the gas industry and to the problems inherent 
in its regulation. The industry, first of all, is strategic and of 
great economic significance. Moreover, the great growth in the industry 
during the postwar period increased its sensitivity to regulation and 
magnified any resulting effects. Regulation of the natural gas industry 
at the field sales level was also highly controversial. Policy disagree­
ments led to preparation and presentation of considerable information 
and public comment, though much of it, as mentioned above, was of little 
analytical value or interest. The unsettled nature of public policy in 
this area, in the proximate political sense as well as within the more 
idealized economic framework, lent timeliness to the study which added 
to its interest to the writer. The presence of unusual regulatory prob­
lems in the regulation of the field price of natural gas was the final 
element leading to the choice of this aspect of the natural gas industry 
for further study. The comments below illuminate the importance of the 
natural gas industry in the economy and the factors which set regulation 
of this industry somewhat apart.
The place of the natural gas industry 
in the economy of the United States
The natural gas industry in 1962 was the sixth largest industry 
in the United States.^ In i960, consumers of all types paid a total of 
almost $6 .3 billion for natural gas. At the wellhead this gas brought
^Federal Power Commission, Forty-Second Annual Report, 1962 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963)» p. 1*
almost $1.8 billion, with the other $4.5 billion going for payments for
the service of conveying the gas from the seat of production and making
n
it available for ultimate consumption. The total marketed production
Û
of natural gas in i960 was 12,771.0 billion cubic feet. Preliminary
figures for 1961 and 1962 showed 13,037.6 and 13,525.0 billion cubic feet
g
produced, respectively. The proportion of energy consumed in the United 
States coming from natural gas has increased steadily along with the 
increase in the absolute quantities of gas consumed. Gas supplied 9.3 
per cent of the energy used in 1933, 13.7 per cent in 1945, and 26.8 per 
cent in 1954. In I960, approximately one-third of all energy used in 
this country was supplied by the gas industry.
The position of the natural gas industry in consumer income 
expenditures has also risen over the years, with the greatest growth in 
the period immediately following World War II. In 1933 the total expen­
diture on natural gas by consumers was only $368 million. Total purchases 
reached $835 million in the last war year of 1945, and by I960 were seven 
and one-half times as high as they were in 1945.^  ^ Volume of marketed 
production increased as well, with gas put to productive use or lost 
rising from 1,555.5 billion cubic feet in 1933 to 3,917.7 billion cubic
feet in 1945. Continuing this growth, gas marketings more than tripled
12between the end of World War II and 1962. One rough measure of the 
7
Data taken from Table A in the Appendix.
g
Data taken from Table B in the Appendix.
9
"Natural gas had best year ever," Oil and Gas Journal, LXIX,
No. 4 (January 28, 1963), p. I68.
^^Data for 1933-1954 taken from American Gas Association,
Historical Statistics of the Gas Industry (New York; American Gas Asso­
ciation, 1954), p. 31 ; data for I96O taken from American Gas Association, 
Gas Facts: A Statistical Record of the Gas Utility Industry in I960
(New York: American Gas Association, I96I), p. I8. The I96O figure is
preliminary and includes Alaska and Hawaii.
^^Data taken from Table A in the Appendix.
12Data taken from Table B in the Appendix.
relative as well as absolute growth of the natural gas industry is the 
change in gas sales to consumers as compared to all personal consumption 
expenditures. Gas sales were approximately ,8 per cent as large as per­
sonal consumption expenditures in both 1933 and 1938, fell slightly to
,7 per cent in 19^ 5, and then rose to 1,3 per cent in 1954 and 1,9 per 
13cent in I960, While factors other than relative growth of the gas 
industry influenced this ratio, the general pattern of more than propor­
tionate growth of the gas industry was plain.
The use of natural gas had spread by I960 until it had reached,
though not covered, all the continental states other than Vermont and
14Maine, as well as Alaska and the District of Columbia, The wide geo­
graphic incidence of gas in I960 contrasted with the earlier years of the 
industry when gas was consumed only in the immediate vicinity of produc­
tion because of the economic and technical problems of long distance 
transmission. Production from other regions had replaced much of the 
output from depleted small gas fields near population centers by I960,
In recent years gas production has been concentrated in fewer areas. In 
1933 only 22 per cent of the gas produced was transported interstate.
In 1938, 28 per cent was shipped interstate, and approximately the same 
proportion went to out-of-state consumers in 1945, The increase in 
interstate shipments accelerated with the postwar pipeline building boom. 
In 1954, 53 per cent of the gas was consumed outside, its state of origin. 
By i960 this figure had increased to 58 per cent,^^
The shift in geographic distribution of gas sales has been par­
tially responsible for a change in the nature of the end uses to which 
gas has been put. The increased value of natural gas as a fuel and the 
ability to transport it to consuming markets some distance from the
13Percentages calculated from gas sales data in Appendix Table A, 
and Personal Consumption Expenditures data from official published data 
in the Survey of Current Business and its supplements,
14Data taken from Table C in the Appendix,
^^Percentages calculated from Table B in the Appendix,
8producing regions has led to an increase in the proportion of the gas 
going to domestic consumers and a reduction in the proportion going to 
field and other industrial uses. In 1933 18 per cent of the gas used 
was consumed by domestic consumers and 76 per cent by industrial con­
sumers, including uses in the field, flaring, and other waste not 
included. The relative figures for 1938 and 19^ 5 were I6 per cent for 
domestic and 79 per cent for industrial uses. In 195^ » however, domes­
tic consumption took 23 per cent of all gas consumed while the industrial 
uses were reduced to 71 per cent of the total, though absolute increases 
in gas consumption were achieved in every end use except carbon black 
manufacture. In I960 the trend evident in 195^ continued. Only 67 per 
cent of the gas put to productive use was consumed in industrial pursuits, 
while a high of 25 per cent of such gas went to domestic consumers. The 
gas not elsewhere classified was consumed in commercial uses.^^ The 
increase in domestic consumption relative to total consumption is an 
indication of the general movement toward higher value use for the gas 
consumed.
The natural gas industry has attained a position of importance 
in the economy of the United States. Its importance has been growing 
over the past three decades. The future of the natural gas industry, 
however, depends on its ability to continue to provide fuel at a reason­
able cost. One prerequisite for such production is the availability of 
undepleted natural gas reserves. Two measures of recoverable natural 
gas can be used to gain some insight into the industry future, but both 
of these measures are highly misleading if taken alone. The first of 
these measures is currently existing proved recoverable reserves and the 
second is estimates of the total amount of gas which might be recovered 
over the life of the industry. Reasonably consistent data on recoverable 
reserves were not available before 19^5» In that year it was estimated 
that 150 trillion cubic feet of proved recoverable gas had not been pro­
duced. In 1954-, despite continued high level production, the estimate
^^Calculated from data presented in Appendix Table D. The com­
mercial classification includes all nonindustrial, nonhousehold uses.
had risen to approximately 210 trillion cubic feet. In I96O these
reserves were set at 265 trillion cubic feet, while preliminary figures
17for January 1, 1963» showed 285 trillion cubic feet available. One 
comparison used to relate the proved recoverable reserves to some mean­
ingful measure is the calculation of the life of reserves at current 
consumption rates. In these terms, in 1962 there were 20.7 years of 
proved reserves, while in 195^  the similar figure was 25*3 and in 19^ 5 
it Was 38.5 years.
The outlook for future discovery of natural gas depends, of 
course, on the quantity of gas actually in place and the success in dis­
covering and producing it. Estimates of total gas in place can only be 
very rough approximations. Historically such estimates have almost 
always proved conservative, primarily because of implicit reliance on 
the state of technology at the time of the estimation. Recent estimates 
have arrived at figures between 5OO trillion cubic feet and 1,000 trillion 
cubic feet, or approximately 50 to 100 years supply for the amount of
gas currently in place and recoverable under the continental United
19States, including Alaska.
Special factors in natural gas 
industry regulation
Two matters affecting the natural gas industry caused a study of 
its regulation to be of particular interest and value. The first of
17Data taken from Appendix Table B; for 1963» Oil and Gas Journal, 
LXIX, No. 4, p. 169.
1 A
Calculated from Appendix Table B; for 1962, Ibid. These data 
are subject to misinterpretation for one reason beyond the obvious fact 
that life rates are based on present consumption levels and no new dis­
covery of gas. This reason is that reservoir deliverability falls more 
rapidly than do reserves. Therefore the total present proved reserves 
could not be produced at the current consumption rate for the full life 
of the reserves because some of the fields will not be able to produce 
at this rate, though the quantity indicated can be produced given 
enough time.
19Bruce C. Netschert, The Future Supply of Oil and Gas (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins Press, for Resources for the Future, 1958), pp. 64-74.
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these was the problem of appropriate use rates, made necessary because 
natural gas is depleted in use, and the second was the time lag between 
adjustments which created a wider than usual wedge between short run and 
long run effects of regulation induced changes.
The total quantity of natural gas that existed at the time of 
the first intended production of the substance has been reduced and 
cannot be replenished in the same form by human action. The use and 
development rates of gas over time are both partially, and at least 
permissively, the products of government action in the regulatory sphere. 
This additional dimension of the resource allocation problem, the 
allocation of an unknown total quantity of a resource available at an 
undeterminable expense over an uncertain period of time, brings exotic 
considerations into play. The usual economic framework is stretched, 
and in the process its more common applications are potentially made 
more meaningful.
A large portion of the investment in the natural gas industry, 
on every level from production to consumption, is highly immobile. 
Exploration and development expenditures, the actual producing wells, 
the transportation and distribution networks, and the gas using facili­
ties all are more or less fixed geographically and have few if any 
alternative uses. The average technical life of these installations is 
long. Consequently, changes in decision variables, such as price, can 
bring large changes in the total industry complex only after the passage 
of considerable time. The immediate effect of any regulatory change 
would likely, then, be quite small, and perhaps even contrary to the 
ultimate result. For this reason industry regulation creates possible 
tension between the long and short run goals sought. In analytical 
terms, the short run can proceed from varied special conditions, and 
therefore prediction of short run results requires special knowledge of 
existing conditions. For the long run, however, the important factor 
is the tendency toward equilibrium set up by the industry-regulatory 
relations. This tendency can be predicted with greater reliability than 
can the short run effect. On the other hand, the longer time period 
increases the possibility that exterior changes could alter the otherwise
11
reasonable ceteris paribus assumptions and upset particular predictions. 
These time period problems are heightened in the natural gas industry, 
and consequently can be considered and in some instances analyzed with 
greater ease here than in other industries. From this review of the 
special industry and regulatory factors involved, it can be seen that 
FPC jurisdiction over the field sales of natural gas for resale in 
interstate commerce introduced challenging issues in government regula­
tion.
An Analytical Approach to the Federal Regulation 
of the Independent Producers of Natural Gas
The issue raised in this study is whether different methods of 
federal regulation of the field sale for resale of natural gas in inter­
state commerce can be evaluated on the basis of attainment of specified 
public policy goals. Certain goals are posited and alternative regula­
tory methods are evaluated on grounds of gross consistency with the goals 
selected. The evaluation requires an explicit formulation of both the 
policies considered and the goals sought. The requirement of a formal 
statement of goals and approaches is expected to result in a clearer 
expression of the choices in gas industry regulation. Further, if mean­
ingful conclusions can be reached on the relative desirability of 
different methods of control, then the applicability of the analytical 
approach to at least one public policy issue will be demonstrated.
20"Government regulation" in this study will be used as a general 
term signifying any government action which is intended to alter economic 
relations. Its choice over alternative terms such as "government inter­
ference" or "government control" or "government direction" was made on 
the basis of relative neutrality and comprehensiveness. The term is 
used as an approximate antonym of laissez faire and not of anarchy. 
Therefore the absence of "government regulation" presumes the maintenance 
of the general duties of government including the enforcement of con­
tracts, the protection of private property and the maintenance of law 
and order. "Public policy" or "government policy" is a more comprehen­
sive term which includes government regulation as well as a policy of 
laissez faire. It presumes a thought-out position as contrasted to 
absence of position.
12
Alternative regulatory methods already under public discussion 
were chosen for comparison in this study. They were more easily com­
pared than others, possibly synthetically created by the investigator, 
because formulated values, administrative techniques, and accepted 
orderings of experience already existed. Furthermore, the usefulness 
of the investigation was enhanced by the choice of recognized approaches 
to regulation because they could be tested for structural consistency 
and usefulness at the same time that the rest of the investigation pro­
ceeded toward its more immediate purpose. It does not follow, however, 
that the alternative regulatory methods used in this study are necessarily 
identical to the public interpretation of methods going by the same 
name. Such identity is not verifiable or meaningful, nor is it necessary 
for the generation of useful conclusions. The positions presented are 
explained in detail so that the reader can adjust the results obtained 
to fit the desired particular variant of the regulatory approach.
Three regulatory approaches were selected for direct study and 
evaluation in this work. One of these policies, no direct regulation of 
the field price of natural gas sold by independent producers, was con­
sidered implicitly through descriptions of preregulation conditions and 
through comparisons of the other policies with laissez faire. The direct 
regulation methods considered were the public-utility and the area-price 
approaches to field price determination. The agency charged with the 
actual regulation of the natural gas industry on the federal level, the 
FPC, had experience in using both these approaches. The present study 
drew on this experience for both analytical and factual material.
Goals Selected for Evaluation of Alternative
Public Policies Toward Gas Field Sales
The values or goals which were selected as bases for evaluating
possible government regulation of the sales of natural gas in the field
were chosen because of their meaningfulness in United States public policy
21discussion in the mid-Twentieth century. Obviously these values cannot
21 The goals of regulatory policy selected for this study are 
considered in detail in Chapter VI below.
13
be judged in terms of "correctness.” Such judgments are not possible on 
anything other than an a priori basis which would be irrelevant in the 
current context. Further, the writer makes no claim that the values 
selected were the most common, prevalent, generally accepted, or even 
most prominent values in the United States. Fortunately the matter is 
not crucial. A demonstration of the ability of analytical techniques to 
evaluate policy alternatives does not depend on the precise nature of 
the values chosen, though the values chosen can influence the conclusions 
reached. The reader, moreover, can substitute other premises and relate 
the findings of the study to them. The nature of the goals selected and 
some of the reasons for their selection are noted below.
Maximum economic welfare as a goal 
in gas field sales regulation
One public policy goal chosen in this study was the goal of 
maximum economic welfare. Economic welfare was measured by the quantity 
of economic value produced, value being conceived in private want satis­
faction terms defined by voluntary choice of individuals in a market 
economy. In a verifiable sense, economic welfare maximization was 
assumed to be equivalent to regulation which would yield the most effi­
cient organization of the natural gas industry. Efficiency was defined 
as the ratio of value output to ,the input of scarce resources. The 
goal of welfare maximization was judged fulfilled when no adjustment 
could be made in field sales regulation which would increase economic 
value.
Satisfaction of the goal of economic welfare maximization should 
not be interpreted as a maximization at the same time of aggregate per­
sonal satisfactions. Verification of the attainment of this latter goal 
requires that individual personal satisfactions be measured and added 
algebraically to determine which organization and distribution of pro­
duction would yield the highest total satisfactions. Hence income 
distribution would play a part in maximizing personal satisfactions but 
would be ignored in economic welfare maximization determination. Since 
interpersonal utility comparisons cannot be verified, alterations in 
aggregate personal satisfactions cannot be demonstrated. No guarantee
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that a change bringing mixed gains and losses to a group of individuals
would either increase or decrease total group satisfactions is therefore
possible. The gains of the gainers might or might not offset the losses
of the losers. This absence of measurability therefore renders the
22result for the group indeterminate. For this reason, regulation to
increase aggregate economic welfare has as its determinable limit the
position at which to increase the satisfactions of one individual others
must suffer a loss. If this condition is not fulfilled, appropriate
economic adjustments can increase aggregate economic welfare. It is
just this sort of adjustment which comes under the category of promotion
of efficiency, a proximate goal leading necessarily to potential increases
23in economic welfare, though the question of compensation remains.
A public policy of maximizing efficiency of production and con­
sumption in an industry would approximate laissez faire if that industry
22The possibility of compensation is sometimes raised at this 
point. The reasoning is that if the gainers gain more than the losers 
lose, the gainers could bribe the losers to agree to a change. While 
this approach serves to clarify some issues in public policy, it does 
not solve the problems inherent in making pragmatic choices involving 
interpersonal utility comparisons. If compensation is paid, then the 
nominal losers would no longer be losers and would voluntarily agree to 
the contemplated change. If compensation was not paid, then the volun­
tarism postulate would be violated. Redistribution would again rest on 
value judgments and no unambiguous evaluation of it could progress 
beyond its mere notation. The notion of potential compensation simply 
pushes the unknown back one step but leaves it unknown still. Since 
voluntary choice between actual alternatives is the only measure of the 
effects of a given change on individual welfare, the amount of potential 
gains compared to the amount of potential losses cannot be established. 
Therefore compensation which is not actually chosen cannot provide a 
criterion for comparing the social welfare associated with two 
alternatives.
23The circumscribed nature of this study must be kept in mind.
When a wider horizon than regulation of the natural gas industry is 
viewed, for example, such factors as administrative cost of regulation, 
noneconomic variables and motives, and external effects in other indus­
tries must be considered. While these ceteris paribus assumptions are 
sometimes maddeningly limiting, they are necessary for consistency and 
can be widened at the reader's discretion. Later sections of this 
study make reference to certain of these external factors.
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were so organized and so adjusted to the total economy as to fulfill the
24
conditions of pure competition as they are generally defined. No 
adjustments in resource allocation decisions could result in increases 
in economic welfare though changes in the distribution of income might 
increase aggregate personal satisfactions. Of course this limiting case 
of perfect resource adjustment does not occur in the world of experience 
faced by policy makers. Similarly, however, regulation is not costless 
in either economic or noneconomic terms. Hence the reality of policy 
formulation is oriented to the presence or absence of gross discrepancies 
between the performance of an industry and the limiting case of maximum 
welfare. The absence of perfect resource allocation does not automat­
ically require adjusting government regulation, but it is necessary before 
government regulation can be tenable in pursuing the goal of maximum 
economic welfare. Economic welfare as a goal must be considered along 
with other elements of public policy. These other policy goals are 
described in the paragraphs below.
Appropriate income distribution as a 
goal in gas field sales regulation
One goal which has motivated regulation of the price of gas sold 
by independent producers in the field has been the desire to alter the 
distribution of income resulting from the unregulated operation of the 
industry. In its essence this goal is not subject to examination in ■ ■
terms of its impact on aggregate personal satisfactions. Yet, public 
policy cannot avoid the issue of income redistribution because of its 
uncertain impact on aggregate personal satisfactions. Government action 
or inaction in field sales regulation necessarily has income distribu­
tion effects. The redistribution of income discussed in this study
concerns the producing and consuming sectors of the industry, and does
25
not include alteration of personal income distribution. No specific
24The qualification "so adjusted to the total economy" is re­
quired because the presence of pure competition in one segment of a non- 
purely competitive economy could result in less welfare than certain 
"balancing" impurities would bring.
25
Only government policies acting through industry relations
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study was limited to evaluating various forms of regulation solely on 
the basis of whether or not the regulation would be effective in achiev­
ing the objective of regulatory agency.
The national interest as a goal in 
gas field sales regulation
Government regulation in the best interests of the nation as an 
entity does not fit into the individualistic welfare maximization pattern 
but it has been accepted as a goal of public policy. The national 
interest referred to here is defined as the conglomerate of values which 
are considered important on grounds other than current, private want 
satisfactions measured by market transactions. In other terms, concern 
with the national interest implies adjustment of the industry to take 
its external economic effects into account. The example of a necessary 
adjustment used most frequently in this study is the alteration in the 
use rate of natural gas. Satisfaction of the national interest in the 
gas industry is therefore presumed to include an alteration in the other­
wise existing use rate of natural gas. The alternative regulatory 
methods are tested on their ability to bring this alteration about. The 
direction and magnitude of the alterations desired are not specified in 
this study in the interest of establishing the general applicability of 
any results obtained.
The recognition of three distinct goals in government policy 
toward the natural gas industry points up potential conflicts in regu­
latory policy. Chapter VI deals with these goals at some length. It 
also considers the possibility of a resolution of those conflicts in the 
form of a coordinated social welfare approach. An outline of the plan 
of the study places these goals and their role in the evaluation of the 
alternative regulatory methods in more meaningful perspective.
themselves are considered in this context. Tax policy or expenditure 
policy of government, where redistribution of income also is envisioned, 
is ignored here.
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The Plan of the Study
The data presented in this study were selected on the basis of 
their contribution to the purposes outlined above. Within this general 
framework several aspects of the gas industry and its regulation are 
examined. Information on the goals selected, and descriptions of the 
regulatory methods examined, is required before any analytical conclu­
sions can be drawn. Since a subsidiary but important part of this 
study concerns policy formation in the natural gas industry, the basic 
information necessary for an understanding of the technology and insti­
tutional organization of the industry is also necessary to the purposes 
of the study. The legal heritage under which the regulation of the 
natural gas industry has developed is unfamiliar to many economists.
Since legal factors play an important part in field sales regulation 
some explanatory material is included to make some of the arguments more 
meaningful to the reader. The contents of the individual chapters are 
indicated below.
Chapter II deals with government regulation of the production of 
petroleum. Production is defined as the physical process of removing 
the hydrocarbon from the reservoir. Information on the physical and 
technical aspects of the discovery, development, and production of petro­
leum is found in Chapter II. The development of regulation on the 
physical level is also traced. An understanding of this regulation is 
important to this study because state regulation provided a reservoir 
of experience in the social control of petroleum production which has 
influenced the federal regulation of the sale of gas.
Regulation on three levels of the natural gas industry is con­
sidered in Chapter III. Regulation of the distribution of-natural gas 
by the states and localities was the first exercise of social control 
over the industry. Federal supervision of the interstate transmission 
of natural gas developed when the states and localities found that 
extension of control beyond the state boundaries was required for pro­
tection of consumers. Jurisdiction over interstate transmission gave 
the federal regulatory authorities the task of valuing gas produced by
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the interstate transporters to their own account. The first regulation
of field price was initiated in this way.
Gas is typically transferred from the independent producer to
the interstate transmission company under long term contracts. In the
absence of government control, the terms of these sales contracts depend 
on the field market conditions at the time of their negotiation. Chapter 
IV describes these markets both geographically and economically. It 
also analyzes the effect of market conditions on the sale of natural gas 
by independent producers.
FPC jurisdiction over the independent producers of natural gas 
was based on the same legislation which brought the interstate trans­
porters of natural gas under federal supervision^ This jurisdiction was 
not settled, however, until 195 »^ some sixteen years after passage of 
the Natural Gas Act. Important economic and legal developments leading 
to field price jurisdiction by the FPC are found in Chapter V below.
The scope of FPC jurisdiction at the end of 1962 is also explored.
A further discussion of goals of regulation selected for this 
study is presented in Chapter VI. The later portion of this chapter 
considers possibilities for joint satisfaction of partially conflicting 
goals.
The public-utility approach to the regulation of the sales of 
gas in the field by independent producers is explored in Chapter VII.
In this chapter the experience of the FPC with the only full scale 
independent producer rate case which used the public-utility method is 
recounted. Some conclusions as to regulatory results are drawn from 
the experience in this case. Regulation utilizing a generalized public- 
utility approach for its model is tested in this chapter for consistency 
with the goals of regulation as posited in Chapter VI.
The area-price method of determining the field price of natural 
gas produced by independent producers is subjected to the same sort of 
examination. In Chapter VIII the operation of the area-price method is 
described and the available experience with it is reported. Most of the 
chapter is devoted to an analysis of goal satisfying possibilities under
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the area-price method. For this purpose the writer has adopted several 
assumptions about the area-price method as it might be put in practice.
Conclusions resulting from this study of regulatory policy 
formation are presented in Chapter IX, along with some suggestions for 
further investigation. In this chapter the operational significance of 
the two alternative positive methods of regulation is also explored.
CHAPTER II
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE PRODUCTION OF PETROLEUM
Regulation of petroleum production refers to the control, usually 
exercised by the states, over the physical processes of petroleum pro­
duction.^ Production in this sense is distinguished from the sale of the 
gas. The sale for resale of natural gas in interstate commerce is under 
the jurisdiction of the federal government. This regulation is discussed 
in later chapters.
The regulation of the production of all forms of petroleum is 
considered here although the study itself centers on the regulation of 
the natural gas industry and especially on the field sales for resale of 
natural gas in interstate commerce. The close relation among all the 
hydrocarbons at the production level requires a joint treatment of them. 
Furthermore, the legal and institutional framework of regulation of 
petroleum production has developed as a relatively undifferentiated whole.
State control of petroleum production is extensive and intensive. 
Many state regulatory bodies have the power under existing law to limit 
the quantity of petroleum to be produced during any given period. Drill­
ing techniques, well equipment requirements, production methods, product 
ratios, water disposal, minimum price standards, and the allocation of
production quotas among various resource owners are among the other powers
2
exercised by some or all of the states. The impact of this wide-ranging
T^he term "petroleum" in this study will cover the undifferenti­
ated related substances oil, natural gas, condensate, and natural gas 
liquids. When differentiation is required it will be clear from the 
context.
2References to these regulatory devices are found in the text 
below. Minimum price requirements are a form of control over natural gas 
production, not over commercial sales. The states using the minimum
20
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regulation is transmitted all through the petroleum industry. Any 
examination of federal regulation of the movement of petroleum to the 
ultimate consumer must consider the effect of state regulation.
This chapter offers some tentative generalizations about the 
regulatory process in state control of petroleum production. The 
presentation is obviously incomplete because a thorough examination of 
all production regulation would require many volumes. Therefore, the 
selection of material has been guided by an attempt to include only the 
most important and the most pervasive forms of regulation. A subsidiary 
selection criterion was the desire to show the evolution of regulation 
over time.
The advocates of government regulation in this industry have 
rejected laissez faire and argued for particular aspects of social con­
trol on many grounds. Most of the argument for regulation can be 
summarized in two contentions, first that regulation is necessary to 
protect correlative rights and second that it is needed to conserve a 
wasting resource. The administrative devices used to protect correla­
tive rights and to conserve gas are important to the development of 
regulation. Similarly, the evolution of regulation was affected by the 
legal issues raised and by the ensuing judicial review of the social 
control exerted. For these reasons in sections three and four consid­
erable attention is paid to the legal and institutional elements 
surrounding regulation. First, however, the nature of the industry 
must be discussed.
Characteristics of the Industry Leading to Regulation 
of Petroleum Production
State regulation of the petroleum production industry has arisen 
because of public rejection of the results of laissez faire. Three 
somewhat interrelated but distinguishable factors have initiated most of 
the regulation. These are the private ownership of subsurface mineral 
rights under the law of capture, the income distribution effects of
price device require that a minimum price be paid as a precondition to 
production;
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industry technology, and the conservation of petroleum. Each of these 
elements is discussed below. Certain characteristics which are viewed 
as leading to regulation are examined. Then the premise of profit 
maximizing behavior under laissez faire is utilized to artificially 
create the conditions under which regulation might have developed. In­
ferred values which might explain the growth of regulation are then noted. 
Special attention is paid to the necessary conditions of industry organi­
zation which would promote economic welfare and distributional equity.
Private Ownership and the Law of Capture
Under common law doctrine, which has been upheld in the courts 
of the United States, the ownership of the surface of the land extends 
downward to the center of the earth. Ownership of the rights to land and 
that positioned on it or under its surface makes property rights clear 
unless property of value can be separated from the real estate without
Lf.
the owner's consent. In some instances control of the land does not 
automatically secure the control of significant elements upon or under 
it. The law of capture was developed to meet this circumstance.
3
Conservation in economic terms is the optimum use rate of an 
economic substance over time. The problem of optimal use rates is 
complex and not subject to simple solution. The uncertainties of the 
problem are such that its solution is beyond any but formal resolution.
The broader implications of the conservation problem in the natural gas 
industry are discussed in Chapter VI of this study. A general discussion 
of resource use and a seminal treatment of the economic meaning of 
conservation can be found in Erich W. Zimmermann, World Resources and 
Industries (rev. ed.; New York: Harper <S Brothers, 1951)*
A recent treatment of conservation in the petroleum production 
industry is James W. McKie and Stephen L. McDonald, "Petroleum 
Conservation in Theory and Practice," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
LXXVI (February, 1962), p. 98. This article, published after the 
formulation of this material, is an analysis of conservation regulation 
in terms of economic efficiency.
4The property rights to subsurface minerals can, of course, be 
divorced from the ownership of the surface of the land. The question 
at issue is whether the minerals themselves can be removed without the 
owner's knowledge through operations which do not directly impinge on 
either the surface of the property or the subsurface regions.
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The law of capture, another common law doctrine, referred to wild 
animals that in their natural wanderings moved from one property to 
another. Disputes over ownership were settled by ruling that a migrating 
resource belonged to whomever subdued it to control and took it to his 
own use. The owner of the land, however, was granted exclusive right of 
capture upon his property. Wild animals were, therefore, owned only in 
a presumptive sense. Similar reasoning was called upon in making deci­
sions as to water rights. The ownership of petroleum reserves and 
drilling rights in the United States has developed from the principles 
of private subsurface ownership and the law of capture.^
The pools in which petroleum is found vary in size and configu­
ration, but except in rare instances do not conform to ownership patterns 
on the surface of the ground. It is likely, then, that any single pool 
will underlay land whose ownership rests in several different hands.
All owners of a portion of a reservoir have the right to capture petro­
leum from it. Further, petroleum does not stay in place but is a 
migratory product which moves toward areas of less pressure. Production 
from one hole reduces pressure at that point and causes a migration of 
petroleum toward the well bole. Therefore, there is no necessary corre­
lation between the amount of surface property owned above some pool and 
the amount of petroleum which can be produced. Though there are vari­
ations depending on reservoir structure and type of petroleum, the area
T^wo possible interpretations of the ownership doctrines have 
been utilized in the United States in determining rights to petroleum.
The first is that the rule be modified to one whereby no one owns the 
migratory mineral until it is reduced to capture, but that the owner 
of the land surface does own the exclusive right to attempt the capture. 
This is called the qualified ownership doctrine and was originated with 
Ohio Co. V. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900). The doctrine of absolute 
ownership held that the petroleum underlying land belonged to the owner 
of the land, but that he lost title when the minerals migrated to some 
other location. Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil and Gas Co., 25^ S.W. 
290 (Tex. Sup. Ctl 1923) upheld this doctrine. For a further discus­
sion of this issue see Wilmer D. Masterson, Jr., "A Survey of Basic Oil 
and Gas Law," Fourth Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 
(Dallas, Texas: Southwestern Legal Foundation, 1953)» pp. 220-22. For
a discussion of the rule of capture with cited cases and legal decisions 
see: W. L. Summers, The Law of Oil and Gas (Kansas City: The Vernon
Law Book Company, 1954), I, pars. 62, 63, pp. 15^ -91.
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drained by one well can be very large if enough time is allowed. Private 
ownership and the law of capture, along with the migratory nature of 
petroleum, have made drainage from one property to another a major factor 
in production decisions under laissez faire conditions.
Production decisions contrasted
The effect of drainage under laissez faire was to force individual 
profit maximizing firms to choose wasteful production alternatives.^ 
Conflicts between ownership interests in the petroleum production indus­
try were also generated. The development and operation of an already 
discovered hypothetical reservoir as a unit (Case A) is contrasted with 
the operation of the same pool under divided ownership (Case B) to isolate 
the effect of potential drainage as a decision variable.
The efficient development and operation of an oil pool as a unit 
by profit maximizing Firm A would require certain information about 
reservoir structure and drive which could only be acquired by drilling.
A few widely spaced wells would provide the physical information needed 
to make subsequent decisions on economic grounds. Using information 
derived from drilling, projections of physical production over time would 
be made for various combinations of well spacing and production periods. 
Estimates of prices at various future periods would then be applied to 
the different streams of physical production to yield a series of possible 
gross income streams depending on physical production and price projec­
tions. Similarly, the costs of wells depending on numbers and the costs 
of production associated with changes in production period and adjusted 
for expected cost variations would be projected for the possible streams 
of physical production. This would produce an analogous family of cost
g
of production estimates also over time. The series of streams of gross
^"Waste" in this context is defined as the absence of maximum 
economic welfare and therefore as inefficient resource use.
7
Further discussion of the production rate and well pattern 
sensitive nature of ultimate recovery ratios follows below.
g
Costs of wells are variable before they have been expended and 
therefore must be considered to arrive at maximizing decisions. After
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incomes are discounted to present values, as are the series of streams 
of costs of production. The present values of the streams of gross in­
come and streams of costs of production are then compared to determine 
the combination yielding the highest present net income. Using this 
procedure the firm could calculate the profit maximizing number of wells 
to be drilled and optimum rate of production. If the net return calcu­
lated were insufficient to attract Firm A, given its alternatives, it 
might decide not to develop the field. Of course it would produce its 
exploratory wells so long as they were covering variable costs.
Profit maximizing behavior for Firm B differs significantly from 
that described above. Ultimate recovery for the reservoir as a whole is 
irrelevant to Firm B which is paid only for the oil reaching the surface 
through its wells. Recovery by one firm can either be higher or lower 
than that justified by the proportion of the petroleum which originally 
rested under the surface controlled by that firm. Potential drainage, 
then, is a highly important factor in determining how much petroleum 
Firm B subdues to ownership. Drainage is not a consideration in a reser­
voir operated as a unit. Profit maximizing calculations by Firm B would 
thus involve somewhat different factors than such calculations by Firm A. 
Hence production decisions in the case of multiple ownership would only 
coincidentally be the same as those under one owner control. For 
example, so long as the increase in production from an additional well 
was greater than the increase in reservoir ultimate recovery accruing to 
Firm B in the absence of that well, physical production of Firm B would 
increase with the drilling of more wells and with faster production.
Net income from that additional production would depend on prices, costs 
of drilling the well, and the discount rate to be applied to streams of 
future income. Firm A, on the other hand, would have to consider total 
reservoir ultimate recovery, not just that portion reaching the surface 
through given wells. Optimizing techniques could be used to determine 
the profit maximizing number of wells to drill in both Case A and Case B.
the wells are drilled their costs are sunk, and hence ignored in deter­
mining production rates. The firm must seek to maximize its net income 
given the existing conditions, and therefore historical costs will not 
change its production decisions.
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The best production rate could be found in the same way. Since the 
number of wells and the optimum production fate in Case B would almost 
certainly differ from that in welfare maximizing Case A, potential 
drainage could be said to force individual profit maximizing firms to 
choose wasteful production alternatives.
The description above of the difference in the development and 
operation of a reservoir under single rather than multiple ownership 
illustrates the effect on petroleum production of private ownership of 
subsurface mineral rights along with the law of capture. In the absence 
of regulation, multiple ownership forces the drilling of extra wells to 
produce less total petroleum faster as compared to unit development and
Q
operation. The multiple owners as a group are left worse off than they 
would have been had they developed and operated the reservoir as a unit. 
Since all of the multiple owners could have been made better off while 
none were made worse off, the conclusion generally drawn is that unre­
stricted multiple operation of a petroleum reservoir, the modal condition 
under laissez faire, would reduce economic welfare as compared to unit 
operation.
Voluntary agreement to limit the number of wells drilled or 
voluntary unitizing of properties faces sizable difficulties. The greater 
the proportion of property under restricted production in a pool, the 
greater the incentive to one producer to violate that restriction. Simi­
larly, the greater the number of persons pooling their properties for 
operation, the greater the incentive for one producer to operate inde­
pendently. In the presence of these facts, welfare maximizing operation 
of a fragmented reservoir realistically required government or other 
coercion.
9lhe average producing well in the United States in I960 had an 
oil reserve of about 53»000 barrels and produced 12 barrels per day. In 
Venezuela, under different ownership patterns, the average well had 1.7 
million barrels reserve and produced 2?1 barrels per day. The average 
well in the Middle East had a reserve of 136.4 million barrels and pro­
duced 5,000 barrels per day. There were only 1,194 wells in the entire 
Middle East at the end of I960 as compared to almost 600,000 wells in 
the United States. These figures for I960 were computed from data in 
"World Trends," World Oil, CLIII (August I5, 1961), pp. 72-73, 76. Some 
of the difference between the producing areas can be explained by differ­
ences in physical production conditions.
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Conflicts of interest
The theoretical analysis above has been -borne out historically 
and has created conflicts among the various property holders. The con­
flicts have been of two primary types. They were first, conflicts between
different property interests and second, conflicts between the owner of
!
the royalty interest and the owner of production rights. Regulation 
which came about as a result of conflicts between owners of production 
interests was of a different type than regulation which was designed to 
increase production efficiency. Welfare maximizing regulation rested on 
the mutual benefits of all parties concerned. Regulation adjusting con­
flicts, however, altered the distribution of income from what it would 
have been in the absence of such regulation. The adjustment of conflict­
ing claims on a reasonable basis sometimes coincided with production 
efficiency, but frequently was opposed to it. No matter how commingled 
in regulatory practice, the problem of economic welfare was distinct 
conceptually from the problem of adjusting conflicting interests in the 
petroleum production industry. Technological factors in the industry 
created conditions wherein regulation was needed if maximum production 
efficiency was to be obtained.
Technological Factors Leading to Production Regulation
The high proportion of fixed costs to total costs and the uncer­
tainty of results from exploration reduce the short run reliance of 
output on price in the petroleum production industry. Price instability 
and a price level intermittently below long run cost of production follow 
from that separation. In the absence of the dampening influence of pro­
duction regulation, the discovery and development of potential petroleum 
production has exhibited great instability. Table E in the Appendix to 
this work depicts the fluctuations in physical discovery and in price 
over time. The discovery of the great fields such as East Texas has 
brought discontinuous jumps in the amount of petroleum offered for sale 
and has resulted in large price fluctuations where quantities of petro­
leum produced were not limited by government action.
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Prices below long run total costs of production have resulted 
from the nature of exploration incentives and from the production 
functions for petroleum under laissez faire. Under laissez faire the 
possibility of a "bonanza" field caused the individual operator to 
continue exploration expenditures in the face of industry wide proba­
bilities of less than normal return. For the industry as a whole, then, 
there were more resources used for exploration than would have been 
used had the individual operator calculated his exploration expenditures 
on the basis of industry data, or had exploration been centralized. The 
El Dorado fixation and easy entry into production prevented the industry 
from adjusting exploration to the rate of probable discoveries which 
could have been sustained by the demand for petroleum.
The typical petroleum production function causes production of 
petroleum even at prices below the total cost of production. The major 
costs in the production of petroleum are fixed because once a petroleum 
pool is discovered and the wells drilled, major costs of producing the 
petroleum have already been sunk. The only variable costs of production 
are pumping (when necessary), transportation, and the relatively minor 
expenses of well upkeep, reworking, and maintenance. After the invest­
ment has been made, it will pay the producer to continue producing a well 
so long as the receipts from petroleum sales cover these variable costs. 
The private entrepreneur would take the future value of the petroleum in 
place into account only to the extent that he could capitalize it.
Because of co-tenancy in the pool and the right of capture, however, the 
alternative of waiting is seldom attractive. The decision to produce 
or to abandon is therefore made in the light of present prices, not 
prospective future prices, given the technological and economic factors 
present in the petroleum industry. As the limiting case, private deci­
sion making could lead to valuing the petroleum at less than the present 
value of its probable future worth and at less than its total cost of 
production.
The technology and economics of petroleum exploration and pro­
duction under laissez faire, following the analysis presented above, 
caused price to be below cost for many producers (excepting those in the
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"bonanza" fields) for long periods of time. This price-cost relationship 
could be interpreted as a subsidy for consumers at the expense of the 
producing industry. This redistribution of income from the producers to 
the consumers was resisted by the producers and their representatives.
The means chosen for redressing the situation was legally enforced pro­
duction control which would stabilize the industry and maintain a cost 
covering price. The major argument the industry used for production 
control was phrased in terms of prevention of waste of physical petroleum.
Conservation
The amount of petroleum in the crust of the earth is unknown but
it is limited in an absolute sense. Natural petroleum, as a substance,
cannot be produced by man. To the extent that a substance has these 
qualities it can be said to be depletable or to have "stock" or "fund"
characteristics. A depletable resource must be allocated over time as
well as among competing uses. In the discussion immediately below the 
outlines of the problem of optimum use rates over time are drawn.
Further discussion is delayed to Chapters VI, VII, and VIII where optimum 
use rates are considered as a goal of the regulation of the field sales 
of natural gas in interstate commerce. The following discussion abstracts 
from the issues of equity, income distribution, and economic welfare 
arising from multiple ownership of pools and from the technical and eco­
nomic organization of the industry.
The determination of an optimum use rate for petroleum is not a 
matter of allocating a known quantity of a substance over time in such 
a way as to maximize the present value of the stream of future benefits.
If it were, private decision making under laissez faire in a perfect 
market could make the allocation decisions satisfactorily. Optimum use 
rate determination requires consideration of economic and noneconomic 
factors, including some external to the industry. Obviously the factors 
chosen and the weight given them is a matter of judgment, influenced by 
the viewpoint and special interests of the evaluator.
The petroleum supply to be allocated is not known, but it is 
affected by investment in petroleum discovery and production and by the
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amount of cost which will be borne by the price of crude petroleum. 
Investment in exploration would bring discoveries which would supplement 
the known supply of reserves in the ground. A higher price for petro­
leum would increase the proportion of the discovered petroleum recovered. 
The actual nature of these functions, however, is unknown, especially 
for the future. Substitutes for natural petroleum would reduce the future 
demand for petroleum, as would other shifts in demand. Suitability, 
availability, and cost of any such substitutes, however, are unknown.
In the face of this vast uncertainty, the decisions made by the private 
market, even in the absence of the special problems from which this dis­
cussion abstracts, would be far from conclusive in terms of welfare 
maximizing use rates over time.
Decisions on factors not amenable to private market consideration 
influence the socially optimum use rate over time of gas. The nation or 
state as an entity has a much longer time horizon than does the indi­
vidual. Therefore the optimum social allocation would probably differ 
from the private market decision even if both the nation and the indi­
vidual determined optimum use rates on the basis of maximizing the 
present value of future r nsumption. The national interest would prob­
ably lie in the direction of a longer use rate over time or, put another 
way, lower present production, because it would value the gas in the 
future at a lower discount due to its longer potential life span. National 
defense factors would also affect petroleum use decisions. Similarly, 
petroleum is a major item in international trade and an important element 
in international political relations. The rate at which petroleum is 
used and the amount produced at any one time has an influence on the pos­
ture of the nation and therefore judgments as to the broader effects of 
various use rates are relevant to policy formation. Finally, economic 
effects external to the petroleum industry would influence public policy 
but would not directly influence the participants in the industry.
Industry Characteristics Leading to Regulation
Characteristics of the petroleum production industry described 
above have distinguished it from industries where the general rule of
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social harmony is accepted by the public. Government regulation of the 
petroleum industry has been the product of public dissatisfaction with 
the operation of the industry under laissez faire. Private decisions 
interfering with accepted public interests have been altered. As Summers 
pointed out in his The Law of Oil and Gas:
Organized society, acting through its agents, the courts and 
legislatures, and moved to act by this same policy of social 
welfare, has’ found it necessary to place some restraint upon 
the acts done upon land, and to that extent the privileges of 
landowners have been limited. . . .  An attempt has been made 
to balance conveniences between the landowner, on one hand, 
and his neighbors as individuals and the community at large, 
on the other hand. . . . This practice has led to the estab­
lishment of the second principle . . . relative to the use of 
land, that every person should so use his land as not to 
unreasonably interfere with his neighbors in the use and 
enjoyment of their lands or to the injury of the community as 
a whole.
Two closely related problems with different emphases have been 
the focus of most regulation of the production of petroleum and natural 
gas. These problems can be summarized under the headings of protection 
of correlative rights and promotion of conservation. The remaining 
sections of this chapter take up these categories of regulation in turn.
Regulation to Protect Correlative Rights
Regulation to protect correlative rights was adopted to maintain 
equity in the relations among owners in a petroleum pool. Such regula­
tion was required because of the property relations under which production 
was carried on. The enforcement of formal rules regulating the mutual 
responsibilities and expectations of producers made it possible for firms 
to adopt profit maximizing adjustments to known conditions. Moreover, 
the reduction of uncertainty brought stability to the production industry. 
The protection of correlative rights was thus mingled with other aims 
and had other results as well. Correlative rights are considered in this 
section under both the common law and the statutory law.
*^^ Summers, I, par. 6l, pp. 147-48.
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Correlative Rights under Common Law
Joint occupancy of a pool of petroleum, under the rule established
in the United States by Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, gave the producer the
dual responsibilities of exercising due caution to protect the reservoir
11and of taking only a due portion of the petroleum. This duty was 
recognized at law, and in judicial approval of legislation codifying this 
duty.^ ^
The common owners of a petroleum pool were responsible for any
damage to the reservoir from negligence, and in gome states, even in the
13absence of negligence. Under common law some restrictions to the rule
of capture which vested ownership with the producer were recognized. The
most important of these was the duty not to waste the resource. While
in one case deliberate waste was allowed as a method to force market
sharing, in most jurisdictions waste constituted an actionable offense
even in the absence of legislation. Those who shared a common pool
have been allowed to recover from the one who allowed the waste to take
place in cases of wilful waste,gross negligence,or, in some juris-
17dictions, common negligence. In the crucial Bandini case it was held
^^177 U.S. 190.
12Summers, I, par. 63, p. 190. "The landowner's correlative 
right-duty relations respecting oil and gas have not been created by
conservation statutes but are the result of judicial decisions on the
basis of peculiar physical and economic facts of these substances."
For a listing of the applicable statutes and further cases not cited 
below, see Summers, I, par. 63, especially pp. 188-91.
13Comanche Duke Oil Co. v. Texas and Pacific Coal and Oil Co.,
298 S.W. 554 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927).
^^ Hague V. Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324; 27 Atl. ?14 (1893).
^^ Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 77 S.W. 368 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1903).
^^ McCoy V. Arkansas Natural Gas Co., I65 So. 632 (La. Sup. Ct.
1936).
^^ Elliff V. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W. 2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1948); 216 S.W. 2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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that legislation seeking to impose reasonable restraints upon owners of
reservoirs to prevent waste and protect correlative rights was consist-
18ent with the United States Constitution.
The common law doctrines arising from the rule of capture were 
not satisfactory in adjusting the interests of producers in a common 
supply of oil and gas. The principle of reciprocity was not sufficiently 
specific to implement the "fair play" spirit of the common law. In 
addition, there were issues which could not be settled by mere reference 
to "fair play." Commenting on this matter, Justice Rutledge, dissent­
ing in Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, wrote:
These difficulties, intensified by the competitive struggle for 
the product and the inadequacy of common-law ideas to control it, 
have forced both the states and the federal government to adopt 
extensive regulatory measures in recent years. This has been 
necessary both to conserve the public interest in this rapidly 
depleting natural resource and to secure fair adjustment of 
private rights in the industry. Rather than being a sacred, 
untouchable enclave of the common law, the field by its very 
nature lends itself especially to governmental intervention for 
such purposes. In this respect it is hardly comparable to situ­
ations comprehending only conventional manufacturers and 
merchants of consumable goods.
Statutory Protection of Correlative Rights
Legislation was enacted in various jurisdictions describing and 
defining correlative rights. Typical measures of this type were quoted 
by Summers in his discussion of the subject. The first statement below 
is found in one of the basic proration orders of the State Corporation 
Commission of Kansas and the second in the New Mexico statute on this 
issue.
Correlative rights shall mean that each owner or producer in a 
common source of supply is privileged to produce therefrom only 
in such manner or amount as not to injure the reservoir to the
1 fiBandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1981). 
"^ Republic Natural Cas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 92 (1948).
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detriment of others or to take an undue proportion of the oil or 
gas obtainable therefrom, or to cause undue drainage between 
developed leases.
Correlative rights means the opportunity afforded, so far as is
practicable to do so, to the owner of each property in a pool to
produce without waste his just and equitable share of the oil or
gas, or both, in the pool, being an amount, so far as can be
practically determined, and so far as can be practically obtained 
without waste, substantially in the proportion that the quantity 
of recoverable oil or gas, or both, under such property bears to 
the total recoverable oil or gas, or both, in the pool, and for 
such purposes to use his just and equitable share of the reservoir
energy.20
One of the most important types of statutory protection of cor­
relative rights was enforced market sharing. Ratable taking (market 
sharing) statutes required that the available market be shared by all 
producers in a field, which prevented drainage by the producer with sole 
access to a market. Such provisions were of most importance to the 
producers of natural gas, who were necessarily restricted to pipeline 
transportation. Ratable taking statutes were of special significance 
in situations where one of the producers controlled the market outlet.
In the absence of coercion to the contrary, these firms could be ' 
expected to utilize their own production exclusively and in this way 
to produce the reserves belonging to others. During the period of the 
development of the Panhandle field, for example, the market for natural 
gas was unable to absorb the total potential production of the field, 
even had the pipelines essential for its transportation been available. 
The pipelines which owned reserves carried their own gas, for which they 
had a market, and at the same time succeeded in draining gas which 
formerly lay under the property of others into the area under their own 
leases. That gas which the pipelines purchased was obtained at a very 
low price because the unconnected producers lacked superior alternatives.
One of the early laws providing for the ratable taking of petro-
21leum products was passed in Oklahoma in 1913• The Texas statute, the
20Summers, I, par. 63, p. 181.
21
52 Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, ##232, 233, PP* 104-105.
(Laws 1913, c. 198, p. 440, ##2, 3)* The provisions of the law were as
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Common Purchaser Act, was passed in 1930 with regard to oil and amended
22to include gas in 1931" Summers described these acts as follows;
Common purchasers are required to buy from all producers of gas 
within reasonable reach of its pipelines without discrimination.
If more gas is offered for sale than is required by the purchaser, 
it must take ratably from all producers, without discrimination as 
to price for gas of the same grade, and in the proportion that the 
production of each producer bears to the production of the field 
or common source of supply. 3^
There appeared to be no question as to the constitutionality of
these acts with regard to common purchasers or common carriers, because
the ends of conservation and equity so obviously demanded such regula-
24
tion. No final adjudication of the issue has occurred, however. In
Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas, a federal court
enjoined the enforcement of the portions of the act applying to private
2 5carriers or purchasers and no appeal was taken. Other cases, includ­
ing Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, dealt with above, have
26indicated that such a law would probably be upheld if properly drawn.
follows: Each owner in the common pool would take his proportionate
share of the gas produced based on the open flow of his well gauged each 
month, but no producer could take more than twenty-five (25) per cent of 
the open flow. Any purchaser must take ratably at terms agreed upon 
between him and the seller, with the Oklahoma Corporation Commission to 
serve as arbitrator in the absence of agreement between the parties. Any 
firm transporting gas from the field is a common purchaser and must take 
all gas offered him for sale, even when his own production is part of 
the total. The purpose of the statute, according to the law, was to pre­
vent any producer from securing an unfair portion of the gas and thereby 
to facilitate the prevention of waste and the promotion of equity.
22Texas Civil Statutes (Vernon, 1948), Art. 6049a, pars. 8-8aa. 
Similar acts in other states can be found: Darts Louisiana General
Statutes Cumulative Annual Supplement, 1937> par. 4785» Compiled Laws of 
Michigan, 1929, c. 223, par. 11635-
23cSummers, IV, par. 752, p. 179»
25,
24Summers, IV, par. 754, p. 182.
Texoma Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 59 F. 
2d 750 (W.D. Tex., 1932).
2^
Robert E. Hardwicke, "Texas, 1938-1948," Conservation of Oil 
and Natural Gas, A Legal History, 1948, ed. Blakely M. Murphy (Chicago: 
American Bar Association, Section of Mineral Law, 1949), p. 4^ 4.
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The regulatory authorities found, however, that the purposes of ratable 
taking legislation were served through the back door by limiting produc­
tion to the point where purchasers had to buy from all sellers tendering 
petroleum in order to meet their needs. The limitation of production was 
administered, in theory, to give the various producers an equitable share
in production. Hence the legal duty to take ratably was secure without
27specific regulation to this end. The limitation of production can best 
be discussed along with the conservation rationale which fathered it.
Regulation to Conserve Fuel Resources
Conservation of petroleum, as it was accepted by the courts, the
public, and the industry, rested on two different rationales. The first
of these was to bring the interests of the individual producers into
harmony with the joint interests of the pool owners so as to approximate
the results to be expected from one-owner operation in a freely function-
28ing market. This goal might have been accomplished through unitization. 
The motive here was an increase in economic welfare, as defined above 
in terras of production efficiency. The second motive for regulation was 
to alter the allocation of petroleum over time. The total impact of 
conservation regulation was to stretch out the time period over which 
petroleum was produced. Conservation regulation as a political fact has 
also influenced the distribution of income among producers and between 
producers and other sectors of the economy. While the three aspects of 
conservation regulation, economic welfare, use rates over time, and the 
distribution of income, can and should be isolated in an analytical sense,
"^^ Summers, IV, pars. 752, 753, pp. 179, 181.
pO
Unitization is the operation of the entire pool as though it 
were one unit, with each producer's income being determined as one frac­
tion of the entire income from the reservoir, calculated on the basis of 
the produced value of the hydrocarbons originally underlying the partic­
ular tracts. The advantage of unitization is that the producers can in 
fact order their decisions on the basis of the total welfare of the 
reservoir without having to be concerned with equity or correlative 
rights as between the separate owners. Many states have established 
statutes to allow, or in some instances, force unitization.
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they have operated jointly, if unintentionally, in the real world of 
conservation regulation. They are considered below as joint products, 
if not goals, of regulation falling in the conservation category.
The early statutes regarding conservation required such duties
29
as plugging abandoned wells, casing wells, etc. These statutes for 
the most part were noncontroversial and did not require adjudication for 
their approval and enforcement. Such codes were rather consistent 
among the various states, and, on Federal land, were enforced by the 
Department of the Interior.The regulation of the rate of produc­
tion, on the other hand, was very important and highly controversial.
Production Rate Control
The rate of production from any particular petroleum horizon 
sometimes affects ultimate recovery of reserves in place. The technical 
explanation presented in a recent book on the subject was cast in these 
terms :
. . . many reservoirs are clearly rate sensitive and there is 
a maximum efficient rate (MER) above which there will be a signifi­
cant reduction in the practical ultimate oil recovery. . . . some 
mechanisms at work in the reservoir, which, in a practical period 
of time, can substantially improve the recovery of the oil in place. 
These mechanisms include (a) partial water drive, (b) gravitational 
segregation, and (c) those effective in reservoirs of heterogeneous 
permeability.
Where initially undersaturated reservoirs are produced under 
partial water drive at voidage rates (gas, oil, and water);'con­
siderably in excess of the natural influx rate, they are produced 
essentially as solution gas-drive reservoirs, modified by a small 
water influx. . . . the loss is due to the increase in the vis­
cosity of the oil and to the decrease in the volume factor of the 
oil at lower pressures, and also to the earlier abandonment of the 
wells which must be produced by artificial lift. Because of the 
higher oil viscosity at the lower pressure, producing water-oil
29
Because of its rather peripheral interest to the central sub­
ject of this study, a detailed presentation of statutory and judicial 
law on conservation is not presented here. Such can be found in Summers, 
I, lA, pars. 71-106; V, 5A, pars. 921-946. (Texts of Statutes).
BO
Summers, I, pars. 71-73, PP- 194-211.
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ratios will be higher, and the economic limit of production rate 
will be reached at lower oil recoveries.
The MER for water-drive reservoirs is that rate above which 
there will be insufficient time for effective (gravitational) 
segregation, and therefore a substantial loss of recoverable oil.
As water invades a reservoir of heterogeneous permeability, 
the displacement is more rapid in the more permeable portions, 
and considerable quantities of oil may be bypassed if the dis­
placement rate is too high. At lower rates there is time for 
water to enter the less permeable portions of the rock and 
recover a larger portion of the oil.3^
This technical explanation of the factors influencing ultimate 
recovery from petroleum reservoirs treated the economic content of MER 
only implicitly. Craft and Hawkins wrote of the "significant reduction 
in the practical ultimate oil recovery." (Emphasis supplied.) The 
significance of the differences in ultimate recovery lies, if anywhere, 
in the cost and value relationships involved. The MER is the rate where 
faster production would lead to a loss in revenue from lowered ultimate 
production sufficient to offset the reduction in costs from shorter 
production periods. The economic content of the concept is apparent. 
Both the expected price of marginal petroleum from the pool in question 
and the costs of stretching out production must be incorporated either 
implicitly or explicitly into calculations determining optimum MER if 
it is to have any economic meaning. One of the most important variables 
affecting these costs is the interest rate or cost of capital. Implica­
tions of the MER for regulation policy will be discussed further in the 
last section of this chapter.
Production at MER would maximize private net return to an 
undivided reservoir ownership. This would not be the obvious best 
policy for the individual producer in a divided, unregulated reservoir. 
In the later case, the interests of an individual producer are weighted 
toward rapid production in order to drain or avoid drainage. The reason 
is that restriction by one producer only allows others to produce a 
greater portion of the reserves without guaranteeing the restricting
31B. C. Craft and M. F. Hawkins, Applied Petroleum Reservoir 
Engineering (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959),
pp. 197-199» (Emphasis in the original.)
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producer the opportunity to benefit from the increased total recovery.
In addition restricting production to the MER in only one portion of a 
water driven pool sometimes has led to less ultimate recovery than 
rapid production everywhere since uneven water influx isolates and seals 
off certain parts of the reservoir from the wells. In the absence of 
unit operation, coercion is therefore required to force all producers to 
act individually to their own collective and several best interest.
Such coercion, through government regulation, is incapable of making 
precise estimates of MER and of formulating regulatory policy which will 
perfectly accomplish its ends. The complex nature of the relationships 
and their dynamic nature preclude such results. Justification for regu­
lation rests on the presumption that it would more closely approximate 
the optimum production level than would operation under laissez faire.
The restriction of production to MER in order to prevent under­
ground waste through the inefficient use of reservoir energy was enforced
by the federal government on national lands and by the states for regions
32under their jurisdiction. California, Kansas, Louisiana, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, and Texas were among the states which passed legislation
designed to conserve reservoir energy to increase the ultimate recovery 
33ratio. Typical of such legislation was that of Oklahoma which defined
underground waste as including;
. . . water encroachment in the oil or gas bearing strata; the use 
of reservoir energy for oil producing purposes by means or methods 
that unreasonably interfere with obtaining from the common source 
of supply the largest ultimate recovery of oil.
. . . the inefficient or wasteful utilization of gas in the
operation of oil wells drilled to and producing from a common
source of supply; the production of gas in such quantities or in 
such a manner as unreasonably to reduce reservoir pressure or 
unreasonably to diminish the quantity of oil or gas that might 
be recovered from a common source of supply; the escape directly 
or indirectly, of gas from oil wells producing from a common 
source of supply into the open air in excess of the amount neces­
sary in the efficient drilling, completion, or operation thereof;
32
Summers, I, pars. 71-73, PP- 19^ -211.
33Summers, I, par. 76, pp. 220-25.
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. . . and the unnecessary depletion or inefficient utilization of 
gas energy contained in a common source of supply.3^
The Oklahoma statute was upheld in Denver Producing and Refining Company 
V. State. The California statute was the first of its kind to reach 
a final court test. In Bandini Petroleum Company v. Superior Court the 
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the conservation statute as an 
exercise of the legitimate power to prevent waste. The wording used, 
the Court held, was neither too vague nor too inconclusive.
Gas Waste Prevention
The conditions under which natural gas is produced create con­
servation problems unique to this product. Natural gas has two basic 
functions, the first being to facilitate the production of oil by lower­
ing viscosity and providing reservoir energy by expansion and the second 
being to provide a source of energy and a source of hydrocarbons for 
chemical processes. Failure to utilize gas efficiently to satisfy these 
functions was termed waste in the course of conservation development.
Conditions which give rise to gas 
waste under laissez faire
Some hydrocarbon traps consist of a gas cap over the oil pool.
If such is the case, the expansion of the gas forces the oil to the 
surface assuring reasonably complete and efficient production through 
wells producing from the oil strata. If the gas cap is removed before 
the oil is produced, then reservoir energy is reduced, viscosity of oil 
is increased (because the oil is no longer saturated with gas), and 
ultimate recovery of petroleum is lessened. Reservoir operation to 
maximize total physical recovery of hydrocarbons uses the gas drive to 
produce the oil and delays production of the gas until the oil is
^ 5^2 Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, pars. 86.2, 86.3.
-^^Denver Producing and Refining Co. v. State, 184 P. 2d 961 
(Okla. Sup. Ct. 1947).
3^284 U.S. 8.
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37substantially recovered. Given recent economic relations, essentially
38the same pattern maximizes both financial return and physical recovery 
Fragmented pool ownership, in the absence of regulation, would not lead 
to maximizing operation. The owners of the gas portion of the pool would 
not wish to delay recovery nor would they wish to allow the gas to 
migrate elsewhere, even to produce the more valuable oil. Hence waste 
of reservoir energy results when individual owners act to maximize their 
own return under laissez faire.
Unitization of the producing structure is one means of resolving 
intrapool conflict of interest to conserve reservoir energy and increase 
recovery ratio. In the absence of compulsory unitization, there is 
difficulty in gaining the necessary approval of all reservoir interests. 
State regulations controlling production from various portions of a 
single reservoir have been approved as an alternative to either laissez 
faire or unitization. These have had the aim, at least, of forcing 
optimal production patterns on the producers.
Prevention of the excessive venting of gas is another area where 
regulations were required in order to encourage producers to act in their 
joint best interests. Reservoirs where oil is saturated with gas pro­
duce both oil and gas as a joint product. Expansion of the gas as it
39goes out of solution forces the oil to the surface. In the absence
of a market for the gas, individual producers under laissez faire market
40their oil and vent or flare the casinghead gas produced. It is not 
economical for the producer to return the gas to the formation because 
while the producer would bear all of the cost, the benefits would be
37Graft and Hawkins, pp. 147-51.
"3 0
The present production of gas would be warranted, considering 
only the profits of the undivided reservoir interests, if the costs of 
waiting (including expected price change) were greater than the value 
of the petroleum sacrificed.
39Craft and Hawkins, pp. 97-114, passim.
40"Casinghead gas" is that gas which is produced with oil as a 
joint product. The name comes from the separation of the liquid and 
gaseous hydrocarbons at the top of the well casing, hence "casinghead."
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shared by all producers in the pool. The regulatory commissions in some 
states were authorized to prevent the dissipation of the gas by requir­
ing that it be used for some "worthwhile" purpose. If no such purpose 
were available, the producers were required either to return the gas to 
the producing formation or to cease production. The rules adopted
recognized the economic limits to gas salvage and therefore allowed
4lventing and flaring within certain permissible gas-oil ratios. By 
increasing future gas sales and maintaining reservoir pressure, such 
regulations forced all producers to do that which was profitable for them 
jointly, but not for any one of them acting alone.
Some conditions in the field market led to direct control. These 
conditions generally exhibited a pattern compounded of joint occupancy 
in the reservoir and limited market outlets. Potential gas production 
at times exceeded the fuel market. If one producer obtained a market 
for his gas, other producers in the same reservoir were willing to accept 
any price which would more than cover variable costs because otherwise 
their gas would be drained without compensation. Hence the producers 
were forced to sell their gas though they would have preferred holding 
it at that price had the option been available. In fields where removal 
of gas liquids was feasible, dry gas prices were depressed even further 
because the stripping operations partially compensated the producers for 
the necessary direct production expenses. The distress level gas prices 
resulting made it economical for carbon black manufacturing concerns, and 
other gas users, to use a production function which minimized capital 
and labor costs but was relatively prodigal in its use of gas. Given 
these conditions, end use control was adopted for two reasons. First, 
the contention was that the present value of the gas was not represented 
by its price. Second, the long run social utility of the gas was judged 
to be higher than the present value of the gas for socially inefficient 
use or dissipation. Under the typical regulation, the nature of which 
is discussed below, the producers were left with the options of finding
41The gas-oil ratio is the ratio between the amount of gas pro­
duced, measured in thousand cubic feet (Mcf) units at standard pressure, 
relative to the amount of oil.
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a suitable, efficient use for the gas, non-production, or returning it 
to the producing formation after it had been stripped of liquids. For 
the most part such regulation was satisfactory to the producers because 
it joined the individual interests of producers into the jointly maxi­
mizing interests of the group.
Regulation to prevent gas waste
Gas waste, as defined above to include venting, flaring, opera­
tion at high gas-oil ratios, unnecessary dissipation of reservoir energy, 
and inefficient or wasteful end use, was prohibited in various states 
by legislative enactment. So called "surface" waste of gas through 
burning, escape, leakage, improper storage, and uncontrolled wells was 
prohibited by statute in most of the producing states. A search of the 
record yielded no significant challenge to the validity of a properly 
drawn statute of this type. The Corzelius v. Railroad Commission case 
dealt with the authority of the Texas Railroad Commission to authorize 
a third party to control a cratering well which was wasting great quanti­
ties of petroleum and creating a public hazard. This case was decided
in favor of the Railroad Commission on grounds of its authority to pro-
A2tect correlative rights and to prevent surface waste.
The flaring or venting of gas produced in conjunction with oil 
or in natural gasoline stripping operations was long considered a waste 
in petroleum production. The basic conservation statutes in many of the 
states prohibited this practice directly or have been held to do so 
through general language. Here too, however, the matter of "waste" did 
not depend on physical results alone, nor even on formal gas-oil ratio 
regulations. In an illustrative case, Texas Railroad Commission v. Shell 
Oil Corporation, the court held: "Whatever dictates of reason, fairness,
and good judgement under all facts would lead one to conclude is a 
wasteful product in production, storage, or transportation of oil and 
gas, must be deemed to have been denounced by the legislature as unlawful
App. 1 9 4 4 )
Corzelius v. Railroad Commission, 182 S.W. 2d 412 (Tex. Civ.
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in statutes prohibiting waste." Following this "rule of reason," the 
Texas Railroad Commission enjoined the Shell company against venting or 
flaring casinghead gas in the Seligson field, even though the gas was 
produced in compliance with the general gas-oil ratio, because contain­
ment was feasible.
End use regulation in the interest of conservation began before
the turn of the century with rules prohibiting the continuous use of gas
44for illumination and requiring efficient combustion devices. But by 
far the most important end use regulations by the states restricted the 
manufacture of carbon black. Carbon black production uses a great deal 
of gas for the quantity of output. For this reason carbon black plants 
are feasible only where fuel prices are quite low. The quantity of gas 
consumed per pound of carbon black produced depends on the type of manu­
facturing process used, the output per Mcf of gas varying over several 
magnitudes among the processes. Further, carbon black manufacture can 
utilize "sour" gas (gas with small amounts of hydrogen sulfide) without 
treatment, while a relatively expensive treatment process is required 
before sour gas is acceptable for most other uses. On the basis of these 
factors, the use of sweet natural gas for carbon black manufacture,
especially with inefficient processes, was attacked as "economic waste."
45The states reacted to these arguments by passing regulatory measures.
43Texas Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Corporation, 206 S.W.
2d 235 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 194?).
44Summers, I, par. 78, pp. 252-53, citing: Burns' Annotated
Indiana Statutes, 1933, ##10-2407, 10-2408, and 10-2409. The constitu­
tionality was upheld in Townsend v. State, 47 N.E. 19 (Sup. Ct. Ind.
1897).
45Some states have prohibited the manufacture of carbon black 
from natural gas (Florida, Georgia, New Mexico, Wyoming); others have 
limited the gas so used to sour gas (Alabama); still others allow it only 
when there is no other market for the gas (Indiana, Mississippi); and 
one state (Arkansas) allows the use of only casinghead gas for carbon 
black manufacture. Some states allow the use of natural gas if approval 
is specifically given (Alaska, Louisiana, Michigan, Oklahoma, Washington) 
and the rest of the producing states (Kansas, Nevada, North Carolina, 
and Texas) set up various specified conditions under which carbon black 
can be produced. Summers, I, par. 79, pp. 254-55*
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The authority of the states to regulate the use of natural gas 
was challenged in the courts. In Henderson v. Thompson, the Supreme 
Court held that such regulation was not arbitrary or unreasonable. It 
also held that such control did not violate the clause guaranteeing the 
sanctity of contracts. End use control of this nature was not repugnant 
to the Constitutions of either Texas or the United States, and concerned 
a matter within the states' jurisdiction as affecting the public inter­
est, according to the Supreme Court.^
Restriction of Production to Reasonable Market Demand
Restriction of production to "reasonable market demand," defined 
below, was advocated on various grounds. In addition to the obvious 
effect on petroleum use rates, it stabilized the petroleum industry and 
altered the distribution of income, both within the industry and between 
economic sectors. Reasonable market demand regulation was different in 
intent from the regulation of production rates along the lines of MER and 
restrictions on the wastage of natural gas. These measures, discussed 
above, were primarily designed to correct conditions within the reservoir 
which led to an inefficient allocation of resources and an inequitable 
distribution of pool income. In contrast to these intraindustry adjust­
ments, reasonable market demand regulation changed some of the basic
decision variables and substituted government determination for market
47decision making in certain important dimensions.
"Reasonable market demand" has been defined by the courts as "the
amount of oil reasonably needed for current consumption, together with a
48reasonable amount for storage and working stocks." From the Interstate
^ Henderson v. Thompson, ]00 U.S. 258 (1937).
47In the discussion that follows the writer treats reasonable 
market demand regulation in general except where specific reference to a 
particular state is made. Emphasis is placed on the effect of reasonable 
market demand on price of petroleum because of the importance of this 
impact in setting the framework in which other decisions are made.
8^Railroad Commission v. Continental Oil Co., 157 S.W. 2d 695,
699 (Tex. Civ. App. 9th. 199-1).
46
Oil Compact Commission Forms for Oil and Gas Conservation Laws comes the 
following definition;
The words "reasonable market demand," as used herein, shall mean 
the demand for oil or gas for reasonable current requirements for 
current consumption and use within and outside the State, together 
with such amounts as are reasonably necessary for building up or 
maintaining reasonable storage reserves of oil or gas or the 
products thereof, or both such oil or gas and products. "
The influence on price of reasonable market demand regulation is discussed 
below to deal with the issue of whether this regulation merely reacts to 
changes in market conditions or whether it has a positive policy making 
role. The conservation rationale for market demand adjustments is then 
explored. This section ends with a survey of the enactment and enforce­
ment of reasonable market demand statutes.
Reasonable market demand as price
fixing
The reduction of supply, ceteris paribus, increases price. Regu­
lation which reduced the available supply of petroleum and had no other 
effect would be presumed to raise the prices to crude producers. MER 
regulation, along with that seeking to reduce gas wastage, etc., was 
directly related to some physical measure though it also had price impli­
cations. Restriction of production to reasonable market demand, however, 
was intended to affect the economic-marketing relationships in the 
petroleum industry. "Price fixing," as the term is used here, covers the 
twin attributes of stabilizing prices to prevent large fluctuations and 
establishing the general price level at which that stabilization occurs.
No implication is intended that price fixing through reasonable market 
demand regulation extends to formal determination of specific prices in 
specific markets.
Regulatory commissions and spokesmen for the petroleum industry 
have often denied or minimized the economic implications of reasonable 
market demand regulation. As evidence for this contention, the absence 
of any specific direct reference to price in the method used to determine
49
Hardwicke, "Texas, 1938-48," p. 468.
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reasonable market demand is submitted.The regulatory agencies have 
stressed that they ignore price and determine reasonable market demand 
from such factors as purchaser nominations, estimates prepared by the 
United States Bureau of Mines, expected imports of foreign crude, and 
other diverse elements such as weather, seasonal factors, stocks on 
hand, etc. With these data available, petroleum production levels can 
be set to minimize waste.
The physical, noneconomic approach to regulation was illustrated 
by Ernest 0. Thompson, as Chairman of the Texas Railroad Commission, in 
a speech delivered to the Interstate Oil Compact Commission; "After all, 
only so much oil can be sold in the market place so what good is accom­
plished by crowding the m a r k e t ? T h e  message intended in his speech 
was that physical consumption levels were predetermined and that it was 
the role of the regulatory agencies to see that this quantity of petro­
leum and no more was produced. Therefore the agencies were engaged solely 
in prevention of physical waste. Thompson's statement, when interpreted 
in economic terms, was that the demand for petroleum was so highly 
inelastic that only so much would be purchased no matter what the price. 
The implication of this statement is that price is purely supply deter­
mined and that the regulatory agencies, by setting supply, fix price, 
certainly not the interpretation Thompson intended.
The regulatory authorities, for the most part, have not taken 
the price influence of their decisions into consideration as an explicit 
variable. Instead the effect of regulation methods has been to accept 
the going price as the price for the demand determination period. The 
Texas Railroad Commission, by far the most important of the regulatory 
agencies, has adjusted the amount supplied to the amount demanded at the
^^Robert E. Hardwicke, "Oil Conservation: Statutes, Administra­
tion, and Court Review," 13 Mississippi Law Journal 386 (1941).
■^ T^he conservation rationale for reasonable market demand regu­
lation is discussed in the next section.
^^Ernest 0. Thompson, "The Oil and Gas Market Demand Law," The 
Interstate Oil Compact Commission Committee Bulletin, II (June, I960),
p. 13.
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going price. Price is not changed or manipulated directly by the 
restriction to reasonable market demand. Instead, changes which would 
have occurred in the absence of regulation are prevented.
A hypothetical diagrammatic presentation of the supply-demand- 
price situation brought on by reasonable market demand control, Figure 1, 
illustrates the above points. The regulatory commission when it meets 
knows the level of production for the month in which it is meeting. It 
also has some knowledge of changes in stocks which indicates the exact­
ness with which the prevailing price level is equating demand for 
petroleum with the amount supplied. Indications of changes in demand 
for the forthcoming month are available. In the diagrams below, let 
be the potential supply of crude (short run supply curve for the 
industry), D be the demand curve for crude petroleum during a given 
month, and HMD the reasonable market demand determined by the regulatory 
agency.
2o
o
0)u•HWCU
HMD
P1
P,
2
Q,0 Q
Quantity of Crude 
Month I
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Figure 1. Supply, demand, and price under reasonable market 
demand regulation.
49
The diagram at the left, Month I, represents the conditions at 
the time the Commission meets to determine RMD for the next month. The 
supply and demand for the industry under laissez faire are indicated by 
schedules and . The equilibrium levels of price and quantity are
and respectively. Actual price is which is established by the
point where industry demand is in equilibrium with the amount of pro­
duction (Q^ ) authorized by the Commission in its previous month's
meeting. Taking month I as the base, assume that the agency expects 
an increase in demand during month II. The diagram at the right 
illustrates the factors faced by the Commission as it makes its RMD 
decision. Under laissez faire, a shift in to would cause to
increase to Q^ , and would rise to P^ . Under reasonable market demand 
regulation, however, the amount of petroleum supplied, RMD^, is so 
adjusted that all produced, Q^ , would be marketed at the prevailing price 
of P^. The Commission need not consider price deliberately in its pro­
ceedings so long as the estimates of expected purchases are predicated 
on price being unchanged.
The fact that price is not considered explicitly, however, has 
led regulatory commissions to refuse to recognize its importance. If 
the contention that price was not regulation-determined could be rele­
gated to the disputations of special interest groups, the matter would 
be of no concern. The question of optimum use rates, however, makes the 
ability of reasonable market demand regulation to affect price important 
as a policy matter. If this control exists and is applied, the regulat­
ing agencies must accept the responsibility for this control rather than 
appealing to market forces as arbiter of production decisions. One test 
of the issue was suggested by E. J. Davis, Jr., Official Representative 
of Oklahoma to the Interstate Oil Compact Commission. He reviewed the 
history of market demand regulation in Oklahoma in a speech in I960.
After discussing the early problems of oil and gas regulation in Oklahoma 
he had the following comments on the subject of immediate concern:
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Since 1915» it has been the duty of the Oklahoma Corporation Com­
mission to limit the production of oil to market demand and 
transportation facilities in order to prevent waste . . .  in the 
early history, there was the contention, which is the contention 
of some today, that this law was intended for the purpose of fix­
ing price, rather than to prevent waste. A reading of the 
opinions of the Corporation Commission . . . discloses a most 
able interpretation of the intent of the law, clearly pointing 
out that this law was passed and its application was for the 
purpose of preventing waste and not to fix price, although price 
might be incidentally affected in some cases. But the ups and 
downs of price during all this period clearly shows that the 
interpretation originally placed by the Corporation Commission 
. . . amply supports the real purpose and object of this con­
servation law.53
A survey of variations in the price of petroleum over time, both 
before and after market demand regulation was instituted, was conducted 
to test Davis* contention. The Oklahoma Legislature in 1933 passed an 
effective statute limiting production to reasonable market demand by 
taking into account the legal problems raised by the Champlin Refining 
case of 1932.^  ^ October 1, 1933, was taken as the breaking point between 
the absence and presence of reasonable market demand regulation in 
Oklahoma in the examination of price variation. Monthly prices of Mid- 
Continent 36-degree gravity crude oil are available from 1913 through 
1960.^  ^ The difference, ignoring sign, of prices from month to month
SBE. J. Davis, Jr., "Early History of Market Demand in Oklahoma," 
The Interstate Oil Compact Commission Committee Bulletin, II (June, I96O),
p. 22.
Champlin Refining Company v. Corporation Commission of Okla­
homa, 286 U.S. 210 (1932). (Hereinafter referred to as Champlin.)
^^Data for 1913-1958 from American Petroleum Institute, Petroleum 
Facts and Figures, Centennial Edition, 1959 (New York: American Petro­
leum Institute, 1959), p. 375* Authorities cited: U. S. Geological
Survey, Platt's Oil Price Handbook and Oilmanac. Data for 1959-1960 from 
American Petroleum Institute, Petroleum Facts and Figures, 1961 Edition 
(New York: American Petroleum Institute, 196I), p. 226. Authority
cited: Platt's Oil Price Handbook and Oilmanac. The Centennial Edition
refers to "Oklahoma-Kansas 36-degree to 36.9-degree gravity crude." The 
1961 Edition refers to "Oklahoma 36-degree to 36.9-degree gravity crude," 
but the same prices held in 1951 and 1958, for which references were 
available from both sources, and therefore the difference in definition 
apparently did not upset the comparability of the series.
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was arranged in a frequency distribution by amount of difference for the 
period from January, 1913, through September, 1933» This distribution 
was compared with a similar distribution of prices from October, 1933, 
through December, 1960.^^
The number of observations in each series was roughly similar,
248 for the pre-reasonable market demand period as against 275 Tor the 
period after. In the first series there were changes from month to 
month 72 times and no changes 176 times or a change 29*0 per cent of the 
months. For the period after October, 1933, however, there were changes 
in prices only 15 times or 5*5 per cent of the months. All but three of 
these latter changes were changes upward, and two of the downward 
changes were in 1958-1959 and totaled only $.10.
Another indication of the difference in fluctuations in prices
before and after the initiation of regulation was the total amount of
change experienced. The pre-reasonable market demand period experienced
a total of $19.12 change or an average change per month of $.077. After
regulation, even including the period of rapid price increase following
World War II, the total change in price was $2.57, or an average change
per month of $.009, approximately one ninth of the average monthly change
57of the earlier period. This test suggested by Davis indicates the 
effectiveness of regulation to reasonable market demand in stabilizing 
the price of crude oil, whatever the intent of regulation. The preven­
tion of petroleum waste was, of course, the major rationale for market- ■ 
oriented regulation.
Conservation rationale for restriction 
to reasonable market demand
Three major arguments have been advanced for the position that 
reasonable market demand regulation prevents physical waste. These are 
that production above reasonable market demand causes petroleum waste on
^^The period of stability during World War II, from December, 
1942, through February, 1946, was ignored to eliminate the effect of 
direct price regulation.
^^Calculated from monthly price data cited in footnote 55» Data 
and calculations shown in Appendix Table F.
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the surface; production beyond reasonable market demand causes "premature 
abandonment" and wasteful practices; and production above reasonable 
market demand brings "inferior" uses for petroleum and consequent sub- 
optimal use rates over time. Assumptions and value judgments relied on 
for the arguments are examined in each case below.
Prevention of surface waste
The first argument for limitation of production to reasonable 
market demand is that under laissez faire the industry would produce more 
petroleum than would be sold, and a portion of the excess amount of 
petroleum supplied would be wasted on the surface because of the physi­
cal characteristics of petroleum. Petroleum is a highly volatile mixture 
of hydrocarbons, some of the most valuable of which escape into the air 
at atmospheric pressure. Storage above ground, then, brings physical 
waste from vaporization. Petroleum is also very inflammable. Any above 
ground storage is subject to a fire hazard which is partially a function 
of the amount of petroleum on hand. Petroleum, being a liquid, is also 
subject to leakage from its containers. Suitable storage space is 
limited and expensive. The argument follows that it is wasteful of 
petroleum to use unsuitable storage such as earthen tanks, and wasteful 
of other resources to build an amount of tank capacity in excess of the 
quantity needed to assure a smooth flow of petroleum products from the 
well to the consumer. The above considerations lead to the conclusion 
that a legitimate conservation objective would be to minimize the amount 
of oil above ground. "The best place to store oil until you need it is 
in God’s reservoir.These arguments are analyzed in the following 
paragraph.
Under only two conditions, assuming profit maximization, would 
petroleum be produced but not utilized. First, if a floor were main­
tained under prices amount demanded would not adjust to amount supplied.
CO
Ernest 0. Thompson, as quoted by Ira Butler, "The Texas Market 
Demand Statute and the Experiences in its Application to Practical Con­
ditions," The Interstate Oil Compact Commission Bulletin, II (December, 
I960), p. 8.
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If prices were flexible, however, presumably there would be a price at 
which the amounts demanded and supplied would reach equilibrium. Price 
flexibility would increase with elimination of market demand regulation. 
Hence no particular surface stock build-up would consistently follow 
unrestricted production except that greater price variability might lead 
to an increase in storage for speculative purposes, just as production- 
consumption adjustments would result in stocks larger than those 
necessary under the stabilizing influence of market demand regulation.
For the second condition, a zero marginal cost of production, including 
the opportunity cost of future production, would lead to increases in 
above ground stocks. If petroleum became in effect a free good,
(possible during the short run in localities with free flow production 
and insufficient transportation or marketing facilities) then production 
would not fall nor amount demanded rise sufficiently to bring equilibrium 
and some petroleum would be produced without a market. Just such a 
combination of circumstances occurred in the East Texas field at the 
time of its discovery and development. Under more normal circumstances, 
however, and in the presence of price flexibility, the only increase in 
surface waste under laissez faire would arise from the marginal quantity 
of waste through leakage, evaporation, fire, or improper storage justi­
fied in the light of the lowered value of the product in relation to the 
cost of waste prevention.
Prevention of reservoir waste
The second rationale for the limitation of production to reason­
able market demand is that wasteful reservoir management practices and
premature abandonment of producing properties resulted from unrestricted
eg
production and lower prices.^ The lower the price, the argument goes, 
the lower the cost of production required of any given well if it is to 
remain profitable to operate. Lower price, it is concluded, forces 
operators to abandon high cost wells. The producing wells will operate 
so long as variable costs are covered, but if price falls below variable
59Continuing the pattern established above, the arguments for 
the position are explained and then evaluated in later paragraphs.
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costs then the production will be lost. The deposits underground which 
feed the marginal wells, once abandoned, will probably never be produced. 
Reactivation requires a large investment which could not be economically 
sustained at prices within prospective ranges.
The added future petroleum supplies created by conservation of 
marginal deposits are expected to contribute to the long run availability 
of petroleum and therefore to stabilize petroleum prices over time. 
Without the crude from the marginal wells the supply of low cost petro­
leum will be exhausted more rapidly. The exhaustion of low cost crude 
will drive prices up in rationing the limited supply among consumers and 
in calling forth other supplies or substitutes for fossil fuel. In 
addition, alternative sources of supply might be more expensive in the 
future than sub-marginal sources in the present. A subsidy for marginal 
producers, it is argued, will save social resources in the longer run.
A stabilized and high price is also expected to prevent resource
waste by encouraging the producers to follow good conservation practices.
The contention is that at low prices the producer cannot afford to take 
precautions to prevent waste, assure highest possible recovery (perhaps 
through secondary recovery projects), and minimize avoidable losses. A 
stable and high price, for these reasons, provides the economic incen­
tive to producers to protect their future supplies of petroleum.
Two elements are present in the reservoir waste argument for
reasonable market demand regulation. The first is that it is a waste to 
abandon sub-marginal deposits and the second is that restriction on pro­
duction is the best means to minimize that waste. There are two causes 
for reservoir waste, abandonments because of price fluctuations and 
abandonments because of the level of price abstracting from fluctuations. 
The stabilization of prices to prevent abandonment because of passing 
fluctuations in price can be justified insofar as resources are saved 
which would unnecessarily be expended for new production upon the revival
60of price. The second matter, the problem of the level of petroleum
^^Estimates of costs of returning a well or reservoir to produc­
tion once abandoned, however, rest on present experience with relatively 
stable or upward trending prices. With prospects of rather stable prices.
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prices, hinges on whether future production costs will be enough greater 
than present production costs (in the absence of regulation) to justify 
present high cost production.
A decision that sub-marginal wells should be retained in produc­
tion to minimize resource use in production does not lead automatically, 
however, to reasonable market demand regulation. In the first place, 
production of marginal deposits could be subsidized without the general 
subsidy of all production through higher price. Secondly, restriction 
of production to raise price is no necessary incentive for better reser­
voir management. The extra price obtained because of restriction applies 
only to that portion of the underground reserve that is produced. No 
incentive is provided for conserving oil unless the amount of oil con­
served is related to the amount that a given producer may produce at the 
subsidized price. Without this relationship, the higher price is simply 
a windfall gain to the producer which does not influence his production 
decisions.
The regulatory policy of most states has recognized the existence 
of this problem. Some have sought to grant special incentives to the 
production of marginal deposits in addition to the general subsidy of a 
higher price. Most states have relieved marginal wells from any produc­
tion restriction. Such policies have not, however, been free of 
uneconomic allocation consequences. Under severe restriction some of 
the free flow marginal wells are allowed to produce more than the much 
more efficient supra-marginal wells. This condition violates generally 
held principles of basic producer equity and produces questionable eco­
nomic results. The marginal well statutes, in the absence of production
chances of ever returning to a well once abandoned are very small, and 
operators therefore cannibalize the wells. Hence, an operator does not 
consider part of his fixed costs as sunk, for he does have some alterna­
tive use for part of the equipment and it has value for him. If, however, 
the expectations were for price variation, rational operations might 
include temporary abandonment without cannibalization which would lead 
to fewer abandonments (since there would be no salvage incentive) and 
less expensive reentry into production. One cannot, therefore, blindly 
extrapolate present experience with marginal wells into an industry 
operating under different expectations and with a different institutional 
structure.
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bonus programs for other beneficial reservoir management practices, also 
have sometimes interfered with the very increase in ultimate recovery 
that they were designed to promote. If, for example, a well were flow­
ing at a high marginal rate, the producer would possibly not invest in 
secondary recovery or reworking expenditures because he would not be 
commensurately rewarded for his increased production potential.
Prevention of "inferior" use
The final rationale used to defend the reasonable market demand 
statutes is that in the absence of regulation, petroleum prices would 
fall and lead to "inferior" uses of petroleum. The terms "inferior" and 
"superior" were defined as the magnitude of consumer surplus in two 
different uses. A superior use was one for which the consumer would pay 
a high premium if faced with an all or none choice, while an inferior 
use was one where the consumer would pay little or no premium if faced 
with such a choice but would instead shift to available alternatives. 
Inferior use would prevent the use of the same petroleum for superior 
uses at some future time. In the more general statement, this argument 
held that the market did not reflect the proper relationship between 
present and future use values, and in this form was discussed above in 
connection with gas production regulation.
Analysis of the inferior use argument led the writer to the con­
clusion that there were really two different situations involved in this 
argument, depending on the time period considered. Given the nature of 
the petroleum production industry, without production restrictions 
price in the short run would fall below the average total cost of produc­
tion measured either in historical or replacement terms. At this low 
price gains from uses found for petroleum would not be worth the cost 
of production of the petroleum as measured by average total cost. Use 
for these ends would be subsidized, both in the private sense of produc­
tion at below full cost and in the social sense of greater consumption 
of resources than that justified by the utility received. Yet, in the 
short run such use was optimal, so long as variable costs were covered 
and replacement costs were ignored. In the long run situation.
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replacement costs could not be ignored. Alternative uses of resources 
might yield more benefit. The judgment that over the long run petroleum 
was undervalued and hence was used for inferior purposes rested on a 
decision that market allocation was inefficient. The individual pro­
ducer lacked the information to make a production decision on rational 
economic grounds because of the uncertainty in the industry and in 
potential substitutes. Moreover, because of the technology and organi­
zation of the industry and its capital markets, whatever decisions were 
made would not be fully reflected in petroleum price and use rates.
Hence an irreplaceable substance was used up more or less rapidly on
grounds independent of any consistent comparison of time oriénted alter-
. . 6lnative uses.
Enactment and enforcement of reasonable 
market demand regulation
The limitation of production to reasonable market demand or pre­
vention of economic waste was the central issue in state conservation 
regulation. This issue was more controversial and more divisive in effect 
than all the others, partly, perhaps, because it so obviously removed 
petroleum production from the operation of the free market. The battle 
for restriction of production was fought on two levels, and in two 
phases. First came the effort to establish the principle in the agencies 
and in legislation, and then came court review of the production limita­
tion statutes on equity and constitutional grounds.
The first legislative enactment of "reasonable market demand,"
and indeed the first official use of that term, came in Oklahoma in 
—  —  —  —
See Chapter VI below for a discussion of the problem of use 
rates in connection with regulation of the natural gas industry. This 
decision requires a framework within which welfare maximization may be 
attempted. Historically, the "long view" of higher future utility of 
petroleum has been characteristic of the regulatory commissions and the 
larger corporations with their greater planning horizon as compared with 
the smaller independent. Consequently the regulatory agencies have 
generally followed a policy of restricted production and price above long 
run cost of production in the absence of restriction. The restriction 
itself, however, raises production costs by forcing use of otherwise 
sub-marginal wells and by making production rates less than optimally 
efficient— efficiency defined by economic MER.
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621915» Though the statute was on the books, it was not enforced and
no major applications of it were made from 1915 until 1928-29. The
intervening years were ones of prosperity for the industry and produc-
tion beyond available market was no problem. With,the discovery of
the Seminole and Oklahoma City fields in 1928 and 1929, the provisions
of the law were applied and brought to the first court test. The
statute itself was upheld in the case of C. C. Julian Oil and Royalties 
64Co. V. Capshaw, but final implementation waited on the Champlin case 
where the Act's constitutionality was upheld, and on supplementary 
legislation.^^ Other controversy over the reasonable market demand 
statute followed, but after the Champlin case it was centered on the 
application of the statute rather than on its validity.
The Texas conservation statute prohibited the limitation of pro­
duction to prevent "economic waste" at the time the discovery of the 
East Texas field brought a great upsurge of production.Despite this 
statute, however, the Railroad Commission attempted in 1931 to limit
production in a manner approximating reasonable market demand. The
68courts ruled that the Commission did not have this authority. This 
6?
52 Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, pars. 271-279.
^^Davis, p. 22.
^ C^. C. Julian Oil and Royalties Co. v. Capshaw, 292 P. 841 
(Okla. Sup. Ct. 1930).
^^286 U.S. 210, 230.
^^For a detailed history of the movement to limit production to 
reasonable market demand in Oklahoma see: W. P. Z. German, "Legal 
History of Conservation of Oil and Gas in Oklahoma," Legal History of 
Conservation of Oil and Gas, A Symposium (Chicago: American Bar Asso­
ciation, Section of Mineral Law, 1938), pp. 126-34; Summers, II, pars.
87, 88, pp. 2-23.
^^The amendment removing earlier existing authority to prevent 
"economic waste" was passed by the Forty-First Legislature. Texas Civil 
Statutes (Vernon, 1929), Art. 6014.
X Q
MacMillan v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 5I F. 2d 400 
(W.D. Tex., 1931).
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ruling was contested in the Danziger case^^ but ultimately upheld.
The issue became irrelevant after 1932 when the Texas Legislature passed
an amendment explicitly ordering the Commission to limit production to
71reasonable market demand. The Commission did not immediately succeed
in restricting production because some of its orders were invalid on
equity grounds. It was not until the decision in the Amazon case in
1934 that the Commission was able to be sure of the legality of both its 
72goals and methods. "After the decision in the Amazon case the Commis­
sion held a strong position. It had legal authority to limit production 
to existing market demand; it had demonstrated that limitations upon
production did prevent physical waste; and its orders apportioned allow-
73able production upon a basis satisfactory to the courts."
Though the pattern varied in detail, the legislative and judicial 
authorization to limit production to reasonable market demand in juris­
dictions other than Texas and Oklahoma presented the same picture in 
outline. Reasonable market demand regulation as a means of stabilizing 
the oil industry received general approval, along with other statutes 
that substituted social control for operation of the free market in petro­
leum production. "It is now settled that any provision which bears a 
reasonable relationship either to conservation of these natural resources 
or to the adjustment of correlative rights of the owners thereof or to 
both, is valid.
One limitation to reasonable market demand regulation might be 
mentioned before the discussion moves to gas conservation by minimum
69Danziger Oil and Refining Co. of Texas v. Railroad Commission 
of Texas, 49 S.W. 2d 837, 842 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); 56 S.W. 2d 1075 
(Sup. Ct. Tex. 1933)'
'^ R^ailroad Commission v. MacMillan, 28? U.S. 576 (1932).
^^Texas Civil Statutes (Vernon, 1948), Art. 6029 d.
72Amazon Petroleum Corporation v. Railroad Commission of Texas,
5 F. Supp. 633 (D.C. Tex. 1934).
73Summers, II, par. 96, p. 66.
74Masterson, "A Survey of Basic Oil and Gas Law," p. 220.
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price fixing. Reasonable market demand regulation was generally not 
applied to marginal production. The Texas statute exempting marginal 
wells from proration or other restriction to reasonable market demand 
was passed in 1931• The Kansas law was drafted to apply to pools / 
rather than to individual wells in that it stated that those pools pro­
ducing less than a certain minimum per day on open flow were not to be 
restricted.The Louisiana law had the same effect as that operative 
in Texas, but again the method used was different. The minimum well 
proration exemption was related directly to underground waste; "[Pro- 
ration] shall be made on a reasonable basis, giving, to each field with
small wells of settled production, an amount which will prevent a general
77premature abandonment of the wells in the field." From restrictions 
on physical output as a conservation device we now turn to another method 
to limit gas use, minimum price legislation.
Gas Conservation Through Minimum Price Fixing
Minimum price statutes setting a minimum price at which natural 
gas might be removed from the reservoir have been adopted in various 
jurisdictions. The avowed intent of these statutes has been to conserve 
natural gas. Minimum pricing to regulate natural gas, rather than pro­
duction restriction, as in oil, has been advocated because of the 
differences between the substances. The price influence of production 
restriction can spread more evenly and rapidly from the impact point for 
liquids than for gas because of the flexibility of liquid transportation 
compared to the fixed nature of gas pipeline connections.
Several conservation reasons for minimum price legislation have 
been given. In its most direct effect, the floor under gas price, if it 
were not set so low as to be meaningless, would raise gas prices at the
"^•^Texas Civil Statutes (Vernon, 1948), Art. 6049b.
^^Kansas General Statutes, Annotated, 1949, Edited by Franklin 
Corrick, c. 55, par. 703*
^^Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950, Vol. Ill, Title 30, par.
11, sec. A.
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time of severance above what they would otherwise have been. The higher 
gas price would presumably reduce the attractiveness of gas as compared 
to other fuels, and therefore reduce total gas consumption. Gas waste 
would also be reduced because the higher price of gas to the producer 
would justify greater expenditure to prevent venting or flaring, if there 
were an outlet at the higher price. A minimum price law would substitute 
the judgment of the regulatory body for the price under laissez faire.
The effect of minimum prices presumably would be to stretch out the time 
over which the gas would be produced.
In addition to changing the allocation of gas over time, minimum 
prices for gas were expected to protect correlative rights by assuring 
the producer an equitable price. Ratable taking statutes did not protect 
a producer under some circumstances. For example, if an owner of a por­
tion of a reservoir also controlled the marketing outlet, such as a 
natural gas stripping plant, he could offer to purchase from other pro­
ducers at a below market price. In this way the requirement to offer to 
take ratably would be fulfilled. The other producers would then be 
faced with the alternatives of selling at a low price or being drained 
of reserves. Minimum price regulation was therefore required to maintain 
equity among producers.
Oklahoma experience with minimum 
price legislation
Oklahoma has been the most active jurisdiction in establishing 
minimum wellhead prices for natural gas. The authority for the setting 
of prices was found in Title 52, #233> Oklahoma Statutes Annotated. The 
relevant portion of the paragraph read as follows;
[Any person must take ratably] upon such terms as may be agreed 
upon between said owners and the party taking such, or in case 
they cannot agree at such a price and upon such terms as may be 
fixed^^y the Corporation Commission after notice and hearing;
78
52 Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, par. 233, P* 105«
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Actions of the Corporation Commission based on this statute were
first tested and upheld in Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil and Gas 
79Co. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found state minimum price fixing a 
legitimate conservation device and one necessary for the protection of 
correlative rights. In this same opinion the Court also approved the 
orders issued by the Corporation Commission as sufficiently certain and 
clear for price fixing purposes. Reasonableness and relevancy were the 
major criteria for validity of price fixing orders, the Court held, and 
therefore so long as price control was relevant and neither arbitrary nor 
discriminatory it was not an unwarranted interference with individual 
liberty. The commerce clause of the federal Constitution was not consid­
ered a bar to state regulation of local prices for legitimate local
reasons, even though the product regulated was destined for interstate
, 80 delivery.
The Supreme Court of the United States upheld the price fixing
authority of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission in the case also styled
8lCities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil and Gas Co. The Supreme Court 
specifically considered the question of the potential burden that state 
minimum price legislation might exert on interstate commerce. The 
opinion included the following passage:
It is now well settled that a state may regulate matters of local 
concern over which federal authority has not been exercised, even 
though the regulation has some impact on interstate commerce . . .
The only requirements consistently recognized have been that the 
regulation not discriminate against or place an embargo on inter­
state commerce, that it safeguard an obvious state interest, and 
that the local interest at stake outweigh whatever national 
interest there might be in the prevention of state restrictions.
79Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil and Gas Co., 220 P. 2d 
279 (Sup. Ct. Okla. 1950).
^°Ibid., pp. 279-281.
Rl
Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil and Gas Co., 340 U.S.
179 (1950) and similar case Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 
190 (1930), argued at the same time.
^340 U.S. 179, 186-187.
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Kansas experience with minimum 
price legislation
The natural gas conservation statutes of Kansas did not specifi­
cally grant the Corporation Commission of that state the authority to
QO
establish minimum prices for wellhead sales of natural gas. The gen­
erally written law which provided authority to protect correlative 
rights and conserve natural gas was interpreted as being broadly enough 
conceived to include power to set minimum prices. The leading case on 
this issue was Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Com­
mission, which ruled on the question in these terms;
Our statute gives the Corporation Commission authority to make an 
order fixing a minimum wellhead price for natural gas taken from 
a common source of supply if the evidence before the Commission 
justifies its conclusion that such an order is necessary in order 
to prevent waste and to secure the relative rights of owners of 
real property from which gas is produced from a common source of
supply.8^
Federal-state conflict over gas 
price regulation
The initiation of federal jurisdiction over the field price of 
natural gas under the 195^ Phillips decision raised the question of 
federal-state conflict over gas pricing. The Kansas Supreme Court 
distinguished the jurisdictions of the states and the federal govern­
ment by defining the Kansas minimum pricing law as regulation of physical 
production under which gas could not be removed from the reservoir except 
that the precondition of a minimum price be met. The federal regulation 
under the Natural Gas Act, on the other hand, was regulation not of pro­
duction but of sale for resale, and therefore the regulation was not in
General Statutes of Kansas, Annotated (199-9), ed. Franklin 
Corrick, c. 55» Art. 7, pars. 55-701 - 55-713, PP* 1508-10; and 1959 
Supplement to General Statutes of Kansas, 19^9, ed. Franklin Corrick, 
c. 55, Art. 7, pars. 55-701 - 55-713, pp. 654-56.
8^Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 
222 P. 2d 704, 705 (Sup. Ct. Kan. 1950).
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in conflict since it covered different phases of the industry. The 
issue was resolved in part by the United States Supreme Court opinion in 
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Panoma Corporation:
In these cases Oklahoma has attempted to fix a minimum price to be 
paid for natural gas, after its production and gathering has ended, 
by a company which transports the gas for resale in interstate 
commerce. We held in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 3^7 U.S. 
672, that such a sale and transportation cannot be regulated by a 
State but are subject to the exclusive regulation of the Federal 
Power Commission.
The result of the judicial review of state minimum pricing 
authority has been to leave the states unhampered in regulating gas at 
the wellhead as a precondition for production. Regulation of the sale 
of gas destined for interstate commerce remains the exclusive province 
of the federal government. For the most part, state minimum prices have 
not been established high enough to raise the general level of field 
prices, but have primarily sought the elimination of gross inequities 
and discrimination. The general escalation of field prices has reduced 
the impact of the state minimums and has lessened the possibility of 
state-federal conflict over gas price.
Production Regulation in Retrospect
The regulation of the production of petroleum on the state level, 
in its operation, has benefited the producing industry as a whole. The 
actions taken to achieve the major goals of production regulation, pro­
tection of correlative rights, conservation of fuel resources, and 
prevention of economic waste, generally were beneficial to the industry. 
These activities led to increased economic welfare through greater effi­
ciency in production, to higher prices for the producers in the short run 
because of restrictions on supply, and to changes in the distribution of 
income within the producing sector. Production regulation, for this
®^Cities Service Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 30U P. 
2d 528, 535 (Sup. Ct. Kan. 1957).
^^Natural Gas Pipeline Company v. Panoma Corporation, 3^ 9 U.S.
44, 44-45 (1958).
65
reason, has had the support of the majority of the producing industry, 
though specific regulations were opposed by certain elements of it. This 
regulation has provided a precedent for other regulation which followed 
and, by altering market relations, has created a justification for other, 
compensatory, adjustments.
Regulation of the petroleum industry to protect consumer interests 
has not enjoyed such industry support. The regulation of the sale of gas 
for resale in interstate commerce, the transportation of natural gas 
interstate, and the sale of natural gas in the localities has in general 
been opposed by the industry representatives. This regulation, however, 
has rested on the very industry conditions created by state production 
regulation. It is this basic structure of the industry which has been 
analyzed and described in this chapter. With this necessary background 
we can now turn to Chapter III and a discussion of the regulation of 
distribution, interstate transportation, and integrated production of 
natural gas.
CHAPTER III
REGULATION OF THE DISTRIBUHON, TRANSPORTATION, AND INTEGRATED
PRODUCTION OF NATURAL GAS
Social regulation of the distribution, transportation, and 
integrated production of natural gas was motivated by a desire to pro­
tect ultimate consumers from exploitation, as contrasted to the producer 
oriented regulation of production on the state level. Regulation of 
this type concerned itself primarily with determining appropriate com­
pensation for services rendered for the consumer. In this sense the 
seemingly different aspects of the natural gas industry considered here 
are joined around a common problem. Conflict arose over these deter­
minations because the service charges selected affected the intergroup 
distribution of income. Other aspects of public policy were involved, 
though to a lesser extent.
Regulation of the distribution and transportation segments of 
the gas industry are considered in this chapter. The transportation 
phase of the industry includes the production of natural gas by the 
transporting firm. Each of these aspects of the industry is discussed 
as it relates to the question of regulation of the field sales of gas 
by independent producers for resale. In terms of the central concern 
of this study, several purposes are served by consideration of these 
topics. This examination provides the technical and institutional back­
ground necessary for an understanding of the effect the transportation 
and distribution phases of the natural gas industry have on the regula­
tion of field sales for resale in interstate commerce. The carry over 
of regulation on one level to regulation on others is examined. Regu­
lation at the distribution and transportation levels is further shown to 
be insufficient to achieve the public interest. The extension of
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regulation to the field sales contract rests on this presumption.
Finally, regulation of the integrated producers of natural gas provided 
the experience on which both the regulators and the regulated drew when 
independent producer regulation became an issue. For this reason the 
later portions of this study are brought into sharper focus through 
knowledge of the matters discussed below.
The first topic dealt with below is distribution regulation.
The jurisdictional difficulties involved in regulating city gate prices 
are considered next. The regulation of transportation of natural gas, 
which arose from the inability of the cities and consuming states to 
satisfactorily control prices at the city gate, was initiated by the 
passage of the Natural Gas Act. An analysis of the contents of that Act 
follows a description of the events leading up to its passage. The 
fifth portion of the chapter summarizes the origin of FPC regulatory 
policy and the regulation of the transportation of natural gas under the 
Natural Gas Act. The final section deals with the problems presented by 
the regulation of integrated production.
Regulation of the Distribution of Natural Gas
Distribution regulation has meant the social control of the price 
and service terms under which gas was moved from the manufacturing plant 
or city gate to the consumer for heating, cooking, cooling, lighting, or 
other uses. The freedom of contract for the gas distributor and the con­
sumer has been abrogated by government regulation and replaced by a 
central rate-making and service-defining contract between the gas company 
and the civil authorities. The nature of the gas distribution industry 
was instrumental in leading to the initiation and acceptance of such regu­
lation.
The Nature of the Gas Distribution Industry
Gas distribution as a major industry originated with manufactured 
gas. The manufacturing plants, owned most often by the distributing 
company itself, converted coal or oil into gas through a hydrogenation
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process. The manufactured gas from the central plant was then conducted 
through mains, under low pressure, to the ultimate consumer. The coming 
of natural gas did not materially affect the operation of the gas distri­
bution companies but merely substituted the transporting line at the 
city gate for the earlier manufactured source of the product. Natural 
gas had a higher energy-volume ratio than the manufactured gas but the 
two could be mixed to provide satisfactory peak service. Manufactured 
gas facilities have only gradually been eliminated, and even in I960 
some manufactured gas was produced, primarily to meet peak loads.
A distribution concern does not face a domestic consumer who is 
devoid of alternatives, but the existing competitive market discipline 
from other fuels and other products is relatively weak. There are many 
fuels available which can supply energy but the nature and form of gas 
are such as to make it preferred, if not obligatory, in certain uses. 
Electricity, while an efficient substitute, is considerably more expen­
sive than gas in most areas. Moreover, for most domestic gas consumers, 
use of other fuels would be impossible except after an expensive conver­
sion and replacement of appliances. Significant substitution within 
reasonable price ranges would be limited in the short run if fuel shifts 
rested on the recurrent replacement decisions taken by the consumers as
ite 
2
a whole.^ The other principal alternative of the consumer, in rindustry
competition from insulation, is probably of little importance.
N^o significant studies of the elasticity of demand for gas from 
the distributing utility with reference to residential or commercial 
demand are available. Of course the demand for gas as industrial boiler 
fuel exhibits considerably different characteristics since many firms 
maintain duplicate fuel facilities to take advantage of discrepancies 
between fuel prices even in the short run. Since our concern is with 
distributing utilities rather than with direct sales to industrial 
users, the latter portion of the industry will be ignored in the present 
context. One study with some application at this point is reported in 
J. B. Vermetten and J. Plantinga, "The Elasticity of Substitution of Gas 
with Respect to Other Fuels in the United States," Review of Economics 
and Statistics, XXXV (May, 1953)j PP» 140-4].
2
This second point has become important as a legal as well as 
an economic factor, especially since the Supreme Court decision in the 
DuPont cellophane case. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 
118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953)» United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours
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The economics of the gas distribution industry leads to a break­
down in direct distribution competition. This factor has contributed to 
the acceptance of social control of the industry. Distribution mains 
make up a very large portion of total gas utility physical investment.
In turn, the cost of gas service to a large extent is made up of invest­
ment costs. Unit cost of service, then, falls directly and significantly 
with increased load density. The marginal cost of serving a consumer 
along an existing line is very small compared to the average cost of 
service. Under these circumstances competition, where tried in gas dis- 
tribution, broke down in violent but short lived price wars. For these 
reasons gas distribution is included in the category of industries 
labeled natural monopolies. While the term natural monopoly has been 
used in the literature in both normative and positive contexts, here it 
shall refer to an industry where competition leads to its own destruction 
for technical and economic reasons. Therefore a judgment that an indus­
try suitably defined with reference to accessible consumer alternatives 
is a natural monopoly does not automatically imply the necessity of 
regulation. The absence of competition along with the inability to foster 
such competition might or might not lead to the further judgment that 
regulation was necessary to protect the consumer. This last judgment 
would flow from the value orientation of the evaluator and from the cir­
cumstances of the case.
Development of the Regulation of Gas Distribution
Traditional acceptance in Western thought has been given to the 
proposition that industries falling in the category of natural monopoly 
were subject to the possibility of government regulation. In addition,
& Co.. 351 U.S. 377 (1956). For a thorough discussion of this case see 
George W. Stocking and Willard F. Mueller, "The Cellophane Case and the 
New Competition," reprinted in Heflebower and Stocking, A.E.A. Readings 
in Industrial Organization and Public Policy, Vol. VIII (Homewood, 111.; 
Irwin, 1958), pp. 118-50.
3
C. Woody Thompson and Wendell R. Smith, Public Utility Economics 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1941), pp. 93-95*
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two further contentions were used to support the desirability of regula­
tion of gas distribution firms. The distribution of gas was an essential 
service the restriction of which would cause severe community disloca­
tion, not mere personal inconvenience. Further, a relationship of 
dependence was said to exist between the consumers and the gas distribu­
tor because, on the basis of the firm's holding itself out to serve, 
the consumer adjusted his own affairs to the consumption of gas. For
these reasons the idea of government regulation of gas distribution has
kbeen generally accepted.
The right of government to regulate a monopoly affected with the 
public interest was established independent of the particular matter of 
the regulation of the distribution of gas to consumers. The gas distri­
bution regulation controversy concerned the applicability of accepted 
doctrine to the industry, not the question of government-business 
relations. One of the leading cases on this subject upheld the public 
service nature of gas lighting.^ Since the gas light business was a 
public service it was held to be subject to the police power of the state, 
following the Slaughter-House decision.^ The police power of the state 
could not be granted away, and therefore the state retained at least 
potential control over the gas company.
For as we have seen, the manufacture of gas, and its distribu­
tion for public and private use by means of pipes laid, under 
legislative authority, in the streets and ways of a city, is not
I4.
A study of the development of the philosophy and practice of 
regulation of economic activity was prepared by this writer in earlier 
stages of the work on the regulation of the natural gas industry. Space 
considerations prevented its being included in the present work.
^New Orleans Gas Company v. Louisiana Light Company, II5 U.S.
650 (I885). The major point of contention here regarded the granting of 
a franchise to one company and its withdrawal some fifty years following, 
on expiration, and reletting to another firm. While the ability to grant a 
gaslight franchise was not contested, the authority of the state in' 
removing the franchise was. Hence the necessity for determining the pub­
lic nature of the service performed.
^The Butchers' Benevolent Association of New Orleans v. The 
Crescent City Livestock Landing and Slaughterhouse Company, 16 Wallace 
36 (I872). (Referred to as the Slaughter-House Case)
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an ordinary business in which every one may engage, but is a 
franchise belonging to the government, to be granted, for the 
accomplishment of public objects, to whomsoever, and upon what 
terms it pleases. It is a business of a public nature, and 
meets a public necessity for which the State may make provision.
. . . [The] State, or . . . the municipal government of New 
Orleans acting under authority for that purpose [can] establish 
and enforce regulations which are not inconsistent with the 
essential rights granted by plaintiff's charter, which may be 
necessary for the protection of the public against injury whether 
arising from the want of due care in the conduct of its business, 
or from an improper use of the streets in laying gas pipes, or
from the failure of the grantee to furnish gas of the required
quality and amount.?
The obligation of a gas distributor to render service to all
g
seeking it was upheld by the Supreme Court of Indiana in 1901. Here 
the special grant of eminent domain and license to use the streets and 
alleys for distribution lines was offered as supporting reasoning 
demanding an area saturation policy. The company, operating under 
prices set by ordinance in the city of Indianapolis, stated that it did
not have sufficient gas to extend its service to new customers and to
Q
maintain service to its old customers. The company's pleading was 
rejected and it was ordered to serve all customers desiring connection 
in reasonable proximity to the mains.
The above decisions, and other sources such as the opinion of
11the Justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, placed the business 
of distributing and manufacturing gas in the category of an economic
^115 U.S. 650, 669, 671.
Û
State V. Consumers' Gas Company, 157 Ind. 3^5 (1901).
^Ibid., p. 348.
^^ Ibid., pp. 3^9-350. "There can be no such thing as priority, 
or superiority, of right among those who possess the right in common." 
Thus it was also impossible for the company to set up priorities which 
excluded some potential customers. (Ibid., pp. 333-35^.)
^^Opinion of the Justices, 15O Mass. 592 (1890). The Justices of
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts were asked by the Massachusetts House 
of Representatives if a bill authorizing cities and towns to build and
maintain gas plants was constitutional. The Justices replied that it
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activity which the states and localities could regulate in the interest 
of protecting the consumers from exploitation. By restrictive franchises, 
city ordinance, and legislative statute, public control over this busi­
ness was extended to such factors as price, service conditions, and safety 
obligations. The traditional cost-of-service method was found satis­
factory and approved as a basemark for establishing service rates.
The regulatory formulas and methodology in the industry were 
worked out before the advent of natural gas but change of source did not 
create any basic problems in controlling the distributing firms. The 
changeover removed the source of the distributed commodity from the 
distributing utility and similarly moved it away from the jurisdiction 
of the regulatory agency. While the regulatory agency had not controlled 
the price of the raw materials that went into manufactured gas, these 
materials were purchased in an essentially competitive market, as con­
trasted to gas purchased from a single long distance transmission line. 
Since the cost of gas as it entered the city gate was passed on to the 
consumer, and since this price was monopolistically determined, after the 
change to natural gas regulatory authorities found themselves unable to 
certify that consumers were receiving gas at the lowest cost consistent 
with maintenance of supply. The problem of controlling gas prices at 
the city gate led to the consideration of transmission regulation.
Regulation of City Gate Prices and Jurisdictional
Conflict
The price of gas at the city gate is the sum of two different 
prices, the price of the gas at the wellhead and the cost of gathering,
was, and that moreover though the House did not ask, it was also within 
the powers of the legislature to authorize the cities and towns to levy 
taxes for the establishment of such facilities. The Justices relied on 
numerous cases justifying public ownership of such facilities as fire 
fighting equipment, water works, etc., as being in the public interest 
and therefore capable of being supported by public entities without the 
taxation therefore being a violation of requirements against taking 
private property without compensation, nor against taking private property 
for non-public use. They then held that gas facilities were analogous, 
and therefore the proposed measure within the competence of the Legisla­
ture.
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processing, and transporting the gas from the wellhead to the city gate. 
In the early era of the use of natural gas by cities, approximately up 
to 1926, most gas was used near the point of production. The total 
industry was generally within the geographic limits of the consuming 
state, and until the development of long distance transmission most 
often a single firm produced, transported, and distributed the fuel.
With the development of the large natural gas fields capable of supply­
ing vast quantities of gas, however, and with the coming of economically 
acceptable long distance transportation technology, the production and 
transportation phases of the natural gas industry came more and more to 
be separated from distribution, both geographically and corporately.
Interpretation of Federal and State Jurisdiction
Local regulation of the distribution of natural gas produced in 
other states came face to face with the anomaly that has influenced the 
development of so much of the law of the United States, the division of 
sovereignty between the federal and the state governments. The division 
of jurisdiction is rooted in the Constitution, but the Constitution does 
not make the boundaries between authorities clear. The center of con­
fusion has been the area between the commerce clause and the Tenth 
Amendment. The commerce clause reads: "[The Congress shall have power]
to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
12and with the Indian Tribes." The Tenth Amendment reserved non­
enumerated powers to the states and to the people. "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by 
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.
The first leading opinion on this question was issued in Cooley 
Ih
V. Board of Wardens. The rule from this case was that if the effect of 
12U.S., Constitution, Art. 1, sec. 8.
13U.S., Constitution, Tenth Amendment.
Ih
Cooley V. Board of Wardens, 12 Howard 299 (I851).
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a state act on interstate commerce was merely incidental to the accom­
plishment of some justified end by the state, the act was valid unless 
Congressional action specifically supplanted it. The federal government 
therefore did not have exclusive jurisdiction over interstate commerce. 
In the case of substantive regulation of interstate commerce or regula­
tion that would unduly burden or interfere with interstate commerce, the 
states were powerless whether or not Congress had acted. It later devel­
oped, parenthetically, that Congress had similar rights with reference 
to intrastate commerce. As held in the Shreveport Rate Cases, the 
federal government could regulate intrastate commerce, but only in so 
far as was necessary to remove unjust discriminations against or inter­
ruptions of interstate commerce.Cooley v. Board of Wardens initiated 
a schematic division of authority which was maintained with varying 
boundaries. Three situations were distinguished; intrastate commerce, 
where the federal government had authority only in so far as interstate 
commerce was adversely affected; interstate commerce relating to matters 
of local concern where the local authorities could act up to the time 
the federal government exerted its jurisdiction, so long as regulation 
was not unduly burdensome to interstate commerce; and finally, inter­
state commerce which was national in character and admitted of only 
national control.
A clarification of the Cooley case of direct interest to the
regulation of natural gas resulted from Peik v. Chicago and North-
17Western Railway Company. One issue in question was the power of
-^^Houston, East and West Texas Railway Company v. United States, 
234 U.S. 342, 343 (1914). "While Congress does not possess authority 
to regulate the internal commerce of a state, as such, it does possess 
power to foster and protect interstate commerce, although in taking 
necessary measures so to do it may be necessary to control intrastate 
transactions of interstate carriers." (Referred to as Shreveport Rate 
Cases.)
16Kenneth F. Burgess, "The Twilight Zone Between the Police 
Power and the Commerce Clause," 15 Iowa Law Review l62, I65 (1930).
17Peik V. Chicago and North-Western Railway Company, 94 U.S.
164 (1876).
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Wisconsin to regulate a railway operating in interstate commerce. The 
court held:
The law is confined to state commerce, or such inter-state commerce 
as directly affects the people of Wisconsin. Until Congress acts 
in reference to the relations of this company to inter-state com­
merce, it is certainly within the power of Wisconsin to regulate 
its fares, etc., so far as they are of domestic concern. With the 
people of Wisconsin this company has domestic relations. Inci­
dentally, these may reach beyond the State. But certainly, until 
Congress undertakes to legislate for those who are without the 
State, Wisconsin may provide for those within, even though it may 
indirectly affect those without.
Following the Peik decision, the authority of a state in the absence of
Congressional action seemed clear. But the Peik decision had stood only
ten years when the Wabash case ended the possibility of effective state
19regulation of interstate commerce. The Court defined those areas in 
which the states were competent to act in the absence of federal legis­
lation as excluding the control of rates and conditions of service of an 
interstate carrier, even with reference to service within the state.
Interstate Jurisdiction Over Natural Gas
Attempts of states and localities to exert control over produc­
tion and transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce were
consistently rebuffed in a series of cases culminating in the Supreme 
20Court. Though the Court need have gone no further than a recitation 
of the commerce clause to strike down state and local regulation of this 
sort, many of the decisions also discussed public policy implications 
of state regulations. Some of the decisions took on importance in their 
own light because of the arguments used.
The emphasis on the unity of the nation's economy was one theme 
running through the Court decisions. According to this view, each
18Ibid., p. 178. (Emphasis supplied.)
19Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company v. Illinois,
118 U.S. 557 (1886).
20Only a few of the major decisions are mentioned here.
7 6
state's resources were held to the benefit of the nation. If one state 
were allowed the privilege of regulating the conditions under which its 
resources could enter into interstate commerce then all could, and 
instead of free transfer of resources between states and regions, perni­
cious and divisive trade barriers could be established. Natural gas, 
the Court held, was no different than other products. ' Regulation by 
a number of authorities would burden interstate commerce with varying 
regulations and limitations so restrictive as to destroy many of the 
benefits of such commerce. In the leading case holding state regulation 
of natural gas transportation in interstate commerce unconstitutional, 
the Court stated;
The paramount interest is not local but national, admitting of 
and requiring uniformity of regulation. Such uniformity, even 
though it be the uniformity of governmental nonaction, may be 
highly necessary to preserve equality of opportunity and treat­
ment among the various communities and States concerned. 2^
The interstate nature of gas shipments across state lines
prevented the individual states from levying a tax on the interstate
23portion of the business. Taxation was found to be by nature an 
unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. Direct regulation of rates 
charged by firms in interstate commerce was forbidden the states on the 
same reasoning. An exception was made, however, in cases where a com- , 
munity of interest existed between the distributing companies and the 
transportation company in interstate commerce. In the absence of
21 This question was at issue in; West v. Kansas Natural Gas 
Company, 221 U.S. 229 (1911); and Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 
U.S. 553 (1923). The right of states to make and enforce any of the 
petroleum conservation laws might just as easily be challenged under 
this same interpretation. If resources are held for the benefit of the 
nation, the regulation of their allocation by individual states seems 
contradictory. While parenthetical at this point, this issue might 
predictably arise in the future.
Op
Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Company, 265 U.S. 298, 309- 
310 (1924).
^^United Fuel Gas Company v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277 (1921);
East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commissioner of Ohio, 283 U.S. 465 (1931)'
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presumptive arm's-length negotiation for gas at the city gate, the 
regulators of the local service were allowed to go beyond the face of 
the distributor's contract with the pipeline.
The regulation of the interstate transportation of natural gas 
passed beyond the jurisdiction of the states with these court decisions. 
The powers of the states remained undiminished with reference to purely 
intrastate business, but the effectiveness of such regulation took on 
more and more of the tone of mockery due to the change in the industry 
from manufactured to imported natural gas. The rates charged the local 
distributors were built into the price charged consumers, and the states 
were powerless to influence these rates. Only the federal government 
was competent to act, and it did not choose to exercise its competence.
A "regulatory gap" between producer and consumer was created because of 
a lack of state power and the inaction of the federal government.
Initiation of Federal Regulation of Interstate 
Transportation of Natural Gas
The decision that state and local jurisdiction did not stretch 
to interstate transportation of natural gas left this industry unregu­
lated because of the absence of federal activity in the field. Consumer 
representatives did not press their efforts at closing the regulatory 
gap through federal action until the middle of the 1930 decade. The 
reasons for this relative inactivity might be presumed to include, among 
others, the mood of a time of big business ascendency, general optimism 
and prosperity, the relative stability of household gas prices, the 
discovery of vast supplies of natural gas which kept the field price of 
the fuel relatively constant, the technological development in the trans­
mission industry which lowered absolutely the cost of gas transmission,
and perhaps most importantly, the relative unimportance of natural gas
2 6transported interstate in all but a few important consuming centers.
24Western Distributing Co. v. Public Service Commission of 
Kansas. 285 U.S. 112 (1932).
25See Tables C and G in the Appendix for data supporting these 
conclusions.
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Whatever the cause of the relative quietude among consumers before the 
business depression, it disappeared in the agitation that culminated in 
the passage of the Natural Gas Act of 1938.
Factors Leading to Demands for Federal Regulation
The demand for regulation cannot be explained by a significant 
increase in the price of gas. The absolute increase in the domestic 
and commercial price of natural gas on the average was not large between 
1929 and 1938 and for the period 1932-1938 the prices were all but 
stable.During this period the proportion of gas going into interstate 
commerce rose from approximately 21 per cent to 28 per cent. The pre­
sumed average increases in the transmission distance for gas meant that 
there was a different "product mix" at the later time which would explain 
a moderate relative increase in domestic and commercial prices of natural 
gas.^ f
The relative stability of delivered natural gas prices in the 
face of the overall decline in prices with the general depression in 
economic activity might have been the source of the dissatisfaction with 
the price performance of the natural gas industry. During the period 
between 1928-1930 and 1938-1939 the consumer price level fell from 120 
to 100 (1937-1939 base) while the domestic and commercial price of natu-
28ral gas went from about 92 to 100 during the same time period. An
26For data see Table H in the Appendix. Information calculated 
from data found in U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, 
Minerals Yearbook (Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office).
Various dates. It must be noted that any analysis of this type using 
average figures over a highly diverse industry can only be considered 
suggestive. Within limits, however, such comparisons can be useful.
When the further extension of interpretation of the data to political 
effects is made the geographical and ideological distribution of politi­
cal power must be considered.
27For data see Table B in Appendix. Information calculated 
from Minerals Yearbook, various dates.
28Data on consumer price index calculated from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics estimates published by U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States,
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algebraic change of less than 30 index points over a nine year time 
period between the general price level and the gas price probably was 
not so great in itself, however, as to bring severe political repercus­
sions. Moreover, the cost rigidity following from the fixed or 
contractual nature of a significant proportion of gas costs could have 
been used to explain some of the pricing patterns and should have served 
to deflect some criticism at least. Nevertheless, gas regulation came 
from agitation arising during this period.
A combination of three factors helps to explain the political
pressure for gas regulation after a period of apparent apathy and in
29spite of relative overall stability of gas prices. First, the chang­
ing but spotted geographic pattern of use, accompanied by increased 
quantities of gas carried interstate, left national measures of industry 
performance unrepresentative of what was happening in specific markets. 
For example, the preponderance of gas used in producing regions at very 
low and sometimes falling prices overshadowed the rise in gas prices in 
the new consuming markets. Moreover, the absolute increase in the use 
of gas caused its price, whatever the level, to be of greater concern 
to more people.
The public image of the utilities and of big business generally 
became tarnished with the end of prosperity and the advent of the 
depression. The public's suspicious and hostile attitude was decisively 
reinforced by investigations of business practices which exposed wrong­
doing. These disclosures came with greater built-in credibility because 
of the great expectations of benefit from natural gas. The wastage of 
gas in the fields and the very low producer prices had been well publi­
cized good omens to the northern and eastern consumer. When wrongdoing
Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
i960), pp. E 113-39. Data on change in price of domestic and commercial 
gas used taken from'Minerals Yearbooks, various dates. See Table H in 
the Appendix.
29
These conclusions were reached by the writer after examination 
of diverse sources, including Congressional investigative reports, hear­
ings on the proposed regulatory measures, and periodicals. In the 
writer's opinion, the variety of the sources and the impressionistic 
nature of the conclusions make specific citation both impossible and 
nonproductive.
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in the utility industry came to light, the public was prepared to com­
pare actual prices with expected prices, rather than with prior 
experience with gas and other fuels.
The service record of the natural gas industry was a final source 
of public disfavor. The charge was made that vested interests in manu­
factured gas prevented full exploitation of the natural gas potential.
As the FTC final report stated, "Monopolistic control permits the
curtailment of production of a better product at lower prices and pro-
30tection of an inferior product at higher prices."' Collusive agreements 
to respect territories designated for other firms in the industry, 
though not yet served by them, were also aired. Conversely, some 
regions favored by early service feared that expansion of service area 
would jeopardize their own future supply of gas because of inadequate 
committed reserves. The waste involved in the occasional parallel lines 
was also roundly condemned. Whatever the motives and sources of impetus, 
the question of federal regulation of the natural gas industry became 
topical during the 1930's. One result of political interest in gas 
transportation regulation was the formation of panels to investigate the 
industry.
Investigations of the Natural Gas Transportation Industry
Two studies prepared the public for federal regulation of the 
natural gas industry and did much to influence the direction that regu­
lation was to take. The first of these, conducted by the Federal Trade
Commission, began in 1928. It was aimed primarily at the holding
31company device and its use in the electric power industry. The second
30U.S., Congress, Senate, Federal Trade Commission, Utility 
Corporations; Final Report to the Senate of the United States on Eco­
nomic, Corporate, Operating, and Financial Phases of the Natural Gas 
Producing, Pipe-line, and Utility Industries, with Conclusions and 
Recommendations, Document 92, Part 84-A, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 1936, 
p. 600. (Hereinafter referred to as FTC, Utility Corporations.)
31
U.S., Congress, Senate, Senate Resolution 83, 70th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1928, and extended by U. S. Senate, Senate Joint Resolution 115, 
73rd Cong., 2d Sess., 1934. The Federal Trade Commission made monthly
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of these studies was conducted under the auspices of the Commerce
Committee of the House of Representatives. Walter M. W. Splawn was
the director of the House study, and the reports issued were referred
to under his name. The first Splawn report was submitted in 1931 and 
32
covered railroads. The second, issued in 193^ ', dealt with power and
33gas company organization. Though the subject matter of the Federal 
Trade Commission investigation and the Splawn study overlapped some­
what, there was a conscious attempt to avoid duplication.
The Federal Trade Commission Report
The FTC conclusions following its study of the transmission 
phase of the natural gas industry were that gas transmission exhibited 
characteristics which could and did lead to the exploitation of con­
sumers and of independent producers. The basic recommendation was that 
the high degree of market power possessed by the pipelines should be 
curbed by federal regulation. The FTC also found that integration 
between the transmission lines and distributors raised regulatory prob­
lems for the states and localities. The following passage from FTC, 
Utility Corporations is illustrative;
Natural gas starts with the mining of a fugitive, unstable, 
nonstorable commodity which is a wasting, nonreplaceable natural 
asset recovered in limited areas, quite generally at considerable 
distance from the actual and potential consuming markets. The 
demands and needs are practically country-wide. The situation
reports to the Congress and prepared other exhibits. The study lasted 
for eight years, with the final report issued December 31» 1935»
32
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, Regulation of Stock Ownership in Railroads, pursuant to H.R. 
114, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 1931 »
33U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, Relation of Holding Companies in Power and Gas Affecting Con­
trol, Parts I-VI, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 193^ > H.R. 827. This report was 
prepared under the direction of Walter M. W. Splawn, special counsel, 
and the reports together are generally and hereinafter referred to as 
the Splawn Reports. Part II contains the general summary, recommenda­
tions, and a legal study. Part IV contains an introductory chapter 
prepared by the Bureau of Mines on the natural gas industry.
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often ends after interstate transportation through pipe lines, 
none of which holds itself out as a common carrier or public 
utility, regulatable as such. The plea of interference with 
interstate commerce generally is advanced by the interstate 
pipe-line companies as a defense against their regulation as 
public utilities by the several States.
Gas and pipe-line companies have asserted in some instances 
that they are solely within State jurisdiction and in other 
instances that they are so engaged in interstate commerce as to 
be entirely beyond State jurisdiction, whichever the exigencies 
of the particular case might seem to demand. There is a juris­
diction, either State or National, which covers the entire 
country. Federal jurisdiction plus the jurisdiction of the 
several States should be so utilized and coordinated as to pro- . 
duce effective regulation and the termination of existing abuses 
and leave no unregulated twilight zone. Otherwise our system 
fails in a very crucial situation.
Conservation of natural gas was one of three other problems for 
which federal remedial action was suggested by the FTC. The transmission 
companies were found to force the price of natural gas in the field to 
very low levels. If the independent producers did not sell at the low 
prices offered by the transmission lines, the transmission companies pro­
duced, or threatened to produce, from their own reserves. This action 
was designed to deny the independent producer a reasonable market and 
at the same time to drain natural gas to the captive wells from the 
other portions of the reservoir. • To meet this threat to efficient gas 
production and utilization the FTC recommended state regulation, common 
carrier or common purchaser status for the pipelines, or ratable taking 
statutes with a federal back-up law.
The performance of the natural gas industry did not meet the non- 
discriminatory standards of public utility operation according to the 
FTC statement. The "skimming" of high load areas without area satura­
tion was a common complaint among the consumer groups. The FTC 
recommended that the transmission companies be required to offer service 
to all cities which could be economically served without prejudice to 
prior consumers.
The FTC report also recommended separation of the different types 
of utilities to foster competition. The Commission contended that gas
'' FTC, Utility Corporations, p. 6.".2. The recommendations of 
the FTC are found on pp. 581-61? of its report.
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and electricity were partial substitutes and that manufactured and 
natural gas were even more closely competitive. Given these relation­
ships, the corporate interconnections among the energy companies 
forestalled healthy competition and led to geographic market segmenta­
tion. Complete segregation of the gas and electric industries was 
desirable, along with strict scrutiny of the two gas segments, in the 
FTC view.
A major inference from the FTC report was that the independent 
producer of natural gas durnng the pre-1935 period required aid, not 
regulation. Pipeline control of access to markets was thought to put 
producers at a general disadvantage. The interstate nature of natural 
gas production was noted throughout the document. Far from questioning 
the constitutionality of federal regulation of the purchase of natural 
gas in the field, the Commission recommended it in another context:
A Federal regulatory law should be enacted applicable to 
interstate gas pipe lines which transport gas for ultimate sale 
to and use by the public, regulating contracts for purchase of 
gas to be transported interstate, or regulating rates for carriage 
or cit^ gate rates at the end of such transportation, or all of 
these.-'■5
\
In sum,' the conclusion reached in the FTC study was that regula­
tion of interstate transportation of natural gas was necessary for the 
protection of the consumers, the producers, and the general public. The 
economics and structure of the industry were found to be such that 
unregulated enterprise exploited both consumers and producers and 
threatened the future supply of natural gas. The FTC also criticized 
unwarranted concentration of control of energy sources, restriction of 
available alternatives for consumers and producers, and the regulatory 
gap due to federal inaction.
The Splawn investigation of holding 
companies
The Splawn investigation concentrated on fields outside the elec­
tric power industry and emphasized the relations between holding companies
^^ Ibid., p. 616. (Emphasis added.)
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and operating utilities. Evidence supplied in this report pointed to 
extensive use of the holding company device in the natural gas industry. 
No necessary economic reason for vertical integration was established.
The success of the device, according to this report, was based on 
exploitative rather than operational considerations. Federal regulation 
of wholesale price of natural gas was necessary because only the federal 
government could meet the need for regulation that the study commission 
judged existed. It was reported that competitive construction of natural 
gas pipelines presented a problem in effective resource allocation and 
in the protection of prior consumers. Certification was prescribed as 
the method of choice for rationalizing the construction of long distance 
pipe lines.
Using reasoning not established in law until the Deep South 
decision," the finding in the Splawn Report was that the production of 
natural gas, whether destined for interstate commerce or not, was in 
interstate commerce if any well in the particular reservoir was producing 
gas dedicated to interstate commerce. The passage bears reproduction 
because of its applicability to later controversy.
Natural gas is deposited in a reservoir in the earth which is 
provided by nature. This reservoir is punctured by a well and 
the gas then blows through the vent into the air unless the well 
is shut in. The practice is to connect these wells through systems 
of pipe with a pipe line. . . . These gas lines are sometimes 
hundreds of miles in length and in some instances cross several 
States. The gas from the well connected with such a pipe line 
flows freely to consumers in the different States served by the 
gas pipe line. The gas remaining in nature's reservoir is neces­
sary to the propulsion and the movement of the gas through the 
pipe line. When a gas well is connected with an interstate gas 
pipe line, that connection places the entire field feeding through 
the well in interstate commerce.^
The FTC and Splawn studies, and the growing demand for regulation 
of the unregulated segments of the natural gas industry, led to the
" Splawn Reports, Part II, p. iv.
Deep South Oil Go. v. Federal Power Commission, 24? F. 2d 882 
(5th Cir. 1957).
O O
Splawn Reports, Part II, pp. iv-v.
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passage of the Natural Gas Act, June 21, 1938.^^ This Act closed the 
previously existing gap beyond the city gate, though whether it pushed 
gas regulation back to the wellhead was later disputed. Undoubtedly 
the major focus of the Act was on the interstate transportation companies 
who produced much of the gas brought to market and who were able to 
purchase the rest at low prices because of their peculiar market power. 
The abuses discovered by the investigations preceding the Natural Gas 
Act emphasized the role of the transmission companies. Events then in 
the future were to place added importance on the provisions of the Act 
relating to regulation of the sales for resale of natural gas by 
producers.
The Natural Gas Act of 1938
The Natural Gas Act of 1938 began in the usual fashion by giving 
the origin of the Act, stating that such regulation was made necessary 
for the protection of the public interest and that the studies of the 
problem pointed to federal regulation as the appropriate solution. The 
scope of the Act was outlined in the controversial paragraph I (b):
The provisions of this act shall apply to the transportation 
of natural gas in interstate commerce, to the sale in interstate 
commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consump­
tion for domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and 
to natural gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale, 
but shall not apply to any other transportation or sale of natural 
gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities 
used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of 
natural gas.^®
Federal regulation of the sale for resale of gas at the wellhead 
depended on whether the exclusion in the last part of the paragraph 
referred only to the physical activities of production or referred to 
the sale of gas produced as well. The question of the applicability of 
the Act to production and gathering by independent producers was not a
^^ 52 Stat. 821 (1938); 15 U. S. C. 717-71?*.' 
^°52 Stat. 821 (1938); 15 U. S. C. 717 (b).
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j+l
subject of particular concern at the time the Act was passed. The 
definitions of the Act set the scope of the firms covered in these words; 
"Natural-gas company means a person engaged in the transportation of
natural gas in interstate commerce, or the sale in interstate commerce
L i o
of such gas for resale."
In its substantive portions the Natural Gas Act legalized only 
"just and reasonable" rates. It empowered the Federal Power Commission 
to enforce these just and reasonable rates by holding illegal any rate 
or charge that did not fall into this prescribed category. In addi­
tion, discrimination was forbidden with the determination of equitable 
treatment also left up to the Commission. Natural gas companies were 
required to file such reports as the Commission would prescribe and 
such reports were to be open to public inspection. The Commission 
was obligated to institute rate hearings on new rates or on changes of 
old rates whenever it deemed such action necessary or upon the complaint 
of an affected party. Suspension of a rate change was authorized during 
the period of the hearing. Such suspended rates went into effect at 
the request of the natural gas company if the Commission did not act 
within five months of the date when the suspension took effect. At the 
discretion of the Commission the natural gas company was required to 
furnish bond to guarantee return of all overcharges collected under the 
vacated suspension if the proposed rates were not approved. The burden
of proof as to the reasonableness of any rate change rested on the
46
natural gas company.
If the Commission found that a rate charge or classification "or 
that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, 
charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory,
41Further consideration of the scope of federal control over 
natural gas production and the sale for resale of natural gas in the 
field is delayed to Chapter V below.
^^52 stat. 821 (1938) 15 U. s .  c. 717a, sec. 2 (b ).
stat. 822 (1938) 15 u. s .  c. 717c, sec. 4 (a ) .
Stat. 822 (1938) 15 u. s .  c. 717c, sec. 4 (b).
Stat. 822 (1938) 15 u. s .  c. 717c, sec. 4 (c ) .
^ 5 2 Stat. 823 (1938) 15 u. s .  c. 717c, sec. 4 (e).
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or preferential, . . . [it] shall fix the same by order, ..." except 
that while the FPC could lower a rate it could not raise one. One 
statement found in this paragraph of the law gave rise to later inter­
pretation issues. Among reasons for lowering a rate was "where
existing rates are unjust, unduly discriminatory, preferential, other-
47wise unlawful, or are not the lowest reasonable rates." This passage 
caused no questions to arise in regulation of transportation rates, 
but it was later argued that the "lowest reasonable rate" provision 
prevented the Commission from adopting a policy of using the field price 
of natural gas to influence the use rate of the resource over time.
The Natural Gas Act, for rather obvious reasons, pointed to 
regulation by means of the traditional public utility approach of return 
of the cost of service. Section 6, though using the verb "may," rather 
than the stronger "shall," empowered the Commission to ascertain the 
cost of property of every natural gas company and to determine deprecia­
tion and capital improvements and inventory for rate making purposes.
The natural gas companies by law were required to file all such informa-
48tion on request by the Commission.
As amended, the Natural Gas Act required the natural gas 
companies to report all projected changes in service and gave to the 
Commission the right to deny approval to all abandonments of service.
It also allowed the Commission to pass upon all expansions and enlarge­
ments of facilities and authorized the Commission to initiate changes
in service so long as those changes in service did not jeopardize the
49service received by prior consumers. Section 7 and Section 8 of the 
code empowered the Commission to issue certificates of convenience and 
necessity under the general admonition to make reasonable and just 
decisions.The code set out in some detail the right of the Commission
"^^ 52 Stat. 823 (1938); 15 u. S. C. 717d, sec. 5 (a).
^52 stat. 823 (1938); 15 U. S. C. 717e, sec. 6 (a).
^^52 stat. 824 (1938); 15 U. S. C. 717f (a).
5°52 stat. 824 (1938); 15 U. S. C. 717f; 61 Stat. (1947); 15 U.
S. C. 717f (b-h); 52 Stat. 825 (1938); 15 U. S. C. 717 g.
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to make determinations of the appropriate rates of depreciation. Stand­
ardization of these and other accounts was required.The law also 
provided that the companies furnish such amortization and other cost 
data as the Commission desired, on either a continuing or irregular 
basis.
The Commission was granted the power to issue such orders as it 
deemed necessary. All affected parties to any Commission action were 
given the right to request a rehearing on any decision. After such a 
request the Commission might or might not reopen hearings or alter 
decisions already rendered. The United States Courts of Appeal were 
given original jurisdiction for all requests for review of Commission 
actions. Questions not raised before the Commission were not to be 
argued before the Court. Substantial evidence given before the Com­
mission was to be accepted as conclusive by the Court. After appeal,
new evidence could be heard only by the Commission, and then only at
53the discretion of the Court. Under these general provisions the regu­
lation of the natural gas industry proceeded. The regulation that 
started with the control of gas street lighting was thus pushed back to 
cover, under some jurisdiction, portions of the natural gas industry 
from production to consumption.
Federal Regulation of the Transportation of Natural Gas
The passage of the Natural Gas Act gave the Federal Power Com­
mission the authority to regulate the sale for resale of natural gas in 
interstate commerce and the transportation of that gas from the produc­
ing areas to the interstate consumers. The law did not, however, set 
forth in any great detail how that regulation was to be conducted, nor 
did it specifically define a regulatory objective to which the Federal 
Power Commission was to aspire. The general intent of the law to protect 
the consumers from exploitation was clear, but it was not clear whether
5^ 52 Stat. 826 (1938); 15 U. S. C. ?17h, sec. 9 (a).
^ 5^2 stat. 826 (1938); 15 U. S. C. 7171.
^ 5^2 Stat. 831 (1938); 15 U. S. C. 717 r.
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that exploitation was to be defined solely in terms of excessive rates 
or was to include the whole spectrum of value decisions surrounding the 
use of any depletable resource. The intent of the law, as it was admin­
istered and enforced, directly influenced the results under it. Yet 
basic regulatory intent was not considered in any extended form until 
the Natural Gas Investigation several years after the passage of the 
Act. Meanwhile the job of regulation existed and some methods and at 
least proximate ends had to be selected. The Commission experience in 
regulatory matters was important in establishing the early rules under 
which the authority was administered.
The Federal Power Commission Before the Natural Gas Act
The Federal Power Commission was not called into being for the 
purpose of regulating the natural gas industry. Instead it was a regu­
latory agency with a past varied in terms of personnel, organization, 
and range of authority. The FPC was established June 10, 1920, as a 
part-time commission made up of the Secretaries of War, Interior, and 
Agriculture. The duty of this commission was to determine and apply 
national water power development policy.It did not become an inde­
pendent commission staffed with full time commissioners until June 25,
561930* Regulatory importance did not accrue to the agency until 
August 26, 1936, when the Federal Water Power Act was subsumed as
Title I of the Federal Power Act. With this law the Federal Power Com­
mission was given jurisdiction over the interstate transmission of
57electric energy and the companies engaged in that transmission.
The regulation of the interstate transmission of electric energy 
was conducted on the more or less traditional regulatory pattern of cost
54.
Federal Power Commission, Natural Gas Investigation, Docket 
G-580 (Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948).
5^ 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) c. 285.
5^46 Stat. 797 (1930) c. 572.
5^ 41 Stat. 863 (1920) c. 285, sec. 320 as added 1935, c. 687, 
Title II, sec. 213; 15 U. S. C., c. 12, sec. 791-828c (1958). (Herein­
after referred to as Federal Power Act.)
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and service analysis designed to give adequate performance to the con­
sumer at the lowest price consistent with the maintenance of the 
industry. Hence the companies generating and transmitting electric 
energy interstate were regulated so that they might receive a limited, 
but adequate, return. The Commission set up standard accounting pro­
cedures so that costs could be determined, and did rate and cost studies 
to provide basic information to itself and other regulating agencies.
It periodically published rate surveys to make information on the prices 
charged to consumers throughout the country public. Exposure and 
publicity were expected to bring reduction in rates where high prices
could be explained only by consumer exploitation. In this way the FPC
efthoped to influence rates it could not act on directly.^
The Commission was primarily engaged in trying to bring the 
advantages of cheap electricity to the consumers. It was not interested 
in broader public policy issues, nor were conflicts in policy common in 
the work of the Commission. The FPC staff presented factual analysis 
of costs, returns, and technical problems. Commission decisions were 
reached by comparing existing conditions with generally accepted stand­
ards. Controversy within the Commission and over Commission decisions 
therefore usually referred to the nature, of the findings rather than to 
the standard against which the case was judged. There was little con­
flict over the nature or goal of regulation— which was traditional and 
generally accepted, though the Federal Power Commission was dissatisfied
with such procedural matters as the doctrine of replacement cost which
59was a legacy from Smyth v. Ames.
^^The FPC annual reports for various years give a good picture 
of FPC operation in terms of actions taken, legislation approved, 
problems noted. Illustrative of this was the Federal Power Commission, 
Fifteenth Annual Report, 1935 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1936), pp. I-I6 which reported on electric energy prices and 
regulation.
59Smyth V. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898). The decision in this 
case required that companies be allowed to earn a fair return on a fair 
value of invested capital. Among the elements going into the make up 
of the "fair value" was reproduction cost of the assets valued. The 
emphasis on reproduction costs increased over time during the period of
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Federal Power Commission Approach to the Regulation of 
Natural Gas Transportation
Congress, when it passed the Natural Gas Act, apparently acted 
under the assumption that the federal regulation of natural gas presented 
essentially the same problem as did the regulation of the electric indus­
try following the Attleboro case,^^ In any event, the Act was modeled 
on the Federal Power Act regulating the interstate transmission of elec­
tricity. The purpose of the Act was interpreted as being to fill the 
"attractive gap" in regulation created by the absence of state control 
over interstate gas movement, just as the Federal Power Act established 
control over the generation and transmission of electric power interstate.
The Federal Power Commission, in its early regulatory efforts 
under the Natural Gas Act, functioned in terms of the traditional public 
utility concept. As the Commission itself said in an explanation of its 
change toward another method of determining an allowance for gas produced 
by a pipeline company.
It may not be surprising that, with its background of actual 
legitimate original cost determinations for licenses under the 
Federal Water Power Act and of efforts to regulate interstate 
wholesale electric rates under Part II of the Federal Power Act, 
the Commission should at the outset of its regulation of rates 
under the Natural Gas Act have followed a similar approach.
Among the FPC's first actions were programs initiating uniform methods 
of accounting (specifically mentioned in the statute, however),
investigating and collecting cost data, and otherwise acting in a
inflation which followed World War I. During the decade of the depres­
sion, with falling rather than rising prices, original cost less depre­
ciation came to be favored in some jurisdictions. The decision in the 
Hope case [F. P. C. v, Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591] instituted 
the rule of the "end result," This decision defined reasonable rates 
as those "Rates which enable the company to operate successfully, to 
maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate 
its investors for the risks assumed," (Ibid., p, 602.)
^^Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro 
Steam and Electric Go,, 273 U.S. 83 (192?)» (Hereinafter referred to 
as Attleboro.)
In the Matter of Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, 13 F.
P. C. 53» 69 (1934). (Hereinafter referred to as Panhandle Eastern.)
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traditional way to protect the consumer from the monopolistic exercise 
of power by the natural gas transmission companies.
The regulation of rates and standards of service for the inter­
state transmission of natural gas and electricity was therefore 
accomplished through traditional public utility means. This approach 
was appropriate for interstate transmission because the requirements of 
efficiency in resource utilization prohibited sufficient units in a 
single consumption area to maintain a stable competitive structure. 
There were no efficient gas transportation alternatives to give even 
interindustry competition. The services performed by the pipelines 
were repetitive in nature, except in planning and initiation, and 
required little managerial innovation or imagination. The industry was 
characterized by a high proportion of fixed costs and there were few 
alternatives to which implanted facilities could be turned in the face 
of changed demand or supply conditions. Natural gas was an essential 
service to consumers, and the distributing utilities had no realistic 
options to service from the interstate transmission lines. Gas trans­
mission was therefore an industry affected with the public interest.
The operations of the interstate transmission lines qua transmission, 
then, were ideally suited for public utility regulation. Because of 
this suitability, the cost-of-service and return on rate-base formula 
pre-empted the field of regulation techniques leaving no room for con­
flict over method.
In some of its regulatory activities the FPC was not guided by 
the cost-of-service formula because some of the decisions reaching its 
jurisdiction called for policy determinations instead. Decisions on 
certification and certification criteria fell into this category. Some
62There has been some talk of transportation of natural gas in 
a liquid stage by means of tanker. While this means has been used to 
a limited extent, thus far it has been proposed only on over-water 
routes where pipelines are at present prohibitively expensive. Future 
experience, however, might present the pipelines with a transport 
competitor which would put an upper limit on transportation charges. 
Ocean carriage would be especially attractive between the coastal and 
tidelands Southwestern production areas and the East Coast. It would 
also provide an effective peaking service.
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judgment necessarily was exercised in deciding which applicant was to 
provide what services in interstate gas transmission. The feasibility 
and desirability of any project, the nature of the service to be pro­
vided, the type of facilities to be installed, and the area to be served 
were similarly within the Commission's jurisdiction. These areas of 
authority involved public policy alternatives, the conflicts between 
which were incapable of resolution by reference to codes or previously 
established formulas which could be applied in any circumstances.
Early FPC Natural Gas Transmission Regulation
The Federal Power Commission regulation of the interstate trans­
porters of natural gas began with rate investigations two weeks after 
the passage of the Natural Gas Act. The early cases came at the insti­
gation of state utility commissions seeking rate reductions at the city 
gate on grounds of unreasonableness. In this same early period the 
Commission also suspended a rate increase pending an investigation into 
reasonableness and lawfulness of the proposed change. Certificates of 
convenience and necessity were considered and import-export petitions 
submitted to the Commission. Petitions to intervene were filed by the 
bituminous coal industry which attempted to block expansion of the 
natural gas industry because it threatened coal sales. The level of 
activity of the Commission in those early days was reflected by a state­
ment appearing in the Nineteenth Annual Report, 1939: "The number of
complaints . . . the number of investigations and proceedings, . . . the 
number of rate suspensions and show cause orders . . . stand as eloquent 
testimony to the need for that Federal regulation of interstate natural- 
gas rates embodied in the Natural Gas Act."^^
The major emphasis of the FPC activity was to lower gas rates. 
Indeed, the annual reports of 1938-1940 did not mention consideration
63Federal Power Commission, Eighteenth Annual Report, 1938 
(Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939), pp. 1-8.
64Federal Power Commission, Nineteenth Annual Report, 1939 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 8.
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of goals other than low rates. The aim of regulation through the rate- 
base method was outlined in the Twentieth Annual Report, 1940, in a two 
page statement. The first paragraph of this statement contained the 
substance of the then current philosophical basis of Commission regula­
tion; a later paragraph pointed up some of the problems of regulation;
The Commission believes that sound thought on the subject [of 
gas regulation] must begin with the premise that the regulation 
of privately owned public utilities came into being in large meas­
ure as a substitute for competition in a field which had come to 
be considered as adapted to "natural monopoly." In the main its 
purpose was to assure the lowest possible costs and prices for 
utility services . .
The story of utility regulation, however, has been in the main 
a story of increasingly elaborate and protracted procedures devised 
by representatives of private companies to delay or circumvent the 
efforts of regulatory bodies to achieve these objectives. The 
reason for this appears obvious. Having obtained a status substan­
tially free from competition, these companies now seek, by the 
establishment of elaborate techniques, to regain the arbitrary 
control of costs and rates which would be theirs under unregulated 
monopoly.66
One of the problems facing the FPC as it established regulation 
of pipeline transportation of natural gas was the determination of what 
value to place on gas as it started to the ultimate consumer. The 
Columbian decision of 1940 resolved the question with reference to gas 
purchased from independent producers: Such gas was to enter at its
purchase price when that price was established through arm's-length 
bargaining.Treatment of gas produced by the pipeline company itself 
still had to be established. It is to this problem that the discussion 
now turns.
^^Federal Power Commission, Twentieth Annual Report, 1940 (Wash­
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 13-14.
66j
^^ In the Matters of Columbian Fuel Corporation, 2 F. P. C. 200 
(1940). This case is discussed more fully in Chapter V where the evolu­
tion of FPC control over the independent producer is traced. (Herein­
after referred to as Columbian.)
^^ Ibid.. pp. 18-20.
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Regulation of Integrated Producer-Transporters of
Natural Gas
The federal responsibility in natural gas regulation under the 
Natural Gas Act was to establish a reasonable and nonexploitative price 
for natural gas at the city gate. In the Columbian case it was decided 
that the transmission company could recover as part of its cost of 
service any payments to independent producers which were arrived at 
without collusion and at arm's-length. In a case decided soon after 
Columbian the corollary to this decision was announced. The FPC took 
jurisdiction over the cost allowance for gas as it entered the trans­
mission line whenever arm's-length negotiations did not exist. The 
question of the form this regulation was to take remained.
A discussion of the two broad categories of possible regulatory 
methods for treating integrated production takes up the greatest part 
of the remainder of this chapter. These categories are the traditional 
cost approach most frequently associated with the general public-utility 
regulatory method and regulation based on value in consumption, measured, 
in this context, by the payments for gas under similar conditions in the 
presence of workable competition. A brief statement of the Commission 
findings which led to regulation precedes this discussion, and some con­
cluding remarks serve to summarize some of the developments in social 
control of integrated production.
The Billings Case: FPC Jurisdiction Over Integrated
Producer-Transporters of Natural Gas
The jurisdiction of the FPC over the production of gas by inter­
state pipeline companies was decided in the case styled Billings decided 
68October 15, 19^ 0. The Billings Company was a wholly owned subsidiary 
of the Ohio Oil Company engaged in transmitting and distributing natural 
gas from a point on the Montana state border to Billings, Montana and 
other points. The FPC ruled that the Billings Company was a natural gas
68In the Matter of Billings Gas Company, Ohio Oil Company, and 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 2 F. P. C. 288 (1940). (Hereinafter 
referred to as Billings.)
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company under the meaning of the statute because it was engaged in the 
transmission of gas which moved uninterruptedly across state lines. The 
fact that it was a wholly owned subsidiary of a natural gas company also 
gave it regulated status. The Commission refused to prescribe steps 
which Billings or the parent Ohio Oil Company could take to so segregate 
its affairs as to avoid jurisdiction. The important rule established 
by this administrative decision was that a natural gas company could not 
isolate some of its activities from the jurisdiction of the FPC.
While it is true that certain activities of this company do 
not involve the transportation of natural gas in interstate com­
merce or the sale of natural gas for resale in interstate commerce, 
it is, nevertheless, the fact that this Commission's jurisdiction 
over a person as a "natural-gas company" attaches to the person or 
the corporate entity and compliance with the requirements of the 
Commission's applicable orders, rules, and regulations will be 
required of one having such status.
Later jurisdiction cases were settled on essentially the same
grounds. Firms which could not demonstrate effective separation between
themselves and a natural gas company were held constructively a part of
that company and jurisdiction was asserted. Whenever either distribution
or production and/or gathering activities alone were involved, however,
and where in addition there was an arm's-length transaction, firms were
relieved of the duties of a natural gas company. The question raised
in the original Columbian decision as to the reasonableness of the,gas
price or the existence of competition was not explicitly raised in
70subsequent orders determining jurisdiction.
^^Ibid., pp. 289-290.
70Among the more important cases based on facts similar to Bill­
ings and decided by administrative order were; LaGloria Corporation, 7
F. P. C. 3^9 (1948); The Superior Oil Company 7 F. P. C. 627 (1948); 
Kansas Nebraska Natural Gas Company, 6 F. P. C. (1947); Hassie Hunt 
Trust, 6 F. P. C. 835 (1947); Sinclair Prairie Oil Company, 6 F. P. C. 
1059 (1947); and the four cases decided together and relating to the 
same property, American Republics Corporation, 7 F. P. C. 952 (1948);  
Houston Oil Company of Texas, 7 F. P. C. 953 (1948); Humble Oil and
Refining Company, 7 F. P. C. 954 (1948); General Crude Oil Company,
7 F. P. C. 1024 (1948).
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Cost-Based Valuation of Integrated Firm Production
One method of valuing gas as it entered the transmission line 
from production controlled by the natural gas company was on the basis 
of cost of service. This is the method which is usually associated with 
regulation of public utilities. It is also the method utilized by the 
FPC in its supervision over rates charged by the interstate transporters 
of natural gas in the transportation phase of their operations. Expla­
nation of this method of regulation, and a starting place for its
evaluation, can best be accomplished through examination of a case where
71it was used. The Colorado Interstate case was chosen for this purpose.
Colorado Interstate; cost-based regulation 
of integrated firm production
The Colorado Interstate case provided an arena for the conten­
tion between the alternative approaches to appropriate regulatory 
policy. Though the question of the valuation of gas as it entered the 
transmission line played only one part in the case, the method of valu­
ation chosen was considered at length in the arguments and in the 
decisions rendered. This case was one of the first where integrated 
production regulation was argued at length. The freshness of the issues 
and perhaps the consciousness that the case would be precedent-setting 
led to a high level of argumentation. The issues received more atten­
tion than the inherent values involved justified. These factors made 
Colorado Interstate a notable example of the application of traditional 
regulation to integrated producers.
The FPC worked solely within the framework of the public-utility 
concept in reaching its decision on Colorado Interstate. The method of 
valuing property, the means used to establish an appropriate rate of 
return, and the division of costs and revenues among the regulated and
71In the Matter of Canadian River Gas Company, Colorado Inter­
state Gas Company, and Colorado-Wyoming Gas Company, 3 F. P. C. 32 
(1942). This case grew out of an investigation instituted by the FPC on 
March 14, 1939. Colorado Interstate took the case to the Circuit Court 
of Appeals, Tenth Circuit. Upon appeal the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari. Colorado Interstate Gas Company v. Federal Power Commission, 
324 U.S. 581 (1945). (Hereinafter referred to as Colorado Interstate.1
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unregulated portions of the enterprise all testified to the refusal of 
the FPC to differentiate between producing and transporting portions of 
the firm’s operations.
The Supreme Court was careful not to prescribe the regulatory 
technique chosen by the FPC in Colorado Interstate as the only one 
acceptable under the law. It simply held, in the majority opinion, that 
the FPC was not prevented from using the rate-base method if the end re­
sult was fair to the company and consistent with the aims of the Natural 
Gas Act. Throughout the majority opinion, which was written by Justice 
Douglas, there were citations of public utility texts, articles by
public utility economists, and other references that showed that the
72Court was thinking of traditional cost-based regulation. Justice
Jackson, concurring in a separate opinion, disagreed. He argued that
the cost approach did not have the flexibility required for regulatory
policy making in the natural gas production industry, though it perhaps
73was suited to regulation of gas transportation. In the Colorado 
Interstate opinion he gave his now famous statement castigating the 
illogic of cost regulation of natural gas production:
To let rate-base figures . . . govern a rate for natural gas 
seems to me little better than to draw figures out of a hat.
. . . These cases vividly demonstrate the delirious results pro­
duced by the rate-base method. These orders in some instances 
result in three different prices for gas from the same well. The 
regulated company is a part owner, an unregulated company is a 
part owner, and the land owner has a royalty share of the produc­
tion from certain wells. The regulated company buys all of the 
gas for its interstate business. It is allowed to pay as operat­
ing expenses an unregulated contract price for its co-owner’s
72Ibid., p. 589« Included, for example, were Walton Hamilton, 
"Cost as a Standard for Price," 4 Law and Contemporary Problems, p. 593> 
Schlatter, Advanced Cost Accounting (1937); Neuner, Cost Accounting 
(1930), p. 601; Bonbright, Valuation of Property (1937)» Smith, "The 
Control of Power Rates in the United States and England," 159 Annals, 
p. 608; Bonbright and Means, The Holding Company (1932); Barnes, The 
Economics of Public Utility Regulation,(1942).
73Justice Jackson’s disagreement with the public-utility approach 
to gas production regulation was expressed forcefully and clearly not 
only in Colorado Interstate, but in the Hope decision as well. [320 U.S.
591].
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share and a different unregulated contract price for the royalty 
owner's share, but for its own share it is allowed substantially 
less than either. Any method of rate-making by which an identical 
product from a single well, going to the same consumers, has 
three prices depending on who owns it does not make sense to me.
These cases furnish another example of the capricious results 
of the rate-base method in this kind of case. . . . The Company 
which took the high risk of wildcat exploration is thus allowed a 
return of 6-1/2 per cent of nothing for the three leases and a 
return of less than $300 a year on the others. Their present mar­
ket value is shown by testimony to be over $3,000,000.
I cannot fairly say that the Commission exceeded its juris­
diction in obtaining this evidence and making these calculations, 
even though the evidence related to production and gathering of 
gas. But I do think it is a fantastic method of fixing a "just 
and reasonable" price for gas.7
Jackson, rejecting value based on cost, preferred to use gas 
commodity price as a tool with which to so order the natural gas pro­
duction industry as to maximize welfare. As he said in different parts 
of his opinion;
Farsighted gas-rate regulation will concern itself with the 
present and the future, rather than with the past, as the rate- 
base formula does. . . .  It will use price as a tool to bring 
goods to market— to obtain for the public service the needed 
amount of gas. Once a price is reached that will do that, there 
is no legal or economic reason to go higher; and any rate above 
one that will perform this function is unwarranted. If the 
supply comes from a region where there is such overproduction 
that owners are ready to sell for less than a fair return on 
their investment, there is no reason why the public should pay 
more. On the other hand, if the supply is not too plentiful and 
the price is not a sufficient incentive to exploit it and fails 
to bring forth the quantity needed, the price is unwisely low, 
even if it does square perfectly with somebody's idea of return 
on a "rate base." The problem, of course, is to know what price 
level will be adequate to perform this economic function.75
I should like to reverse this case, not because I think the 
rate reduction is wrong, but because I think the real inwardness 
of the gas business as affects the future has been obscured by 
the Commission's preoccupation with bookkeeping and historical
U.S. 581, 610-611. 
f^Ibid., p. 612.
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matter. Such considerations may be relevant to rate-base theories, 
but will not be very satisfying to a coming generation that will 
look back and judge our present regulatory method in the light of 
an exhausted and largely wasted gas supply."
Economic effects of cost-based regulation 
of integrated production
The controversy expressed in the arguments over cost-based 
determination of gas allowances rested to some extent on disagreement 
over the effect of such regulation. The analysis below is aimed at 
some of this controversy. Actual producing and gathering operations of 
integrated companies are similar in nature to the transmission 
function. Production, gathering, maintenance, and pumping are rather 
routine, utilize reproducible resources with quoted market prices, and 
involve little fortuity or opportunity for successful speculation.
These same conditions do not hold for exploration* development, and 
acquisition of gas reserves. The formal techniques which would be 
expected to produce results for integrated firms comparable to those if 
competition existed, do not yield the return received by the independent 
producers operating in fact in a competitive market. Consider the formal 
model as an indication of actual market behavior. If factors were 
mobile and variable, and the rate of return chosen for regulatory pur­
poses actually corresponded to the cost of capital plus a margin over 
costs sufficient to adjust for risk and to compensate individuals for 
remaining in the same occupation, the competitive price and the regulated 
price would be identical. In both cases relatively insufficient returns 
would cause factors to migrate elsewhere, and shifts into the industry 
would result if excessive profits were available. If some factors were 
not mobile, however, the compensation of those factors would be demand 
determined and would vary with shifts in demand at a rate inversely 
related to the mobility of the factors. Economic rent, either positive 
or negative, would result. Factor immobility is an important part of 
the explanation of conditions in the gas field markets under regulation.
^^Ibid.. p. 615.
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The effect of cost-based regulation on the integrated producers is 
traced below within the framework of changing conditions in the South­
western field markets.
The Southwestern natural gas industry, until the end of World 
War II, was characterized by 1) associated gas and flush production 
from wells discovered during the search for oil, and by 2) a demand for 
gas which was limited because of few pipeline or other outlets. The 
price of gas as a commodity was just sufficient to bring the necessary 
gas to the transmission line or other consuming use except in a few 
market areas. The independent producer received little or no economic 
return from his gas production. The integrated companies, however, 
were more able to achieve a satisfactory return from owned production.
The negligible returns from the production operations could be supple­
mented by profits from the other phases of the business which, in the 
absence of the production properties, they would not otheirwise be allowed 
to earn. Therefore, in the general case, the allowance for pipeline 
produced gas yielded a higher return to the integrated producer than the 
unregulated independent producer was able to obtain from the open market. 
The integrated firm was effectively isolated from the effects of over­
supply of a fixed factor on rate of return. Under the conditions that 
faced the industry in the Southwest through the 1930's and early 1940's 
the pipeline companies were encouraged to own and acquire,their own gas 
reserves. These reserves came into the company at a cost consistent 
with the depressed field price of gas.
The rapid widening and deepening of the market for natural gas 
after World War II brought an increased demand for natural gas in the 
field. The excess amount supplied hanging over the market at the pre­
vailing price was soon exhausted, and purchasers entering the market were 
forced to bid against other potential users and against the holding 
alternative of sellers expecting a rising price trend. Because of the 
less than completely elastic total supply of gas, even in the long run, 
and the much less elastic supply in developed and locationally attractive 
deposits, the price of field gas rose.
On an analytical plane, competition could be expected to hold 
the return to the mobile factors in gas production to the general economy
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level plus some possible quasi-rent. A rise in price yielding returns 
higher than this would be absorbed as rent by the holders of noncommitted 
natural gas reserves, who in fact became the prime beneficiaries of the 
price increases. The industry practice of requiring long term contracts, 
and the FPC requirement of twenty years reserve commitment by natural 
gas companies, raised the price of uncommitted reserves even further. 
Integrated producers and independent producers committed to long-term, 
fixed-price contracts were unable to take advantage of these higher 
prices.
The result to be expected from the limitation of natural gas
company return on production investment, a shift away from ownership by
the pipeline companies, occurred. The natural gas companies found that
their gas reserves were worth considerably more on the open market than
the capitalized value of the return allowed. While the FPC made an
attempt to put some restrictions on the sale of dedicated reserves by
the gas companies, producing properties were sold or spun off to take
advantage of the greater pricing flexibility of nonregulated independent 
77status. More importantly, new development was left to the independent
producer. Greater additions to independent reserves than to captive
reserves thus occurred, leading to a relative shift to independent pro- 
78duction. The shift to independent production and the other results 
which followed the use of cost-based regulation in the postwar field 
market had effects which were considered unfortunate in their impact on 
the natural gas industry. With this analytical treatment of the effect
77See the following decisions for evidence of attempts of the 
FPC to force the pipeline companies to retain their owned reserves; 
Federal Power Commission v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, 337
0.5. 498 [1949): Northern Natural Gas Company. 11 F. P. C. 400 (1952); 
Northern Natural Gas Comply, 11 F. P. C. 174 (1952); Northern Natural 
Gas Company, 12 F. P. C. 66 (1953)•
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Panhandle Eastern, 13 F. P. C. 53» 75* In the Panhandle 
Eastern case decided in 195^ in favor of fair field pricing the Commis­
sion cites the decline in pipeline produced gas in the following terms:
"When we look to the over-all situation, we cannot but be 
stinick by the fact that no new major pipeline which has been 
certificated since the Commission's pricing practice was first
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of cost-based regulation on integrated producers as a background some 
of the value effects of this regulation are considered below.
Implications of cost-based regulation 
of integrated producers
Under cost-based regulation of integrated producers the allow­
ance for gas which entered the pipelines depended upon its ownership 
and historical cost. As a result, the price of gas was not directly 
related to its value as a commodity. This policy discriminated among 
producers on the basis of contract date, circumstance, and relation to 
other phases of the natural gas industry. It also discriminated among 
the ultimate consumers to whom gas came at different prices. The price 
differentials resulting from alternative methods of calculating a com­
modity allowance to the integrated producer were small, perhaps two to 
four cents, compared to a $1.00 per Mcf delivered price to domestic 
consumers. The inpact of this small differential was minor on domestic 
consumers but of some importance in commercial and industrial uses.
There natural gas was consumed primarily on the basis of price compared
to other fuels and the cost of the commodity itself made up a much larger
79proportion of delivered cost.
In addition to the discrimination involved in a multi-price 
system, prices based on factors other than commodity value in alternative 
pursuits gave no consistent direction to the allocation of gas over time
established— including some of the largest systems serving 
enormous new markets— produces any significant portion in its 
total supply. That the ratio of pipeline-produced gas to 
total gas transported and sold in interstate commerce has 
declined markedly is clearly apparent from the facts of record.
This trend is the important thing; the precise movement is a 
relatively unimportant detail. . . . And we are unable to adopt 
the position taken in the staff brief that there is no validity 
in the claim that the rate regulatory policies of this Commission 
have been a factor contributing to this undesirable result."
79See Table H in the Appendix for a comparison of field price 
to delivered price in various years for different uses. The evaluation 
of cost-based regulation of gas prices in the field is discussed at 
length in Chapter VII. The discussion at that point concentrates on 
independently produced gas but the conclusions are similar.
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or among different uses. For exanjple, if the price of gas varied 
between consumption areas solely because of historical cost differen­
tials, then decisions as to amount consumed in some specified end use 
would vary for economically irrelevant reasons. Or again, while at a 
price determined on historical cost it might be economical to consume 
gas, the price required to make present consumption preferable to 
future consumption might be prohibitively high or extremely low, 
depending on future events.
One implication of costwjDased allowances for transporter pro­
duced gas was disputed both in terms of its effect and its desirability. 
The contention was sometimes offered that FPC regulation of integrated 
producers lowered the basic field price. Integrated producers further 
contended that this result was contrary to the national best interest. 
Higher field prices were said to be necessary in order to promote 
conservation, to generate exploration, to induce producers to cease 
wasting gas, and to shift consumption away from low value uses. The 
Commissioners rejected this assertion in the reports on the Natural Gas
Investigation though they admitted that some indirect effects might
80exist in this direction. An alternative to the cost approach, com­
modity valuation, was also considered in the Natural Gas Inyestiga^ion. 
The present study now turns to this approach to integrated producer 
regulation.
Commodity Valuation of Integrated Firm Production
The FPC tradition of determining the amount to be allowed trans­
mission companies for their own gas on the basis of historical cost was
81overturned in the Panhandle Eastern decision rendered April 15, 195^ *
80Federal Power Commission, Natural Gas Investigation, Docket 
G-580 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), Smith-
Wimberly Report, pp. 178, 189, 250, 260. This report was issued in two 
volumes, one authored by Commissioners Nelson Lee Smith and Harrington 
Wimberly and the other by Commissioners Leland Olds and Claude L. Draper. 
Reference to each volume will be made by the names of the issuing 
Commissioners, as in above reference and Olds-Draper Report.
®^13 F. P. C. 53.
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Even though this shift in allowance base was not allowed to stand 
legally, it had important repercussions on the later Commission regula­
tion of independent producers. Commission experience with commodity 
valuation of gas is discussed first in terms of the facts in the Pan­
handle Eastern case itself, then general arguments on both sides of the 
controversy are considered, and finally, the legal disposal of the issue 
on appeal is reported below.
Panhandle Eastern facts
The FPC decision instituting commodity oriented regulation was
preceded by a Commission order issued February 9, 1953» Commissioner
Buchanan dissenting, requiring the presiding examiner in the Panhandle
Eastern case to take evidence as to "weighted average field prices" and
82"fair field" prices. This evidence had been refused by the hearing 
examiner on grounds consistent with past FPC policy. The intermediate 
decision process was eliminated in the Panhandle Eastern case. The 
hearings before the examiner were concluded May 15, 1953, and oral argu­
ment was completed that November.
The Commission majority based its final decision on certain 
facts which in broad measure were accepted by Panhandle Eastern, the 
FPC Staff, and dissenting Commissioner Draper. Panhandle Eastern pro­
duced approximately 23 per cent of its gas supply, buying the rest 
either from independent producers or from its otherwise regulated 
subsidiary, Trunkline Natural Gas Company. The cost method of estab­
lishing an allowance for the gas produced by Panhandle Eastern required 
revenues averaging .85 cents per Mcf to yield the cost of service and 
an appropriate return on rate-base for the test year. When tax benefits 
due to the production phase of the company's operations were added to 
the other revenues. Panhandle Eastern was left with a .12 cents per Mcf 
cost-of-service. Revenue from joint products reduced net cost-of-serv- 
ice further to an average of a negative 1.24 cents per Mcf. The Commis­
sion majority pointed out that rising depreciation and depletion reserves,
Qp
Order on Appeal to the Commission from Certain Rulings of 
Presiding Examiner with Respect to the Admissibility of Evidence, 12 
F. P. G. 840 (1953).  ^ !
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as well as rising prices for joint products, would bring this return
QO
even lower (more negative) over time. Panhandle Eastern paid an aver­
age of from 7 cents per Mcf in Texas to 11 cents per Mcf in Oklahoma 
for gas purchased from independent producers. If the company were 
allowed an average field price for gas it produced, revenues on juris­
dictional sales would rise approximately $3,571,448 or 1.3 cents for
84every Mcf of jurisdictional gas sold.
Majority argument for commodity-based 
regulation
The FPC majority argued that an allowance based on the average 
price received by independent producers, the "fair field" price, was 
preferable economically, was acceptable to the courts, and was not pre­
cluded by the precedent of cost-based regulation. The economic 
arguments against cost-based allowances were those mentioned in a 
previous section, namely that the multi-price system was capriciously 
inequitable, that allocation of gas over time was indefensibly weighted 
toward current rather than future use, and that exploration and develop­
ment of needed additional reserves was discouraged.®^
The Commission also argued that continuation of the cost basis
would lead to progressive diminution in the role of transmission-owned
production. Several effects judged harmful were expected from this 
development. First of all, the weakened bargaining position of the 
transmission companies was expected to lead to higher prices for gas in 
the fields. Second, it was anticipated that the lack of production by 
the transmission companies would make it more difficult for these firms 
to balance out their seasonal gas requirements. The take or pay pro­
visions in contracts with independent producers (discussed at greater 
length in Chapter V below) lessened the ability of the firms to make 
satisfactory adjustment to the fluctuating demand for gas. Finally, the 
Commission argued that the continued presence of the transmission com­
panies in the production phase of the industry helped to assure the
Rfi
long-run availability of gas reserves.
®^13 F. P. C. 53, 61-62. ®^Ibid.. pp. 62-63.
®^Ibid., pp. 71-74. ®®Ibid.. pp. 74-75-
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The Commission argued that the courts had approved of cost-based
regulation but had not established it as the only acceptable method.
The general judicial tradition, and the wording of the Natural Gas Act
itself, argued against the substitution of judicial for expert Commission
87opinion on substantive matters. Hence, so long as Commission rulings 
were not discriminatory, did not result in unconstitutional confiscation 
of private property, and were consistent with the enabling legislation, 
they were safe from judicial reversal. In a more positive direction, 
the Commission noted that both minority and majority decisions of the 
Supreme Court had mentioned that cost-based regulation of gas production 
was perhaps less suitable than other alternatives. The Commission 
decided that divergence from the cost approach was acceptable if reason
QQ
for the divergence existed.
The traditions of the FPC itself were of no moment in making
changes in regulatory policy, the Commission held, because custom and
tradition did not bind the Commission as they bound the courts through
the doctrines of stare decisis and res adjudicata. The Commission, was
bound, it said, only to follow the law and to render decisions in the
public interest. Changing conditions and the experience gained through
the administration of the law were ample reasons to change a procedural
69method if public gains could be foreseen. "The question here pre­
sented is what method of pricing pipeline-produced gas will, under
present day realities and in the light of the facts of record in this
90case, best serve the ultimate public interest." For these reasons, 
then, the Commission set the rate schedule for the Panhandle Eastern 
Pipe Line Company to reflect evaluation of the gas produced by itself 
on the basis of sales at arm's-length in the fields from which the gas 
was drawn.
87The Natural Gas Act explicitly stated that no evidence was to 
be considered except by the Commission. 52 Stat. 831 (1938); 15 U. S.
C. 717 r.
®®13 F. P. C. 53, 64-69.
G^lbid.. pp. 64-65. ^°Ibid.. p. 69.
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Dissenting arguments opposing 
commodity-based regulation
There were two dissents from the Panhandle Eastern decision,
those by Commissioners Doty and Draper. The Doty dissent referred only
to the method of treating tax concessions granted by Congress and
91therefore was not related to the gas allowance issue. Draper's dis­
sent, however, centered on the change in regulatory method. He stated 
that there was not enough latitude in the Natural Gas Act to permit the 
rejection of the traditional method of rate making and the substitution 
of fair field pricing. He further held that cost-based regulation was
in the general public interest. His stated reasons for these conclu-
92sions are summarized in the following eight points:
1. Cost-based regulation of pipeline-produced gas had been 
scrutinized in previous studies and had always been 
approved as the method of choice to foster public welfare,
2. Legislation seeking to put the fair field method into the 
law had failed of passage.
3. The FPC was not empowered to take into account various eco­
nomic or local conditions in making its determinations.
[Draper relied on the Hope case (320 U.S. 591» 608) and on 
Corporation Commission of Kansas v. F. P. C.; Northern 
Natural Gas Company v. F. P. C., 206 F. 2d 690 (Certiorari 
denied January 4, 1954.) Reference was also made to the 
Colorado Interstate decision (324 U.S. 581), and to Justice 
Jackson's dissent.]
4. The fair field method did not replace the cost-based method 
with the maximizing alternative envisaged by Justice Jackson 
in his dissents, but instead substituted another method which 
could give rise to similar "delirious results." "No test 
was made to ascertain whether the annual additional revenues 
of $3,571,448, which the majority gave Panhandle for its own 
produced gas, are too great or too small to achieve the social 
objectives thought desirable by Mr. Justice Jackson.
5. The fair field method did not avoid different prices for pro­
duction from similar or identical locations, and more 
seriously, did not provide an objective test for determining
9~kbid.. pp. 117-122.
92
Ibid., pp. 123-140. (Summary in paraphrase by the present 
writer. Direct quotes are noted with separate reference.)
93lbid.. p. 130.
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the weighted field average to be used in ascertaining appro­
priate allowances.
6. The determination that Panhandle Eastern would receive a 
negative 1.25 cents per Mcf was fallacious. The gas produced 
would make a net contribution to Panhandle Eastern's return 
under cost-based regulation.
7. The rates established under the fair field method were not 
the "lowest reasonable rates" and therefore did not fulfill 
the legislative mandate of the Natural Gas Act.
8. The effect of the regulation on the individual consumer, or 
the minimal nature of that effect, was not a proper matter of 
concern to the Commission. Legal rates should be determined 
as the lowest reasonable rates without consideration of their 
ultimate impact or lack thereof.
Judicial review of fair field pricing
The City of Detroit and the County of Wayne, Michigan, represent­
ing consumers of Panhandle Eastern gas, challenged the FPC decision to 
allow average field prices to determine the allowance received by Pan­
handle Eastern for its own production. An appeal, taken to the Circuit 
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, was decided on December 15,
1955, in favor of the petitioners and against the FPC and Panhandle
94Eastern as intervenor.
The decision of the Court of Appeals held in part;
. . . that evidence was insufficient to justify the allowance by 
the Federal Power Commission of the fair-field value of the gas 
produced by Pipeline Company itself as an operating expense in 
determining just and reasonable rates for natural gas, and that 
Commission's failure to credit Company's revenues from gasoline 
extraction operations was improper.
95Order set aside and case is remanded for further proceedings.
The reasoning of the Court rested on the key words "evidence insufficient 
to justify . . . fair-field value." The Court did not object to the
City of Detroit v. Federal Power Commission; County of Wayne, 
Mchigan v. Federal Power Commission, 230 F. 2d 810 (C.A.D.C. 1955/' 
(Hereinafter referred to as City of Detroit.)
•^^Ibid., pp. 810.
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abandonment of the traditional rate-base method. As it said, earlier 
interpretations of the Act did not require "that use of the field price 
[method] is necessarily prohibited and that the rate-base method is 
mandatory for all properties and all circumstances. The holding in the 
case is inconsistent with such a meaning . . .  it is the result reached, 
not the method employed, which is controlling."^^ The use of prevailing 
field price as an element in the ultimate composition of rates was per­
fectly permissible, the Court held, so long as the result reached was
97not a rate higher than that which was just and reasonable.
The Commission was reminded that the fundamental purpose of the
Natural Gas Act was to prevent the exploitation of consumers, and that
this must be the basis of Commission policy and action. In pursuing
this end, the FPC was not required to hold rates at the lowest possible
level— to the "brink of confiscation." This rate was a constitutional
98limitation, not a statutory command. The need for exploration and 
development of gas reserves in order to assure future supplies was an 
acceptable element in rate making so long as it was directly related to 
the fundamental purpose of the Act. The Court concluded that the Com­
mission must use the rate-base method as a point of departure so that
99some comparative basis for decision was available. Denying the 
applicability of the concept of opportunity cost to rate making, the 
Court held that prices paid to other producers could not automatically 
be placed into the rate equation as a determinative element.
The whole thinking of the Court, then, revolved not around the 
use or non-use of a cost-based method, but instead on the validity of 
the fair field prices as the determinants of allowances for gas produced 
by interstate pipeline transporters. As the Court said in summarizing 
this position;
If the Commission contemplates increasing rates for the purpose 
of encouraging exploration and development, or the ownership by 
pipeline companies of their own producing facilities, it must see 
to it that the increase in fact is needed, and is no more than
^^ibid.. p. 814. ^^Ibid., p. 810.
^^Ibid.. p. 815. ^^Ibid., p. 810.
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is needed, for the purpose. . . . The amount allowed to Panhandle 
for the encouragement referred to is not shown to meet this test 
by any evidence and findings.
The amount here allowed is not brought into relationship by 
the evidence and findings with purposes for which it is granted 
except that it affords a larger revenue to Panhandle than other­
wise it would have. This is not an adequate basis for bringing
the resulting rate within the "just and reasonable" standards of
the Act. The mere fact that the field price method is used does
not vindicate the rate. Its use can be justified only in terms
of demonstrated public interest. In this case an allowance for 
the desired purposes, assuming they are valid, could be included 
without resort to field price.
The Federal Power Commission appealed the City of Detroit deci­
sion to the United States Supreme Court. It denied certiorari. The 
case was then remanded to the FPC for further consideration in the light 
of the Circuit Court decision. The FPC was forced to return to the 
traditional cost-based regulation of the integrated producers of natural 
gas. The cost-based method remained the basis for determining the 
allowance for gas produced through the end of 1962. No other concerted 
attempts were made to use the fair field price, partly because the issue 
of independent producer regulation arose to take the central position 
in the controversy over the appropriate role of the federal government 
in gas industry operations.
Social Control in the Natural Gas Industry
The City of Detroit decision stabilized all regulation of the 
natural gas industry other than that dealing with the sales for resale 
in interstate commerce by independent producers. A summary of industry 
regulation as it existed when independent producer control became the 
major item of controversy is now possible. The physical production of 
natural gas was under the supervision of the producing states. The dis­
tribution of natural gas to ultimate consumers was treated as a public
l°°Ibid.. p. 817.
^^^Certorari denied, 351 U.S. 829 (1956). Petition for rehear­
ing denied November 19, 1956.
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utility operation in most jurisdictions, with local authorities charged 
with the duty of protecting consumers from exploitation. The constitu­
tional barrier which prevented the states and localities from enforcing 
their estimates of fair value on the industry beyond the state line 
brought federal government regulation of interstate transmission. For 
the same reason, the production of gas by the transmission companies was 
subjected to similar federal price control. The valuation of gas pro­
duced by the transmission companies was assimilated into the same public- 
utility framework which was used to regulate the rest of the industry.
Federal regulation of the sales for resale of natural gas pro­
duced by independent producers had been suggested and was developing 
before the cost-based regulation of integrated production was re-estab­
lished by the City of Detroit case. Understanding of the development 
of this regulation requires knowledge of the market for natural gas in 
the field. Chapter IV below is presented to provide that information 
as background to the analysis of the development of FPC independent 
producer regulation in Chapter V.
CHAPTER IV
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIELD MARKET FOR NATURAL GAS
The field market for natural gas consists of the exchanges of 
gas between independent producers and direct or indirect consumers of 
natural gas. The exchange takes place at the point where the produc­
tion, gathering, and processing operations by the producer or his 
representatives are terminated. It was this market over which the FPC 
assumed control after the Supreme Court decision in the Phillips case 
expanded the recognized scope of authority under the Natural Gas Act. 
This study concentrates on the market for gas produced in the South­
west. The other markets, while of local importance, do not provide a 
sizable share of the gas moving into interstate commerce. Moreover, 
similarities between conditions in all field markets allow the study to 
be limited to the Southwestern region without significant sacrifice of 
general relevance. Characteristics of this market which influenced the 
course of regulation and the suitability of various methods of exerting 
social control over this phase of the industry are examined below.
The matters deemed essential for an understanding of the field 
market in the light of regulatory problems were summarized in three 
parts for presentation here. The first of these is the institutional 
organization of the field market. The second centers around the rela­
tionships between the independent natural gas producers and the 
interstate pipeline purchasers of natural gas. The field sales contract
^Southwest in this context refers to the five major gas produc­
ing states, Kansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Texas. In I960 
they produced 6,75^*9 billion cubic feet of the 7»5^>2 billion cubic 
feet transported interstate. Table B in the Appendix contains data on 
the role of the five Southwestern states in the natural gas industry of 
the United States.
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and its elements provide a convenient outline for examining these rela­
tionships. Finally, the market structure in the field markets was studied 
for indications of expected behavior relevant to regulation. Several 
competent studies of competition in the field markets have been made; 
these studies were the source of the findings which are reported in the 
last section of this chapter.
Field Market Organization
Two essential physical functions in the natural gas industry are 
the production and gathering of gas and its transportation to interstate 
consumers. The field market corollaries to these functions are selling, 
by the producer, and buying, by the transporter. Some firms are engaged 
solely in selling natural gas which they have produced. These are called 
independent producers. Other firms limit themselves to buying natural 
gas from others for interstate transportation. "Integrated" gas firms 
both produce gas and market it interstate. Whatever the institutional 
arrangement, the function performed is the important analytical element.
Sellers of Natural Gas in the Field
The sellers of natural gas in the field markets are either the
2
producers themselves or others in effect acting as agents of producers.
The producers of natural gas are those owning the wells and the produc­
ing facilities through which natural gas is brought to the surface.
These producers secure gas reserves, either by purchase or by explora­
tion, develop production, and operate producing and gathering facilities. 
Natural gas produced is sometimes secured as a joint product with oil, 
in which case it is known as associated or casinghead gas. Dry gas is 
that produced with no associated liquids. From some reservoirs gas is 
produced along with condensate (heavy hydrocarbons which condense into
2
Some natural gas plants sell residual gas after processing it 
for liquid hydrocarbons. Whether the plant takes ownership of the gas 
and therefore sells to its own account, or merely sells as an agent of 
the producer, is of no functional significance in field market analysis.
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liquids when pressure is released). Whatever the nature of the gas 
supply, the producers determine the conditions under which it is released 
for interstate shipment.
The similarity in function between the integrated and the inde­
pendent producers does not carry over to similarities in the commercial 
transfer of gas from the producer's control. The integrated firm trans­
fers gas "ownership" from one division of the corporate entity to another, 
except for some possible extra-firm sales to local consumers or trans­
porting companies. The independent producer gives up all future control 
over the gas in exchange for agreed upon payments. In the one case there 
is, conceptually at least, a mere intracompany transfer price agreed 
upon for control purposes. The total economic position of the company 
is not changed by the terms of the transfer. For bargains between the 
independent producer and the purchaser of gas, however, the terms of the 
transfer determine intercompany gains or losses. For this reason there 
is the presumption of an arm's-length bargain between a truly independent 
producer and a purchaser, while no such presumption can hold for trans­
fers within an integrated firm.
Purchasers of Natural Gas in the Field
The gas purchased in the field is destined for both interstate 
and intrastate use. The major purchasers of gas for interstate use are 
the gas transmission pipeline companies. These companies obtain some of 
their gas supplies from their own production, but even the integrated 
companies make some purchases from independent producers. Consuming 
market purchasers, either distributors or those who will use the gas for 
industrial purposes and power generation, occasionally buy gas in the 
field market and hire the transmission companies to transport it on a 
common carrier basis. Under agreements of this sort the transmission 
companies do not enter into the contracts as the owners of the gas they 
transport.
The intrastate uses of natural gas are similar to the interstate 
uses, except that part of the gas is used as a fuel in field production 
operations. Gas distribution companies purchase gas within the state
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for distribution to domestic, commercial, and industrial consumers.
Industrial consumers of natural gas purchase gas directly or indirectly 
for use as a raw material. Gas is used directly in the manufacture of 
carbon black and as a hydrocarbon source for various chemical processes. 
Natural gas used in the field is sometimes reinjected into producing 
formations to maintain reservoir pressure; such gas injection facilitates 
oil recovery. It is also recycled to bring up the heavy hydrocarbons
3
which could not otherwise be recovered.
Field Market Organization and Federal Regulation
Federal regulation of the natural gas field markets under the 
Natural Gas Act as interpreted in the Phillips decision extends only to 
interstate sales for resale of natural gas in interstate commerce.
Direct federal jurisdiction in the field market is exerted over sales of 
gas by an independent producer to a purchaser who buys for resale. The 
transfers of gas within a firm, as between the production and trans­
mission divisions of an integrated interstate company, are not jurisdic­
tional per se, though they fall under federal regulation if the gas is 
later sold for resale. From the point of view of this study, the 
important field market is that in which transfers of gas are made from 
independent producers to interstate purchasers for resale. The transfer 
conditions themselves are important to the allocation of natural gas and 
to the distribution of income. These conditions are examined below.
The Gas Sales Contract in the Field Market
Contracts between producers and purchasers of natural gas in the 
field deal with many variables, of which price is only one. Some of
3
Uses of natural gas on a national basis for various years since 
1929 are noted in Appendix Table E.
4A thorough explanation of the development and scope of federal 
authority over the sales for resale of natural gas in the field is post­
poned to Chapter V below. Provisions of the Natural Gas Act itself were 
summarized in Chapter III.
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these variables have to do with the suitability of the gas for its pros­
pective use and some with the costs of preparing it for interstate 
transmission. Among these might be listed such items as gas purity, 
heat value, pressure, size of reservoir dedicated, and number of points 
of delivery. Adjustments required in contracts to make proper allowance 
for differences in these conditions are rather determinable and straight­
forward. The price at which gas is to be transferred, however, and at 
least three other jaatters -are not technical and depend instead on the 
results of bargaining between the gas producers and the interstate pipe­
line purchasers. These elements of gas sales contracts either directly 
or indirectly affect the allocation of gas and the distribution of income 
and have an effect on regulation policy.
In the analysis of the field market for natural gas which follows, 
three elements in gas sales contracts are examined. The first of these 
is the life of the sales contract; the second is the indefinite pricing 
provisions found in some contracts; and the third is the take or pay pro­
vision. The general level of price is not considered except as it 
relates to other field market conditions. The interest in this material 
rests on three factors: first*, the historical changes in the producer-
purchaser balance of power in the market are illustrated by the changing 
contract provisions as much as by changes in the gas price level.
Second, regulation and market institutions must be reconciled, and the 
institutions of the gas field market are embodied in contract provisions. 
Finally, the clauses considered have important public policy implications 
in themselves.
Length of Contract Life
One significant difference between the sale of natural gas and 
the sale of many other commodities, including any associated oil and 
natural gas liquids, is that the sale of natural gas typically is made 
through long term contracts. A survey of contracts in the Southwestern 
field markets for the years 19 5^-1953 by Edward J. Neuner showed that 
approximately 38 per cent of the contracts were for twenty years or 
longer. Two per cent of the contracts were of indefinite length and
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presumably limited only by the life of the reservoir. Fifty-six per cent 
of the contracts were for fifteen or more years, while 78 per cent were 
for over ten years. Only 19 per cent of the contracts covered less than 
ten years, while five per cent of the contracts expired before the pass­
age of five years.^
Reasons for long term contracts
Long term contracts in the natural gas industry arose from the 
desire to provide a secure supply of gas over a long enough period to 
amortize fixed investment. Protection was desired for two categories of 
investors, the interstate transmission lines and the ultimate consumers, 
especially domestic and commercial users. The typical elements of 
investor decisions which led to the institution of long term contracts 
are analyzed below.
An interstate pipeline cannot be moved in search of gas supplies 
once it is in place, though extensions can be laid to new reservoirs. 
Similarly, the pipeline has almost no alternative uses. The initial com­
mitment of the pipeline to a given source of supply would require, then, 
assurances of long term adequacy of available reserves as a prerequisite 
for financial feasibility and for easy access to capital markets. Mere 
physical availability of gas supplies in the field would not be suffi­
cient in the absence of a firm dedication of those supplies to the 
particular pipeline. If gas supplies were owned by the pipeline, avail­
ability would be of no concern. If independent producers were relied 
upon, however, long term, firm, contracts would be essential.
Data calculated from Edward J. Neuner, The Natural Gas Industry; 
Monopoly and Competition in Field Markets (Norman; University of Okla­
homa Press, i960), pp. 104-07, including Table I8. Neuner presented data 
for 723 contracts negotiated between 1945 and 1953 in the Southwestern 
field markets. He pointed out that the indefinite nature of the provi­
sions in some contracts with price renegotiation clauses could lead to 
different interpretations of the length of some contracts. For our 
purposes, however, such adjustments are unnecessary because we deal with 
the length of the dedication.
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Once natural gas enters a consuming area the potential consumer 
faces the decision as to whether to begin natural gas service or not.^ 
This decision is usually faced upon the occasion of a replacement of an 
appliance so that the conversion to service is gradual and amounts to a 
marginal shift in use rather than a sudden switch. Ordinarily, the con­
sumer invests in equipment which has a high capital cost relative to the 
cost of the gas service. Therefore the ultimate consumer is a "captive" 
of the natural gas service in the sense that with the purchase of gas 
appliances he shifts his demand for natural gas upward. While the con­
sumer can shift back to other energy sources, such a shift will 
ordinarily involve a capital loss unless it takes place gradually as
7
replacement of gas appliances becomes otherwise justified. Long run 
availability of gas supplies is required to guard against such capital 
losses. Mindful of the fixed nature of the consumer investment in 
equipment to utilize natural gas, the FPC has required pipeline companies
If the consumer was formerly served by manufactured gas the 
decision is out af his hands. He must convert his appliances because
his earlier service will no longer be available to him. Of course, he
also has the option of discontinuing gas service. Consideration of 
this matter from the distribution industry viewpoint is found above in
Chapter III and is treated on the consumer level here.
A distinction frequently ignored in this connection is the dif­
ference between a shift in a consumer's demand for natural gas and a 
response to a change in price given a certain demand structure. Demand 
curve A in the illustrative graph below shows a given (small) demand for 
gas for a limited purpose, say cooking.
Demand curve B shows the short run 
demand for gas by the same consumer 
after an investment in additional gas 
using appliances. If price rises from 
to Po after the investment the 
householder can only move up his demand 
curve B. Given price P£ at the time 
appliance replacement decisions were 
made, the consumer might well have de­
cided not to use gas as an energy source.
After the investment he no longer has 
this choice except at the expense of a 
capital loss. Consumption of gas does, 
however, respond to price changes though 
the elasticity of demand.can be expected 
to be small.
«
Ü
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to control adequate reserves to assure long run gas service in the con­
suming markets as a precondition for certification. Contracts not 
contributing to the twenty year deliverability of gas are not considered 
as part of the available supply required before certification.
Producer objections to long term 
contracts
Long term contracts, though to the advantage of the transporters 
and the consuming public, were not similarly desirable from the producer 
point of view.^ The producers could be expected to resist dedicating 
reserves for twenty years at current prices for two reasons. First, the 
producer costs of uncertainty from short term contracts were low relative 
to potential gains, even assuming no change in the average price of gas. 
Second, higher gas prices were in fact to be expected during the 1946- 
1960 period, given the underlying market factors.
General preference for short term 
contracts
The producers recognized that the pipeline companies were subject 
to significant exit costs once lines were connected and facilities in 
place. These exit costs were a source of bargaining power to the pro­
ducers because the pipeline could be required to pay the cost to it of 
receiving gas from its best alternative upon threat of disconnection. 
Given the capital outlays required, the exploitative gain was poten­
tially large even though the spot price in the alternative field was 
lower than the price in the original field. The producer could feel 
relatively sure, then, of selling gas at or above the spot price once 
the pipeline was connected. Short term contracts increased the oppor­
tunity for exploiting the transporter exit costs without at the same 
time appreciably increasing producer uncertainty. Offsetting the pro­
ducer's desire for short term contracts was the cost of negotiating 
added contracts and the possibility of being left without a market if
8The analysis which follows is based on the theoretical reactions 
of the profit maximizing independent producer. No claim is made that any 
given individual producer did organize his decisions in this way.
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short term contracts were insisted upon. This uncertainty as to pipe­
line connection was reduced in some states by the ratable taking and 
prorationing statutes.
The producer commitment decision was made in the face of 
expected price increases which reinforced the producer desire for short 
term contracts. The depressed condition of the economy during the 1930 
decade delayed expansion of natural gas pipelines and of natural gas 
consumption, but even during the depth of the depression there were large 
increases both in natural gas production and in transportation inter­
state. Between 1933 and 1938, for example, interstate transmission of 
natural gas almost doubled, going from 3^7 billion to 637 billion cubic 
feet. Marketed production of natural gas rose from 1,556 billion to 
2,296 billion cubic feet during the same period.^ World War II slowed 
the growth in interstate transmission of natural gas, but the growth 
accelerated when resources were released for pipeline construction fol­
lowing the war. The expected and experienced growth in the market for 
natural gas raised expectations that the value of the gas in the field 
would rise when the excess productive capacity was gradually taken up by 
increased gas sales outlets. The producers, given this picture of the 
future, preferred not to commit their reserves to long term contracts 
at fixed prices. So long as their bargaining power was restricted by 
the excess capacity hanging over the market, however, there was little 
that the producers could do to alter the contract conditions.
In addition to the expansion of both the interstate and intra­
state markets for natural gas, the relative shift from intrastate to 
interstate consumption led to an even more optimistic sales outlook.
The growth in the interstate market allayed fears of intrastate market 
saturation. In 1933 approximately 22 per cent of marketed gas flowed 
into interstate channels. In 1938 this figure had risen to approxi­
mately 28 per cent, where it stayed until the postwar pipeline expan­
sions started making themselves felt in 1947. In the three years from 
1947 to 1950 the proportion of marketed gas going into interstate
9
See Table D in the Appendix for source and more complete data.
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commerce rose ten points from approximately 31 per cent to 41 per cent. 
Fifty per cent of marketed gas went interstate in 1953* After 195^ the 
change from intrastate to interstate use slackened off, and in I960
approximately 58 per cent of the marketed natural gas flowed across state
,, 10 lines.
The strengthened position of the producer of natural gas was 
reflected in the trend of gas prices in the postwar period. An exami­
nation of that price trend puts the producer’s position into perspective 
and points up the costs to him of fixed field prices. Two indicators of 
field gas prices are available. The first of these is the average field 
price of natural gas delivered each year. The second is a measure of 
new contract prices. Average prices are considered from 1938 forward, 
but estimates of average new contract prices are readily available only 
from 1945 through 1953»^ ^
The average price data used were drawn from the estimates pre­
pared by the Bureau of Mines and published in the Minerals Yearbook each 
12year. The new contract data were secured from Neuner's study of the
Southwestern field markets for gas flowing interstate. The two sets of
data are not strictly comparable. The average field prices include all
13United States sales, some of which are intrastate. Of course, these 
sales vere made under contracts of various maturities and with various 
initiation dates. The preponderance of old contracts at any one time 
dampens changes in the series. Neuner dealt only with Southwestern 
sales to interstate pipelines. New contract data are more responsive
^^Calculated from Minerals Yearbook, various years. Data for 
some years are found in Appendix Table B.
^^These are the dates covered by Neuner in his study. Other 
estimates of new contract prices would not be consistent with these 
data so no attempt was made to fill out the series with the scattered 
other references available.
12Some of these data are found in Table H of the Appendix.
13These two differences in coverage compared to Neuner*s sample 
would most likely exhibit counterbalancing bias. Non-Southwestern field 
prices are probably higher but intrastate use brings lower prices (be­
cause of field and carbon black consumption).
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to short run fluctuations and the indicating series is not influenced by 
past prices. The new contract data presented are a composite of the 
estimated prices of all contracts entered into during a given year with 
adjustments for non-price contract elements. The resulting series was, 
in Neuner's terms, "Representative Natural Gas Field Prices, Large- 
Volume Interstate Pipe-line Market, Various Gas Supply Areas, 19^5- 
1953»"^^ Changes in prices from year to year can be expected to reflect 
market movements, but untoward reliance should not be given to the abso­
lute levels of prices.
Figure 2 was prepared to present the information on price trends 
in the most meaningful way consistent with a description of changing 
conditions in the field market. The average field prices are shown by 
the solid line segments linking the values for various years. A 
schematic scatter diagram illustrates new contract prices in various 
supply areas, with one dot for each area in which contracts were nego­
tiated, and two dots if there was a significant change in price during 
the last half of the year. A typical "representative" price determined 
by simple averaging of the various new contract price estimates is shown 
with the broken line.^^
The price of gas in the field markets was quite stable from 1938 
until 1943-1946 at which time the average price started moving up. The 
national average price, raised by the relatively high prices in the 
eastern producing regions, was actually above the new contract price in 
the Southwestern field markets before 1 9 4 6 . After 1946 the new con­
tract prices rose rather steadily until 1951 when average prices jumped
^^Neuner, Table 16, p. 63-
^^No consideration was given to differing quantities of gas 
dedicated or to other contract provisions not already included in Neuner*s 
adjustments. All plots were made to the nearest one half cent.
^^What Neuner characterizes as the "prior to 1945" new contract 
price in the Southwestern markets, when averaged as in the data for 1945- 
1933, works out to a typical price of 3*7^ Mcf., well below the average 
national price of approximately 5^  Mcf. Neuner, Table l6, p. 63.
Figure 2
AVERAGE NATURAL GAS FIELD PRICES, 1938-1960;^ "REPRESENTATIVE NATURAL GAS FIELD PRICES, 
LARGE-VOLUME INTERSTATE PIPE-LINE MARKET, VARIOUS GAS SUPPLY AREAS, 1945-53" 
AVERAGE OF "REPRESENTATIVE FIELD PRICES," 1945-1953°
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^Minerals Yearbook, various years. All gas markets.
Neuner, Table 16, p. 63, "Representative Natural Gas Field Prices, Large Volume Interstate 
Pipe-Line Market, Various Gas Supply Areas, 1945-53*" Data plotted from this table and labeled "New 
Contract Prices." Both amounts plotted in cases of intra-year price changes.
^Broken line. Calculated by simple averaging of "Representative Field Prices" in order to 
show central tendency. No adjustment was made on basis of contract volumes.
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almost 50 per cent over the previous level. The bar graph below was
prepared to illustrate the changes in per cent of previous year's new
contract price. It can be seen from these data that the producers in
the postwar period were committing their reserves in a market which
17showed rather continuous price increases. For this reason the pro­
ducers did not wish to obligate themselves to deliver gas in the future 
at the price current at the time the contracts were signed.
20
c
8
1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952
Figure 3• Per cent change to previous year's 
price, average of "Representative Field Prices." Cal­
culated from Neuner, Table 16, p. 63.
Contract length became a negotiable factor in the over-all gas 
purchase package because of the importance of it to the two contracting 
parties. To get long term contracts the purchaser was required to give 
up something of value once bargaining power shifted to the producer. 
Price flexibility upwards, discussed at a later point, was one device 
offered by pipeline companies to obtain long term dedication of gas 
reserves. To gain contract certainty, pipelines sometimes negotiated
17The rising field prices could be expected to feed on them­
selves. The anticipation of further price increases caused the pro­
ducers to hold production off the market awaiting a higher price.
Holding production off the market lessened the supply of gas reserves 
and drove the price paid by the producers upward. The higher prices 
paid, in turn reinforced the expectations of still higher prices and 
caused even more gas to be held off the market. In this way expecta­
tions of higher price to some extent made those higher prices obtainable.
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definite price increases to take effect at specified times during the 
life of the contract. Initial prices sometimes were established at 
higher levels to induce the producers to forego indefinite pricing 
provisions. These changes were among the implications of long run 
contracts.
Implications of long term contracts
The long term contracts characteristic of the field market for 
natural gas going interstate had significant public policy implications 
during the pre-regulation period. The long term contracts, especially 
those with firm prices throughout the length of the contract, changed 
the allocation of natural gas among consumers and over time, and changed 
the distribution of income as well. Analysis of these effects of long 
term contracts rests on the introduction of a new purchaser into a given 
producing area. A model limited to one area and one new purchaser 
simplifies but does not alter the case of a general increase in the de­
mand for natural gas for interstate transmission.
Effect in the field market
The new purchaser entering a supply area operates under a given 
derived demand for natural gas. This derived demand for natural gas is 
the product of the purchaser's resale market and his own cost function. 
The two factors determining the amount of natural gas which would be 
purchased at given prices reinforce one another because the lower the 
throughput, generally the higher the unit cost of transmission. So long 
as this derived demand curve is somewhat elastic the burden of the argu­
ment is unchanged.
If the field market into which the purchaser sought entry had 
been developed over time most of the gas reserves would be under long 
term contract and both prospective suppliers and prospective purchasers 
would be out of the market. The effect of the long term contracts would 
not be neutral, however, because of the upward movement of gas prices. 
The amount of gas demanded under long term contracts at the time the new 
purchaser entered the field would be greater than it would have been had 
those contracts not existed. This follows because the price at which
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the gas was delivered under older contracts would typically be lower than 
the equilibrium price without long term contracts. At the lower effec­
tive price the amount demanded would be greater even if the demand for 
gas were the same under long term contracts as under spot markets. Simi­
larly, the total amount of gas supplied in the developed field would be
somewhat lower under the long term contracts than under the probable
18higher spot equilibrium price. As a result, the greater the proportion 
of the supply of gas dedicated under long term contracts, and the lower 
the dedication price relative to the equilibrium price in the absence of 
long term contracts, the higher the price the new purchaser will have to 
pay to obtain a given quantity of gas from a specified field, holding 
external factors constant.
Economic results of long term 
contracts
Long term contracts in the gas field markets led to two economic 
results of interest to public policy. The first of these concerned eco­
nomic welfare and the second the distribution of income. Long term sales 
contracts led to pricing of natural gas to different consumers at dif­
ferent prices for no reason justified by the cost of production or even 
by profit maximizing price discrimination. There was no opportunity for 
arbitrage to balance prices through a secondary market because of fixed 
transportation facilities. Therefore identical gas was priced differ­
ently in different consuming markets. Conceptually, one group of 
consumers, the marginal nonusers in the high priced consumption area,
18
The effect of a higher equilibrium price on supply depends on 
the nature of the assumptions made. If price were raised on developed 
reserves the only effect on amount supplied would result from improved 
reservoir management since the higher price would be nonmarginal in 
terms of development. In unexplored and undeveloped areas adjustments 
of supply would have far greater potential since they could affect well 
drilling and spacing decisions. (See Chapter II.) In this context, 
the higher price for old and developed areas resulting from spot prices 
rather than long term contracts would be counterbalanced with a lower 
price for new and undeveloped areas. Since marginal adjustments are 
potentially small in the developed areas and large in the undeveloped 
areas the direction in which total gas supply would move might well be 
downward if long term contracts were eliminated.
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could have profitably compensated the other group of consumers, the mar­
ginal users in the low price area, for giving up some of the gas consumed. 
The existence of possible gain from trading demonstrated the absences of 
an optimal allocation of the gas and consequent loss in economic welfare 
because of long term gas sale contracts.
Long term contracts also changed the distribution of income as 
compared with short term or spot markets. The consumers benefiting from 
old low price contracts received gas at sub-equilibrium prices. The pro­
ducers who dedicated gas at low prices obtained less income than they 
would have received had their reserves been part of the total supply for 
which all buyers were bidding, though the gains from earlier realization 
might have offset the lower price later. The producers with undedicated 
reserves received a higher price when the reserves were sold because of 
the unsymmetrical effects of long term contracts on the amount of gas 
supplied and demanded. The purchasers bidding for the limited supply of 
natural gas paid a higher price for the gas than would have been paid 
in the absence of prior reserve dedication. The desirability of this 
change in income distribution is, of course, not a matter of issue here. 
That long terms for gas sales contracts changed this distribution is a 
matter of analytical importance.
Indefinite Pricing Agreements
The effects of the long term contracts were considerably modified 
by the development of the indefinite pricing or escalation clauses.
These clauses made their appearance in the gas field market after the 
upsurge in demand for natural gas resulted in rising field prices and in 
a strengthened producer position. The clauses established price pro­
tection to the seller by providing for an increase in price under certain 
triggering conditions. These clauses reduced producer reluctance to 
commit reserves in the face of a rising market price.
Types of escalation clauses
There were several variants on the escalation clause pattern, 
the distinctions between them based on the triggering mechanism. The
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two-party favored nation clauses held the pipeline responsible for pay­
ing to the seller the highest price that the pipeline paid for gas 
purchased in the same geographic area. The third-party favored nation 
clause required the pipeline to pay as much as any purchaser paid who 
bought similar quantities and qualities of gas in a certain geographic 
area. While the pipeline maintained control over the price it paid in
the two-party clause contracts, it did not have such control when a
19third-party clause was instituted. A variation of the third-party 
favored nation clause required periodic price redetermination on the 
basis of the three highest prices paid in the gas supply area. Under 
some arrangements the pipelines were required either to share or to 
assume any tax increases on the commodity in the field. Under still 
other agreements the price of gas in the field was tied to the price 
received by the pipeline transporter or some index of general price 
movement. Whatever the nature of the price adjustment clause, if the 
pipeline were free to void the contract rather than pay a price increase 
the limits of price change were the cost of the alternatives available
to the pipeline. In some contracts this freedom existed; in a majority
. . . ,20 it did not.
Effects of escalation clauses
The escalation clauses in general removed to some degree the 
effect that long term contracts had on the allocation of resources and 
the distribution of income. Escalation clauses, when effective, removed
19The result of the two-party clauses was probably uneconomic 
expansion and duplication of transmission lines because the pipeline did 
maintain control over prices paid. A given pipeline would be unwilling 
to trigger the two-party clauses in its old supply area and therefore 
would be willing to extend lines outside its historical purchase area to 
tap higher prices reserves. While the pipeline cost of line extensions 
was perhaps less than the cost of higher prices for all purchased gas, 
the social cost from unnecessary resource use would certainly lie in the 
other direction.
20The various types of escalation clauses are discussed in 
several works. One easily available source is Neuner, pp. 80-111.
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some of the disadvantage experienced by a pipeline seeking new or expanded 
gas supplies. Some of the price differential among gas sales contracts 
was eliminated. Natural gas was therefore allocated more nearly in 
accordance with its value to the ultimate consumer. In this way the 
escalation clauses contributed to increasing economic welfare by increas­
ing the efficiency of gas allocation.
Most attention has been given to the effect of escalation clauses 
on the distribution of income. Producers who sold their reserves under 
price escalation provisions received the benefits of rising field prices 
which they would otherwise have been denied. The difference in producer
return represented primarily a transfer of income from the consumers of
21the gas to the producers. These additional payments did little to 
alter the production decisions of producers except to cause some small 
adjustments in reservoir management because of the fixed nature of reser­
voir development. As discussed above, the new consumers benefited from 
lower prices and greater available gas supply to the extent that the 
higher prices under the old contracts choked off some of the gas sales 
to old customers and freed supply for higher value uses. The distribu­
tional effects of the escalation clauses, then, were not limited to 
increasing producer rent.
Take or Pay Provisions
The "take or pay" provision in a gas sales contract established
the requirement that the purchaser pay for a certain quantity of gas
each time period whether it was taken or not. The minimum take was usu-
22
ally stated in terms of a per cent of the face amount of the contract.
This provision has received little attention in the literature, either 
on a descriptive level or in terms of analysis of its impact. For
21
Some of this income, as explained in the section above, came 
from the undedicated reserves. Had the escalation clauses not existed 
the higher total demand for gas would have resulted in higher prices for 
the previously undedicated reserves.
22
Eighty per cent appears to have been the typical take or pay 
ratio, though summary data on this point were not available.
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example, no compilation of contracts in which the take or pay provision 
was considered explicitly has been located. The nature of the various 
passing references to the provision led the writer to conclude that the 
clause was so common in the industry as to have passed with little or no 
comment.
Purpose of the take or pay provision
The take or pay provision was inserted into contracts for the 
benefit of the producers. The desirability of the clause from the pro­
ducer point of view rested on three factors. First, the interstate 
consumption for natural gas was highly seasonal, and therefore pipelines 
required less gas during the summer months. Second, the independent 
producer had no guarantee that the pipeline would reduce its take equi­
tably among all producers. Without a take or pay provision it would be 
more profitable for the pipeline to produce from its own wells or from 
the lowest cost reservoir. The individual producer, however, had high 
fixed costs relative to variable costs and therefore had an additional 
high incentive for rapid pay-out. Finally, in the case of co-tenancy in 
a pool, drainage of reserves resulted when some wells produced while 
others were shut in. The drainage problem was especially troublesome to 
the producer in a pool shared with an integrated producer which was also 
the pipeline purchaser. The take or pay provision was thus designed to 
assure the independent producer of a relatively equitable and constant 
share of the market for natural gas. But in doing so it exaggerated the 
existing pipeline load problem.
23Among the fragmentary references to th is  is su e  were the fo llow ­
ing found in  the l i t e r a tu r e  between I960 and 1962s Arthur K. Lee, 
"Introducing Supply and Demand Control for  Gas Producer Regulation,"  
Public U t i l i t i e s  F ortn igh tly . LXVII, No. 6 (March 16, 1961), p. 374; 
Arthur K. Lee, "Gas Confusion Unlimited," Public U t i l i t i e s  F ortn igh tly , 
LXVI, No. 7 (March 31» I960), p. 444; Frederick Stueck, "Current Factors 
in  Gas Producer Rate Cases," Public U t i l i t i e s  F ortn igh tly , LXVI, No. 3 
(February 4 , I960), p. I 5I; "Oil men concerned, but hopeful," Oil and 
Gas Journal, LX, No. 3 (January 15, 1962), p. 50.
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Economie effects of take or pay
The take or pay provision is particularly significant in affect­
ing resale patterns by the pipelines. By shifting a large part of the 
commodity cost from the variable to the fixed categories, the take or pay 
provision leads to different profit maximizing marketing and pricing 
strategies. The following are the salient factors in pipeline marketing 
decisions: The pipelines are required to maintain sufficient capacity to
accommodate peak demands from their firm customers. Therefore the pipe­
lines cannot react to take or pay provisions by refusing to serve peaks 
to stabilize demand at relative full deliverability. Yet the very sharp 
peaks for which allowance must be made typically last only a few days or 
weeks each winter. For five months the domestic and commercial load is 
relatively high and stable, and for the rest of the year it is relatively 
low. Hence serving the demand peaks under perfect foresight would leave
excess line and production capacity 98-99 per cent of the year, and
2^highly excess capacity over 50 per cent of the year. Given the fixed 
nature of capital and commodity costs, the marginal cost of peak service 
is very high to the pipelines and the cost of service at all other times 
is minimal. The take or pay provisions increase the costs of peak 
capacity.
Off-peak loads are the preferred means of raising line load fac- 
25tors to reduce peak costs. Except for possible expansion of air 
conditioning loads, the major opportunity for additional summer gas sales 
is in the bulk energy market. In this market, advantages of cleanliness 
and controllability which ordinarily enable gas to obtain a premium are 
of minimal consequence. The price obtainable for gas is set through 
competition with other fuels on a delivered BTU basis. The pipelines
24
An alternative to excess deliverability capacity would be peak 
shaving capacity at the consuming end of the pipeline. Gas storage, 
manufactured gas, and gasification of stored gas liquids are the most 
important peak shaving methods available at present.
25A nonseasonal firm demand for natural gas would be a desirable 
market for the pipelines. Though such a market would not be contra- 
seasonal, it would increase both peak and trough sales by some amount 
and thereby reduce the amplitude of the peaks.
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add to their net income so long as the price they receive for their gas
in off-peak sales more than covers the variable costs of delivering the
gas. For a company purchasing gas under a take or pay contract this
price limit would possibly fall below the average cost of the gas to it
in the field. Depending on the demand conditions, then, the pipeline
might lose money on every cubic foot of gas it delivered to the inter-
ruptable or off-peak consumers. Other consumers would have to pay a
price for gas sufficiently above the average cost of delivery to offset
the losses from sales negotiated below cost. Yet the alternative of no
below-cost sales would result in even higher prices to the firm con- 
26sumers.
Public policy implications of take 
or pay
The take or pay provision was the natural defense of the pro­
ducer. It forced the pipelines to take some of the responsibility for
The problem of pricing off-peak gas to industrial and other 
consumers is beyond the scope of this paper. The FPC faced this problem 
directly in setting the rates in industrial sales by the pipeline com­
panies. The so-called Atlantic Seaboard formula was adopted by the FPC 
as a rule of thumb in these decisions. The Commission decided in the 
Atlantic Seaboard case that fixed costs should be allocated $0 per cent 
to demand charges and 50 per cent to commodity charges. Under this rul­
ing pipeline fixed costs were allocated to both the capacity and the 
volumetric services performed by the pipeline. Off-peak consumers con­
tributed to the fixed costs of line capacity even though they did not 
participate in the peak demand. Their contribution was limited, however, 
to their share of the 50 per cent of the fixed charges which were allo­
cated to the commodity service. Interruptable users did not contribute 
to charges levied on peak consumption demand. The firm service customers 
were left with their share of the fixed costs allocated to the commodity 
and with all of the 50 per cent of the fixed costs which were allocated 
and charged on a demand basis. In the Matters of Atlantic Seaboard 
Corporation and Virginia Gas Transmission Corporation. 11 F. P. C. 43, 
52-57 ( 1952) .  For further information on the issuesraised by the 
Atlantic Seaboard decision see; Arthur K. Lee, "Producer and Gas Pipe­
line Yardsticks," Public Utilities Fortnightly, LXIII, No. 7 (March 26, 
1959) ,  pp. 451-61  ; Lee, Public Utilities Fortnightly, LXV, No. 7, pp. 
443-53; Lee, Public Utilities Fortnightly. LXVIII, No. 6, pp. 369-75: 
Stanislow H. Wellisz, "The Public Interest in Gas Industry Rate Struc­
tures," Public Utilities Fortnightly. Part I: LXX, No. 2 (July 19,
1962) ,  pp. 65-78; Part II: LXX, No. 3 (August 2 , 1962), pp. 145-56.
the seasonality in gas sales. In the absence of strong laws protecting 
correlative rights, it also protected the producer from possible exploi­
tation from co-tenants in the pool. From the pipeline point of view, in 
turn, industrial sales below cost were optimizing behavior given the 
circumstances. The public policy implications of the take or pay pro­
vision, however, rested on an evaluation of the social effects of the 
take or pay provision itself. The first order effects of the presence 
of the take or pay provision, holding other factors constant, would be 
to increase producer income at the expense of consumers and to increase 
the use rate of natural gas. The desirability of these effects depends 
upon the values held by the evaluator and upon their further effects on 
other matters.
Transfer Conditions in the Postwar Field Market:
A Summary
The relative advantage in the field market shifted from the pur­
chasers of natural gas to the producers of natural gas during the postwar 
period. The average price of gas in the field rose from five cents per 
Mcf in 19^5 to 14 cents in i960. New contract commitment prices showed 
an even greater increase. Nor was the price change the only benefit the 
producers received. While the producers were unable to shorten signifi­
cantly the total contract length, they were able to get the indefinite 
pricing agreements which reduced the disadvantage to them of the long 
term commitment. Take or pay provisions were also inserted in the con­
tract and protected the producers against seasonality and discrimination 
on the part of the pipeline companies.
The ascendance of the producer in the postwar field market as 
indicated by changes in contract terms could have been due to the natural 
limits of natural gas supply in conjunction with the continuously rising 
demands exerted in the fields. Alternately, the producer benefits could 
have been increased by noncompetitive behavior in the field market which 
artificially restricted output and forced exploitative concessions on 
the pipelines. An examination of the competitive nature of the field 
market is presented below to throw some light on these issues.
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Competitive Nature of the Field Market for Natural Gas
The presence or absence of workable competition among the sellers 
of natural gas in the field bore importantly on the general question of 
field sales regulation. It was noted above (Chapter III) that the absence 
of competition in an industry which was significant to a segment of the 
public brought a presumption for regulation under traditional United 
States public policy. The presence of considerable market power, a 
monopolistic element, in the field sales market would lead to a presump­
tion for regulation of producers. The presence of competition, on the 
other hand, would indicate that the industry could be presumed to be 
adequately performing its allocative functions and regulation would neces­
sarily rest on other motives. Cookenboo expressed the import of this 
issue in a statement describing the purpose of his monograph on field 
market competition;
Rather our purpose is to analyze for this industry the central 
economic issue present in deciding whether any industry should be 
regulated, viz, whether there is "workable" (effective) competi­
tion present. To some, perhaps to most, economists the answer to 
this central economic issue would in itself tell us whether regu­
lation is necessary. An affirmative establishment of the 
existence of effective competition would indicate that regulation 
is unnecessary; conversely, proof of the absence of competition 
would indicate the desirability of regulation. 7^
Neuner said on the same subject: "The main argument used to justify an
extension of public price control to natural gas field markets centers
pQ
on the claim of monopoly."
Three independent studies of the gas field markets have examined 
the question of the existence and viability of producer competition. 
Together they covered the postwar period up to about 1958. These studies 
were based primarily on contract data filed with the FPC, along with 
other information supplied by industry sources. Two of the studies, the
27Leslie Cookenboo, Jr., "Competition in the Field Market for 
Natural Gas," The Rice Institute Pamphlet, XLIV, No. 4 (January, 1958),
p. 2.
28Neuner, p. 20?.
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ones by Neuner and by Mac Avoy, discussed the entire Southwestern field
markets, dividing the region into submarkets and gas supply areas where
necessary and possible. Cookenboo chose to consider the producers in two
groupings, those located in the Gulf Coast markets (Texas, Louisiana,
and Mississippi), and in the nation as a whole. The discussion below of
competition in the field markets was drawn from these published works.
29The conclusions reached by the three writers are reported separately.
The Neuner Study of Competition in the Gas 
Field Markets
Neuner isolated and described the necessary conditions for
monopoly exploitation in the gas field market and then tested the market
during the period 19^5-1953 for the presence of those conditions. In
the portion of his study devoted to a theoretical formulation of monopoly
preconditions, he reported that control over only particular portions of
the total supply of field gas could yield monopolistic potential. These
critical portions of the gas supply were the low cost reserves or any
uncommitted portion of developed supply areas.
Control over low cost gas reserves brought monopoly power
30limited only by the cost of noncontrolled alternatives. Similarly,
monopolistic control over the uncommitted reserves in a partially
developed field led to possible monopoly returns even though the other
portions of the gas supply were secured competitively. When demand
increased, purchasing pressures were exerted only on the uncommitted 
31reserves. Under monopoly control, the price of the uncommitted 
29The present writer has made no independent study of competition 
in the gas field markets and therefore has no contribution to make on the 
subject. The major concerns of the present study do not depend on the 
structure of field market competition. Some indication of the market 
structure is helpful, however, and for that reason this discussion of 
the findings of other students of the problem is presented.
^^Neuner, pp. 224-28.
31The discussion of the effect of long term contracts earlier in 
this chapter bears on this point. In the prior discussion competition 
was assumed. Here the element of monopoly is shown to push scarcity 
returns even higher.
137
reserves could be raised by an all-or-none strategy to the level just
offsetting the cost of a movement to an alternative reservoir. In this
way the interests which controlled the uncommitted reserves could obtain
a price that was both higher than the competitive price and higher than
the price which would have resulted if the previously sold gas were
32available to meet the total demand.
In essence, these conditions delineated by Neuner merely reflected 
the price determining quality of the marginal source of supply. If the 
marginal source of supply were monopolistically controlled, any price 
higher than the supply price of the marginal unit produced would be 
reflected in all sales, just as would any other supply price at the mar­
gin. The limits to the extra-marginal supply price which could be 
obtained would be set by the price required to bring uncontrolled alter­
natives into the market. Under competitive conditions, of course, 
alternatives are not artificially restricted and no exploitation of this 
sort is possible. Exploitative field markets in the natural gas industry 
would require either monopolistic control or collusion sufficient to 
yield the same effect. To test the gas markets for these elements,
Neuner first tested the concentration of the gas sellers against certain 
concentration benchmarks. This involved a study of the market structure. 
He then tested for collusion by means of comparing the experienced 
market behavior with the behavior anticipated under collusion.
Structure of the market
A new pipeline would be free to locate its facilities and there­
fore its source of supply anywhere in the nation because it would not be 
committed to any locality. The relevant supply market for new pipelines 
would therefore include the entire nation and some foreign countries 
under certain circumstances. Seller concentration in the production 
industry as a whole would determine the range of possible monopolistic 
exploitation of a new pipeline buyer. Neuner concluded from his study 
of gas sales contracts and holdings of gas reserves for the 19^5-1953
^^Neuner, pp. 228-31.
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period that the concentration of sellers in the gas industry was less 
than the concentration in most of the manufacturing industries in the 
United S t a t e s . H e  found further that the natural limitations on supply 
and the difficulty of entry into the production industry were not suffi­
cient to reflect a lessening of the impact of competition as compared 
with manufacturing industries. Though this last finding was a matter of 
judgment, he decided that all matters considered, the gas production 
industry was more competitive than manufacturing. Neuner concluded that
the concentration ratio in the gas producing industry taken as an entity
3k
was not sufficient by itself to yield exploitative gains to producers.
The relative immobility of established pipelines, however, made 
the individual submarkets the important unit for studying the possibility 
of monopoly exactions from expanding demands. The four submarkets into 
which the Southwestern producing region was divided were geographically 
situated so as to minimize exit costs of buyers shifting within them.
The submarkets were chosen to exhibit some degree of internal homogeneity 
in costs and desirability to buyers.
The concentration of producers was greater when individual sub- 
markets were considered than when the entire Southwest was taken as an 
entity. Because different producers were producing in different submar­
kets, the smaller the market area considered the greater the concentration 
would appear to be. Even so, Neuner concluded that the concentration of 
production was not sufficient even within the gas supply submarkets to 
lead to significant exploitative gains. The only region in which there
was a very high concentration of production, the Panhandle-Hugoton-West
35Texas area, contained a counterbalancing monopsonistic buyer. Neuner
concluded: "Generally, the level of submarket concentration is not so
high that it is likely to result in a large market power based either
36upon differential supply costs or buyer exit-costs." Therefore the 
structure of the field market for natural gas did not reveal a high degree 
of concentration.
33lbid.. 239-46. ^\bid., pp. 245-46.
^^Ibid.. pp. 246-51. ^^Ibid.. p. 250 .
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Collusion in natural gas production
Collusion, whether tacit or direct, would have offset the competi­
tive structure of the gas supply industry if it had limited the alterna­
tives available to interstate gas purchasers. Neuner used inferential 
evidence to test the market for noncompetitive behavior. As Neuner put 
it, "The primary clue to noncompetitive behavior is the existence of 
uniformities in seller actions under circumstances where such uniformi­
ties are inconsistent with the realistic functioning of a competitive 
market.
The benefits of monopolistic control over price can only be 
obtained through restriction on production. This restriction is diffi­
cult to secure if a large number of sellers exist because each producer 
could be expected to gain in so far as he did not cooperate while others 
did. For this reason collusion requires policing. Neuner stated that, 
because of the policing problem, identical contracts are necessary to 
maintain collusion in an industry with a competitive structure and com­
plex sales contracts. Diversity in contracts was taken, then, as 
inferential evidence of competitive market behavior.
An examination of the contracts available to him convinced
Neuner that contract diversity existed nationally. Historically, prices
rose in a stair-step pattern, indicating a competitive response of
prices to increased demand exerted first in the most desirable producing
regions. The pattern followed was characterized by price pressure at
one point bringing a shift of buyers to another field, where the increased
demand resulted in a higher price. Over time, the price changes were
39transmitted in this way to all the gas supply areas.
Contracts were more uniform within individual gas supply areas. 
Generally, however, and in all cases where the uniformity persisted, it 
was the pipeline buyer, not the seller, who in effect "posted" prices 
and contract terms. In most cases where such a pattern was observed its
3?Ibid.. pp. 255-56. ^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.. p. 257.
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source was pinpointed by the presence of other pipelines making contracts 
containing different conditions. To generalize, Neuner said; "The 
analysis of field market transactions covering the period 1945-1953 did 
not disclose a condition of contract uniformity which could sustain an 
inference of monopolistic seller agreement.
Monopoly and contract provisions
The final topic considered by Neuner was the competitive impli­
cation of certain market practices. These provisions were the favored- 
nation clauses, the price redetermination stipulation, and the long term 
contract. Two questions relating to these practices were entertained by 
Neuner. The first of these was whether the mere presence of these 
clauses was an indication of noncompetitive behavior. The second was 
whether these devices had monopolistic potential, and if so, how much.
These provisions in the contracts were found to be perfectly con­
sistent with a workably competitive market. Moreover, to Neuner there 
"does not appear to be sufficient evidence to support readily an inference 
of seller collusion" in obtaining favored-nation or price redetermination 
clauses in the contracts.Whatever the source of the provisions, by 
themselves they had little price effect nor did they have exploitative 
potential. Even the two-party, favored-nation clause, the most common 
of all the specialized practices, was not uniform in the territory it 
covered. The impact of the two-party, favored-nation clause; according 
to Neuner, was merely to exaggerate pre-existing conditions. The basic 
market device which led to prices above the competitive level was the
long term contract which prevented the readjustment of supply to changing
42demand and price conditions. The long term contract, however, was 
essential for the protection of consumers and pipelines and was certainly 
not imposed by producer interests. On these points too, then, Neuner 
found little evidence of noncompetitive field market activity. These 
results were supported by the Cookenboo study to which we now turn.
^ Ibid., p. 260. ^^Ibid.. p. 2?0.
42
Ibid.. pp. 272-78.
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The Cookenboo Study of Competition in the Gas 
Field Market
Cookenboo, like Neuner, placed most emphasis in his study on the
structure of the gas production industry. In measuring concentration he
utilized the individual and cumulative shares of sales of the top twenty
firms in the industry. In order to consider the problem posed by long
term contracts Cookenboo dealt with volume of sales committed during
43particular periods, total sales made, and reserve holdings. His study 
also reflected factors affecting competitiveness which did not involve 
the structure of the industry.
Market structure in natural gas 
production
Cookenboo first examined sales to all interstate buyers in 1955 
under all contracts, both old and new. His data showed that the top
four sellers sold 23 per cent of the gas, the top eight sold 35 per cent
of the gas, and the top twenty 54 per cent. Cookenboo noted that there 
were mixed biases in the compilation of sales by producer. On balance, 
however, these were the probable concentration levels which held in 
that year. Reserves held were examined for their exploitative potential. 
While the data were not perfectly reliable, the similarity between 
independent estimates persuaded Cookenboo that they were adequate as a 
first approximation. On the basis of these figures the distribution of
reserves was similar to the distribution of sales. The Gulf Coast mar­
ket, as expected, showed a somewhat greater concentration than did the 
interstate market as a whole. For all sales in 1955» regardless of date 
of contract, the top four sellers accounted for 26 per cent of the sales, 
the top eight for 42 per cent, and the top twenty for 6? per cent.
Sales under contracts initiated between 1951 and 1955» which 
would reflect new dedications during the period of rapid gas price in­
crease, did not show large differences in concentration as compared to 
the total of all contracts. Sales to all interstate buyers under
43 44
•^ Cookenboo, pp. 40-47. Ibid., pp. 47-58.
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contracts initiated between 1951 and 1955 were divided in this fashion; 
the top four sellers, 20 per cent; the top eight, 33 per cent; the top 
twenty, 53 per cent; all others, 4? per cent. If the difference between 
old and new contracts was significant, it was toward lower levels of 
concentration during the period of the rapid increase in field gas prices. 
The Gulf Coast sales to interstate buyers under contracts dated 1951- 
1955 were distributed almost eiactly the same as were such sales without 
reference to date, but reflected greater concentration than sales to all 
interstate buyers. For the Gulf Coast, the 1951-1955 data were: top
45four, 27 per cent; top eight, 42 per cent; and top twenty, 6? per cent.
Cookenboo examined contract data for different periods before 
1955 and concluded that the concentration in the field market for natu­
ral gas decreased substantially with the postwar expansion in the 
industry. From his study he could see no reason for greater future con­
centration of production as compared with 1955* He concluded that the 
only possibility of such a trend rested with small producers selling new
discoveries to the major producers. Such sales were contrary both to
46experience and to expectations.
Cookenboo concluded that the structure of the natural gas field 
market was workably competitive. The gas industry had a lower new sales 
concentration ratio for the top four producers than did three-fourths of 
the manufacturing industries in the United States. Furthermore, the top 
producers had frequently changed positions, with one and then another 
firm becoming the largest purchaser. Finally, there was freedom of entry 
even into the ranks of the largest producers, as illustrated by the new 
firms which became important in the postwar period. In Cookenboo*s words.
There are, then, many alternative sources of supply in this market; 
and these alternatives are real. No one firm is several times 
larger than the next smaller, and there are many of sufficiently 
large size relative to the largest to create significant competi­
tion for it. Under these conditions it would be almost inconceiv­
able that any one seller could have any significant influence over 
price. 7^
^^ Ibid., pp. 59-64. ^ Ibid., pp. 64-79.
"^^Ibid.. p. 80.
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Other competitive factors
The competitiveness of the natural gas industry was viewed in the 
light of certain factors other than market structure. These factors 
were considered by Cookenboo because of the contention that they counter­
acted the competitive structure found in the field market.
The first argument considered by Cookenboo was that the supply 
of gas was determined by the exploration and development of oil. If 
this argument were correct, price did not influence the supply of gas 
but merely allocated a fixed quantity among alternative uses. In this 
view the total return to gas production, over confinement costs, was 
rent extracted from consumers. Cookenboo rejected this argument on both 
theoretical and statistical grounds. He said that increases in total 
revenue from joint products led to increased output. He pointed out 
further that historically the discovery and development of new gas 
reserves increased much more rapidly than did the discovery and develop­
ment of new oil reserves when the relative price changed to favor gas.
The difference between ratios of discoveries in different periods demon­
strated that the product mix was variable; the direction of the change
was consistent with the proposition that gas discovery responded to
. 48price variation.
The second contention Cookenboo examined was that the demand for 
gas was inelastic and that this inelasticity prevented the effective 
functioning of competition. Cookenboo pointed out that the demand was 
in fact not completely inelastic, and even if it were, that competition 
would still be operative except under certain highly restrictive and 
unrealistic assumptions. He agreed that the somewhat inelastic demand 
for gas would lead to a relatively large price change in the face of 
altered supply-demand relations. Such adjustments were necessary to re­
allocate the natural gas among consumers in response to changed conditions.
48
Ibid., pp. 83-92. This inferential evidence is only sugges­
tive, of course, because other factors such as the change in average well 
depth would have a similar effect.
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But this factor in itself was no threat to competitive behavior in the 
market.
The efficiency and vigor of pipeline bargaining were questioned 
by some observers of the rapid increase in gas prices in the postwar 
market. Admitting that little unambiguous evidence could be generated 
on this question, Cookenboo presented several reasons for doubting the 
validity of the allegation. First, a significant proportion of the 
pipeline sales was not regulated by the FPG and therefore the lower the 
field cost of gas the higher the pipeline profits. Even in regulated 
sales, pipeline earnings are sacrificed during the period between 
increased field charges and resale rate changes. Moreover, resale rate 
increases are not automatic and can be denied if the FPG considers the 
field price unreasonable. Given these possibilities, Cookenboo concluded 
that there was a strong presumption that pipelines were not indifferent 
with regard to field price.
The fourth contention examined by Cookenboo was that gas pro­
duction was characterized by abnormally high profits. Utilizing costs 
and expected returns for 1954, he found that over-all return was approxi­
mately 12 per cent, a rate in line with return in other industries.
This average return hid, of course, the far higher returns achieved by 
some companies and the far lower returns obtained by others.Though 
Cookenboo ignored this point, the use of current data eliminated the 
effect of price changes in the natural gas field markets and therefore 
these results did not include the producer economic rent secured from 
rising field prices.
The indefinite pricing clauses in gas contracts were viewed as 
a result of long term contracts and rising field prices. Cookenboo 
wrote that such indefinite pricing agreements were consistent with com­
petition. The clauses were simply substituted for a higher initial
49Ibid., pp. 93-96. For a further development of the question 
of the elasticity of the demand for gas in domestic uses, see footnote 
7 above.
^°Ibid., pp. 96-103. bid., pp. 103-10.
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fixed contract price. According to him, indefinite pricing contracts, 
when properly drawn, gave results representative of spot markets for 
natural gas. Cookenboo suggested that a sufficient guarantee of fair 
price to consumers would be provided by a pipeline escape clause added 
to the indefinite pricing agreements.
The Mac Avoy Study of Competition in the 
Gas Field Markets
Mac Avoy studied the field markets for natural gas through the 
use of sales contract data in the Southwestern region during the postwar 
period. His study included contracts signed through 1958. The approach 
he used was ,to isolate the important factors in gas sale contracts and 
to compare them with expected behavior under different market structures. 
The elements studied included price, volume of gas dedicated, distance 
of the reservoir from the consuming end' of the transmission line, term 
of contract, and existence of contingency pricing clauses.
The expectation was that under competitive market structures the 
contracts entered into would have provisions which reflected the rela­
tive desirability of the reservoir to the pipeline. That is, a pipeline 
would be willing to pay more for a larger volume of gas than a smaller, 
a closer supply than a farther, a longer term contract than a shorter, 
and for firm price rather than contingency contracts. Cost functions 
for the pipelines were obtained which estimated the observed costs of 
some reservoir variations. Theoretical analysis applied to other data 
provided not only a qualitative but in some cases a quantitative esti­
mate of the expected value of other reservoir conditions. Noncompetitive
behavior was inferred from actual contracts which did not approach the
53terms expected under competition.
^^ Ibid., pp. 110-20.
53Paul W. Mac Avoy, Price Formation in Natural Gas Fields; A 
Study of Competition. Monopsony, and Regulation (New Haven; Yale Univer­
sity Press, 1962), pp. 2Ô-52.
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Mac Avoy separated the Southwestern field market into different 
submarkets. He tested the contracts made between 1946 and 1958 in each 
submarket for evidence of noncompetitive behavior. Unfortunately 
Mac Avby's methodology and findings do not lend themselves to summariza­
tion. His conclusions were that in all submarkets the contract provisions 
were those to be expected in the presence of producer competition. 
Considerable monopsony was exhibited in some regions and during some 
periods. Nothing that Mac Avoy found, however, supported regulation of
producers on grounds of preventing or reducing monopoly returns to them
• S4except in a few, small, isolated, intrastate fields.
Mac Avoy's conclusion that producer monopoly was absent from the 
gas field market at least through 1958 reinforced the results of the 
earlier studies by Cookenboo and Neuner. The finding that monopoly was 
absent gave rise to the question of the need for federal regulation since 
much of the popular argument for regulation rested on the supposedly 
monopolistic position of gas producers. In this study, of course, the 
goals of regulation posited have been broader than redistribution of 
income toward consumers and away from producers. Even so, the evolution 
of FPC jurisdiction in the absence of a clear indication of monopoly is 
of interest. In the next chapter the evolution and scope of FPC juris­
diction over field sales is examined to point up the background of the 
regulatory issues which have continued to create both policy and admin­
istrative problems.
54^ Ibid., pp. 243-52.
CHAPTER V
EVOLUTION AND SCOPE OF FPC JURISDICTION OVER FIELD 
SALES BY INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS
The federal regulation of the independent producer of natural 
gas at issue in this study extended only to the sales for resale in 
interstate commerce. The question of federal jurisdiction, then, 
centered on the field markets, some of the salient characteristics of 
which were discussed in the last chapter. Field sales thus defined 
included only sales of gas when production control was maintained by 
the independent producer. In-place sales of gas to interstate trans­
mission companies did not fit in this category, and neither did intra-
1
company gas transfers. Gas sales in intrastate commerce were similarly 
excluded. Consideration of the nature and direction which the regula­
tion of field sales for resale took is left to a later point in this 
study. In this chapter attention is focused on the development of the 
federal jurisdiction over field sales thus defined, and on the scope of 
authority exercised by the FPC as of the end of 1962. Passing references 
to other jurisdictional issues are included to provide a somewhat 
rounded picture of FPC activities.
The Phillips decision, which granted the FPC jurisdiction over 
the field sales of natural gas for resale in interstate commerce, extended 
social control to the last unregulated segment of the natural gas indus­
try affecting domestic and commercial interstate consumers. A survey of 
the development of field sales regulation culminating in this decision
^FPC supervision of in-place sales to the pipelines is exercised 
primarily by certification procedures.
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was undertaken and is presented here not only to provide insights into 
some natural gas regulatory problems but also to point to the source of 
some of the issues which even now cloud independent producer regulation.
In this portion of the study the jurisdictional questions considered 
lead to a primary emphasis on the legal and political elements of the 
conflict and their economic implications. The constitutional and statu­
tory limit of federal authority is the first matter considered under 
this heading.
Constitutional and Statutory Issues in 
FPC Jurisdiction over Field Sales
The authority of the FPC, like that of any other federal agency, 
was derived from both the Constitution and the enacting statutes. Con­
stitutional approval of any federal activity requires that the contemplated 
action fall within the ambit of the enumerated or implied powers of the 
United States government and that it does not encroach on the powers left 
to the states or to the people. Within these constitutional limits the 
Congress can establish, generally with the approval of the President, an 
agency with such powers and jurisdiction as Congress deems necessary for 
the general welfare. The FPC authority éver the natural gas industry, 
then, fell within two boundaries, the outer of which, superior in case of 
conflict, consisted of the constitutional limits on federal power and 
the inner of which consisted of the delegations of authority actually 
granted by Congress to the FPC. Those boundaries were defined, as they 
are with any law, by the interpretation given the Constitution and the 
statute by the courts. The actions and refusals to act of the courts on 
particular cases establish the law pursuant to a particular statute.
The jurisdiction of the FPC over the field sales contract between inde­
pendent producers and the interstate transporters was settled through 
just such a process of litigation. The constitutional and statutory 
issues about which this litigation centered are discussed before the 
litigation itself is reviewed in the context of the field markets.
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Constitutional Authority
The constitutional authority of Congress to regulate the produc­
tion and gathering of natural gas by independent producers and the sale 
for resale of such gas destined for interstate markets is scarcely ever 
questioned. Production and gathering is part of the process of deliver­
ing gas to users across state lines. The gas moves in an unbroken stream 
from the time it leaves the bottom of the well until it reaches the city 
gate. Since a reservoir is physically one entity, the connection of one 
well to an interstate pipeline creates a condition where federal 
authority can be exerted over the entire reservoir. The business of 
supplying gas to consumers interstate is by its very nature interstate 
commerce, and under the Constitution the federal government is charged 
with the responsibility of regulating such commerce for the common good.
As Justice Douglas said in his dissenting opinion in the Phillips case, 
"There is much to be said from the national point of view for regulating
sales at both ends of these interstate pipelines. The power of Congress
2
to do so is unquestioned."
Statutory Authority
The legal controversy over federal regulation of the gas industry 
at the field sales level was centered on the scope of the legislative 
grant of authority. Paragraph 1 (b) of the Natural Gas Act (discussed 
in Chapter III) stated that the Act would apply to the "sale in interstate 
commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public consumption for 
domestic, commercial, industrial, or any other use, and to natural-gas 
companies engaged in such transportation or sale . . . This statement 
standing alone gave jurisdiction to the FPC over the sale of natural gas 
by independent producers to pipelines for resale to distributors.
^347 U.S. 672, 688. (Emphasis supplied.)
^52 Stat. 824 (1938); 15 U.S.C. 717-717*.
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Industry and other spokesmen have accepted this positive statement of 
the Act as holding that independent producers were so covered.^
The grant of authority in the Act was followed, however, by a 
restriction worded "but shall not apply to any other transportation or 
sale of natural gas or to the local distribution of natural gas or to 
the facilities used for such distribution or to the production or gather­
ing of natural g a s . T h e  phrase "other transportation or sale" 
referred to industrial sales by the pipelines which were exempted from 
control. Local distribution control was left to the consuming locali­
ties. The last phrase, "or to the production or gathering of natural 
gas" was the source of conflicting interpretations of the scope of FPC 
jurisdiction. There were three possible interpretations of the Act's 
production and gathering exemption. The first was a loose interpreta­
tion of the exemption to the effect that both production and gathering 
and results flowing from it were exempt from regulation. This inter­
pretation excluded integrated company production from regulation.
Approval of the loose interpretation of the exemption would have placed 
the commodity value of the gas transported beyond the reach of the FPC 
and in this way would have nullified the intent of the Act to protect 
consumers from exploitation. Early decisions held production and
gathering activities of integrated companies subject to FPC jurisdiction
6despite the negative statement.
The second possible interpretation of the production and gather­
ing exclusion supported the regulation of the integrated producer on 
grounds of practical necessity. The sales made by independent producers, 
however, were excluded because they were part of the production and 
gathering phase of the industry which was specifically exempt from FPC 
jurisdiction. This interpretation perhaps did not make a distinction 
between regulation of production and gathering as a physical process and 
regulation of the sales for resale by the producer as a commercial
^Smith-Wimberly Report, p. 156.
^52 Stat. 824 (1938); 15 U.S.C. 717-717W.
B^illings, 2 F. P. C. 288 and other early decisions of the FPC.
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transaction in interstate commerce. Alternately, recognition of the 
difference between the physical and commercial functions was consistent 
with denial of FPC jurisdiction if the two were presumed to be so joined 
that regulation of one could not be accomplished apart from regulation 
of the other.
The third interpretation was that the production and gathering 
exemption did not apply to sales by producers for resale to ultimate 
consumers across state lines. In this view the exemption was designed 
to reassure the industry and the producing states that the FPC had no 
power to do what it was not intended that it should do in any case—  
assume jurisdiction over facilities for production and gathering and 
thereby supplant the state's authority in such fields as conservation 
and safety regulation. This interpretation limited federal control to 
the interstate gas sales contract. Essentially local matters were left 
in local hands, but the FPC was given sufficient authority to protect 
the vital interests of consumers. It was this latter interpretation 
that ultimately prevailed, but only after a series of administrative 
and judicial decisions, the first of which involved Columbian Fuel 
Corporation.
Formation of Early FPC Policy toward Independent 
Producer Sales; The Columbian Case
The FPC, in a policy formed in the early years of gas regulation, 
favored an interpretation of the Natural Gas Act which denied it juris­
diction over independent producer sales. This interpretation was
7
expressed in the Commission decision in the Columbian case. The rea­
soning which lay behind this decision guided the Commission until court 
actions made it no longer tenable. Similarly, the objections to it 
presented by a dissenting Commissioner retained their basic applicability 
throughout the long controversy over regulation of sales in interstate 
commerce for resale. The Columbian decision had both a practical and a 
historical impact in the evolution of FPC jurisdiction over field sales 
by independent producers.
2^ F. P. C. 200.
152
Columbian was an independent producer operating solely within 
the confines of Kentucky. The FPC issued an order on October 31> 1939,
g
suspending changes in the price of natural gas furnished by it.
Columbian sought to have the order dismissed and a hearing on the ques­
tion was set. The facts were that Columbian sold gas to Warfield 
Natural Gas Company at the terminus of Columbian’s gathering lines.
The gas purchased by Warfield was consumed both within and without the 
state of Kentucky. It entered into interstate commerce within the legal
meaning of that term, following "a regular unbroken and uninterrupted
9transmission and a continuous flow."
Columbian maintained that it was solely a producer and gatherer 
of natural gas and therefore not under the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Power Commission because of Section 1 (b) of the Act. The Commission 
decided that the question of jurisdiction must rest on three elements;
1) the language of the Natural Gas Act, and its legislative history 
including 2) the Congressional committee report on the bill, and 3) the 
floor debate.
Interpretation of the Production and 
Gathering Exemption
The Commission majority held that the positive statements in the 
language of the Act left the producers and gatherers under FPC juris­
diction and that the negative language in itself was not sufficient to 
exclude them. While jurisdiction over production and gathering facili­
ties seemed contrary to the spirit of the Act, direct statements in the 
Act pointed to specific Commission powers which prevented the Commission 
from completely ignoring these activities.
The committee Report accompanying the natural gas bill stated 
that Commission authority encompassed all phases of an integrated
g
Unnumbered order reported in 2 F. P. C. 200, 201.
2^ F. P. C. 200; 202-203.
^^Ibid., pp. 203-204.
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11company’s operations, including production and gathering. According 
to the Commission majority, Congress had an oversimplified impression of 
the natural gas industry and viewed control over the transporting com­
panies and their producing and gathering operations as the only regulation 
needed. For this reason, it was concluded, no direct reference to sales 
for resale in interstate markets by independent producers was included.
The last of the sources of interpretation of the Natural Gas 
Act, floor debate on the bill, was cited by the Commission as reinforcing 
its judgment that sales by independent producers were nonjurisdictional. 
Again the Commission majority emphasized that the Congress acted on the 
assumption that the transporting natural gas companies were the only 
commercial link in the movement of gas from the reservoir to the city 
gate. This one link, the integrated natural gas company, was to be regu­
lated to fill the regulatory void beyond the city gate. The intention 
of the Congress was thus somewhat different from the face of the Act. 
Regulation of sales for resale by independent producers was not so much 
enjoined by the Act as it was ignored. The majority of the Commissioners 
interpreted the will of the Congress in these words;
Clearly, Congress thought it was closing the gap in regula­
tion of the natural gas industry by providing Federal Power 
Commission regulation of companies whose main function was to 
transport natural gas through interstate pipelines and sell gas 
so transported at city gates for resale to ultimate consumers.
The companies to be subjected to regulation were conceived 
of as "pipeline" companies, and it was assumed that production 
and gathering would enter the field of regulation only to the 
extent that the "pipeline" companies, either directly or through 
affiliates, controlled the production or gathering of the gas so
transported.12
Substantive Arguments for Nonjurisdiction t
Inquiry into the jurisdictional question would have ended with 
interpretation of the statute had the wording of the Act and the intent
^^ Ibid., pp. 205-206, citing Report of Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce Re: Natural Gas Bill.
IZlbid., p. 207.
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of Congress been the only factors of importance to the Commission. 
Actually, however, the Commission went on to present the substantive 
arguments undergirding its decision in the Columbian case and its 
policy with regard to the industry. The proposition that regulation 
of sales for resale at the field level was inseparable from regula­
tion of production and gathering was fundamental to the Commission!s 
arguments. The Commission pointed out that it must consider the inter­
relationships between the gas and oil industries to properly regulate 
production and gathering by independent producers. Since the required 
appropriations and authority to investigate the connection between 
these joint products was lacking, the Commission majority held that as 
a practical matter it could not regulate independent producers, what­
ever its legal jurisdiction.
The philosophy of regulation followed by the Commission, and its 
view of the industry, further encouraged a finding of nonjurisdiction 
over independent producers. In the Commission’s words;
If, as intimated by Representative Lea, [the House sponsor of
the natural gas bill and its co-author] the justification for
regulation lies in the monopolistic character of the wholesale 
rates charged for natural gas, the necessity for regulating the 
price at the well mouth or at the end of gathering lines exists 
only to the extent that such prices are fixed on a monopolistic 
basis or by interests with sufficient control in a given field 
to weaken the force of competition. The record in the present 
case does not show such control.
The next paragraph, read in conjunction with the one preceding, left 
open the question of the possible regulation of some producers and 
gatherers of natural gas if conditions were other than those prevail­
ing in the field markets where Columbian operated.
We conclude, therefore, that it was not the intention of Con­
gress to subject to regulation under the Natural Gas Act all 
persons whose only sales of natural gas in interstate commerce, 
as in this case, are made as an incident to and immediately upon
completion of such persons’s production and gathering of said
natural gas and who are not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction 
of this Commission.
^^Ibid. ^^ Ibid., p. 208. (Emphasis supplied.)
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The Commission majority did not completely renounce jurisdiction 
over production and gathering. In its closing statements it held that 
the final decision on the necessity for federal authority over independ­
ent producers rested on FPC experience in the performance of its mission.
Further experience with the administration of the Natural Gas 
Act may reveal that the initial sales of large quantities of natural 
gas which eventually flows into interstate commerce are by producing 
or gathering companies which, through affiliation, field agreement, 
or dominant position in a field, are able to maintain an unreason­
able price despite the appearance of competition.^^
It should be noted that the only justification for field sales regulation 
apparent to the Commission was excessive price maintained by sheer mar­
ket power. Other possible regulatory goals were not considered.
The Dissent in the Columbian Case
Commissioner Scott dissented vigorously from the majority opinion 
in the Columbian case.^^ He based his objections to the ruling opinion 
on both legal and policy grounds. The basic intent of Congress, accord­
ing to Scott, was to protect the ultimate consumer by using federal 
action to fill the regulatory void beyond the city gate. That purpose 
was not served if independent producer sales were not regulated. Scott 
argued that Congress intended to exempt companies engaged in production 
and gathering of natural gas unless they also sold gas in interstate 
commerce. All companies which did make such sales, however, were natural 
gas companies and were subject to FPC control. Facilities and produc­
tive activities were left outside FPC jurisdiction by the law, but the 
sale of gas for resale in interstate commerce was not. In support of 
this functional division of jurisdiction Scott cited as precedent the 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co. case [298 U.S. 238 (1936)]. The decision in 
the Carter case rested, in turn, on reasoning in such other cases as; 
Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord [262 U.S. 1?2, 1?8]; Champlin Rfg. Co. v. 
Corporation Commission [286 U.S. 210, 235]; Utah Power and L. Co. v. Pfost 
[286 U.S. 165, 182]; and Chassaniol v. Greenwood [291 U.S. 584, 587].^ ^
^^Ibid. ^^Ibid.. pp. 209-21?. ^^Ibid.. pp. 212-213.
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Scott disagreed with the majority that the report accompanying 
the Natural Gas Bill supported nonregulation of field sales of natural 
gas for resale. Moreover, he also said that the report was not admis­
sible as an interpretation of the Act, no matter what its impact. In
his view, the Commission could not go beyond the language of the Act to
18seek other interpretive authority.
Commissioner Scott favored independent producer regulation on 
policy grounds. The objection raised by the majority that such control 
was not feasible was rejected by the dissenting Commissioner. He sug­
gested administrative rules restricting regulation to the larger and the 
more important producers. This limitation would reduce the practical 
and administrative difficulty of regulating many small producers without 
severely reducing the effectiveness of control. An analogous restric­
tion in enforcement of the system of uniform accounts was referred to 
19for precedent.
Scott did not rest his policy case on the negative recognition 
that regulation was practical. The situation that he saw and expected 
from the future course of events caused him to regard effective regula­
tion of producer field sales as of the greatest importance. In his 
strongly worded conclusion he warned:
The practical consequences of the action of the majority in 
the instant proceeding cannot be overemphasized. I fear there 
will accrue from this action results substantially curtailing 
our ability effectively to regulate in the public interest inter­
state sales of natural gas for resale. ... it is obvious that 
the consuming public cannot be as well protected from any 
exploitation in the rates it is charged, unless there is an 
exercise of Federal authority under the commerce clause of the 
Constitution.
I cannot help but feel that the majority opinion leaves ade­
quate and effective regulation, in the public interest, of the 
sales of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale, hoped for 
by the consuming public and deemed essential by a Congress desir­
ing to fill the gap in which the States may not act, suspended in 
limp and lifeless form from the yardarm of inaction.20
^^Ibid.. pp. 214-215. ^^Ibid.. p. 216.
2°Ibid.. p. 217.
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The Columbian Case in Perspective
The goal of the FPC in the years during which gas regulation 
policy was being formed was to keep gas prices to the ultimate consumers 
as low as possible. Other goals which might have been followed included 
efficient allocation of the natural gas and provision for important 
national interests. Yet the FPC limited its jurisdiction to the trans­
mission phase of the industry without attempting to control the field 
prices charged by independent producers. Some perspective on the prewar 
field market is required to explain the equanimity with which the Com­
mission accepted denial of jurisdiction over independent producers. The 
record indicates that the limitations on FPC jurisdiction in this regard 
were primarily due to the absence of any clear advantage to any signifi­
cant group from such regulation. This condition changed, of course, in 
the postwar period.
The domestic consumers had no reason to press for FPC jurisdic­
tion over independent producers because the field price of natural gas 
was quite low and falling. For twelve of the thirteen years preceding 
the Columbian decision average field price of natural gas had fallen, and
the year that it had not fallen it remained constant. The average field
21price of natural gas was at an all time low in 1940. Moreover, at 
this time much of the natural gas utilized, and a much larger proportion 
of that originating in the high price fields near the consuming centers, 
came from already regulated integrated production. Extension of the 
rate-base method of price setting to the independent producers in the 
Southwestern field markets would probably have raised gas prices since
22a large number of the producing properties were not covering full costs. 
The failure to exert jurisdiction to adjust the distribution of income 
was consistent under these conditions with the Commission dedication to
21Table H in the Appendix contains data for some years. Averages 
for all years were taken from the Minerals Yearbook, various years.
22See Chapters II and III above for an explanation of the low 
gas prices in the Southwestern field markets.
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lower gas prices for consumers. The Commission did not want to face a 
possible court fight for jurisdiction over an activity which it was not 
staffed or equipped to handle, which would pose enormous technical and 
legal problems, and from which little gain in consumer protection could 
be foreseen. Even Commissioner Scott argued more in terms of future 
effects than in terms of the Columbian case itself.
Changes in the allocation of natural gas through regulatory 
changes in its field market price were not in the apparent interest of 
either consumers or producers. The reservoir price of gas did not 
restrict or ration its consumption because in economic terms the com­
modity in the reservoir was in many respects a free good, discovered as 
a by-product of the search for oil. Increases in price were not neces­
sary to bring more reserves into being because reserves were abundant.
The field price of gas, then, determined only the maximum costs of 
confinement and capture which could be sustained in the production of 
known reserves. Reductions in price could be expected to result pri­
marily in reduced confinement of gas so that supplies to consumers would 
fall— even though reserves and perhaps even withdrawals remained constant. 
Reduction in consumption through higher price, on the other hand, would 
not have automatically had the effect of making gas available for higher 
value uses over a longer period of time. Associated gas, produced with 
oil, would be wasted without a market and the potential contribution to 
economic development of gas not produced would be thwarted. The allo­
cation decision for a significant portion of the gas was not between 
future and present consumption alternatives, but between present con­
sumption and venting, flaring, or underground waste.
The only group seriously advocating restrictions on natural gas 
consumption was made up of the competing fuel interests. These interests 
sought to limit the use of natural gas because it reduced the potential 
market for the competing fuels, especially coal. Arguments on these 
grounds were not convincing to the consumers or to the agencies responsi­
ble for consumer welfare. Even if the social validity of the competing 
fuel position were granted, the lack of broad political appeal explained 
its failure to influence the prewar regulation of natural gas production.
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The last prewar FPC report to the Congress, that for 1940, 
expressed the general FPC satisfaction with its authority through omis­
sion of specific requests for widened jurisdiction. The FPC did not 
request clarification of its role in field sales regulation either. It 
did seek other extensions of power, however, including control over 
construction of all natural gas lines, control over direct sales to 
industrial consumers, and authorization to publish statistics on natural 
and manufactured gas. In this same report there was a mention of a 
possible future multi-dimensional approach to natural gas regulation.
The Commission specifically commented on several potential problem areas, 
Among these were the conservation of natural gas and the prevention of 
waste, the inter-industry fuels competition issue, and the use priorities 
to be ascribed to types of gas consumption. Issues other than low rates 
were considered by the Commission, but its decision was that the situ-
23ation at the time of the report was not such as to demand federal action.
Conditions in the industry at the time of the next full-scale annual
24report, that for 1946, were quite different.
Postwar Conditions; The "New” Natural Gas Industry 
and Its Regulation
The close of World War II marked the recognition of the birth of 
a "new" natural gas industry. Conditions had changed so rapidly during 
the war induced period of regulatory quiescence that the cumulative 
changes of the period when reviewed as a whole appeared revolutionary. 
Regulatory activities of the FPC were limited during the Second World War. 
because most of the energies of the nation were devoted to the war effort. 
After the war, the Commission faced drastically changed public policy
^^Twentieth Annual Report  ^pp. 9-10, 79-80.
24Federal Power Commission, Twenty-Sixth Annual Report, 1946 
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 194-7), pp. 9» 60. The
Commission published only the statutory minimum of reports during the war. 
No formal annual reports were made and no far reaching statements of 
regulatory policy were issued.
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issues brought on by expansion in the market for natural gas, a revised
balance between available supply and existing and potential market,
structural changes in the industry, and the growing pains of an industry
2<
trying to catch up with long deferred demands.
The changes in the industry between the close of World War II 
and i960 were even greater. These changes, the magnitude of which is 
indicated in the first section below, brought forth regulatory responses 
by the FPC. The FPC did not ignore the fact that regulation designed 
to meet prewar conditions was not completely suited for the regulation 
of the new industry developing in the postwar period. A general inves­
tigation into the industry had been initiated even before the close of 
the war. Salient features of the reports filed at the close of this 
investigation are noted in the second section below. New FPC policies 
arose from this investigation and from temporary emergencies which made 
it necessary to develop short run expedients. The Commission also 
recommended changes in legislation to meet the problems presented by 
shifts in industry operations. The most important of these changes was 
the extension of FPC jurisdiction to include some interstate sales in 
the field by independent producers. These alterations are also surveyed 
in this chapter.
25Ibid., pp. 9, 60. The Commission, commenting on this upsurge 
in demand, had this to say:
"The expansion in the use of natural gas for space heating came 
so rapidly following the removal of war restrictions on natural gas 
appliances, that it proved impossible for the natural gas pipe line 
companies to secure sufficient pipe to expand capacity rapidly 
enough to meet the demands." (p. 9)
"These increases in the applications for construction permits 
were due to unprecedented demands by the public for natural gas 
service. Such increased demands were brought about largely by 
increases in prices of other fuel, inconvenience caused by short­
ages of other fuels during the war, postponement of normal pipeline 
construction and extensions during the war because of material 
shortages, and action by the Federal Power Commission in reducing 
wholesale rates of pipe line companies. In addition, depletion of 
local natural gas supplies in certain areas, particularly the 
Appalachian area and California, have necessitated the construction 
of pipe lines to move plentiful gas supplies." (p. 60)
161
The Postwar Change in the Natural Gas Industry
Physical measures alone are never sufficient to reflect a basic 
industry change because change is not limited to measurable qualities. 
There is also the change in attitude, response, and general "feel" of an 
industry or institution. Nevertheless, comparisons of magnitudes, 
whatever their shortcomings, do give a picture of the basic alterations 
in the natural gas industry between 19^ 5 and I960. Such comparisons are 
made below through reference to data presented in the text and in 
Appendix tables.
Production of natural gas
The production of natural gas rose rapidly following the end of 
World War II. Production in 1938, at the time of the passage of the 
Natural Gas Act, was approximately 3,048 billion cubic feet. By 1945, 
production had not quite doubled to 5»902 billion cubic feet. This 
increase came over a seven year period. In 1952, after the passage,of 
another seven years, production was up to 10,984 billion cubic feet; in 
i960, 15,088 billion cubic feet were produced.
Throughout this period, and despite the gross withdrawals of 
natural gas, the proved recoverable reserves grew as well. In 1945, the 
first year in which reasonably consistent data were available on this 
subject, there were proved recoverable reserves of approximately 150,000 
billion cubic feet. By I960, however, there were approximately 260,000 
billion cubic feet of natural gas in proved recoverable reserves. The 
recoverable reserves figure is peculiarly susceptible to inconsistent 
definition. Changes in its level, while indicative, should not be inter­
preted as having any great precision, even with reference to the imprecise 
definition of what is "proved" and "recoverable." Notably, however, the
26All data in this section were taken from Minerals Yearbook, 
various years. Information on gas withdrawn, marketed, used for re- 
pressuring, and vented and wasted are also found in Table D of the 
Appendix. All measurements are reported in standard pressure, tempera­
ture, and purity units.
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life of "proved" recoverable reserves at the 19^ 5 marketed production 
rate was approximately 38*5 years in 1945, while the index for I960 had
dropped to 23*7 years. By 1962, using preliminary figures, the life
27index had fallen to 20.7 years.
Disposition of natural gas
The disposition of the increased amount of natural gas produced 
was altered in the postwar development of the natural gas industry. The 
switch in the postwar market was toward the higher valued uses and 
toward interstate rather than intrastate consumption. The two drifts, 
of course, were related.
The increase in interstate use of natural gas by domestic and 
commercial consumers was made possible by the rapid expansion of pipeline 
facilities beginning in 1946. A similar proportionate increase in intra­
state sales was not possible. Most potential consumers within the pro­
ducing regions were already served by gas. Some expansion of sales took 
place in the Southwest following the war, for example when appliances 
became available to meet rising demands brought on by higher consumer
incomes, but this expansion was relatively small. Since the greatest
expansion of gas sales was in the interstate markets where transportation 
costs limited gas consumption to high value uses, a relative shift away 
from lower value industrial uses was to be expected in the postwar market.
The data bore out the expected shifts in consumption. In 1938 
domestic and commercial consumption of natural gas accounted for approxi­
mately 21 per cent of gas by volume consumed, with industrial use 
accounting for the remainder. By I960, however, the domestic and commer­
cial consumption of gas had risen to 33 per cent of the total quantity.
The postwar period accounted for practically all of this gain because in
1945 domestic and commercial consumption was only 21.5 per cent of the 
28total. Within the industrial sector, the consumption of gas in the
27See Table B in the Appendix; for 1962 data see Oil and Gas
Journal, LXIX, No. 4, p. 169.
28Percentages calculated from data published in Minerals Yearbook, 
various years. Basic data on gas use are reported in Appendix Table D.
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manufacture of carbon black went up from 325 billion cubic feet in 1938
to a high of 441 billion cubic feet in 1948. It soon fell after that,
however, and was just under 200 billion cubic feet in I960. Relatively
speaking, of course, the use of gas for carbon black manufacture fell
29consistently because of the rapid rise in other uses of natural gas.
The proportion of gas shipped interstate increased in each of 
the years considered except for 1945 when the expansion of the inter­
state gas transmission system had been delayed because of the war.
Table 1 below points up the shift in disposition of gas.
TABLE 1
NATURAL GAS MARKETED AND SHIPPED INTERSTATE IN BILLION CUBIC FEET 
AND PER CENT, UNITED STATES, SELECTED YEARS,
1933-1960»
Year
Marketed
Production
Shipped
Interstate
Per Cent Shipped 
Interstate
1933 1,556 347 22.3
1938 2,296 637 27.7
1945 3,919 1,106 28.2
1948 5,148 1,757 34.1
1952 8,013 3,795 47.3
1954 8,743 4,662 53.3
1956 10,082 5,628 55.8
i960 12,771 7,544 58.8
»Data taken from Minerals Yearbook, various years. Some other 
data are found in Table B of the Appendix. Per cent calculated from 
data.
The increase in the interstate transportation system during the 
postwar period made it possible for a larger number of consumers to be 
served with natural gas. In 1938 the total number of consumers was 
approximately 9*3 million. The seven years to 1945 saw an increase of
cited.
29Table D in the Appendix contains data for most of the years
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only 2 .5 million to 11.8. During the first three years after the war,
shortages continued to hold back consumer connection growth, but between
1948, when consumers numbered 14.7 million and 1952 the connections
increased 9.7 million to 24.4. Growth slowed after 1952 and the next
eight years saw only 9*3 million new natural gas users added to the dis- 
30tribution systems. The shift to higher value uses, to larger number 
of consumers, and to interstate markets was accompanied, as to be 
expected, by an increase in the average price of gas both in the field 
and in the consumption markets.
Price of natural gas
The price of natural gas rose following World War II, but the 
rise was not steady. The discussion in Chapter IV above dealt with the 
rise in gas prices in the field markets. The change in price of natural 
gas in various consumption uses exhibited less rapid and less consist­
ent upward changes than did average gas prices in the field. Table H of 
the Appendix contains average price data for various consumption uses of 
natural gas, along with field price averages. The influence of a differ­
ent "product mix" on the price of natural gas in consumption uses should 
be noted in interpreting the gas price increase. The consumers were, on 
average, getting a greater proportion of a more costly service after the 
war than before. The expansion in interstate transmission of gas 
increased the average distance gas was hauled between field reservoir and 
burner tip, which meant higher transportation costs.
Value of natural gas
The greater production and consumption of natural gas and the 
higher price combined to increase the total sales of gas both in the 
field and in consumption uses. The value of natural gas sold in the 
field rose from $114 million in 1938 to $1,790 million in I960. The 
value of natural gas in consumption uses rose rapidly as well. The 
total value in consumption, as estimated by the Bureau of Mines, amounted 
to only about $368 million in 1933. By 1938, however, the value of gas
30Minerals Yearbook, various years.
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in use had risen to $501 million, or an increase over 1933 of approxi­
mately 36 per cent during the five year period. In the twenty-two years 
between 1938 and I960 the value of natural gas consumed rose $5»770 
million, to $6,270 million, for an increase of approximately II50 per 
cent. The average value increase calculated in this manner was 7 per 
cent a year during the first period and 52 per cent a year during the 
second. While the amount of gas consumed and the value of that gas was 
increasing very rapidly, the distribution of the value of that gas re­
mained relatively stable among different classes of consumers. Industrial 
sales brought approximately one-third of the sales income, and domestic 
and commercial two-thirds. This constancy existed despite the shift to 
greater proportionate consumption of gas by domestic and commercial users. 
The seeming inconsistency was explained by the shift within the industrial 
sector toward higher value uses which increased its proportion of dollar 
sales while physical consumption was declining relatively. Similarly 
constant was the proportion of the domestic and commercial gas sales 
attributable to domestic consumers, about 80 per cent. It was approxi­
mately 80 per cent between 1938 and I96O. Within the industrial sector 
the changes were somewhat greater, with the growth in some sales, notably 
fuel use, far outstripping sales for carbon black manufacture and field 
use.
Regulation Adjustments to Industry Expansion:
The Natural Gas Investigation
The vast changes in the natural gas industry reflected in the 
data presented above brought with them adjustments in regulation and in 
the regulatory process. No direct and perfect correlation between changes 
in field price, say, and movements toward regulation of independent pro­
ducers can be traced. Nevertheless, the changes in the industry certainly 
created conditions wherein the FPC was forced to consider the suitability 
of its policies. The Natural Gas Investigation provided a formal oppor­
tunity for a re-evaluation of all FPC policies.
31Ibid. Data reported are also found in Appendix Table H. Per­
centages calculated from these data.
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The Natural Gas Investigation, which was initiated by an order 
of the FPC on September 22, 1944, gave all interested parties an oppor­
tunity to express opinions on regulatory policy for the "new” natural 
32gas industry. It was a sounding board for the opposing theories of
the approach to regulation appropriate to the FPC. The basic nature of
the disagreements which came to the surface in this investigation was
indicated by the filing of conflicting reports, one by Commissioners
Smith and Wimberly and the other by Commissioners Olds and Draper. The
differences between the Commissioners frequently rested on different
value orientations and on different views of the role of regulation in
the natural gas industry. For convenience in designation. Commissioners
Smith and Wimberly were labeled "industry oriented" while Olds and
Draper were "consumer oriented." These positions were more or less
33visible in the conflicting reports, dealt with separately below. The 
investigation covered the whole range of regulatory policy. Conflicting 
views of the appropriate regulation of the gas produced by the integrated 
natural gas companies, an important part of the investigation, has 
already been discussed.
The Smith-Wimberly Report; independent 
producer regulation
Commissioners Smith and Wimberly concluded from their study of 
the gas industry that the FPC did not have the authority to regulate the
32The Investigation, designated Docket No. G-580, was instigated 
by an order which stated its scope as; "the extent and probable life of 
natural-gas reserves; present and prospective measures for preventing 
waste and prolonging the life of such reserves; the present and probable 
future utilization of natural gas for domestic, commercial, and indus­
trial purposes; the extent, character, and results of the competition of 
natural gas with other fuels; and such related matters as may be helpful 
ip the administration of the Natural Gas Act or in determining what addi­
tional legislation, if any, should be recommended." Smith-Wimberly 
Report, p. 1.
33These labels, like all short cut designations, are subject to 
the danger of oversimplification. Their use should be interpreted with 
care.
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sales for resale in interstate commerce by independent producers, that 
it did not need such power to fulfill the function of protecting the 
consumer from exploitation, and that actual harm would result from such 
regulation if it came to pass. They suggested that legislation settling 
the matter once and for all be passed by the Congress to reassure those 
who had wrongly become exercised over the possibility of FPC control 
over independent producers.
These Commissioners found no evidence in the Act that there was 
any intent to separate the activities of production and gathering from 
the sales for resale. From this conclusion the further inference was 
drawn that the Congress intended some force for its negative "shall not 
apply . . . "  phrase. Since it was impossible to separate production and 
gathering from sales of the gas produced and gathered, and since there 
was to be some meaning attached to the production and gathering exclusion, 
sales by producers and gatherers were not jurisdictional. The legisla­
tive history of the Act was cited to demonstrate that in certain state­
ments Congressmen and some of the witnesses apparently interpreted the 
Act as excluding control over the selling price of arm's-length independ­
ent producers. Smith and Wimberly concluded that the Commission had 
consistently and properly held to the position first enunciated in the
33
Columbian decision, and that the courts had upheld this interpretation.
The second point made by the Commissioners was that authority
existed to achieve by other means any of the potential gains of direct
independent producer regulation. The Commission was empowered to look
behind any contract not negotiated at arm's-length. It was obligated by
law to disallow as a cost of service any improper payment by a natural
gas company, including exorbitant payments to independent producers.
Finally, they held, if monopoly or concentration existed in the field
36markets the proper remedy was to initiate antitrust action.
The final point raised in the Smith-Wimberly Report was that FPC 
control of the independent producers would harm the cause of state
34
Smith-Wimberly Report, p. 173*
^^Ibid.. pp. 7-8, 155-65. ^^Ibld., pp. 8, 172.
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regulation and would usurp regulatory powers more properly remaining in
local hands. This conclusion was reached because the Commissioners felt
that no regulation of the independent gas producers was possible without
37coincident regulation of associated oil and oil pipeline operations. 
Regulation of oil and gas production and gathering, in turn, would 
impinge on state regulation of conservation and state protection of cor­
relative rights. While the state regulation might be improved, the 
nature of the task led to preference for local control unless there was 
a future breakdown in state control in this field. Any federal incursion
o Q
would require, according to Smith and Wimberly, Congressional action.
The Smith-Wimberly Report; 
general findings
Smith and Wimberly sought to restrict the role of the FPC to the 
minimum of regulation consistent with their somewhat limited goals.
Their goals were expressed as follows: "The essential purpose of regu­
lation is to see that the rate and service conditions under which natural
39gas is provided are reasonable and non-discriminatory." Yet these two 
Commissioners also reported that it was necessary to consider the effect 
of price on use and on depletion of the gas supply, certainly factors 
beyond the range of simple utility regulation to avoid undesirable 
income distribution effects. While not advocating FPC action, gmith and 
Wimberly urged the industry to sell only to firm demand customers in 
industrial and other uses where the quality of service and the conveni­
ence and special properties of gas were so valuable as to justify a 
price high enough to amortize the additional transmission investment.
The Smith-Wimberly Report accepted the need for higher field 
prices for natural gas to encourage conservation. The added use of 
casinghead gas to save the nonassociated gas for future use, conservation
37This conclusion followed from the refusal to distinguish be­
tween production and gathering and commercial sale for resale.
^^Smith-Wimberly Report, pp. 8, 166-78.
39 40
•^abid.. p. 15. Ibid., pp. 16, 352-54.
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programs, and research on the development of alternative gaseous fuel
41
sources were also urged. In sum, Smith and Wimberly, like Olds and 
Draper, recognized that the performance of the natural gas industry was 
not completely satisfactory judged by public welfare criteria. But these 
two Commissioners restricted themselves to the role of vocal critics 
without seeking by their actions to remedy the faults found except in 
certain areas. Olds and Draper were more activist in their prescriptions 
for the industry.
The Olds-Draper Report; independent 
producer regulation
Commissioners Olds and Draper supported a broader interpretation 
of the public interest in natural gas industry regulation. In terms of 
the independent producers of natural gas this interest centered on main­
tenance of a market for gas at a reasonable price. This price was 
implicitly defined by the Commissioners as a cost covering price rather 
than a competitive one. For the most part Olds and Draper were satisfied 
that the independent producers were not exploiting the consumer. Their 
Report indicated instead that the pipeline companies were exploiting the 
producers of natural gas. Olds and Draper based their conclusions with 
regard to independent producer control on the premise that the field 
markets for natural gas were buyers' markets and that the existing con­
centration of gas production among independent producers was either
insufficient to threaten the consumers or was harmless because of the
42preponderant pipeline strength.
Olds and Draper recommended that the Commission adopt a watchful 
attitude toward the field sale markets to guard against leaving this 
stage of the natural gas industry unguarded when and if;
The trend toward concentration of control of gas reserves reaches 
a point where effective competition is destroyed and eventually 
monopoly prices are substituted for competitive prices.— Should
^^Ibid.. pp. 111-20, 175-77, 459, 470-71. 
42Olds-Draper Report, pp. 6-14, 117-36.
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such a situation develop there would appear to be no recourse but 
federal regulation of all sales of gas in interstate commerce.^3
Olds and Draper, then, supported independent producer exemption from FPC 
control. In other matters the disagreement between these Commissioners 
and Smith and Wimberly were far more definite and sharp.
The Olds-Draper Report; 
general findings
Olds and Draper decided that the Natural Gas Act for the most 
part was a satisfactory instrument for regulating the natural gas indus­
try in the public interest. No,change was advocated in FPC methods of 
determining the value of gas in the field. More vigorous exercise of 
some of the other powers under the Act was, however, suggested. Gas 
conservation deserved more attention, and direct end use control was 
selected as a suitable regulatory device to attain conservation goals. 
Olds and Draper thought that the use of gas for such "inferior" purposes 
as carbon black manufacture and boiler fuel use on an interruptible
basis was seriously depleting the natural gas reserves for no good pur- 
44pose. Greater use of coal was suggested as an alternate source of
energy for those uses for which it was suited. Its relative plenty
along with its geographic location made it the fuel of choice over the 
45long run. Priorities for use which would allow gas consumption only
where it fulfilled special requirements not obtainable from other fuels
were recommended as yielding social benefits. Gas use was acceptable
to Olds and Draper where gas was decidedly cheaper counting all costs,
and where the use of gas as a cheap source of fuel would bring on the
industrialization of the underdeveloped producing regions of the nation,
46especially the Southwest. Olds and Draper also advocated a concerted
^^Ibid., p. 13.
44
Ibid., pp. 12-13» and passim. For definition and discussion 
of economic meaning of "inferior" and "superior" as used in this con­
text see Chapter III above.
^^Ibid., pp. 27-31. ^ Ibid., pp. 6-I3, 33-50.
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effort to find and develop gas storage fields near consuming areas before 
their storage potential was reduced by depletion. The advantages of gas 
storage were that it provided cheap winter peaking service. Peak shav­
ing in this fashion was judged preferable to either interruptible "dump"
sales of natural gas for inferior uses or excessive unused line capacity
47
during off-peak periods.
Independent Producer Regulation After the 
Natural Gas Investigation
The conclusion of the Natural Gas Investigation left the Com­
missioners and the different portions of the gas industry in disagreement 
over appropriate regulatory policy and method. Even so, the Investiga­
tion did clear the air of some confusion and make it possible for future 
decisions to rest on more precise data and on more explicitly defined 
alternatives than had ever existed before. Unfortunately, the most 
significant industry change from the point of view of regulation, the 
great upsurge in field prices in the Southwestern field markets, had yet 
to occur and was not considered in the investigation. When this increase 
did occur, interest in regulation of the producing phase of the industry 
arose. Since there had been little or no consideration of the matter 
before, both the issues and the policy positions had to evolve through 
the slow process of accretion in response to day to day influences. The 
result of this process was an extension of effective FPC jurisdiction 
and a new departure in industry regulation.
The rapid increase in field prices has been described in an
earlier section of this work. As stated above, the increase was a factor
48
in bringing about producer regulation. This effect is discussed below.
"^^Ibid., pp. 9-10, 13, 85-116.
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Emphasis on the change in field price as the motivating factor 
in the regulatory changes must not cause neglect of other elements. 
Neither this issue nor any other is so simple as to be explained by pure 
economic determinism. Certainly the regulatory atmosphere, for example, 
as well as political and social conditions of the time contributed to 
regulation. Nevertheless, the rapid increase in the field price of
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The Commission reaction to changes in the field markets, and more speci­
fically to rising field prices, is of obvious importance in explaining 
the development over time of public policies toward producers. On a more 
interpretive level, indications of possible Commission reasoning and 
motivation are important in understanding the enforcement of the public 
policy which evolved, as well as in understanding the Commission views 
of regulation.
FPC reactions to changes in the 
field markets
The prewar regulatory pattern was continued after the war in 
most respects because most of the changes in the natural gas industry 
were more in degree than in kind. The increase in the interstate 
transportation of gas, increased number of interstate transmission com­
panies, greater pipeline capacity and wider geographic coverage were 
not in themselves changes that required any alteration in the method of 
regulation. The rise in the field price of natural gas, however, was 
of a different nature. It forced a re-examination of the earlier policy 
which was to regulate integrated producers on a public utility basis but 
to exempt independent producers from FPC jurisdiction. The FPC deci­
sions on issues were indicated formally in Commission legislative 
recommendations to Congress and in policy statements and Orders.
Recommendations to the Congress
The FPC was authorized by its establishing legislation to make 
recommendations to the Congress for legislation which would further its 
achievement of the purposes of the Natural Gas Act and other legislation. 
These recommendations, when interpreted along with other Commission 
actions, were a good indication of Commission evaluation of the basic 
regulatory problems facing it. Similarly, omission of items presented
natural gas, along with the expectation of further increases, was the 
unifying and central issue in field market regulation. Had field prices 
not increased it is unlikely that any regulatory effort would have 
arisen even if the legal power of regulation were available.
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before indicated a change in some variable. In an attempt to gain
insight into FPC thought, the legislative requests of the agency were
compiled in certain categories to facilitate examination of the FPC
reaction to the rising field prices of natural gas.
There was no comment on independent producer regulation before
1955* To make this omission even more significant, the period between
1950 and 1955 exhibited a very rapid increase in field price. The Annual
Report immediately following the Phillips decision (decided June 7»
1954), which covered the period July 1, 195^ to June 30» 1955» was the
first in which independent producer regulation appeared as a subject of
I4.Q
legislative recommendations. The FPC had habitually sought changes in 
the other laws under which it operated and therefore did make such 
recommendations when it considered them necessary. The conclusion fol­
lows that it was the Supreme Court decision that galvanized the FPC into 
advocating legislative consideration of the independent producer problem. 
In the 1955 Annual Report the Commission expressed its approval of the 
Harris-Fulbright bill^^ which would have eliminated jurisdiction over 
the independent producer and vdiich would have required the FPC to allow 
a reasonable market price to both the integrated natural gas company and 
to the independent producer. The Commission disapproved of a bill which 
would have strengthened the Phillips decision and of another bill which 
would have excluded certain small producers from coverage by the Act.^^ 
The thinking of the FPC apparently had stabilized by the time 
of the writing of the 1956 Annual Report. The general position which 
had evolved by this time was one of reluctant acceptance of jurisdiction
49
Federal Power Commission, Thirty-Fifth Annual Report, 1955 
(Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 180-82.
^^ U.S. Congress, House, H.R. 4566 (Harris) 84th Cong. 1st Bess., 
1955; U.S. Congress, Senate, S. I853 (Fulbright) 84th Cong. 1st Sess.,
1955.
^^Thirty-Fifth Annual Report, pp. 176-78, I8O. H.R. 4923 
(Heselton) would have defined any sale for resale in interstate commerce 
as not being included under production and gathering, and H.R. 4924 
(Heselton) would have excluded certain small producers from the Act., 
Senator Douglas joined in these proposed amendments (S. 1926).
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over independent producers. Modification of independent producer regula­
tion was the dominant theme of the FPC approach for the next four or five 
years. As a first step the Commission advocated basing independent pro­
ducer regulation on something other than the usual cost of production 
method with its emphasis on the firm as the regulated unit. As a regula­
tory substitute, the FPC advocated a commodity basis without reference 
to cost or type of producer. In terms of goals, the FPC suggested a 
two-variable approach "which would enable the Commission to weigh the 
interest of the consumer in low prices with the necessity of providing 
assurance of future gas supplies."^ The elimination of escalation 
clauses in gas purchase contracts was requested as an aid in protecting 
consumers without utility regulation of independent producers. With 
only very minor changes, all these 1956 recommendations appeared in the 
FPC annual reports for 1957, 1958, and 1959 as well.^^
There were five significant changes in the legislative recommenda­
tions of the FPC for I960 over those for the prior years. In I960 the 
FPC abandoned its attempt to avoid or minimize jurisdiction over inde­
pendent producers and moved instead to ask for administrative and other 
changes to make such regulation feasible. The most important of these 
changes was dropping the request to establish "reasonable market price" 
determination of transfer values for field gas. Instead the Commission 
requested Congress "to clarify the present authority of the Commission 
to fix producer rates on an area basis." The price escalation clauses 
were attacked in the FPC appeal for Congressional "clarification" of
52Federal Power Commission, Thirty-Sixth Annual Report, 1956 
(Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957), P- 19.
53Federal Power Commission, Thirty-Seventh^nual Report, 1957 
(Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 23-26;. Federal 
Power Commission, Thirty-Eighth Annual Report, 1958 (Washington; U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 15-18; Federal Power Commission, 
Thirty-Ninth Annual Report, 1959 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, I960), pp. 18-21.
54Federal Power Commission, Fortieth Annual Report, I960 
(Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 1?. This regu­
latory technique is discussed in Chapter VIII.
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authority to eliminate them in new contracts and in certification pro­
cedures. FPC opposition to escalation clauses (dating from 1956) was 
not new, but the presumption that it had some power to act was. In I960 
the Commission took another position which in the past it had merely 
requested authority to take. It asked for another "clarification,” this 
time of its authority to use a method other than the cost-of-service, 
rate-base method to arrive at an appropriate price for gas. Clarifica­
tion rather than authorization was also requested for the proposal to 
ignore joint costs and joint revenues.
A still greater break with the past was exhibited in the legis­
lative requests of the FPC in the 196I report to Congress. The 
Commission writing the Annual Report for 1961 was made up entirely of 
Kennedy appointees. Consequently, the I96I legislative recommendations 
represented the judgment of the new Commissioners though the rest of 
the Report was a record of actions taken by Commissioners appointed 
under the Eisenhower administration.^^ In I96I the most notable change 
from past legislative programs was not in new powers requested, but 
rather in powers not requested. The new Commission simply assumed that 
the powers desired were available under existing legislation. This 
implied that only excessive timidity or misinterpretation of the law had 
prevented them from being exercised in the past. The new FPC Commission­
ers took the regulatory initiative from Congress. This put Congress in 
the position of either ratifying by inaction any changes the FPC made or 
else acting to overrule the direction in which the Commission was taking 
regulatory policy. In the absence of Congressional action, the Courts 
stood as the ultimate judge of the legal status of the FPC position.
No references to independent producers were to be found in the 
1961 report. Requests for authorization to raise rates to prevent dis­
crimination and to allocate gas in time of shortage were also eliminated. 
There were two changes from I960 requesting extended authority, the
^^Ibid., pp. 17-19*
^^Federal Power Commission, Forty-First Annual Report, 196I 
(Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 1.
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first renewing the earlier request for jurisdiction over direct sales for
industrial use only and the second changing the request "to be allowed
to authorize emergency interconnections" to the more forceful "authority
57to require" such interconnections.
Some conclusions can be drawn about the course of FPC reaction 
to regulation of independent gas producers during the 1954-1961 period 
from the above review. The FPC did not seek jurisdiction in the years 
before the Phillips decision, and with varying amounts of vigor it 
attempted to have the existing jurisdiction removed by the Congress 
after 1954. The request to allow "reasonable market prices" to determine 
regulation was not abandoned until I960, and the new Commission taking 
office in 1961 was the first to feel that it could act .adequately with­
out further legislation. The year I960 was crucial as one of transition, 
with the area-pricing formula adopted and with the move toward seeking 
Congressional review, rather than Congressional initiation, in getting 
producer regulation off the ground.
Producer regulation and the consumer 
interest
The FPC reaction to the field market changes between 1950 and 
i960 was consistent with the expected reaction given a pervasive public
rO
utility image of appropriate regulation. The attempt to carry over 
to the regulation of natural gas production methods designed for the 
regulation of quasi-"natural monopolies" added justification to the 
desire to avoid jurisdiction over independent producers. In this con­
text there were three reasons why the Commission did not press for 
regulation of the natural gas production industry. The first of these 
was that the Commission assumed that competition existed in the field
^^Ibid., p. 2.
The motives and reasoning behind the FPC reaction— or lack of 
reaction— to field market jurisdiction can only be inferred from the 
actions taken, and the inferences made are not subject to either proof 
or disproof. The inferences drawn in this section were based on the 
assumption that in the face of given field market conditions the FPC was 
acting in the total consumer interest.
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markets, and that its bare existence, as defined by number of sellers 
and the absence of collusion, made regulation both unnecessary and 
unwise. The second was that though the field market conditions were 
perhaps not such as to maximize welfare, the tools of regulation avail­
able— the cost of service or rate-base method— were not such as to 
enable the Commission to make better decisions. The final possible 
explanation was that the FPC perceived the tasks of regulation of 
natural gas production by independent producers as beyond the abilities 
of the Commission, since the public-utility approach required individual 
cost and revenue studies of the multitude of individual producers.
Competitive nature of the industry
Traditional public-utility regulation rested on the presumption 
that the public interest was not served due to the lack of competition. 
The presence of competition, however, was assumed to result in appro­
priate allocation of resources among competing uses and hence maximum 
economic welfare measured by private decisions. Interference in the 
allocative process under these assumptions resulted in a lessening of 
welfare because the optimal consumer decisions would be altered. The 
generally competitive structure of the production phase of industry was 
dealt with above in Chapter IV.
A competitive structure in the field market was consistent with 
the rising field prices. In so far as those rising field prices were 
brought on by the increasing expense of obtaining natural gas supplies 
they were necessary to the provision of the natural gas to the ultimate 
consumers. The rise in the field price of natural gas which resulted in 
increased rental payments to the holders of gas reserves was also neces­
sary if the limited gas supplies were to be allocated among potential 
users. Given underlying conditions, if the price of gas did not rise 
there would be unsatisfied potential purchasers of gas and rationing on 
some basis other than price would be necessary. The only way, in this 
view, of assuring that the gas would go to its most valued use would be 
to allow price to rise to a point where the amount supplied was just 
taken off the market by the consumers.
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If competition were thought to be present in the field markets, 
under the public-utility rationale the FPC rejection of regulation of 
the natural gas production industry was consistent with its efforts to 
protect consumers from exploitation and promote the aims of the Natural 
Gas Act. This interpretation of the role of competition was predicated, 
of course, on the assumption that free market operation resulted in 
maximum social benefit, which in turn required acceptance of the desir­
ability of laissez faire and a belief that it was applicable to the 
natural gas industry. The review of the economics of natural gas pro­
duction in Chapter II pointed out that in some relevant particulars the 
industry differed from the model encountered in economic theory. The 
existence of the appearance of competition in the field market, however, 
lent justification to FPC inaction in producer regulation.
Scope of the regulatory concept
The second plausible reason for FPC rejection of field market 
regulation was that the appropriate industry regulation was necessarily 
beyond the scope of the prevailing cost of service, rate-base method.
All price regulation (as contrasted to certification procedures) by the 
FPC followed a formula designed to relate price to cost to prevent 
exploitation of the consumer. Specified service conditions were imposed 
only to prevent those with market power from doing by indirection what 
they were prevented from doing openly. By its essence public utility 
type regulation was capable only of adjusting the interests of two 
parties— the purchasers and the sellers. These adjustments were possible 
only over a limited range of variables, which did not include some of 
the important issues of regulation. End-use control, the appropriate 
use rate of gas over time, and the geographical claims on the natural 
gas supply were among the issues which the traditional regulatory methods 
were conceptually unable to resolve. Public utility regulation would, 
despite the lack of intent, affect these and other variables. Such ef­
fects would be unintended but inevitable by-products, not entering as 
considerations at the decision level. Conservative regulation would 
avoid bringing alterations which were not the intended by-product of
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direct action. Consequently, because of the limited scope of regulation 
the FPC might have felt the wiser course to be no regulation at all. 
Actually the welfare result from lack of action bore no assurance of 
superiority over the results from regulation, whatever the basis 
chosen. Its seemingly impersonal operation, however, freed individuals 
from obvious responsibility.
Enormity of regulatory task
One final factor might well have caused the FPC to avoid juris­
diction over the independent producer of natural gas. The job was just 
too big for effective accomplishment under the accepted regulatory 
method. The number of independent producers was in the thousands while 
the number of transporters of natural gas in interstate commerce, the 
firms the FPC was equipped to handle, was closer to 100. Given the 
number of producers, cost-of-service and investment studies of each firm 
on the usual basis required more resources than the FPC thought would be 
available. Even the regulatory minimum of accepting filed reports, 
verifying them, and granting production certificates would have over­
burdened the FPC facilities. The alternative of limited regulation of 
producers was inconsistent with FPC experience or with the public utility 
concept under which it functioned.
Regulation of spacially oriented monopolies requires total 
coverage by the regulatory agency if protection from exploitation is to 
accrue to all consumers. Since the only alternative consumers have is 
to move, an unregulated firm, no matter how small or limited geographi­
cally, has just about as much exploitative potential as the largest. In 
the natural gas production industry there was no spacial monopoly, and 
if market power of any sort existed it was far from absolute. Two 
implications flowed from this difference between the production and 
transportation phases of the industry. First, as noted above, the regu­
lation of production was incapable of being justified on the same grounds 
as were used for justifying the regulation of transportation. Analo­
gously, if regulation were adopted the type of regulation required would 
also be different. If individual gas supply markets were either not
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monopolized or not isolated, then alternatives were open to buyers. If 
buyers were mobile, then control over one portion of the industry would 
generate effects which would be transmitted to the rest of the industry. 
The leverage exerted through control over big producer contracts, for 
example, could act on small producers as well by forcing the unregulated 
producers to meet the terms offered by the regulated producers if they 
were to retain a market for their gas. While the result might not be 
uniform, effective regulation could result from jurisdiction over a man­
ageable number of independent producers. The regulation of the natural 
gas production industry, to the extent that it was rejected on the 
grounds that the burden would overtax the available regulatory resources,
was based on a model which in certain important respects did not coin-
59cide with the regulatory context which existed.
As the above three arguments have demonstrated, the FPC rejec­
tion of jurisdiction over independent producers was consistent with a 
consumer oriented view of the regulatory scene during the 1950-1960 
decade. Whether the FPC was or was not motivated by these arguments 
throughout the period is not subject to verification. The possibilities 
presented by them, however, preclude the easy conclusion that the FPC 
was unmindful of consumer interests in allowing the rapid increase in 
the field price of natural gas without action on its part.
Legal Development of FPC Jurisdiction 
Over Field Sales
FPC jurisdiction over the field sales of natural gas for resale 
interstate was established in a series of court decisions which spanned 
the postwar period. Whatever the FPC position as to the wisdom or the 
practicality of regulation of the field sales contract, the legal obli­
gation to effect that regulation became inescapable under the law.
59The discussion here has abstracted from certain practical 
considerations which quite possibly would require full independent 
producer coverage. The point made, however, is that the nature of the 
FPC experience was such that this alternative was rejected in the 1950- 
1960 period for other reasons.
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This obligation was a result of judicial interpretation of the Natural 
Gas Act. While many cases settled minor regulatory issues, the Phillips 
case of 195^ and three others were the most important in establishing 
the jurisdictional framework which existed at the end of 1962. These 
cases are discussed below because of the insight provided by them on the 
evolution of field sales regulation. The discussion of each is limited 
to issues which have a direct effect on field regulation. The legal 
decisions are considered within the regulatory framework. No attempt is 
made to report the cases in a balanced or thorough manner. The Phillips 
case, for obvious reasons, is discussed at somewhat greater length. 
Dissenting positions are given where pertinent.
The Colorado Interstate Case
The Colorado Interstate case involved three main points; first, 
whether the Commission had to separate the properties used for juris­
dictional sales from those used for nonjurisdictional sales or whether 
it could merely allocate costs between them; second, whether the inter­
state sales for resale for industrial uses were to be regulated under 
the Act; and finally, whether the production and gathering exclusion 
prevented the Commission from taking production properties into account 
in its regulatory activity. Overriding all these concerns was the 
further question of the method of regulation. This last question made 
the Colorado Interstate case important in the development of regulation 
of integrated producers.
With reference to FPC jurisdiction, the most important finding 
in the Colorado Interstate case was that production and gathering 
activities and properties were not to be regulated directly by the FPC. 
This judgment was to be interpreted narrowly, however, because the 
exclusion clause did not restrict FPC jurisdiction solely to matters 
which would not influence production and gathering. Any incidental 
effects of regulation of sales for resale were not deemed sufficient 
grounds for invoking the production and gathering exclusion. A portion 
of the decision more precisely delimited this thinking:
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. . . That provision [production and gathering exclusion] precludes 
the Commission from any control over the activity of producing or 
gathering natural gas. For example, it makes plain that the Com­
mission has no control over the drilling and spacing of wells and 
the like. It may or may not put other limitations on the Commission. 
We only decide that it does not preclude the Commission from 
reflecting the production and gathering facilities of a natural gas 
company in the rate base and determining the expenses incident 
thereto for the purposes of determining the reasonableness of rates 
subject to its jurisdiction.
That treatment of producing properties and gathering facilities 
has of course an indirect effect on them. As we have said, rate- 
making like other forms of price fixing may reduce the value of the 
propert^Qwhich is being regulated. [Hope, 320 U.S. 591j 601
The Court held, explicitly following reasoning from the Hope 
case, that the Act established the necessity for regulating the inter­
state sales of natural gas for resale, and this required some 
determination of the price of gas as it entered the pipelines of regu­
lated companies. It stated further that the Congress had not established 
a method of regulating the cost of gas, though it could have done so had 
it chosen. Hence the Colorado Interstate decision left the production 
and gathering activities and facilities under state control but provided 
the FPC with authority to regulate transfer price between the field and 
the interstate transmission phases of the industry. Such regulation 
necessitated direct consideration of production and gathering costs-- 
which consideration was specifically approved here only with reference 
to integrated producers. In this manner the Court approved in part the 
position advanced by Commissioner Scott in his minority opinion in the 
Columbian case.^ ^
The Interstate Case
The second case leading to further definition of the problem of 
the regulation of the independent producer of natural gas was Interstate
^^324 U.S. 581, 603. See above. Chapter III, for a discussion 
of integrated producer regulation as influenced by the Colorado Inter­
state decision.
F. P. C. 200, 212-213.
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Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission which was decided June 16,
621947. The question at law in this case was whether the production and 
gathering exclusion applied to a company which did some producing and 
gathering but which also purchased gas from other producers and then, 
after mingling all the gas, transported it across state boundaries for 
eventual resale. The contention of the company that the sales were not 
in interstate commerce was immediately rejected. In an earlier action 
even Interstate had successfully argued that its operations were in 
interstate commerce and therefore beyond the reach of state control.
Filling the gap in gas regulation created by the Attleboro and
64Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. cases was accepted by the Supreme 
Court as one of the purposes of the Natural Gas Act. The Act filled 
this gap, according to the decision, and the production and gathering 
exclusion was to reserve to the states only those powers that the states 
were legally competent to administer. The Court held that if the juris­
diction of the FPC interfered with the lawful exercise of state power, 
jurisdiction would not follow. It restricted this limitation, however, 
by stating that the interference must be clear and the conflict obvious 
— the production and gathering exclusion was to be strictly construed.
In its closing statement on the case the Court looked to the effect of 
the operations of Interstate. It said that the sales were in interstate 
commerce.
62Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 331 
U.S. 682 (1947). (Hereinafter referred to as Interstate.) Investigation 
begun by FPC by an order of December 5> 1939. Opinion of FPC reported 
in In the Matter of Interstate Natural Gas Company, 3 F. P. C. 416
(1943).
^^Ibid.. p. 687. Reference is made to Interstate Natural Gas 
Co. V. Public Service Commission, 33 F. Supp. 50» 34 F. Supp. 980 
Td.C. La. 1940).
^ 2 7 3 U.S. 83; 265 U.S. 298.
^^Interstate, pp. 689-691-
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It cannot be doubted that their regulation is predominantly a 
matter of national as contrasted to local concern. . . . 
Unreasonable charges exacted at this stage of the interstate 
movement become perpetuated in large part in fixed items of costs 
which must be covered by rates charged subsequent purchasers of 
the gas, including the ultimate consumer. It was to avoid such 
situations that the Natural Gas Act was passed.
The immediate reaction to the Interstate decision was one of 
great concern among the independent producers because they felt that the 
Interstate case gave a precedent for their own regulation. Legal inter­
pretations bore out this expectation. Commenting in the context of the 
Interstate decision, Marshall Newcombe, an expert on gas law, wrote that 
sales of natural gas at the well were sales in interstate commerce if 
destined for interstate markets, no matter what the contractual relation­
ship involved. He also said that the production and gathering exemption 
would be strictly construed and that it would be limited to physical 
matters and to such local concerns as conservation. Sale for resale in 
interstate commerce would not fall under this exclusion. The statement 
that sale for resale was a matter of national concern, rather than local, 
was reinforcement sufficient to remove all doubt on this point. Finally, 
and more specifically, Newcombe said;
The FPC may regulate any purchase or sale of gas which affects 
or enters into the ultimate rate charged by a natural gas company 
for gas which it sells for resale in interstate commerce. This 
includes the authority to regulate the price at the point of pro­
duction or gathering, and such regulation is valid even though , 
local interests (state interests) may in some degree be affected.
Donald C. McCreery, writing in the Mississippi Law Journal, came 
to essentially the same conclusion. He said that as a result of this 
decision the Congress in delegating authority over interstate commerce 
delegated authority over all activities "leading to," "affecting," or
^^ Ibid., pp. 692-693.
^^Marshall Newcombe, "Federal and State Regulation of Gas Utili­
ties," First Annual Institute on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation (Dallas: 
Southwestern Legal Foundation, 1949), p. 124.
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"relating to" the "flow," "stream," or "current of" that commerce. He 
wrote that this interpretation prevented the Congress from establishing 
boundaries of jurisdiction in expressing its legislative discretion. 
McCreery disagreed with the Supreme Court interpretation which he said 
provided for an unwarranted expansion of all authority granted by the
Congress. The effect of the Court's interpretation, he said, was clearly
68to place independent producers under FPC control.
The Phillips Case
The Phillips case began October 28, 1948. In an order insti­
tuting the investigation which led to the Court decision the FPC said 
that it was necessary to determine whether the Phillips Company was a 
natural gas company within the meaning of the Natural Gas Act and, if 
so, whether its charges were unfair or discriminatory. If the answers 
to the first two questions were positive, it would be necessary to 
establish proper charges for the Phillips operations. The City of Detroit 
actually set the wheels of the investigation in motion when it requested 
that Phillips, as the producer and gatherer of the natural gas involved, 
be made a part in the proceedings entitled In the Matter of Michigan-
Wisconsin Pipe Line Co.^  ^ The decision was to open a new investigation
70to make the above determinations.
The Commission decision
Hearings and investigations continued in Docket G-1148, the 
Phillips investigation, and the others which were joined with it until 
August 16, 1951» when the decision was announced. The Commission held 
that because of the production and gathering exclusion the Phillips
Donald C. McCreery, "The Legal Consequences of the Interstate 
Natural Gas Company Decision and Related Cases," 19 Mississippi Law 
Journal, I53 ( 194-8).
^^In the Matter of Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 6 F. P. C.
1 (1947).
^^In the Matter of Phillips Petroleum Co., 7 F. P. C. 938
(1948).
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Company was not a natural gas company under the law, and that a considera­
tion of the rates charged by Phillips in its operations was therefore not 
71appropriate. The decision was purportedly based on the Supreme Court 
interpretation that the statute excluded jurisdiction over "incidents 
connected with" and "activity related to production and gathering." 
Phillips operations were found to fall within these limits because they 
were either part of the gathering process or so closely related to it so 
as to fall within the "incidents to" exemption.
The FPC staff position in the case was that the gathering opera­
tions of the company were completed before some of the sales were made 
and that the company was therefore under the jurisdiction of the Com­
mission because it transported gas interstate. Intervenors from consum­
ing states argued that Phillips* sales were sales for resale in interstate 
commerce and therefore should be regulated for the same reasons that the 
"sales" of gas produced to their own account by pipeline companies were 
regulated. To these intervenors the timing of the sales was not an 
issue capable of removing Phillips from FPC jurisdiction.^^
The interpretation of the production and gathering exclusion as 
involving physical activity and facilities alone was accepted by the 
Commission, following the reasoning of Colorado Interstate. The Commis­
sion argued that the Colorado Interstate case, if it were holding, would 
justify regulation of Phillips. The Interstate case was also cited as 
affecting the interstate commerce question. This ruling left the pro­
duction and gathering exemption to be strictly construed and only 
applicable when there was a direct and stringent conflict with state 
regulation. Here, according to the Commission, the Court could have 
made a clear demarcation, leaving local control where it was not uncon­
stitutional and giving national jurisdiction to the FPC. The Commission
71In the Matter of Phillips Petroleum Company, Proceeding to 
Determine Whether Phillips Petroleum Company Is a "Natural Gas Company" 
as Defined by The Natural Gas Act, 10 F. P. C. 246, 283 (1951).
T^Ibid., pp. 276-278.
"^ I^bid., p. 251.
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held that the Court did not choose to use those grounds for its Interstate
decision. It relied, instead, according to the Commission, on the fact
that the gathering process was complete before the sales for resale took 
Ikplace.
The Commission did not find the Colorado Interstate and Interstate 
cases persuasive. The Commission chose to rely instead on its interpre­
tation of the decisions in other litigation. In Federal Power Commission 
V. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., the FPC was denied authority to
prevent Panhandle Eastern from disposing of some of its producing proper- 
7Sties. The Court interpreted the production and gathering exclusion in
this case as limiting the FPC jurisdiction over physical properties. The
Commission saw in this case a model more in keeping with the Phillips
facts, and saw this decision as being partially inconsistent with Colorado
Interstate and Interstate. T h e  Commission also relied on precedents
established in litigation over state established floors under gas prices
at the well to bolster its decision that the independent producer was
beyond regulation. In Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil and Gas Co.
the Supreme Court upheld the right of the states to make and enforce such 
77regulations. The Commission argued that if the state had the legal
right to regulate the wellhead price of natural gas, FPC regulation of
the same matter would constitute a significant interference with state
operations and therefore the FPC action would fall under the most strict
78interpretation of the Interstate decision.'
^^Ibid., pp. 271-273. U.S. 498.
P^hillips, 10 F. P. C. 246, 273. Quoting from and referring to 
Panhandle Eastern, 337 U.S. 498, 505-506, 512-513- The point that both 
the Colorado Interstate and the Interstate decisions denied FPC juris­
diction over physical property, but allowed jurisdiction over sales for 
resale and property valuation was ignored. Thus the three cases were 
consistent, and consistent on the issue relevant to the Phillips hearing, 
namely FPC jurisdiction existed over commercial transactions despite any 
influence those transactions had on operations.
"^ 3^40 U.S. 179. See above. Chapter II.
'^ P^hillips. 10 F. P. C. 246 , 274-276.
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In statements not bearing directly on the outcome of the issues 
before it, the FPC majority pointed out protections remaining to con­
sumers even in the absence of control over prices charged by independent 
producers. The representatives of consumer interests were urged to 
appeal the FPC decision to bring the matter to decision at the highest 
level through the judicial process. The majority also noted that dis­
agreement with the decision and concern over consumer exploitation would 
find its appropriate remedy in the Congress, and not in an expansion of
the Natural Gas Act beyond the Commission’s interpretation of its 
79statutory scope.
The minority view
Two Commissioners disagreed in part with the Commission decision. 
Draper concurred with the outcome of the case but felt that it should 
have been based on different grounds. The production and gathering 
exemption was not enough, in his view, to eliminate FPC jurisdiction 
over an independent producer such as Phillips. Interference with state 
regulation would result from FPC regulation of independent producers,
however, and this fact alone was to him justification for limiting FPC
• . 80 jurisdiction.
Commissioner Buchanan dissented in a long opinion which empha­
sized exhaustive analysis of all facets of the case. This dissent 
rested on the argument that the majority decision nullified the Con­
gressional intent to close the regulatory gap opened by the Attleboro 
and Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Company decisions. While for 
Phillips the production and gathering processes were completed before 
the sales in interstate commerce took place, this condition was sitiply 
an unnecessary addition to the basic justification for regulation. The 
Interstate decision clearly established the precedent for regulation of 
the sales for resale even at the production and gathering level, accord­
ing to Buchanan.
f^Ibid., pp. 277*283. ^ Ibid., pp. 283-284.
Ibid., pp. 284-299.
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Buchanan stated that the conflict between state and national 
regulation, on which the majority relied so heavily, did not exist.
Surmise, conjecture, or speculation concerning possible future 
conflict provides no basis for denying jurisdiction under the 
Natural Gas Act.
The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates the absence of any 
known conflict or interference by the FPC with the activities 
and regulation by these State agencies during a period of 13 years.
, The states have conducted their conservation activities with no 
known conflict between the two jurisdictions.
Buchanan concluded his dissent with a review of the different 
ways the Commission had interpreted the production and gathering exclu­
sion. He pointed out that in the Columbian decision the Commission held 
that it was not authorized to regulate field sales. The Commission in 
the Peoples Natural Gas Company case, with facts very similar to 
Columbian, took a very different position though the issues in conten­
tion were not different. The Peoples Company divested itself of the 
disputed business and the proceedings were dropped.The position of 
the FPC on the Interstate matter was noted above.
Buchanan charged that the majority decision in the Interstate 
case, when coupled with the sustaining ruling by the Court of Appeals, 
brought forth such a storm of protest and political pressure that the 
FPC attempted to hedge when it argued the case before the Supreme Court. 
To forestall the critics of independent producer regulation the FPC 
tried to distinguish between the Interstate company and independent pro­
ducers in such a way as to leave Interstate within, and the independent 
producers without, the range of FPC authority. Buchanan charged that in 
addition the FPC hastily decided some independent producer cases to 
establish a precedent for the tack it took before the Supreme Court and
82
Ibid., pp. 301, 305.
ÛO
Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 12? F. 2d 
153 (C.A.D.C. 19 2^ ). The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia upheld the Commission and the District Court on this matter. 
Cited in 10 F. P. C. 246, 3O9 .
190
84to reassure and thereby quiet the producing interests and states.
Despite these moves, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision 
and left the FPC with jurisdiction over production and gathering. Even 
in the face of these facts the Commission followed the Interstate decision 
with the issuance of Order 139 which disclaimed jurisdiction over sales 
by independent producers.According to Buchanan, Order 139 directly
repudiated the Interstate decision, and moreover, by its nature was a■■
nullity. Then, despite the issuance of Order 139» the Commission 
initiated the investigation of the Phillips Company on October 28, 1948.
In April, 1949, Buchanan pointed out, the Commission reversed 
itself again. Three Commissioners testified before the Congress on bills 
to restrict jurisdiction of the FPC. These Commissioners took the posi­
tion that because of the Interstate decision the FPC had authority to 
regulate the independent producers, and that this authority was necessary 
to protect the consumers from exploitation at the hands of the independent 
producers. When the Congress, in March, 1950» passed the Lyle-Harris 
bill over the objections of a majority of the Commission, that same major­
ity favored a veto by the President. President Truman vetoed the bill 
April 15, 1950. The Commission then issued Order 154 on July 11, 1950. 
Order 154 rescinded Order 139 and set the policy that there would be no 
general investigation of producer rates but that any rates which appeared 
excessive would be examined by the Commission. The Commission's Phillips 
decision went directly contrary to Order No. 154, Buchanan wrote. Prior 
to the Phillips decision, as this short summary by Buchanan pointed out, 
the FPC had held almost every conceivable position on the question of
87the jurisdiction over the independent producer under the Natural Gas Act. 
^10 F. P. C. 246, 309-310.
^^ 6 F. p. C. 835-838. Order 139» as it is referred to in Commis­
sion proceedings, was apparently published as separate orders in three 
cases involving the Hunt gas holdings. Hassie Hunt Trust (Docket No. 
G-925); H. L. Hunt (Docket No. G-926); H. L. Hunt (Docket No. G-927).
^10 F. P. C. 246, 310-311.
"^^ Ibid., pp. 311-313.
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The Phillips case on appeal
The Phillips decision by the FPC was appealed by the consumer
representatives, and the case was carried forward by the Public Service
Commission of Wisconsin which had initiated the first proceedings. The
case went first to the Circuit Court of Appeals of the District of
88Columbia and the FPC was reversed. Upon appeal, Certorari was first 
denied and then granted by the Supreme Court (^46 U.S. 93^ > 935) and
go
the Circuit Court decision was affirmed June 7, 195^ * Justice Minton 
delivered the opinion of the Court, with Justice Frankfurter concurring 
in a separate opinion and Justices Douglas and Clark writing separate 
dissents. Justice Burton concurred with the dissent offered by Justice 
Clark. Justice Jackson took no part in the proceedings.
Majority opinion
The reasoning by which the Court affirmed the decision of the 
Circuit Court of Appeals need not be discussed at length since the argu­
ments basically were those used in earlier decisions referred to above. 
Three points were made by the Court: a) Phillips was engaged in inter­
state commerce, b) the production and gathering exclusion [sec 1(b) of 
the statute] did not exclude jurisdiction because sales for resale were 
commercial transactions and not part of the production and gathering 
process, and finally, c) Congressional intent was to fill the regulatory 
gap and the Natural Gas Act did so, conferring jurisdiction over all 
sales for resale, whether before, during, or after production and gather­
ing operations.
The first of these points, that Phillips was engaged in inter­
state commerce, was all but obvious. This position was accepted by
90Phillips and by the FPC. For the second question the Court referred 
back to its decisions in the Colorado Interstate, Panhandle Eastern, and 
Interstate cases in deciding whether the production and gathering
88
Wisconsin v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 205 F. 2d 706 (C.A.D.C.
1953).
^^347 U.S. 672. ^^Ibid., p. 677.
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91exclusion limited jurisdiction to integrated producers. In these 
cases, as in others, a distinction was made between regulation of pro­
duction and gathering with reference to facilities and operating methods, 
which was left to the states, and sales for resale which had a national 
effect. The Interstate case, moreover, provided a test of the potential 
conflicts between state and federal jurisdiction when the decision held 
that any conflict must be clear, present, and immediate before the ques­
tion of jurisdictional conflict would arise. As the Court stated, when 
refusing to grant the distinctions which Phillips and the FPC tried to 
make between Interstate and Phillips, "This Court, however, refused to 
rely on such refinements and instead based its decision in Interstate on 
the broader ground that sales in interstate commerce for resale ty pro­
ducers to interstate pipeline companies do not come within the 'production
92or gathering' exemption." In emphasizing that the Phillips decision 
was no new interpretation for the Court, the decision read in part; "We 
see no reason to depart from our previous decisions, especially since 
they are consistent with the language and legislative history of the 
Natural Gas Act."^^
The last point made by the Court was in a line which stretched 
back, at least as a minority opinion, to the dissent filed by Commissioner 
Scott in the Columbian case. Congressional intent, according to the 
Court, was to fill the regulatory gap in order to protect the consumer 
from exploitation. Quoting from the last paragraph of the opinion.
Regulation of the sales in interstate commerce for resale made 
by a so-called independent natural-gas producer is not essentially 
different from regulation of such sales when made by an affiliate 
of an interstate pipeline company. In both cases the rates 
charged may have a direct and substantial effect on the price paid 
by the ultimate consumers. Protection of consumers against 
exploitation at the hands of natural-gas companies was the primary 
aim of the Natural Gas Act. Federal Power Commission v. Hope 
Natural Gas Co., [320 U.S. 591» 610] Attempts to weaken this pro­
tection by amendatory legislation exempting independent natural
9^324 U.S. 581; 337 U.S. 498; and 331 U.S. 682, respectively.
^^347 U.S. 672, 681. ^^Ibid.
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gas producers from federal regulation have repeatedly failed, and 
we refuse to achieve the same result by a strained interpretation 
of the existing statutory language.9^
Minority opinions
There were three dissenting Justices in the Phillips decision, 
and since Justice Jackson took no part in the case the decision was 
split 5— 3» with one of the majority writing a separate concurring 
opinion. The grounds given for the dissents, like the arguments of the 
majority opinion, were not original. Justice Douglas implied that regu­
lation perhaps should cover the natural gas production industry but he 
thought that the production and gathering exclusion removed the inde­
pendent producer from regulation. He found that the record of the FPC 
had been consistent in never regulating the independent producer.
Further, apparent Congressional intent, the history of the FPC operations 
in the industry, and the weight of legal opinion pointed to the con­
clusion that jurisdiction should be withheld unless Congress granted it 
explicitly. Justice Douglas expected regulation of sales for resale by 
independent producers to bring all their operations under control. He 
said that the effects of this action were too great to be undertaken by 
the Court, which, after all, had limited knowledge of the results that 
would flow from such a decision. "Regulation of the business of produc­
ing and gathering natural gas involves considerations of which we know
QC
little and with which we are not competent to deal."
Justice Clark held in his separate dissent that the regulation
of the independent producer was withheld from the FPC by the production
and gathering exclusion. Phillips, according to Clark, operated only
on the production and gathering level of the natural gas industry, and
therefore should not be regulated by the FPC. Such regulation, he wrote,
"acts contrary to the intention of Congress, the understanding of the
96states, and that of the Federal Power Commission itself." National
^^Ibid., 685.
QC
Ibid., p. 690. Justice Douglas’ dissent is found on pp. 687-690,
96Ibid., p. 671. Justice Clark’s dissent is found on pp. 69O-698.
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regulation of sales for resale would interfere with the exercise of state
responsibility for conservation regulation. In terms of the proposition
that the Natural Gas Act was written to fill the regulatory gap, Justice
Clark agreed but interpreted the "gap" quite strictly. The "gap",
according to Clark, was that expressly opened by the Missouri v. Kansas
97Natural Gas Co. and Attleboro cases. Since production and gathering
by independent producers had not been mentioned in these cases, Clark
held that these functions were not part of the gap that was to be filled.
Moreover, the FTC, in its reports which provided the issues and data
which gave rise to the Natural Gas Act, did not find that the independent
98producers were exercising abusive pricing methods.
Clark disagreed with the interpretation of the phrase "production 
and gathering" as relating only to physical activities, facilities, and 
properties. He said on this point;
If the Congress so intended, then it left for state regulation 
only a mass of ençty pipe, vacant processing plants and thousands 
of hollow wells with scarecrow derricks, monuments to this new 
extension of federal power. It was not so understood. The states 
have been for over 35 years and are now enforcing regulatory laws 
covering production and gathering, including pricing, proration of 
gas, ratable taking, unitization of fields, processing of casing­
head gas including priority over other gases, well spacing, 
repressuring, abandonment of wells, marginal area development, and 
other devices. Everyone is fully aware of the direct relationship 
of price and conservation. Federal Power Commission v. Panhandle 
Eastern Pipe Line Co. [337 U.S. 498 at 50?J And the power of the 
states to regulate the producers' and gatherers' prices has been 
upheld in this Court. . . .  We cannot square this result with the 
House Report on this Act which states that the subsequently enacted 
bill "is so drawn as to complement and in no manner usurp State
regulatory authority." H. R. Rep. No. 709 [?5th Cong., 1st Sess.
p. 2 ].99
9^265 U.S. 298; 273 U.S. 83, respectively.
98As noted in Chapter III above, the economic conditions in the 
gas field markets were such as to make the absence of citations to abus­
ive pricing practices by consumers not surprising. Whether the "gap" to
be filled was defined by the conditions of the time of the Act or by the 
situation as the passage of time brought new conditions was a matter of 
judicial determination. The Court majority favored a loose interpreta­
tion of the Act.
99phillips, 347 U.S. 672, 683-684.
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In his dissent Justice Clark also distinguished the Phillips 
operations from those of Interstate and pointed out that the Interstate 
decision was therefore not binding on the Court in the case of an inde­
pendent producer. Interstate was a middleman, Clark said, and it had 
avoided state regulation. No possibility of regulatory conflict arose.
In addition, the Court in the Interstate opinion explicitly denied that 
its decision had any effect on Columbian and Billings. Since there was 
no essential difference between the operations of Columbian and those of 
Phillips, the finding that jurisdiction accrued to Interstate could not 
serve as a precedent for regulating Phillips.
The Deep South Case and Others
The Supreme Court decision in the Phillips case removed all doubt 
as to whether, under the Natural Gas Act, jurisdiction existed over the 
large producers and gatherers of natural gas destined for interstate sale. 
Some of the producers thought, however, that the finding was based on 
the large size of Phillips operations and on the fact that Phillips owned 
gathering lines which could be viewed as transporting gas. Two partic­
ular circumstances were viewed by some members of the industry as provid­
ing a barrier to federal regulation. The first of these involved the 
small producer who made his sales at the wellhead before any gathering 
or processing of the gas had taken place. The second was the matter of 
jurisdiction over casinghead gas, produced along with state regulated 
crude oil. In the fall of 195^ a group of producers asked for an order 
removing the uncertainty about their status under the Natural Gas Act.
The producer petitions were accepted and several were joined for a common 
hearing which began January 10, 1955* The presiding examiner filed the 
intermediate decision April 15, 1955-^ ^^  The full Commission rendered
l°°lbid., pp. 696-698.
^^ I^n the Matters of Deep South Oil Company of Texas, Humble Oil 
and Refining Company. Shell Oil Company. 14 F. P. C. 309 (1955). Edward 
B. Marsh, Presiding Examiner. (All proceedings on this issue hereinafter 
referred to collectively as Deep South.)
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102its decision affirming the examiner's decision on September 9> 1955»
The two proceedings are discussed jointly below.
The finding of the presiding examiner was that all production 
and sales of gas of which even a portion entered interstate commerce 
were under the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission;
The Supreme Court made it crystal clear that the over-riding con­
sideration motivating Congress in the passage of the Act was the 
protection of gas consumers from exploitation. Construing the 
provisions of the Natural Gas Act so as to protect the ultimate 
consumer of natural gas from exploitation as contemplated by Con­
gress and for that purpose to fill the "gas" [sic] between state 
and Federal regulation, it must be concluded that no conceivably 
useful purpose would be served by determining a point at which, 
under other circumstances and for other purposes 'production' and 
'manufacturing' might end. 'Interstate commerce' as the term is 
used in the Act is, at least, coextensive with the 'gap' to which 
the Court referred.1^ 3
In affirming the opinion of the presiding examiner the Commission 
made eight general points which are of interest as a summary definition 
of the limits of FPC jurisdiction. With this affirmation, and its 
judicial acceptance, federal control was extended to the wellhead, or 
beyond, for any gas sold for resale in interstate commerce or commingled 
with that which was so sold. The eight points are summarized below:
1. Casinghead gas is natural gas.
2. A sale of natural gas before completion of production and 
gathering does not bring that gas under the section 1 (b) 
exemption.
3. Processing of gas does not interrupt the interstate flow or 
continuous movement.
4. Jurisdiction holds where only a portion of the gas produced 
goes interstate, and that, as a part of a commingled mass.
5. Lack of producer control over the destination of the gas does 
not relieve the producer of jurisdiction because it does not 
influence whether or not the sales are in interstate commerce.
102In the Matters of Deep South Oil Company of Texas, Humble Oil 
and Refining Company, Shell Oil Company, 14 F. P. C. 83 (1955)»
l°3peep South, 14 F. P. C. 309, 331-332.
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6. The intent of the producer does not affect the nature of the 
sale since it is the facts of the sale and not intent which 
is ruling.
7 . Sale to an intermediary which in turn sells in interstate com­
merce leaves the producer in interstate commerce if such sales 
are made.
8. The degree of state regulation or state opposition to federal 
regulation has no effect over federal jurisdiction.10^
The Commission decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals of 
the Fifth Circuit. This Court, in a two to one decision, affirmed all 
the decisions of the FPC in the individual cases which were brought before 
it.^^^ Humble and Shell both carried an appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Certiorari was denied in both instances and there the issue of producer 
regulation was finally put to rest.^^^ No longer could the issue of the 
jurisdiction of the FPC be raised with reference to independent produc­
ers with any hope of establishing a legal defense against regulation.
^^^^ Deep South, 14 F. P. C. 83, 84-91.
*^^ T^here were four cases appealed to the $th Circuit Court of Ap­
peals. All cases were argued concurrently. A decision was written with 
particular reference to Deep South. Other cases took up individual 
points while referring to Deep South for the basic decision. The cases 
were; Deep South Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 247 F.2d 882 ($th 
Cir., 1957); Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 247 F. 2d 900 
(5th Cir., 1957)» Humble Oil and Refining Company v. Federal Power Com­
mission, 247 F. 2d 903 (5th Cir., 1957); Continental Oil Company v.
Federal Power Commission, 247 F. 2d 904 (5th Cir., 1957).
Another case involving essentially the same facts was decided a 
short time later in another jurisdiction. This other case provided a 
concurrent decision which, had it gone against the other cases, would 
have required a Supreme Court hearing. This was: Saturn Oil and Gas
Company v. Federal Power Commission, 25O F. 2d 6l (10th Cir., 1957)•
*^^ C^ertiorari was denied in Shell Oil Company v. Federal Power 
Commission, 355 U.S. 930 (1958)» and Humble Oil and Refining Co. v.
Federal Power Commission. 355 U.S. 930 (1958).
CHAPTER VI
GOALS OF REGULATORY POLICY
The goals of regulatory policy accepted for the purposes of 
evaluating various alternative regulatory patterns in the natural gas 
production industry were discussed in Chapter I. At that point the 
reasons for selecting these goals were discussed. The first of these 
guidelines for regulatory policy centered on individual welfare maxi­
mization, emphasizing the goal of maximum efficiency in the allocation 
of resources. The broader question of maximum total personal satis­
factions was ignored. The second goal selected was establishment of 
the appropriate sector distribution of income through intervention in 
the industry. Changing the allocation of resources over time (and 
perhaps coincidentally the distribution of income) because of social 
or national interests which differed from individual interests as 
expressed through market operations was the final value considered.
Other goals could have been chosen, or other content than that 
which follows could have been placed within these goals. The elements 
of public policy selected, however, were chosen on the basis of their 
usefulness in organizing the experience of the FPC in gas regulation 
and because they seemed to coincide with accepted public policy postu­
lates in the United States at this time. The discussion relating to 
these goals can with some degree of success be shifted to other possible 
value choices and the interpretations given will be of some value.
Maximum Welfare
Maximum welfare as à determinable condition was discussed in 
Chapter I. At that point this criterion was related to efficiency in 
the allocation of resources. It was considered abstracting from income
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distribution and with efficiency defined solely in terms of private 
individual interests. Maximum welfare does not exist, following this 
usage, if adjustments in production and distribution can result in 
benefit to some with no harmful effects to others. This constraint 
requires, because of the lack of ability to measure or offset gains and 
losses by different persons, that voluntary choice be the criterion for 
the comparison of relative states of well being. Hence if compensation 
for a change were freely offered and freely accepted it would demon­
strate that the proposed change actually increased welfare.^
The idea of welfare maximization in terms comprehensible to the 
economist and subject to any sort of organized study rests on the pre­
sumption that motivation of individuals is based on economic gain. The 
assumption of purely economic motivation is, of course, an oversimpli­
fication if not a distortion. Economic motivation is only one of the 
factors which enters into the decision equation of an individual. Though 
they perhaps have a greater impact on business decisions, economic
factors alone are by no means sufficient to explain even corporate
2
behavior. This study focuses on the economic variable as a partial 
explanation of behavior and choices despite its limitations. The reason 
for depending on the economic variable is that other motivational fac­
tors would be extremely imprecise and would not add significantly to an 
understanding of regulatory impacts on the level considered. More 
basically, if all other factors could be held constant, the effects of 
changes in the more purely economic variables, which would be marginal, 
could be determining. For example, whatever the conglomerate of influ­
ences (none being lexicographically ordered) that leads an individual 
to dedicate a reserve of natural gas to interstate commerce, variations
T^he basis of this didcussion was developed in the "new welfare 
economics." A more complete formulation of it can be found in numerous 
sources.
2
For a recent direct confrontation of maximization concepts and 
the issue of economic motivation see Adamentia Pollis and Bertram L. 
Koslin, "On the Scientific Foundations of Marginalism," The American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology, XXI, No. 2 (April, 1962), pp.
113-30.
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in the one factor of price would have the determining impact if all 
other factors were, or could be, held constant.
The economic variable itself is not an easily defined single 
item in gas sales contracts between producers and transporters, even if 
integrated production is left aside. Sales contracts in the natural 
gas field market offer many opportunities for negotiations, unless one 
party attempts to hold to a standard take it or leave it contract form. 
The price at which the gas is transferred is.of course the most obvious 
and most important single clause in the contract, though as the discus­
sion above in Chapter IV demonstrated, it is by no means the only one.
To simply list the more important variables is to illustrate the 
complexity of the required negotiations. Among the variables are; 
size of reserve dedicated, length of contract, firmness of price, 
delivery pressure, purity, BTU content, number of delivery points, pres­
ence or absence of recoverable liquids, taking requirements, and peaking 
capacity. The other factor which influences gas price directly is the 
location of the reservoir with reference to the consuming area. Because 
of the expense of gas transportation, the most distant the reservoir 
the lower the price which can be offered for it. In general, it might 
be said that one set of factors influencing sustainable price is the 
cost of delivering energy to the consumption point. Any condition in 
the reservoir that affects the ultimate cost of energy has a bearing on 
price, and therefore is subject to negotiation between seller and buyer.
The negotiations between buyer and seller in a free market are 
of two types. These are first, negotiations on issues where trading can 
accomplish gains to at least one party with at least no losses to the 
other, and second, where opportunities for mutual gain have been 
exhausted. The large number of variables in a gas sales contract provide 
many opportunities for trading, because while "gas is gas," there are 
significant variations in delivery properties. Once all opportunities 
for mutually satisfactory trading have been exhausted the second type 
of negotiations begin. The price of natural gas in a package depends 
on the nature of the alternatives available to the producer and trans­
porter as conflicting bargaining agents because the limit beyond which
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each bargainer cannot be forced is determined by his next best alterna­
tive. Whenever the point is reached where all mutually satisfactory 
trades have been made, the range of the determinable welfare maximizing 
allocation of resources has been reached. The final resting place of 
the bargain will affect the distribution of income but will not affect 
its allocations! efficiency.
The existence of attractive alternatives to both buyers and 
sellers in the field is therefore required to push the bargain to wel­
fare indifference. The nature of alternatives requires some scrutiny 
for this reason. The pipeline transporter purchasing gas seeks gas 
reserves at the lowest reasonable price. The market from which the 
pipeline can draw its supplies is the undedicated reserves within an 
economical distance— given price variations— of its facilities. Its 
potential supply is limited both by geography and by available undedi­
cated reserves. If there are a sufficiently large number of independent 
potential sellers within the relevant radius then pressures to sell will 
be sufficient to drive the final bargain toward the welfare maximizing 
point.
The types of alternatives available to an independent producer 
are more varied though not more numerous than those of the pipeline 
purchaser. The independent producer can sell to a pipeline purchaser, 
to an intrastate fuel market, for local industrial use, or possibly can 
choose to hold reserves for future production. These freedoms, while 
circumscribed by state regulation and intrapool considerations, do, if 
they exist in relevant forms, make it possible for the producer to with­
stand purchaser pressure to the point where the final bargain can 
generally be assumed to be within the welfare maximizing range. Monopo­
listic buying power, of course, also limits producer freedom. For 
producers faced with monopsony and intrapool drainage, some relief is 
granted by state minimum price and ratable taking statutes such as 
those discussed above in Chapter II.
3
The results of Cookenboo's study in support of this position 
are reported above in Chapter IV. See Cookenboo, pp. 96-103.
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The conclusion from this line of reasoning is that if, as several
studies have found, the field market for natural gas exhibits workable
competition on the producer side with some monopsony, then no field price
regulation holding price down would be required for a satisfactory allo-
4cation of resources. The natural gas would go to the highest value 
uses available to it as a commodity, and consumers would take natural 
gas to the limits of its usefulness compared to other means of satisfy­
ing energy and other wants. The lessening of competition, of course, 
would threaten this welfare maximizing allocation. Analogously, the 
absence of workable competition would provide the opportunity for regu­
latory adjustments which would possibly benefit some persons with no 
losses to others.
Welfare maximization defined in demonstrable private terms is 
not the only element in public policy. Just as the pipeline company 
looks to the "package" including many variables in addition to the 
central element of price, public policy looks to goals in addition to 
welfare maximization. To carry the analogy further, appropriate deci­
sions on public policy would probably include the balancing of possibly 
conflicting goals. The next element of public policy to be considered 
in the regulation of the field sales of natural gas is another of these 
goals, appropriate income distribution between the producers of natural 
gas and its consumers.
Appropriate Income Distribution
The existence of elements of economic rent in natural gas pro­
duction and sale for resale in the field leads to consideration of 
income distribution between producers and consumers. Economic rent is 
a payment over and above that required to maintain resources in their 
current occupation. Rent that arises from irretrievably sunk investment 
or from the natural attributes of a resource does not disappear with 
time as does rent which relies on special position which can be dupli­
cated by entering factors. It is this permanent rent which is at issue.
h-
See Chapter IV above for conclusions reached in various
studies.
203
Rent is said to be demand determined because the amount of rent 
does not influence price but instead is determined by the price required 
to ration the resource among competing uses. The greater the demand 
for the resource, holding amount supplied constant, the higher the rent 
required to discourage sufficient buyers to balance available amounts 
supplied with prospective purchases. Whether the potential rent is 
distributed to the individual who controls the resource or not, it is 
the essence of rent that the amount of the product directly supplied is 
not altered. The rent nature of portions of natural gas producer 
incomes is identified below.
Royalty Payments
The purest and most obvious rent paid for natural gas in the 
field is that portion of the field price going to the owner of the reser­
voir because of ownership of the surface of the ground or through 
assignment from that surface owner. In the petroleum industry this 
distributive share is described as the royalty and leasing interest. 
Natural gas as a commodity came to be in place under the surface of the 
land through no actions on the part of the owner of the reservoir. He 
can neither increase nor diminish the amount of gas in place through 
his actions. Since to him the gas has a zero cost of production, and 
since in any case no more gas can be produced, no payment is required 
to call forth the gas. Any payment made to the reservoir owner, then, 
is in the form of pure rent and has no influence on amount of gas sup­
plied by him. Because of transfers and prospective payments, the owner 
of the subsurface rights might suffer an actual as well as opportunity 
loss if rent were not paid, but this would be a nonmarginal loss which 
would hot influence production decisions. The reservoir rent situation 
is illustrated by the simple diagram, Figure 4, on the next page. If 
OQ represented the amount of gas producible from a certain reservoir, 
the owner would be willing to sell that same amount of gas at price OC 
or price OA, or price OB, according to the demand for the gas. The cost 
of gaining control of the gas is immaterial to the owner's decision.
If the owner had paid OA to obtain control over the reservoir, and the
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Reservoir rent under different demands 
for petroleum
demand for it was D^ , he would suffer a loss of CGEA, but this loss 
would not induce him to alter the amount of gas he offered for sale.
On the other hand, if he could obtain OB for the reservoir (demand D^ ) 
a gain of AEFB would be secured. Again, no change in amount supplied 
would result.
The amount which the owner of a gas reserve can exact under 
free bargaining depends upon the demand for that particular gas 
reserve. The owner of the reserve can exact only so much as will make 
the prospective purchaser indifferent between that gas reserve and the 
marginal alternative, that is, the best source of gas (or other means 
of satisfying the particular want gas satisfies) which is not being 
used. Regulation can remove this entire payment from the owner of the 
gas reserve and redistribute it to some other use without affecting 
the amount of gas that will be made available by those who control the 
right to produce gas through their control of reservoirs.^
The property owner would, of course, have to be compensated 
for actual damages resulting from drilling and producing activities.
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Producer Rent
Rent accrues to the producers of natural gas as well as to the 
royalty holders. Production is here defined to include the discovery, 
development, and operation of gas production facilities. The payments 
covering the costs of operation of developed reserves merely represent 
the costs of making the gas available. These direct costs, plus a rate 
of return consistent with the return in alternative occupations, must 
be paid to the producers if they are not to move out of the industry 
over time. This payment is not available for distribution without an 
influence on supply. Payments which compensate for gas use which 
reduces the value created by the discovery and development of the reser­
voir are not elements of producer rent. It is true that once the 
reservoir is discovered and the development wells drilled these costs 
are sunk and any net return will retain the production on the stream in 
the short run. In the long run, however, if these costs are not met 
further exploration and development will cease and supply will fail.
Any rent derived from the sunk nature of the costs, then, is of a 
transitory nature and cannot be redistributed without effects on the 
long run supply of gas.
There are two purely rent categories of payments which can be 
redistributed without altering the long run supply of gas. The first 
of these is payments for "costless" discoveries of gas reserves and the 
second is payments to producers over and above those necessary to main­
tain a given level of exploration and development. They are discussed 
below in turn.
"Costless" discoveries
Exploration did not proceed with the intent of discovering either 
oil or natural gas reserves when the state of the geologic art was less 
advanced. The knowledge of the day could only suggest areas where 
entrapment of mobile hydrocarbons was possible, but whether any hydro­
carbons found would be in the gaseous or liquid state could not be 
predicted. In those days of low gas value the object of the search was 
oil, and any gas found could properly be considered an unintended and
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for that reason "costless” by-product of the search for oil. The return 
from all gas discovered in this way was in the nature of rent, a wind­
fall gain to the oil explorer which could be appropriated without 
significantly influencing the exploration for or development of gas 
reserves. To the extent that gas return contributed to the joint return 
from exploration, however, the total income from exploration rose. 
Increased supplies of both products resulted if this return was meaning­
ful in the total exploration context. The present value of most older 
gas reserves in the Southwest arose from no intended effort; it thereby 
represents potential rent income such as we have been discussing.
Recently discovered gas reserves present a somewhat different picture.
The increase in the demand for gas which brought higher field 
prices for gas changed the relationship between price and output. The 
knowledge of reservoir characteristics improved in the postwar period 
to the point where reliable predictions of hydrocarbon form were possible. 
The combination of higher price and predictability caused sales condi­
tions to become a significant factor in determining the amount of gas 
discovered. Even at present, however, all gas reserve discovery is not 
explained by the price of gas. Phillips Petroleum Company, which has 
pioneered in separating its exploration into oil and gas divisions, 
finds that its predictions of hydrocarbon form are correct only something 
over 80 per cent of the time.^ Therefore pure gas reserves are still 
being found in the search for oil. Moreover, gas in commercial quanti­
ties not required for field operations is sometimes associated with 
liquid petroleum discoveries which would be produced whatever the price 
of gas. In summary, the older gas reserves were frequently costless as 
to discovery, just as are some of the more modern gas discoveries. 
Therefore some of the payments for reserves to those who discovered them 
are economic rent and its payment is not required for the maintenance 
of the industry.
G^. M. Allen, "Depth makes a difference in the search for 
Natural Gas," Oil and Gas Journal, LIX, No. 1? (April 24, 1961), p. 
103.
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Excessive discovery return
The final broad category of rent payments to natural gas pro­
ducers are those payments which exceed the expectations which motivated 
the exploration. The gross return to the discoverer of a gas reserve 
depends on two factors, the amount of gas discovered and the price at 
which that gas is sold. The amount of gas discovered by an individual 
producer as the result of a given amount of exploration expenditure is 
subject to wide variation. The larger the aggregate, the broader the 
sample considered, the smaller the range into which success ratios are 
likely to fall. The entire industry over a series of years would be 
the limiting case. In this case, with a high degree of certainty the 
success ratio could be predicted to fall within narrow limits, assuming 
no changes in basic technology or other conditions. Though it is the 
individual producer who receives the rent from chance discovery of 
bonanza production, and also the individual producer who suffers a long 
series of dry holes, the industry as a whole is the relevant decision 
entity when analysis of the supply of natural gas is concerned. In this 
analysis the expectations for exploration and development success will 
be assumed to be correct in terms of quantity of gas discovered.
The price of gas, and therefore the value of the predicted dis­
coveries, is another matter. At any given time there exists a given set 
of price expectations which are used as one of the factors going into 
the industry investment decision. If the price on which the allocation 
decision was based is verified by experience, then the exploration will 
yield the going rate of return adjusted to the special conditions of 
uncertainty under which the decision was made. But whatever the price 
experienced, once a commitment of resources to exploration and develop­
ment has been made the result of that exploration and development will 
be placed on the market. Under these conditions, the expected price 
which would call forth an appropriate amount of exploration would be the 
necessary cost of maintaining the desired supply of natural gas. Any 
price above that expected would result in redundant profits. Any price 
below that expected would result in a loss. Whatever the experienced 
price, however, the expected price is what determines how much exploration
208
will occur. As a practical matter, of course, expectations unfulfilled 
result in revisions of future expectations in the absence of a clear 
indication to the contrary. It follows that a regulatory policy which 
led to fulfillment of the price expectations required to bring about 
the predetermined desirable level of gas discovery would successfully 
replace demand determined rent. Under this regulation return to pro­
ducers would compensate them for remaining in their occupation. In the 
case of an upward trend in the demand for gas such as the United States 
has experienced the economic rent avoided by regulation would be avail­
able for distribution. Similarly, if gas value were falling, losses 
would be shiftable from the producers to the consumers if a decision to 
do so were made. These changes in the distribution of income, to repeat, 
would be possible without changes in the amount of gas supplied to the 
field markets so long as appropriate (nonmarginal) methods were used.
Three sources of economic rent have been isolated in the dis­
cussion above. These are 1) royalty payments; 2) "costless" discoveries 
(those not motivated by a conscious search for gas); and 3) the differ­
ence between expected discovery return and that actually experienced.
The decision as to the amount of rent which is to flow to the producers 
is in essence a noneconomic one. It is based instead on value judg­
ments as to the relative merit of the claim of the conflicting interests. 
It is necessary that such judgments be made on the basis of broad public 
policy because market decisions have no external claim to justification 
in this regard. Problems of distributing economic rent in ways other 
than it is now distributed will be considered in later chapters.
The national interest in natural gas use is affected by the 
distribution of economic rent because under laissez faire that rent is 
distributed through a price pattern which does affect producer and con­
sumer decisions. The higher the price, the greater the number of 
resources which can be sustained in a profit oriented industry— and the 
higher the rent return to the supra-marginal producer. Similarly, the 
price of a commodity also allocates the amount supplied among competing 
uses. Holding other things equal, the price of gas determines both the 
size of the market, for example that for fuel, and the division of that 
particular market among natural gas and its potential substitutes. In
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the case of a depletable resource with a variable rate of production, 
price to the consumer influences allocation over time as well. This 
allocation of natural gas over time is a matter of national importance 
as well as one of individual concern.
Regulation to Promote the National Interest
The essence of the "national interest" question is the hypothesis 
that the interests of a society are not necessarily the same as the sum 
of the privately experienced interests of the individuals who make up 
that society at any one point in time. The difference in interests 
leads to the necessity for public policy either to accept a continuing 
predominance of private individual interests, or to balance all interests 
through appropriate social interference by means of the only instrument 
available, government. The first chapter of this work, and the intro­
duction to this chapter, mentioned the national concern in the allocation 
of natural gas over time. Many of the nominally separate public policy 
questions in natural gas regulation are concerned with one or another 
form of this issue. Less important unrelated national issues exist too, 
but they are ignored for reasons of brevity and simplicity of presenta­
tion.
Two responsibilities rest on any argument that government 
interference in economic activity is needed to further the national 
interest. First, it must be demonstrated that the national interest 
does indeed differ from the sum of individual interests, and second, a 
method of successfully furthering that national interest must be pre­
sented. The concentration in this chapter is upon the first of these 
matters.
Individual interests are developed and expressed within a con­
text of a given society and a given set of expectations about the course 
of future events. The goals and interests of the nation, however, are 
established in a much broader context and therefore are subject to an 
even greater range of alternatives. So long as this basic difference 
in frame of reference exists, the distinction made here between indi­
vidually and socially oriented interests does not require either a
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rejection of the individual as the valuing unit or the establishment of 
an anthropomorphic "State." All that is required is recognition that 
while individuals make their preferences known within a given context, 
these same individuals acting as the group called a nation can change 
the decision matrix within which they are bound as individuals. To 
explain by analogy: One firm in the pure competitive model has no
influence over price; all such firms taken as the industry do set the 
price which the individual firm must take. The mechanism of change and 
the stimulus which leads to divergent values is of no interest to us 
here so long as such divergence is accepted as possible.
The economic interests of individuals qua individuals are ex­
pressed primarily through a market system such as was described earlier. 
One of the choices expressed through the market is the allocation of 
any depletable resource over time. Given the usual assumptions, the 
rate of natural gas use would be such as to maximize the sum of the 
present value to individuals of future use of the gas after an appro-
7
priate discount for the passage of time.
The national interest would possibly be quite different from the 
individual interests and as a result would require different rates of 
natural gas consumption. There are three conditions under which such 
interests do not coincide. The first example of such a difference is 
the lack of identity of goals or basic values. Individuals within a 
market framework seek to maximize their personal satisfactions, whatever 
those might be. The nation, however, must concern itself with such 
other ends as national defense, overall economic growth and development, 
and its role in international affairs. The stability of the social 
fabric might, for another example, require a distribution of income out­
side the range of efficiency or production indifference. The economic
7
The market in this context would be assumed to operate per­
fectly as the limiting case. Imperfect markets would obviously 
establish theoretical conditions for intervention since even private 
welfare would not be maximized. Our task at this point is to establish 
conditions wherein the national interest is not satisfied even in the 
presence of private welfare maximization and appropriate income distri­
bution.
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development of one region, or the depressed state of another, might 
require politically palatable though uneconomic adjustments of gas use 
over time. For reasons of different goals the national interest might 
require different gas use patterns than those which would be most satis­
factory to the citizens in their private lives.
The difference between individual and national time horizons 
are also significant in this regard. The rate of discount applied by 
an individual when determining decisions on matters involving time 
depends, to some extent, on the transient nature of his existence.
Man's planning horizon is limited, and time is valued accordingly. The 
nation, however, is not subject to inevitable decline and extinction.
In a phrase, the nation's concern is long run continuity, Or, in a 
somewhat different light, the nation promotes equity or justice among 
all its citizens, among those of the current generation and between the 
present and future generations as well.
The final example of aspects of resource allocation which bring 
different optimal results according to the valuing framework is the 
breadth of the national concern at any point in time. Individual inter­
ests include those of the direct participants in market transactions 
and those rather directly affected by the transactions. All individuals 
who are affected by a given set of transactions are not able to influ-
g
ence the results of bargaining. The sum of these indirect effects of 
gas use patterns might be more important than the direct effects, but 
they would be ignored under private market decision making. For this 
reason, then, the national interest may differ from the sum of the 
individual interests.
Sub-optimal temporal allocation of gas, from a national view­
point, leads to no automatic conclusions about the wisdom, necessity, 
or form of social action to change that allocation. The only inference 
which can be drawn is that the matter is one of concern to public policy 
and therefore explicit consideration of it is appropriate. Decisions 
among alternatives considered would rest on value judgments. Choice of
g
External economies and diseconomies, for exatrple, are a special 
case of the indirect effects described here.
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an appropriate regulatory policy would require three steps; first, 
determining what values should be considered under the heading of the 
national interest; second, estimating the use rates which would opti­
mize these values; and finally, reconciling the national interest with 
private welfare maximization and appropriate income distribution policy. 
It is to this last question, the reconciliation of various public 
policy concerns, that the discussion now turns.
Goals and Their Fulfillment in Natural 
Gas Field Sales Regulation
Three different public policy concerns in the regulation of the 
field sales of natural gas were identified above. They were maximum 
welfare, appropriate income distribution, and the national interest in 
the use rate of gas over time. Each of these elements was considered 
more or less separately from the others. Yet, active regulation requires 
joint consideration of all values to which expression is sought. In 
developing and applying a specific program all other things cannot be 
held equal. Change of any variable to express one value probably has 
an effect on the satisfaction of all others. Optimal regulation requires, 
then, the development of a "package" which unifies, if possible, and 
compromises if not, the joint effects of efforts to reach particular 
ends.
The first task of regulation, viewed in this light, is to deter­
mine exactly what ends are sought and with what priorities. Specific 
or quantified content cannot be supplied for the generalities of policy 
values by data or economic reasoning alone. This content must flow 
from value judgments, but preferably those based on the most complete 
information available. The second task of regulation is to develop 
feasible techniques which both in their proximate and more removed 
impact fulfill welfare maximizing criteria. This section deals with 
the content of regulation while particular regulatory techniques are 
considered in the chapters below.
The package nature of the joint goals sought in gas field price 
regulation form a desired welfare frontier. Though more difficult to
213
deal with conceptually than single variable maximization, administra­
tively a frontier is easier to approach than a given single point. The 
plurality of variables makes administrative flexibility possible. 
Compromise can be used to reduce individual resistance and balanced 
movement toward the desired result can be achieved.
The problem of putting content into this package, of specifying 
a maximizing social welfare function, remains. Quantification of spe­
cific parameters for various elements in the social welfare function 
will not be attempted in this context. The social values which deter­
mine a maximizing function can only be validated through the established 
evaluative organs of the society, and the opinions of this writer, per 
se, are neither conclusive nor persuasive. Some general comments about 
the nature of that social welfare function are appropriate within these 
limits.
No functioning society is without a public policy which can be 
thought of as the embodiment of certain values. For exançle, in the 
absence of direct public regulation of the gas industry, gas is allo­
cated to certain uses, its use is distributed over time in a certain 
fashion, and income is distributed in given ways. In this case the 
public policy is laissez faire and the inferred social welfare function 
associated with it includes the results of this policy. Discussion of 
whether there is to be a public policy toward the natural gas industry, 
or of whether any public policy has a co-ordinate social welfare func­
tion, is not meaningful because policy always exists and with it a 
social welfare function is expressed. Moreover, since there is a com­
munity consensus of a passive, if not active, nature which accepts all 
which it does not change, that public policy must be at least accept­
able. The questions that remain concern the nature of the welfare 
maximizing function and establishment of a public policy to satisfy its 
conditions.
The attempt to establish a conceptual social welfare function 
that demonstrably maximized or even increased welfare measured in 
individual terms has had only very limited success. Only two verifi­
able statements can be made about the social welfare effects of any
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given action. First, a prospective change increases welfare if it is 
preferred by at least one person and no one opposes it. Second, if a 
change yields sufficient benefit to enable the gainers to voluntarily 
compensate the losers for their losses, and if as a consequence of the 
payment of compensation the potential losers voluntarily agree to the 
change, then welfare is also increased. One statement encompasses 
both these points because the payment of compensation establishes the 
unanimity conditions of preference and indifference, substituting a 
combination of changes for just one. Beyond these meager results there 
have been few positive conclusions from the search for conditions under 
which the welfare effects of economic change could be determined. Wel­
fare economists have, however, succeeded in specifying the necessary 
conditions for determinable welfare gain. On the negative side, they
have been able to reject certain hypotheses which would have, if veri-
9fied, widened the scope of determinable results.
The implications of the work of the welfare economists need not 
be stultifying with regard to public policy despite the lack of positive 
results from the analysis. The nature of the knowable has been shown 
to restrict opportunities to make positive statements about the welfare 
impact of any given proposed change taken by itself. But with equal 
force the status quo has been stripped of any standing as a preordained 
good. While welfare economics has not given policy makers the tools to 
establish any alternative as unconditionally preferred, it has with the
9
While the literature in welfare economics is extensive, three 
surveys present a suitable overall view of the sweep of the subject.
Hla Myint, Theories of Welfare Economics (Cambridge, Massachusetts;
Harvard University Press, 1948) deals with the classical and neo-classical 
welfare theories. I. M. D. Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics 
(Oxford Paperback, 2d ed.; London: Oxford University Press, I960) deals
primarily with the "new welfare economics" which is based on the switch 
from cardinal to ordinal utility measurement and the inability to com­
pare utility interpersonally which resulted from its acceptance. A 
recently published book, Jerome Rothenberg, The Measurement, of Social 
Welfare (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961),
brought the survey consideration of relative welfare states through the 
more recent hypotheses.
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same force freed policy action of the necessity of maintaining the 
status quo unless the unanimity condition could be satisfied. 
Responsibility has been placed directly upon the decision making 
process and the value judgments of the decision makers within that 
process. Operationally, then, effective public policy requires that 
a system be established which can determine and express the maximizing 
societal values.
The public policy toward the natural gas industry existing at 
the time of this study rejected the results of laissez faire in favor 
of direct regulation. It had been decided that certain institutional 
channels would be used to answer many of the allocative and other ques­
tions in the industry even before the field price regulation issue 
reached the Supreme Court in 195^ » At that time, however, there were 
no existing means of making decisions on field price issues. A regu­
latory process had to be worked out.
There are two requirements for a regulatory process which will 
facilitate determination of the appropriate parameters of a maximizing 
social welfare function. It has to both satisfy the existing consensus 
of appropriate policy goals and also be adaptable to changed and chang­
ing welfare parameters. The focus of analytical concern with regulatory 
policy lies in the means by which the value judgments of the community 
are gauged and placed into operation as effective public policy. The 
crucial matter for analysis is the dynamic of regulation, the decision 
making process itself.
Paradoxically enough, concentration on the process, rather 
than on attempts to establish scientific welfare maximizing solutions 
to public policy issues, leads to a resurrection of some potentially 
verifiable welfare conclusions.^^ The acceptance of a given decision 
making process has welfare implications. If one process is accepted, 
then the choices of policy alternatives made through that process must 
be expected to be preferable to other packages made up of all other
^^The final chapter of Rothenberg's book, "Social Choice of a 
Social Welfare Function," pp. 309-36, contributed to the writer's 
thinking at this point.
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alternatives plus the change in the decision process required before 
each of these other alternatives would be instituted. To be accepted 
passively the package of the process and its results are not required 
to be optimal, but they must be preferred to change along with result­
ing uncertainty. This conclusion is perilously close to "whatever is, 
maximizes social welfare." There are two factors, however, which make 
the conclusion significant rather than trivial. First, an adjustment 
element is included which is weighted toward change which will lead to 
increased welfare as judged by the community which selected it. That is, 
the fact of adjustment implies that in the ongoing process itself the 
drift of regulation decisions will be toward greater welfare because 
choice is exercised expressing social preferences. Second, the values 
of the individuals who are the community are to a great extent framed 
through acceptance of the decision making process itself. It forms 
part of the "value matrix" mentioned in distinguishing between the indi­
vidual and the national interests. Therefore the decision process, to 
which the individuals in the community are committed, is partially 
self-validating. The decisions made approach the unanimity criterion 
because the values of a going community adjust to the results of the 
accepted decision process. Rather than "whatever is, maximizes social 
welfare," a more appropriate phrase would be "whatever is becoming, is 
approaching social welfare maximization."
Rothenberg put a similar thought in these words:
This structure of system, is given content by certain strategic 
decision-making institutions in the society. . . . These decision­
making processes are approved as the rules of the game and their 
decisions are approved in advance. Such decisions are legitimized 
articulations of the group's values. Since socialization in a 
going society commits most individuals so deeply to established 
values in seeking to fulfill their desires, acceptance of these 
strategic social processes is a most important means by which these 
individuals uphold their own values. These processes become 
themselves important values. And they create by their functioning 
other social values. Since they are choice mechanisms they 
separate chosen from rejected alternatives. In this way they 
differentiate, and define by this very differentiation, socially 
desirable and socially undesirable alternatives, or more generally, 
they rank alternatives as to the degree of social desirability.
. . . The basic consensus extends to social validation of decision
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processes whose choices concern the social state alternatives of 
welfare economics; the consensus extends to choice of an "official" 
Social Welfare Function.
It must be recognized that nothing that has been stated above 
has moved us toward the welfare economists' goal of an objective and 
verifiable determination of maximum welfare positions. Value judgments 
still abound, not the least one of which is the acceptance of the 
decision process itself as the central variable in and about which all 
value conflicts can be resolved or compromised. There is no method of 
demonstrating that the answers received in the quest for maximum social 
welfare, or in the selection of a social welfare function, are actually 
maximizing welfare. There is no method of demonstrating even that the 
essence which we are maximizing is welfare, even if we succeed in maxi­
mizing it. But through specification of variables the policy maker has 
opened the value choices to the evaluative and corrective process of 
public examination.
The goals of regulation are a matter of policy determination.
The means of regulation, which include both the decision process and the 
regulatory method itself, must be adjusted to the tasks that are set 
by the goals selected. Hence regulation techniques can be judged in 
terms of their success in fulfilling accepted goals, while the goals 
themselves can be judged ultimately only in terms of other goals. What­
ever the specific content of the maximizing social welfare function, 
it is possible to determine whether regulatory methods could accomplish 
the general ends sought. Two regulatory methods are considered in the 
next two chapters. The nature of the experience with the methods is 
specified, when applicable, and then the techniques are evaluated by 
analyzing whether or not they are able to fulfill the basic regulatory 
purposes presented iq_this chapter.
11Rothenberg, pp. 316-1?.
CHAPTER VII
REGULATION OF INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS OF NATURAL GAS:
THE PUBLIC-UTILITY APPROACH
The FPC was granted jurisdiction over the sales of gas for
resale in the field by independent producers in 195^ when the Phillips
decision was rendered.^ With the decision in the case styled Deep
South, the legal issue of FPC jurisdiction over independent producers
2
selling in interstate commerce was settled. The immediate FPC reaction 
to jurisdiction was to freeze rates at the levels existing as of June ?, 
195 »^ and to cause all rate changes to be held in abeyance or collected 
subject to refund until some regulatory procedure could be devised.
With rates held stable through this expedient, the FPC began its efforts 
to find a means of dealing with the new situation in which it found 
itself. The traditional public-utility approach was the first such means 
explored by the Commission, The operation and implications of this 
method of regulating the sales for resale of natural gas by independent 
producers are discussed below.
The FPC, itiis rather clear, had no definite idea of the direc­
tion it wished to take with reference to producer regulation when the 
supervisory function was forced upon it. The goals to be sought in 
this regulation were not settled nor were the alternatives specified.
Its experience had not prepared the FPC for the role of allocating, 
either directly or indirectly, natural gas among competing uses and over 
time, though the Commission was familiar with income redistribution 
issues because of its regulation of the interstate pipeline companies.
P^hillips. 3^7 U.S. 672.
^Deep South. 24? F. 2d 882.
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Moreover, apparently the Commissioners and the FPC Staff, as well as 
the natural gas production industry, expected the Congress to pass
3
amendatory legislation to remove producers from regulatory control.
This expectation reduced the pressure on the Commission to arrive at 
some regulatory method. A relaxed regulatory atmosphere was retained 
until it became apparent that legislative relief from this responsi­
bility would not be forthcoming. Finally, action was initiated on the 
Phillips case which was pending from its original filing and from the 
specific court order remanding it to the Commission for further con­
sideration.
There was no established procedure for independent producer 
regulation to which the FPC could turn. The sole analogous problem 
faced by the Commission was in the determination of allowances for gas 
produced by the interstate pipeline companies to their own account.
In 1954 the Commission attempted to replace the traditional cost-based 
regulation with the fair-field method in a rate proceeding involving 
Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company. The judicial review of this
Commission decision, styled City of Detroit, forced the FPC to revert
4 •to the cost or rate-base approach. It was this same rate-base method 
that was adopted as a working principle in the efforts to establish a 
price for gas produced by Phillips. In effect, there was no positive 
decision to use the cost approach; it was simply the only accepted 
available alternative when the time for action came.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into two parts in its 
analysis of the cost method of regulating jurisdictional sales by 
independent producers.^ The first of these discusses the use of the
3
John C, Mason, General Counsel, FPC, "Problems in Regulation 
Under the Natural Gas Act of Interstate Operations of Producers,"
Before Mineral and Natural Resources Law Section, American Bar Associa­
tion, August 8, 1961, (Mimeo.) pp. 5-6. Speech reprinted in Public 
Utilities Fortnightly. LXVIII, No. 7 (September 28, 1961), p. 512, 
under the title "Producer Problems Under the Natural Gas Act."
4 _230 F. 2d 810. See the discussion in Chapter III above.
■^ The firm by firm, cost-based, traditional, public-utility type 
regulation of the independent producers is termed the public-utility 
approach in this work. The public-utility approach is differentiated
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rate-base method for establishing gas prices for Phillips and on the 
later rejection of this approach as the general solution to independ­
ent producer regulation. The final portion of the chapter analyzes 
cost-based regulation in the light of selected public policy goals, 
those discussed above in Chapter VI.
Regulation of Independent Producers Under the 
Cost Approach
The first, and as it turned out, only, traditional cost-of-
service rate study of an independent producer involved the Phillips
Petroleum Company and the same proceedings. Dockets G-1148, et al,
which gave rise to the Supreme Court test case on jurisdiction. On
November 22, 195^ » the Commission vacated the order issued August 22,
61951, terminating proceedings under the Natural Gas Act. It ordered 
that the proceedings be reopened to determine
. . . whether in connection with any transportation or sale of 
natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, 
any rates, charges, or classifications demanded, observed, 
charged or collected by Phillips, or any rules, regulations, 
practices or contracts affecting such rates, charges or classi­
fications are unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or 
preferential.7
If charges or other aspects of Phillips' operations were found 
to be contrary to those required by law under the Natural Gas Act, the 
Commission ordered that appropriate charges be determined. It was not 
until May 28, 1956, that the Commission consolidated proceedings; it 
ordered that hearings begin June 26, 1956. Various other filings and 
dockets from time to time were added to the case. The hearings closed
from other regulatory methods by the fact that it is on a firm by firm 
basis, and that price is set so as to yield no more than the cost of 
service and some appropriate return on the prudent, depreciated invest­
ment rate base.
^10 F. P. C. 246, 283.
7
Order Vacating Termination of Proceedings and Continuing Inves­
tigation of Phillips Petroleum Company, 13 F. P. C. 1527 (1954).
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December 18, 1957, after 82 hearing days and the compilation of a 10,620 
page hearing record, not including 235 exhibits. The Presiding Examiner,
g
and author of the Examiner's Decision, was Joseph Zwerdling.
The Examiner's Decision
The Examiner's Decision in the Phillips case was issued April 6, 
1959. This 230 page mimeographed document included a summary of the 
hearing testimony assembled and organized with reference to the major 
issues as identified by the Presiding Examiner. The Examiner first con­
sidered the rate-base method and its feasibility. Then he examined the 
positions of the four major parties to the case, Phillips itself, the 
FPC Staff, the Eastern Seaboard Intervenors, and the Wisconsin Inter­
venons, on various regulation issues. These proposals were considered 
by subjects, some of the most important and relevant of which are dis­
cussed below. The final portion of the Examiner's Decision was given 
over to the Order putting the findings into force and to appendix tables 
which brought together the various findings on specific issues.
Feasibility of public-utility 
regulation
Examiner Zwerdling commented directly on the feasibility and
desirability of the public-utility method. He stated that the general
attacks on the method had taken the form of contentions that it was
"unworkable, that it presents monstrous problems which are impossible
of solution, that it is administratively unfeasible, and that it pro-
9
duces incongruous results." Zwerdling pointed out that the Phillips
g
In the Matters of Phillips Petroleum Company; Decision Upon 
Consolidated Proceeding Under Sections 4 (e) and 5 (a) of the Natural 
Gas Act to Determine Just and Reasonable Rates for an Independent Pro­
ducer, Docket G-1148, 24 F. P. C. 590 (1959). (Hereinafter referred to 
as the Examiner's Decision.) This writer referred both to the original 
mimeographed document distributed to the parties in the proceeding and 
to the decision'as reported in the FPC Reports. Citations whenever 
possible refer to the official reporting.
^Ibid., p. 601.
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study was the first thorough analysis of the operation of the rate-base 
method, A great deal of industry material was read into the record to 
set the stage for producer regulation, and much time was spent in 
exploring alternative solutions to problems posed by the new departure 
in FPC regulation. In addition, there were a great many intervenors, 
all of whom had to be heard.Phillips, which company prepared the 
data justifying its rate proposals, did not contend that the method was 
unworkable or unduly complex, Zwerdling remarked. There was a two year 
wait between the instigation of the investigation and the beginnings of 
hearings which explained some of the long delay before the filing of 
the decision. The time taken for the Phillips matter, Zwerdling con­
cluded, would certainly be shortened in future proceedings.
In more general terms, the Presiding Examiner argued positively 
that use of the public-utility approach to producer regulation was 
feasible and desirable. It was established, for example, that Phillips 
had been able to provide all data that was reasonably required for cost- 
of-service determination. A period of experience with regulation and a 
uniform system of accounts were expected to make the task even less 
difficult for other producers. Of course, the allocation of joint costs 
between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional sales required admittedly
^^Mimeographed copy. Examiner's Decision, pp. i-iv. A list of 
the intervenors in this case points out the widespread interest it 
engendered and, incidentally, the disparate interests involved. Inter­
venors included; Northern Natural Gas Company, Permian Basin Pipeline 
Company, Texas Gas Transmission Corporation, Panhandle Eastern Pipeline 
Company, Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Company, Consolidated Gas Utilities 
Corporation, Council Bluffs Gas Company, Minneapolis Gas Company, Public 
Service Commission of Wisconsin, State of Wisconsin, City of Detroit, 
Michigan Public Utilities Commission, Metropolitan Utilities District 
of Omaha, Brooklyn Union Gas Company, Long Island Lighting Company, 
Public Service Commission of the State of New York, Public Service Elec­
tric and Gas Company, United Gas Improvement Company, Consolidated 
Edison Company of New York, Philadelphia Electric Company, County of 
Wayne, Michigan, Mississippi River Fuel Corporation, Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company, El Paso Natural Gas Company, Southern Counties Gas 
Company of California, Southern California Gas Company, San Diego Gas 
and Electric Company, California Public Utilities Commission, State of 
California, Minnesota Valley Natural Gas Company, and Northern States 
Power Company.
^^Ibid.. pp. 601-603.
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artificial determinations. But to put the allocation problem into per­
spective, similar problems were faced in pipeline regulation as well.
The inability to resolve these issues with scientific accuracy did not 
prevent cost-of-service regulation in the gas transmission industry. 
Satisfactory, if not perfect, solutions could be found in gas production 
regulation as well. While admitting that complexity and imprecision 
were part of any regulation, Zwerdling remarked that the courts upheld
good faith regulation so long as it did not violate due process or
12substantive guarantees.
Zwerdling concluded that the cost-of-service, rate-base method 
was workable if 1) the Commission came to some determination on cri­
teria, standards, and methods; 2 ) a uniform system of accounts and
records keyed to the criteria, standards, and methods chosen were estab-
13lished, and 3) experience were accumulated in a case by case way.
Zwerdling decisions on major issues
No attempt to summarize or even categorize the involved findings
reported in the Examiner's Decision will be made here. They lost their
particular significance when, in I960, the Commission abandoned the
Ih-public-utility method for the area-price approach. Five elements of 
the Examiner's Decision did, however, bear on Commission policy or on 
the use of the public-utility method for regulating sales for resale in 
the field by independent producers. These five items were; 1) the 
"phantom tax" allowance; 2) the rate of return to be allowed on prudent 
dedicated investment; 3) the allocation of costs between jurisdictional 
and nonjurisdictional business including the allocation of exploration 
costs; 4) the treatment of escalation contracts in force between Phillips 
and some of its suppliers; and 5) the choice between systemwide or
^^ Ibid.. pp. 603-606. ^^ Ibid.. p. 60?.
^^ Statement of General Policy No. 61-1 Establishment of Price 
Standards to be Applied in Determining the Acceptability of Initial 
Price Proposal and Increased Rate Filings by Independent Producers of 
Natural Gas, 24 F. P. C. 818 (I960). (Hereinafter referred to as Area- 
Pricing Statement.)
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production-area bases for rates. These problems are discussed in turn 
below.
Phantom taxes
The percentage depletion allowance at the time of the Proceed­
ings on producer regulation made it possible for firms in extractive 
industries to deduct a certain per cent of total income from their 
taxable income to offset using up the discovery value of a depletable 
asset. The percentage depletion allowance could be taken without 
regard to other deductions or depreciation. In the petroleum industry 
the depletion allowance at this time amounted to the lesser of 2?.5  
per cent of gross income or 50 per cent of net income. Firms engaged 
in petroleum exploration and development were also allowed to expense- 
off intangible drilling costs even if the firm capitalized them in its 
own accounting. This enabled the firms to defer taxes, because of the 
higher earlier write-off, and provided in effect an interest free 
loan.l^
Phillips contended that it should be allowed, as a cost-of-
service, the amount of federal income tax it would have paid if these
two tax provisions had not reduced its actual tax liability. In this
case the sum amounted to almost $12 million out of a total cost-of-
service, as calculated by Phillips, of $92 million.Phillips argued
that it was the intent of Congress that this tax reduction should serve
as an incentive for exploration and development. If such intent did
exist, the FPC had no power to make the saving available to the consum- 
17ers. Phillips relied on the Court of Appeals decision in the City 
of Detroit case for legal precedent. The Commission in that instance 
was ordered to allow Panhandle Eastern the tax advantages accruing from
Intangible drilling expenses are those associated with devel­
opment of producing property which are not in the form of land or 
equipment. Such expenses include road building, site preparation, and 
real estate damage. Examiner's Decision, p. 707»
^^ Ibid., pp. 708, 615. l^Ibid., p. 709.
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the accelerated amortization provisions of Section 216 of the Revenue 
Act of 1950.^ ®
The Presiding Examiner rejected the request for the phantom tax 
allowance. He pointed out that the depletion allowance and the tax 
treatment of intangible drilling expense antedated the Natural Gas Act 
and producer regulation. The Congress could have written the tax 
privileges into the Natural Gas Act, but since it did not, Zwerdling 
contended that no such Congressional intent was present. On Phillips' 
general arguments for the allowance on the basis of need, the Examiner 
concluded that the company should show cause for ; higher rate of return 
directly rather than attempt to gain its objective through the confus­
ing method of an allowance for phantom taxes. The City of Detroit
decision on treatment of accelerated amortization was rejected as a 
precedent because of the difference between a tax deferral and a tax
reduction. The City of Detroit situation was also held to differ from
that at issue because the accelerated amortization provision was a 
temporary national defense measure specifically designed to aid the 
qualifying firms. Further, the 195O Revenue Act (accelerated amortiza­
tion) came after the Natural Gas Act, reversing the relationship between
the Natural Gas Act and the depletion and intangible drilling costs
19provisions of the tax code.
The Amere case was also rejected as a precedent for the Phillips 
20position. Following Amere, natural gas companies could use the 
liberalized depreciation methods approved by the 195^ Internal Revenue 
Code in calculating their tax, and straight line depreciation in deter­
mining cost-of-service for regulatory purposes. According to Zwerdling, 
the distinguishing elements between Amere and the Phillips matter were
again Congressional intent and the distinction between a tax deferral 
21and a tax saving.
1 ft
Ibid., pp. 7I6-7I8, citing City of Detroit, 23O F. 2d 810, 822.
19Examiner's Decision, pp. 7II-7I7.
20
In the Matter of Amere Gas Utilities Company, I5 F. P. C. 781 
(1956). (Hereinafter referred to as Amere.)
P 1Examiner's Decision, pp. 718-719-
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Rate of return on rate-base
The choice of an appropriate rate of return to be allowed 
Phillips on its dedicated jurisdictional investment required a decision 
on whether the gas production industry was to be granted special treat­
ment because of its nature or whether it would be judged on the same 
criteria as other public-utility regulated industries. Zwerdling
suggested the rate of return elements first set down in the Bluefield 
22and Hope cases. The allowed rate of return was that which would (quot­
ing Hope) ". . . enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain 
its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its 
investors for the risks assumed. . . ." The Examiner rejected Phillips' 
contention that it should receive special compensation for risk. He 
pointed out that all exploration and development costs, including non­
productive exploration, were fully covered as a cost-of-service item. 
Moreover, Phillips had a better success ratio than other firms in natural 
gas production and exploration. In addition, financial risk was less 
than physical risk because Phillips operated in a large number of areas. 
Zwerdling concluded that an appropriate rate of return based on the
24
traditional factors would compensate the natural gas company for risk.
A sample of companies with characteristics similar to Phillips 
was chosen as the basis from which an appropriate rate of return would 
be derived. An average earnings-price ratio for common stock was cal­
culated using the five year period 1951-1955 to eliminate short term
fluctuations. This process yielded a rate of. return of 8.5 per cent,
2Scompared to the observed 8.8 per cent for Phillips. To this was added 
.75 per cent for financing costs and .75 per cent "fudge factor" to 
attract capital at a price which was appropriate given the book value
22Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Company v. Public 
Service Commission, 262 U.S. 679 (1923) (Hereinafter referred to as 
Bluefield.); Hope, 320 U.S. 591, cited in Examiner's Decision, p. 723.
^^320 U.S. 591, 605, quoted in Examiner's Decision, p. 724.
24Examiner's Decision, pp. 726-728.
^^Ibid., pp. 742-745.
227
of the equity outstanding. There was approximately 11.6 per cent of the
capital structure outstanding as debt at an average cost to Phillips
of 3«2 per cent. An adjustment of .79 per cent, rounded to .75 per cent,
was made to provide the desired equity return of 10 per cent. After
all adjustments, the rate of return allowed Phillips on its total invest-
26ment was 9.25 per cent.
Allocation of costs
Phillips' operations included the production of jurisdictional 
gas, nonjurisdictional gas, and petroleum liquids. General and joint 
costs had to be allocated among these phases of Phillips' operations so 
that the cost of the jurisdictional portion could be added to the cost 
of service to be recovered through regulated rates. After the basic 
allocation between gas and liquids, the separation of jurisdictional and 
nonjurisdictional gas costs was made on a volumetric percentage basis 
and presented few difficulties.
There were three basic gas-liquid allocations to be made. The 
first of these was made up of production costs between gas and liquids 
when the two were joint products. Zwerdling chose the relative cost 
basis for distributing these costs. In this method costs of production 
of oil and of gas separately were first determined. The relationship 
between the per unit costs of the two individually was then used to
27allocate lease joint costs on the basis of the volumes of each produced. 
Granting gas an allowance for the lifting of oil, as was proposed by 
some parties to the proceedings, would increase Phillips' observed 
revenues from natural gas. In his decision Zwerdling adopted the posi­
tion that the gas lifting contribution in joint product leases was 
present but of such indeterminate value that it would be best to avoid
pQ
any consideration of it. Therefore the amount that Phillips could 
recover from the sale of gas was not reduced by this contribution to 
oil production.
^^Ibid.. p. 748. "^^Ibid.. pp. 623-625.
^^Ibid.. pp. 631-633.
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Jurisdictional exploration cost allowances presented the most 
important and controversial allocation problem in determining Phillips' 
cost-of-service. Until a well is actually drilled, the contents of a 
suspected underground trap are unknown. It may contain nothing, water, 
crude oil, a gas-crude oil mixture, gas and crude oil with a gas cap, 
dry gas, or gas with associated natural gas liquids. No "proper" or 
objectively correct means is available to decide what portion of 
exploration expenses should be borne by jurisdictional gas because there 
is no way of determining or separating these expenses by final product 
sought. While for successful wells cost distributions can be made on 
the basis of what was found ex-post, for dry holes even this contact 
with objectivity is not available. Various arbitrary methods of making 
this allocation were suggested in the Phillips Hearings.
Phillips suggested separating the dry gas and joint product 
exploration costs on the basis of net investment in leases of the two 
types. This division was rejected by the Presiding Examiner because it 
inappropriately imputed exploration activity to undepleted holdings 
rather than to need for further exploration. Further, because the gas 
reserves were relatively less exploited, this method exaggerated the 
gas element. Phillips wanted to divide the joint product lease portion 
on the basis of BTU's of gas and petroleum discovered. This approach 
was also rejected. Oil companies sought economic value and not heat 
potential, Zwerdling held, and there was if anything an inverse rela­
tionship between the physical aspect of the heat value discovered and
29the economic motivation for exploration.
The exploration allocation method adopted by the Examiner was 
that termed "Reserves Added Realization." ["RAR"]: "... the method
which bases the allocation between oil and gas on the relative commer­
cial importance [the valuation at going prices of such additions to
reserves] of the additions to their respective reserves through success-
30ful exploration over a recent period of time."^  ^ Exploration cost was
Z^Ibid.. pp. 635-644.
30Ibid., p. 653» Quoted from the testimony of Dr. Benjamin 
Caplan, Eastern Intervenors' witness. Volume 100, p. 13,271 of Hearings.
229
based on value of reserves discovered, rather than on production sold, 
for several reasons. For one, it tied the allocation to the desired 
discovery result expected by the company in so far as the company was 
successful in accomplishing its goals. It also priced the discovery on 
the basis of value at the time of discovery rather than on the value at 
which the sales in the test year were made. Finally, exploration costs 
were allocated on the basis of results rather than on the basis of the 
quantity of reserves left from prior exploration. To the extent possi­
ble, then, the allocation was made on the basis of marginal factors in 
company decisions. The "RAR" itself was calculated through relating
geological estimates of discoveries over a period of years with a
31weighted average of appropriate gas field prices.
General administrative costs, the third type of costs to be
allocated between gas and non-gas production, were divided on the basis
of gross investment. This criterion was chosen on the assumption that
company management utilized its time in proportion to the needs for its
32major service, the care and maintenance of investment.
Gas contract escalation
Phillips had gas purchase contracts with various producers and 
processors of gas. The price paid by Phillips under these contracts was 
based on Phillips' resale price. Phillips contended that if it received 
an increase in the price of gas the escalation clauses in its gas pur­
chase contracts would be triggered. These known changes, the company 
argued, should be considered in the determination of cost-of-service.
In denying this request the Presiding Examiner reminded Phillips that 
no escalation clauses could take effect without FPC approval. All price 
changes to Phillips, then, would be based not on "escalation" but on a 
showing of need. This situation was merely anticipated, not known, and 
therefore not properly subject to contemplative adjustment. Other gas 
price adjustments were of a similar type except for those resulting from, 
increased royalties and gathering taxes. These latter adjustments were
"^Ibid.. pp. 653-659. ^^Ibid.. pp. 626-63O.
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approved as "known." In summary, any time gas prices to Phillips were 
actually raised Phillips was free to apply to the Commission for a 
revision in its rates.
System-wide or production area 
cost-of-service
Price per unit of gas charged the various gas purchasers depended 
in part on the method of allocating the cost-of-service among those 
purchasers. Two alternatives were considered. Cost could be returned 
from purchasers on an average unit cost basis or adjustments in price 
reflecting the different actual costs per Mcf in different production 
areas could be made. These two approaches were termed system-wide rates 
and area rates, respectively. Whichever alternative was chosen, price 
was to be adjusted to specific delivery conditions, including gathering 
costs, delivery pressure, dehydration, and purity.^
The area approach was favored by the FPC Staff and most of the 
intervenors. This group reasoned that old customers should not have to 
pay for the exploration and development required to serve new customers, 
who, for the most part, would be receiving gas from high cost areas.
One of the intervenors. Eastern, went even further in proposing that any 
necessary increases in Phillips' rates be accomplished so as to maintain 
the traditional differences. This procedure would serve not only to 
reflect gas costs at the time of the contract letting, but would have 
the effect of maintaining for the future the differences in contract 
prices due solely to period of origination.^^
The various area rate proposals were rejected by the Examiner
for a series of reasons, any one of which he considered sufficient. The
most immediate and practical objection was that area pricing was not
possible without extensive additional evidence obtainable only through
new hearings. Further delay in completion of the case was considered
37contrary to the public interest. Further, additional difficult and
33ibid.. pp. 748-738. ^^Ibid., p. 782.
3^1bid., p. 786. ^^Ibid.. pp. 788-791.
^^Ibid.. p. 795.
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arbitrary allocations would be required because of the system-wide 
nature of most costs. The definition of boundaries itself was an almost 
impossible task. Moreover, area rates, far from fulfilling the Natural 
Gas Act injunction to eliminate rate discrimination, would perpetuate
OQ
differences resulting in part from historical accident. A final
fatal objection to area rates was that this system would not allow the
company to recoup its full cost of service. In newly developed areas
of low initial production, for example, gas priced to cover total cost
could not be sold. A price that would move gas, on the other hand,
39would not cover the total cost of production.
On the basis of decisions made on the various issues raised in
the Hearings, some of which are reported above, the Presiding Examiner
arrived at a cost-of-service for Phillips of $55,870,286. This amounted
40on an average price per Mcf basis to $0.11375* The issuance of 
Zwerdling's report marked the conclusion of this phase of the proceed­
ings. The matter was returned to the full Commission for final 
disposition. The Commission had available to it a transcript of the 
Hearings, the Presiding Examiner's report, and briefs in answer to the 
Examiner's Decision filed by Phillips, the Intervenors, and the FPC 
Staff. The Commission deliberated on the matter until September 28, 
i960, at which time it filed the decision to which we now turn.
38The Examiner could have, but did not, remark on the factor of 
disturbing equity and economic neutrality by maintaining price differ­
entials for identical products. Ibid., pp. 786-787, 795*
^^Ibid., pp. 785-787, 792-795-
40Ibid., pp. 8O6-8O7, and Appendix Table 12 of the Examiner's 
Decision. The "Gross Cost-of-Service" for Phillips was calculated as 
$57,280,218 or 11.662 cents per Mcf. This gross figure included adjust­
ments for the royalty and gathering tax increases, brought on by the 
revenue increases allowed, and for the Texas production tax adjustment.
41. Opinion and Order Determining Cost of Service and Terminating 
Proceedings, Phillips Petroleum Company, 24 F. P. C. 537 (i960). 
(Hereinafter referred to as FPC Phillips Decision.) Rehearing denied 
24 F. P. C. 1008 (i960). This decision was issued by Commissioners 
Kykendall, Stueck and Kline, with Kline dissenting in part. Sweeney 
did not participate and there was one vacancy on the Commission.
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The FPC Phillips Decision
The FPC, on the basis of the record in the Phillips proceedings 
and from experience and study of other cases, rejected the firm by firm 
cost approach to the regulation of jurisdictional sales by independent 
producers of natural gas. With regard to Phillips, however, no other 
type of information was available and therefore cost regulation was 
used. The views expressed on the cost-of-service issues decided in 
this context were significant because they reflected the Commission's 
opinion on problems to be faced with any regulatory method. Of far 
more effect, of course, was the rejection of traditional regulation in 
favor of the area-pricing approach. The disagreements with the Presid­
ing Examiner are discussed below in a review of the Commission Opinion.
Phillips cost-of-service
The Commission differed with the Presiding Examiner in the treat­
ment of several cost-of-service issues, but the effect of the differences 
on balance was small. As compared to Zwerdling*s cost-of-service of
$53,870,286 or $0.11375 per Mcf, the Commission's cost-of-service based
h-2
on the same elements was $55,5^8,05^ or $0.11309 per Mcf. The major 
differences are considered separately below.
t
Phantom taxes
The Commission accepted the Examiner's rejection of a phantom
tax allowance but pointed to different grounds. The Commission held
that the courts had ruled tax benefits granted by Congress to specific
Z4.3
industries beyond the reach of the Commission. Tax savings were to 
bé treated in this view, however, as a partial return of costs and bal­
anced off against the fair return of the regulated company.
42Ibid., Appendix 10, p. 589» This finding was amended to 
$55,525,315 or $0.111009 per Mcf in the order denying a rehearing. 24 
F. P. C. 1008, 1011.
^^ El Paso Natural Gas Company v. F. P. C., 281 F. 2d 567 (5tb 
Cir. i960), cited in FPC Phillips Decision, p. 568.
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The Court concluded that there was no statutory authority for 
the Commission to treat actual savings in taxes any differently 
than any other savings, that must be passed on to the consuming 
public. Therefore no amount representing tax benefits or tax 
savings could be included in the cost of service. The savings 
were available, the Court said, to make it so much easier for the 
natural gas producers . . .  to earn a fair return.
Since the cost of service and return on investment earned by Phillips 
was greater than the tax saving, the tax saving had no effect'on the 
amount that Phillips was allowed to recover from its gas sales.
Rate of return on rate-base
The rate of return allowed by the Commission recognized special 
characteristics in the gas production industry which required differen­
tial treatment. While the Commission approved the method used by 
Zwerdling to determine cost of capital, it decided that no additional 
rate factor should be utilized. The Commission maintained that it was 
required to come to a reasonable decision on the basis of all factors. 
"We must apply our judgment to a multitude of interrelated facts which 
cannot all be weighed mathematically, but nevertheless we must reach a 
decision and in doing so shall take such factors into consideration 
which appear to us relevant.One such factor was the tendency of 
the investing public to consider inflation, possible discoveries, and 
non-gas business (which was 94 per cent of the total) in addition to 
gas earnings estimates. The Commission members decided that they
"should not base our findings wholly upon a passing tendency of inves- 
46tors." Two further adjustments were emphasized by the Commission:
Phillips, which had most of its capital stock in equity (88.4 per cent),
did not need the "cushion" that the usual public utility required; there
47was additional risk in obtaining the necessary future gas supplies.
44FPC Phillips Decision, p. 568.
4<
Ibid., p. 567. The opinion referred to Bluefield, 262 U.S. 
697» S. E. C. V. Chenery Corp.. 332 U.S. 194 (1947); and others empha­
sizing the role of informed judgment in regulation.
^ Ibid.. p. 569. % b i d . . pp. 570- 573-
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The Commission admitted that any amount of return over cost of 
capital which it selected would be arbitrary.
The amount cannot be determined by any formula, and we can con­
ceive of no evidence that would enable us to reach an amount 
other than by the exercise of our judgment with all the circum­
stances in mind.
In these circumstances we think that an allowance for common 
equity of approximately 12 per cent would be fair and reasonable.
This rate of return was adjusted to 11 per cent overall by the debt 
ratio adjustment, as compared to the 10 per cent and 9-25 per cent 
allowances, respectively, granted by Zwerdling.
Allocation of costs
Major differences in method between the Commission and the
Examiner were found in the allocation of costs between gas and other
products. The Commission removed unallocated development costs from
the production category and allocated them along with exploration costs.
The remaining production costs the Commission allocated on the basis of
direct operating expenses rather than gross investment as used by 
49Zwerdling.
The Commission allocation of exploration costs rejected the 
"RAR" method proposed by the Examiner. The reasons given by the Com­
mission for rejecting the "RAR" method were: 1) it allowed liquid
prices to influence gas prices; 2) it created some circularity because 
gas prices depended to some extent on the price of gas; 3) it relied on 
correlation between the exploration result desired and that experienced, 
which could yield incongruous results in the short run; and 4) it 
required estimates of reserves discovered which were difficult to make 
and which exhibited instability over time.^^
Several premises influenced the FPC choice of allocation method. 
Industry factors, the Commission noted, should be considered in allocat­
ing costs. The Commission argued that the rising relative importance of
Zig liq
Ibid.. pp. 573, 574. abid., pp. 553-555.
^^I b i d . . p .  5 5 7 .
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gas required correlative gas responsibility for exploration. The bias 
toward gas discovery in the trend to deeper drilling also pointed to 
greater gas participation in exploration costs. Finally, higher gas 
prices would bring high gas development, and as a corollary, greater 
gas discovery should reflect the additional expenditure on production 
development.
A physical measure of the relative amount of gas discovered was 
essential for establishing some measure of response to exploration and 
development stimuli. BTU content, the Commission decided, was the only 
measure available. This judgment was expressed in the passage:
. . . it is appropriate that the changing outputs of each product 
should bear the changing exploration costs in proportion to the 
contribution that such costs make to each supply, and it is 
necessary for currently produced gas to bear an increased propor­
tion of the joint exploration costs and development leases if the 
growing gas demands are to be supplied on a continuing basis.51
The BTU method chosen by the Commission was not the same method advocated
by Phillips because it contained an adjustment for the differing economic
values of a BTU in gaseous and liquid form. Over time, the price of a
BTU in gas had risen compared to the price of a BTU in the liquid form.
In 1958 the price was about twenty-four for oil to one for gas. The FPC,
while maintaining that there had been no recourse to any sort of formula,
came to the conclusion that six Mcf of gas discovered should, for cost
62allocation purposes, be equal to a barrel of oil. When measured in 
relative BTU's this was the same ratio that held between prices of gas 
and of oil. The Commission method of allocation, which boiled down 
essentially to a back-door "RAR" method, resulted in an allocation of 
32.74 per cent of the exploration and development costs to gas, as com­
pared with the Examiner's allocation of 30.46 per cent and Phillips'
63contention for 6I.88 per cent.
^^Ibid., p. 560. ^^Ibid., pp. 560-561.
53Ibid., p. 561 and Examiner's Decision, pp. 653, 636.
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Gas contract escalation
The Commission agreed with Phillips that recovery of its increase 
in costs, because of automatic escalation clauses in some of its gas 
purchase contracts, should be allowed. The Commission pointed out that 
the contracts were written so that the producer received a stated -per 
cent of the final sale price of gas that was stripped in Phillips' gas 
plants. These contracts were not filed with the FPC as a matter of FPC 
policy. They did not involve a rate but merely a distribution among 
producers. The FPC ruled that it would not have jurisdiction over the 
higher gas cost to Phillips which would automatically follow a price 
increase. Phillips therefore was entitled to recover the higher cost- 
of-service resulting.^
Rates to be charged purchasers
The FPC did not specify rates in the proceedings. The Commission 
held that for the future it was going to rely on the area-pricing method 
for setting producer rates and that this method would be applicable to 
Phillips. Since the total cost-of-service determined for Phillips was 
greater than Phillips' gas revenue, there were no refunds due purchasers 
as a group. The lack of evidence of significant discrimination among 
Phillips' rates led to the conclusion that allocation of Phillips' cost- 
of-service among the various purchasers would show rate deficiencies 
for the test years in all cases. Since it was impossible to grant 
Phillips retroactive rate increases, the Commission saw no reason for 
going to the expense and effort of establishing test year rates. The 
FPC further suggested that upon the proper motion all rate suspensions 
prior to 1959 would probably be dismissed because the study demonstrated 
that prices appeared to be less than the cost-of-service through 1958. 
Rate changes filed afterr 1958 were to be studied and acted upon by the 
Commission.
^^ FPC Phillips Decision, p. 551» 
^^ ibid.. pp. 575-578.
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FPC rejection of public-utility regulation 
of independent producers
The Commission rejected the traditional public-utility method 
of regulating the rates of independent producers for several major 
reasons. The first of these was that the independent producer differed 
from the usual public utility in ways significant to the regulatory 
process. "Producers of natural gas cannot, by any stretch of the 
imagination, be properly classified as traditional public utilities."^
In making this point the Commission contrasted the independent producer 
with the regulated interstate pipeline. The interstate pipeline has 
some assurance of the financial feasibility of any project begun because 
studies are made prior to investment to determine sales potential, 
probable cost of gas, availability of supplies, etc. Construction 
starts only after FPC certification and usually after specification of 
rates. Uncertainty is virtually removed for the pipeline because the 
relevant variables are either determinable or controllable. The pros­
pective independent producer, however, faces considerable uncertainty. 
Investment is made without knowing whether or not there will be produc­
tion. If there is production, the price received by the producer is
unknown. Hence the pipeline fits the stable picture of the public
57utility image, but the producer, in important aspects does not.
The nature of the regulatory problem presented by the independ­
ent producer is different from that offered by traditional public 
utilities. In pipeline regulation, for example, cost-of-service and 
value to the consumer are directly related to investment. The technology 
and equipment used are relatively stabilized, have a market determined 
price, and a determinable expected life. The gas production industry 
exhibits none of these qualities. The value of an individual gas reser­
voir is not meaningfully related to cost of discovery and development. 
Joint product allocation and evaluation problems are far greater than 
the range of difficulty encountered in similar adjustments in other 
regulated industries. Allocation and estimating decisions in nonproducer
^^I b i d . .  p .  5 4 2 .  ^^I b i d . .  p .  543.
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regulation are usually of minor importance, but in independent producer 
regulation these are large enough to create either vast windfall profits 
or bankruptcy. The Commission concluded that the differences between 
traditional public utility operation and natural gas production were of 
such a nature that refinement in procedures and methods would only give 
an appearance of accuracy and certitude; the substantial problems of 
such regulation would remain intact.
Traditional regulatory methods, when transferred to the natural 
gas industry, also gave both incongruous and undesirable results, 
according to the FPC. The heart of public-utility regulation is price 
based on costs. These costs, because of the nature of most public 
utility operations, are rather easily discerned and provide a measure 
of the quality of utility management. Gas production, and especially 
its exploration and development phases, is such that only very close 
scrutiny could detect the difference between apparently good and poor 
management. High costs to the firm, then, might be the result either 
of unavoidable conditions or of bad management. Cost determination of 
price would isolate the company from most cost pressure and would 
reward the inefficient and incompetent as much as the prudent and wise. 
In addition, cost-determined price would reward the timid, slow, and 
parasitic as much or more than the pioneering firm which extended the 
zones of production. The company which opened up a new production area 
would receive no reward for its initiative because its investment base 
would show a low value for the producing property. The company which 
bought reserves in a proved area at no risk would be entitled to recover
CQ
its full cost from the inflated mineral values purchased.
A similar incongruous result would follow for royalty owners.
If the price at which natural gas were sold for resale in the field 
depended on the cost-of-service, then the royalty owner would be well 
advised to seek out the most inefficient producer to develop the reser­
voir. The inefficiency and resulting high cost would bring a higher 
price but no offsetting higher cost to the royalty owner. This result, 
the Commission held, was clearly inconsistent with public welfare.
^ ® I b i d . ,  p .  543- 544. ^^I b i d . ,  p .  5 ^ 3 -  ^ ° I b i d . .  p .  5 4 4 .
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Under cost-of-service based regulation the producer would have 
an incentive to concentrate his high cost gas in interstate commerce to 
the detriment of public welfare. In regulated interstate service the 
producer would receive a cost covering price whether that cost was 
higher or lower than the average cost of all gas sold. If the producer 
held his low cost gas for the unregulated intrastate market he could 
charge whatever the market would bear and receive as gross margin the 
difference between cost and market price. This arrangement would pos­
sibly distort the gas market, therefore increasing total social costs 
and would also artificially raise price to interstate consumers.
The administrative difficulties of cost-of-service producer 
regulation were, even if no other problems existed, enough to doom the 
method in the Commission's view. According to Commission judgment, the 
rate-base method would require cost-of-service and rate studies on 
every producer of natural gas. This number included not only the 3>372 
companies which had filed rates with the Commission but also the 5>^35 
nonfiling co-owners whose rights would have to be considered. As of 
September 28, I960, there were 11,091 rates and 33>231 supplements to 
rates on file at the Commission awaiting decision. The Commission 
decided that it would be impossible, as a practical matter, to make 
cost-of-service studies on each of these companies, especially since 
several studies would probably be required each year. On this adminis­
trative problem the Commission concluded that; "... effective regu­
lation of the price of natural gas must be on some more manageable plan
62that [sic] the rate base method."
In reviewing its experience with the rate-base method the Com­
mission found that the cost-of-service derived from a traditional study 
was higher than the actual proposed prices in every case decided.
"... regulation of producers on a company-by-company rate base method 
will in all probability result in higher consumer prices than we would 
otherwise have." Cost-of-service would in some cases, the Commission
^ I^bid., p. 545. ^^Ibid., pp. 545-547.
Ibid., p. 5^. In a footnote the Commission notes the excep­
tion of the Panhandle-Hugoton field which was developed early, produces 
from shallow horizons, and has tremendous reserves.
240
found, price gas out of the market. Moreover, in the studies that were
conducted, it was shown that the contracts in existence on June 7» 195^j
were at prices less than the cost-of-service and showed no unfair
discrimination. The Commission concluded, then, that; "Since the cost
rate base method seems almost always to produce the higher rates it
appears that consumers, in most instances, will be thoroughly protected
if we place more reliance on existing prices and on applicable economic 
64principles."
The final dismissal of the Phillips case, after the usual 
appeals, marked the end of the six year attempt to regulate independent 
producers on a cost-of-service basis. From this time on regulation was
to be based on a different method. An examination of the approach pro­
posed by the FPC, the area-price method, is delayed to Chapter VIII 
below. An analysis of the public-utility approach to independent 
producer regulation in terms of the goals of regulatory policy follows.
Public-Utility Regulation as a Means of Fulfilling Public
Policy Goals in the Field Sales of Natural Gas
The public-utility approach to the regulation of the independent 
producer was rejected by the FPC as a basis for the regulation of inde­
pendent producers. In its rejection the FPC considered both adminis­
trative and policy objections to this method. This study concentrates 
on matters beyond the administrative issues of tax treatment, cost allo­
cation, and appropriate rate of return. Its focus is on whether, 
abstracting from administrative questions, the public-utility approach 
to independent producer regulation can fulfill selected public policy 
goals.
The three public policy goals for the production portion of the 
natural gas industry were formulated in Chapter VI above as the promo­
tion of maximum economic welfare, an appropriate income distribution, 
and the furthering of the national interest in gas use. Content was 
not specified for any of these goals but rather was left for decision
\^bid.
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by the appropriate valuing agency of the society. The purpose of this 
study was limited to determining whether the proposed regulatory method 
was capable of fulfilling the goals of public policy, abstracting from 
specific content and from administrative problems. An examination of 
the ability of the public-utility approach to meet these criteria is 
presented below. In order to isolate the approach from all external
influences the rest of the regulatory framework was assumed to remain
as it was described to be in Chapter III.
The Public-Utility Approach and the Promotion of 
Maximum Economic Welfare
Maximum economic welfare, following the extended discussion in 
Chapter VI above, is defined as the provision of the greatest possible 
number of satisfactions to individuals by actions which do not achieve 
benefits to some at the expense of others. Changes in the distribution 
of income are avoided and maximization is sought given the existing 
income distribution. The sole criterion for determinable maximum eco­
nomic welfare is the optimal allocation of available resources as 
determined by individual choice. In the natural gas production industry 
two basic allocation problems exist. The first of these is the allo­
cation of productive factors, and the second is the allocation of
natural gas among alternative uses. Part of the regulatory potential 
of the public-utility approach depends on its success in providing 
welfare maximizing solutions to these allocation problems.
Allocation of productive factors
The use of the public-utility regulation method in the natural 
gas production industry guarantees the producer the opportunity to 
recover the costs required to bring gas under control and to prepare it 
for shipment to the ultimate consumer. The producer is not free of 
cost pressure because the elasticity of the demand for gas, limited 
though it is in the short run, does restrict the opportunities to shift 
the cost burden on to constimers. Nevertheless, the producing company, 
within certain ranges, is isolated from most of the discipline of a
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market-determined price for its nonindustrial, jurisdictional sales if 
public-utility regulation is used. As a consequence, the producing 
firm does not have the efficiency incentive it would have if there were 
no limit to the gains or losses which it could sustain. The potential 
for passing the costs of inefficiency on to consumers is not nearly so 
great in other industries where the public-utility method of regulation 
is commonplace. These industries, for example gas transportation and 
distribution and electric generation and transmission, for the most 
part are highly repetitive and routinized in their operations. Little 
opportunity for the exercise of significant managerial discretion 
exists. Moreover, operations are essentially similar among firms in the 
same industry. Any significant departure from expected costs can be 
traced and managerial performance judged. While the record of rate regu­
lation has been far from satisfactory, expert regulatory agencies have 
a better chance of protecting the consumers from exploitation and mana­
gerial inefficiency in the presence of the traditional conditions than 
in their absence. For this reason, in the natural gas production 
industry public-utility type regulation does not successfully substitute 
social control for the spur of profit maximization provided by the 
sanctions and incentives offered by market direction.
Research, exploration and development 
effects
The lack of a direct and full profit response to successful 
ventures leads to a reduction in the incentive of the independent pro­
ducer to pioneer new developments. The resulting drop in developmental 
expenditure lessens the possibility for discoveries which would increase 
industry productivity and bring gains to consumers. Any research, 
exploration, or development expenditure might fail to return its cost 
to the individual firm, even if the actuarial expectation for the indus­
try as a whole were almost certainly positive. Under public-utility 
regulation the individual firm is legally allowed to charge a rate 
designed to enable it to cover costs and earn a reasonable return on 
investment. If no commodity is produced, or if costs are such that the 
legal rate exceeds the rate at which the commodity will be purchased,
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the firm cannot recover its costs. The firm faces a risk, then, that 
certain research, exploration, and development expenditures will not be 
recoverable and will serve to reduce the net worth of the firm. This 
risk is very much greater in the natural gas production industry than 
it is in the industries where regulation by the public-utility method 
was developed.
In the absence of regulation the risks of loss would be counter­
balanced by opportunities for supra-normal gain from successful 
.expenditures. Under firm by firm, cost-based regulation, however, a 
ceiling is placed on return from successful ventures but there is no 
floor under losses from unsuccessful ones.^^ Under public-utility 
regulation, then, on theoretical grounds one would expect the firm to 
engage in less research than would be expected under free market opera­
tion. Similarly, exploration is prejudiced in areas where, with a 
higher level of uncertainty, low cost natural gas reserves might be 
found. The welfare consequences of the bias given to the "quiet life" 
are considerably more severe for the natural gas production industry 
than for the more common public utilities. The greater opportunity 
for cost reduction, especially through exploration, makes the cost of 
managerial inertia more significant for the consumers of natural gas 
than for the consumers, say, of electric energy.
Jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional 
effects
The public-utility method of regulation of the natural gas
industry could be expected to reduce the efficiency of the allocation
of resources because it would create an incentive to treat jurisdictional 
and nonjurisdictional phases of a natural gas company's operations dif­
ferently. Under cost-based regulation the firm is encouraged to 
associate the largest possible portion of its costs with jurisdictional 
sales. To the extent that the company would substitute uneconomic
^^This is the same practical argument for system-wide rates
rather than those reflecting experiences in each production area which 
Zwerdling raised in the Examiner's Decision, p. 785. See above.
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methods for more economic methods in order to accomplish this end, waste 
would be encouraged by cost-based regulation of sales price. The same 
results would follow from company profit-maximizing decisions between 
sales outlets. Gas which had a high book cost of production would be 
shunted into the interstate market for jurisdictional sale, while low 
cost gas would be sold where there was no price regulation. In inter­
state commerce the legal margin between sale price and cost would be 
the same for low cost gas as for high cost gas. If the firm were 
unable to cover the cost of some portion of the gas sold interstate the 
loss incurred would justify a higher return on other jurisdictional 
operations. Use of low cost gas intrastate would make possible a larger 
gross margin in the market-directed portion of the firm's operations.
The result is that the net return on the sum of jurisdictional and non­
jurisdictional operations might be increased by dedicating high cost 
gas to interstate commerce, even though this led to a higher total cost 
of production. To the extent that the more efficient resource alloca­
tion is rejected for the more profitable there is a greater use of 
resources than would otherwise be required for the same output measured 
in physical terms. Cost-based regulation would to this extent lower 
economic welfare.
Backward-looking resource allocation
The final reason that the public-utility approach reduces eco­
nomic welfare through inefficient use of resources is that this approach 
forces management to look backward to historical costs rather than for­
ward to alternatives. Social costs at any point in time can only be 
measured in terms of alternatives. Alternatives foregone, because 
decisions have already been reached, are not socially relevant because 
nothing can be done about them. When price and service conditions are 
set on the basis of costs that have been incurred in the past not only 
are commodities allocated in ways which only coincidentally reflect the 
social costs of given uses but the criteria on which new decisions are 
made are altered as well. Expectations are not allowed to play their 
full role because the individual firm knows that present expenditures
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will establish the future price allowances, just as present sales terms 
were conditioned by prior expenditures. Under these circumstances the 
results of privately maximizing decisions can diverge significantly from 
the optimum measured in social terms.
Allocation among current alternative 
uses
Maximum welfare from natural gas depends not only on regulation 
which promotes maximum efficiency in the use of productive factors 
(inputs), but also on the use of the commodity produced in a manner 
which yields the greatest consumer satisfaction measured in individual 
terms (outputs). One criterion by which the public-utility method must 
be judged, then, is the efficiency in consumption to which it leads.
If the gas produced is distributed in such a way that, abstracting from 
transportation and distribution costs, no consumers receive gas at a 
price at which nonconsumers would purchase it, it is allocated appro­
priately. In other words, the criterion is satisfied if the priority 
of use assumed by the common utility function is not violated by gas 
going to low value uses while it is priced away from higher value ones.
The biases in the cost-based method which push high cost gas to 
jurisdictional markets would reduce economic welfare if this method were 
used. Jurisdictional sales would be made at rates higher than those 
which would reflect the necessary social costs of providing the commodity. 
At the same time, the nonjurisdictional rates would not cover the total 
social costs of such service. Hence the use of resources would not 
reflect true social costs and therefore would not balance resource use 
on the basis of marginal social benefits and marginal social costs in 
alternate ends. Such violations of optimum conditions could be expected 
even in the absence of further regulatory problems.
The cost of gas at the wellhead varies with any number of condi­
tions, almost none of which are in any way relevant to the ultimate 
consumer. The variation in the cost of gas from field to field and from 
dedication period to dedication period is considerable, both absolutely 
and in comparison with the variations in prices of other identical
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commodities at any given point in time. These variations in large part 
do not reflect social costs of alternative use of resources. Under the 
public-utility approach the price of gas to the consumers reflects 
these costs. These differences in price are meaningless as an indica­
tion of the welfare maximizing allocation of the commodity. Some gas 
is therefore consumed in uses which yield less utility than other uses 
where gas is excluded because of its price. If less gas were used in 
the former activity and more in the latter there would be a net increase 
in individual satisfactions which could conceptually make some better 
off and none worse off. Hence the public-utility approach to producer 
regulation does not fulfill the criterion of maximizing economic welfare 
on either the production or the consumption sides of the market.
The Public-Utility Approach and the Distribution
of Income
The public-utility approach to the regulation of the field price 
of natural gas is basically a method designed to adjust the distribu­
tion of income between the producing and consuming sectors of the 
economy. Control over this distribution is one of the goals of pro­
ducer regulation. Regulation of the sale of gas for resale in interstate 
commerce by means of the public-utility approach in theory maintains the 
status of the producer so that engaging in this activity yields a "fair" 
return, but no more than that amount.Variation of the amount of 
return considered "fair" makes it possible for the regulators to use the 
public-utility approach to alter the distribution of income between the 
producers and the consumers of natural gas in response to changes in 
external conditions or changes in concepts of what the distribution of 
income should be. This method, while flexible enough to express the 
consensus at the industry level, is not capable of differentiating between 
particularly deserving (on the basis of efficiency) producers. In 
general, then, the public-utility approach is capable of altering the
^^Restrictions of space prevented inclusion in this study of a 
discussion of the evolution of social regulation of business which, in 
one of its sections, traced the similarities between the doctrines of 
just price and the public-utility concept of regulation.
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distribution of income among producers and consumers as groups, if non­
monetary gains and losses are ignored.
The Public-Utility Approach and Natural Gas Use 
In the National Interest
The national interest, as it has been considered in this work, 
is centered on the allocation of natural gas over time in the interest 
of the long term continuity of the economy of the United States. It is 
recognized that selection of a policy toward the natural gas industry 
that would conform to the national interest requires balancing several 
different elements. Gas use rates over time, geographical distribution 
of production and consumption, and policies toward the development of 
alternative fuels are all aspects of such a policy. Selection of the 
details of such a policy is not attempted here. The question at issue 
is whether the public-utility approach to regulation can provide a suit­
able framework for furthering the national interest in the natural gas 
production industry, whatever the content of that interest. The dis­
cussion that follows concentrates on the allocation of natural gas 
reserves over time. Two associated factors affect the allocation of gas. 
The first of these is the speed with which the known and determinable 
reserves are produced and utilized. The other influence on the avail­
ability of natural gas over time is the proportion of the existing gas 
reserves which are known and deliverable.
The public-utility approach to regulation establishes price on 
the basis of cost of production. The price of gas in the field becomes 
a part of the price of gas in its ultimate use. The amount of the known 
and deliverable supply of gas consumed is influenced by the price 
charged for the gas. Since the public-utility approach sets the field 
price of gas on the basis of historical cost of production to the firm 
there is no opportunity for the social value of a preferred allocation 
of gas over time to make its influence felt. Therefore there is no way 
for the national interest in gas availability to be expressed directly 
through this sort of regulation.
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y The quantity of gas in the earth is not, of course, the amount
of gas which is relevant to national policy. Only that gas which is 
effectively known and economically producible is of economic impor­
tance. The knowledge of natural gas reserves, necessary to rational 
development of a use-rate policy, depends in large part on the actual 
discovery process. One factor important to rational public policy 
toward the gas industry, then, is encouragement of expenditures which 
both yield information and prove-up gas reserves for future production. 
Such a program of incentives cannot be fitted into the public-utility 
mold. Thus, in this particular the national interest cannot be served. 
The public-utility method is not capable of putting a policy decision 
into effect unless the desired results flow from the regulatory formula. 
Income distribution alteration fits this criterion, but regulation 
cognizant of use rate issues does not. No opportunity exists for the 
volitional policy changes which would be required to express the social 
interest in gas use decisions.
The public-utility formula for regulation is also inflexible in 
its operation. Effective regulation in the national interest requires 
adjustment to changing conditions. One example of a change which would 
require policy alterations would be a breakthrough in the development 
of successful substitutes for the energy provided by natural gas. If 
such were to occur, natural gas would have to be used at a rate consist­
ent with a far lower future evaluation of it if the reserves were to 
make their maximum contribution to national welfare. The impact of the 
reduction in the future value of natural gas would be exerted almost 
entirely on the most immobile factor, the gas in the field. Under 
public-utility regulation, however, the price in the field would continue 
to be based on historical cost of production. In turn, the maintenance 
of the higher price would bring the substitute commodity into the market 
far more rapidly than the national interest would indicate. Hence the 
useful life of the service facilities would be unnecessarily shortened 
by the continued emphasis on past sunk costs. This is one example of 
why the inflexibility of the public-utility approach makes it unsuitable
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as a tool to achieve the national interest because it focuses on factors 
which are not important to efficient resource allocation.
The Public-Utility Approach and the Social 
Welfare Function
The preceding sections have examined the ability of the public- 
utility approach to gas producer regulation to fulfill the goals of 
efficiency, equity, and the national interest. These various goals 
cannot be achieved independent of one another but rather must be weighed 
and balanced for joint attainment. Public-utility oriented regulation 
is incapable of providing this balance. The rate of return is the only 
decision factor which is not fixed or pre-determined when regulation is 
tied to historical cost. While this factor would influence both the 
distribution of income and the use rate of gas over time, only coinci­
dentally would a rate satisfying one criterion simultaneously satisfy 
the other. Within the limits of the cost-based approach there exists 
no way of interweaving multidimensional welfare maximizing regulation.
The public-utility approach, perhaps most seriously, provides 
a quantified answer according to a formula which only hides and hinders 
the process necessary for development of a self-validating social welfare 
function of the sort discussed in the last section of Chapter VI. Only 
a few elements are accepted as germane in public-utility regulation.
The limited and specified number of these preclude the feedback essen­
tial to the modification of policies. Only through the modification of 
regulation in the light of experience can a program more in keeping with 
the wishes of the public be built. Similarly, a public which accepts 
as its own the policies and the values expressed in the regulation 
develops only when these modifications can take place. For these reasons 
the public-utility method is not able to achieve a satisfactory amalgam 
of the three basic public policy goals.
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Cost-based Regulation in Perspective
When the Federal Power Commission initiated regulation of the 
sale of gas for resale by independent producers it was natural for it 
to turn to the public-utility method with which it was familiar. Even 
from the beginning, however, this type of regulation was opposed by 
many in the natural gas industry and by some of the regulators them­
selves. The opposition focused its primary attention on removing FPC 
jurisdiction from the industry. It was not until several years after 
the Phillips decision that serious consideration was given to the 
actual mechanics of regulation. Examiner Zwerdling, the FPC Staff, 
and the other participants in the Phillips hearing used the firm by 
firm, cost format. The Examiner upheld the public-utility approach in 
his decision and utilized it to determine an appropriate cost-of- 
service and rate of return.
The FPC, charged with the responsibility for both a wise and a 
tenable decision, concluded that the public-utility method was not 
satisfactory for the industry. The reasons given for this conclusion 
paralleled to some extent the findings of the present study that the 
method was inherently unsuitable for regulation of the independent pro­
ducers in the public interest.
The public-utility approach was the focus of regulatory interest 
between the Phillips decision of 195^ and I960. While partisans of the 
public-utility approach remain, interest has shifted to the area-pricing 
technique and its implications. This study now turns first to describe 
the area-pricing approach and then to evaluate it in terms of the goals 
of regulatory policy.
CHAPTER VIII
REGULATION OF THE INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS OF NATURAL GAS 
BY THE AREA-PRICE METHOD
The area-price method of regulating the independent producers 
of natural gas was instituted by the FPC Area-Pricing Statement issued 
September 28, I960. This statement launched regulation in an entirely 
different direction and on a different tack than the traditional cost- 
based, firm by firm procedures with which the FPC was familiar. Two 
basic changes resulted from the switch to the area approach; Gas was 
treated as a commodity rather than as a service performed by a given 
firm; regulation was freed to look forward to the public interest 
rather than restricted to adjustments to past events. The implications 
of these basic changes are considered in this chapter.
The area-price proposal advanced by the FPC has had, at the
time of this writing, something over two years existence.^ There has
been some clarification of the administrative process during this time,
but few elements of area-price regulation can be considered settled
public policy. The precedent making area-price decision, when it comes,
2
will almost certainly be appealed to the courts. Whatever the Court
F^all, 1962.
^The FPC Phillips Decision (24 F. P. C. 537; 24 F. P. C. I6O8) 
was appealed to the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia which upheld 
the Commission in a decision issued November 30> 1961 (303 F. 2d 380). 
Wisconsin, among others, appealed the Circuit Court decision to the 
Supreme Court which granted certiorari in May, 1962 (369 U.S. 870). 
Arguments were held during the October Term, 1962. The Supreme Court 
rendered its decision on May 20, 1963» upholding (as obiter dicta) the 
right of the FPC to attempt to develop the area-price method of regula­
tion, Wisconsin v. Federal Power Commission, 83 S.Ct. 1266, 1274-1275 
(1963). The decision was split five and four, with Justice Harlan 
speaking for the Court and Justice Clark, joined by Justices Warren, 
Black, and Brennan, writing the dissent.
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decision on the area-price method, it will concern only the authority 
of the FPC under the present statute. If the challenge to the method 
is upheld by the Supreme Court it could still be enacted through Con­
gressional amendment of the Natural Gas Act. While no conclusions can 
be drawn as to the specific shape of area-pricing under the current 
legislation, analysis of issues and alternatives can proceed based on 
the essence of the approach.
The area-price approach to independent producer regulation 
under the FPC treats all the gas produced by independent producers in 
a certain geographical area as a commodity and sets a price on that 
commodity. Under this regulation all firms in the area are limited to 
no more than the area-price for the gas, with specified adjustments, 
whatever their individual cost or revenue positions. Any contract 
which embodies a price and other delivery conditions equal to or below 
the price and conditions set in the area is approved automatically by 
the FPC. The area-price under present FPC treatment is, then, a ceiling 
beyond which contract prices cannot go, though it is not similarly a 
floor. The integrated producers of natural gas are regulated 'under the 
traditional public-utility determinations of their cost-of-service plus 
return on prudent investment dedicated to public service.
Independent producer regulation since the Area-Pricing Statement 
has moved toward the establishment of permanent area-price guidelines.
The major developments in this effort by the FPC are mentioned below to
serve as an administrative background for analysis of the proposals 
themselves. The major issues in area-price regulation are also analyzed. 
The specific public policy evaluation of the area rate approach abstracts
from administrative technique because of the undetermined nature of the
approach as it will finally evolve from the FPC procedures and the 
courts. For this reason certain assumptions are made as to the appli­
cation of the policy. For example, it is assumed in this portion of the 
study that the area-price is both a ceiling and a floor, and that all 
production either comes under area-price regulation or is consistent with 
it. Evaluation based on these assumptions leads to certain conclusions 
on the use of this method. These are reported in the last section below.
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Major Developments in the Regulation of Independent 
Producers by the Area-Price Method
The Area-Pricing Statement included in its first paragraph these 
sentences indicating its purpose:
By this statement and the appended area price schedules we will 
set standards for initial and increased rate filings by producers 
for the sale of natural gas into interested [sic] commerce. These 
standards will serve as a guide to us and to interested parties in 
determining whether proposed initial rates should be certificated 
without a price condition and whether proposed rate changes should 
be accepted or suspended.3
The Commission said at another point: "In our opinion, the price stand­
ards established by this statement will aid in effectively applying the 
provisions of the Act to independent producers on a simple, clear, and 
administratively feasible basis, and in a manner fair to all whose 
interests are affected by Commission regulation." With this pronounce­
ment the Commission began its attempt to develop a legal and adminis­
tratively feasible means of applying the Natural Gas Act to independent 
producers.
Temporary Areas and Prices Established in the 
Area-Pricing Statement
The geographical areas used by the Commission were selected on 
grounds of convenience and administrative ease. The choices were not 
explicitly defended by the FPC, nor were the criteria for these choices 
made known. The Commission noted that the areas delineated might not 
coincide with economic factors relevant to producer regulation. It 
suggested the possibility of boundary changes to remedy any inequities 
which developed in the course of regulation.^
1
Area-Pricing Statement, 24 F. P. C. 818.
4
Ibid., p. 819.
I^bid. The areas chosen are noted in Table 2.
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The Commission did not specify the method by which it arrived 
at the prices published in the original area-pricing statement. More 
importantly, it did not make clear the goals pursued in establishing 
these prices or the industry results expected from the prices set.
The following, in fact, was the total reference to the level of prices;
In arriving at the price levels for the various areas set 
forth in the appendix to this statement, we have considered 
all of the relevant facts available to us. Such consideration 
included cost information from all decided and pending cases, 
existing and historical price structures, volumes of produc­
tion, trends in production, price trends in the various areas 
over a number of years, trends in exploration and development, 
trends in demand, and the available markets for the gas.&
The Commission order referred to prices for pipeline quality gas. 
Adjustments for quality differentials were to be made on a case by case 
basis until general rules could be formulated. A temporary two-price 
system was set up with initial prices above those for price increases 
under old contracts. These differences in price were required, accord­
ing to the Commission, because economic conditions in the newly
7
discovered and the established reservoirs were not the same. Table 2, 
adapted from Appendix A of the Area-Pricing Statement, gives the prices 
originally set by the Commission.
The areas and area prices presented in the Area-Pricing State­
ment had no force in themselves because they had not been developed 
through the usual FPC procedures and had not received the sanction of 
due process. These prices were designed as temporary guidelines for the 
Commissioners, the FPC Staff, the industry, and consumers. A passage 
from the Area-Pricing Statement itself makes this point clear.
For the present, and in the absence of compelling evidence 
calling for other action by us, proposed initial sales of natu­
ral gas by independent producers which include rates higher 
than those indicated in the appendix attached to this statement 
shall be denied a certificate or certificated only upon the con­
dition that lower rates be filed, and all rate changes filed 
under existing contracts which call for a rate exceeding the 
indicated price level in the attached appendix to this statement 
shall be suspended.
^Ibid. ^Ibid. ^Ibid., p. 820.
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TABLE 2
AREA PRICE LEVELS FOR NATURAL GAS SALES BY INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS
(All Rates at 14.65 Psia)
Area
Initial Service Rates 
Per Mcf
Increased Rates 
Per Mcf
Texas :
District No. 1 15.0 cents 14.0 cents
District No. 2 18.0 cents 14.0 cents
District No. 3 18.0 cents 14.0 cents
District No. 4 18.0 cents 14.0 cents
District No. 5 14.0 cents 14.0 cents
District No. 6 15.0 cents 14.0 cents
District No. 7-b 14.0 cents 11.0 cents
District No. ?-c 16.0 cents 11.0 cents
District No. 8 16.0 cents 11.0 cents
District No. 9 14.0 cents 14.0 cents
District No. 10 17.0 cents 11.0 cents
Louisiana:
Southern Not determined 13.7 cents
Northern 16.6 cents 13.7 cents
Mississippi Not determined 13.7 cents
Oklahoma:
Panhandle area 17.0 cents 11.0 cents
Other 15.0 cents 11.0 cents
Carter-Knox 16.8 cents 11.0 cents
Kansas 16.0 cents 11.0 cents
New Mexico:
Permian Basin 16.0 cents 11.0 cents
San Juan Basin 12.7 cents 12.7 cents
Colorado 14.6 cents 12.7 cents
Wyoming 15.0 cents 12.7 cents
West Virginia 26 .8 cents 23.9 cents
Adapted from Appendix A, "Area price levels for natural gas 
sales by independent producers," Area-Pricing Statement, 24 F. P. C. 
818, 820.
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The Commission stated that exceptions to the guidelines would 
not be considered on an individual producer basis. Instead, industry 
and area data would be used to determine whether the area ceilings or 
the area boundaries were unsatisfactory. The Commission thus decided 
to regulate the commodity within an area rather than individual firms. 
Changes in gas prices, following the proposed area-price method, would 
only be made as amendments to the area-price levels. No individual 
company exceptions were to be allowed. The Commission requested that 
interests seeking to challenge rates or area boundaries bring the pro­
ceedings with other parties with the same interests in order to expedite 
and simplify the administration of gas regulation.
Permanent Regulation Using the Area-Price Method
The Commission moved rather rapidly to start proceedings to
determine permanent specific area prices. The area chosen for the first
rate determinations consisted of the Permian Basin of New Mexico (from
which the common name of the proceeding was taken) and Texas Railroad
9Commission Districts ?-c and 8. The preliminary rate for each of 
these areas was identical. A prehearing conference was convened under 
the direction of FPC Chief Examiner Edward B. Marsh to "consider the 
type of evidence to be adduced, the order of presentation, the simplifi­
cation and delineation of the issues, and the number of witnesses to be 
heard on any issue or subject.The results of the prehearing confer­
ence were meager in terms of agreements, but some observers reported 
that there was at least an airing of important issues. The conference 
broke up prior to its expected date. One of the questions in dispute 
was whether cost-of-service data was to be required from individual pro­
ducers. Another prehearing conference was scheduled for Washington 
in the hope that some decision on the cost-of-service data question
^Area Rate Proceeding, Docket No. AR61-1; Claude E. Aikman, 
Docket No. 0-18466; North Central Oil Corporation (Operator), Docket No. 
CI60-435. Order Instituting Area Rate Hearing, Consolidating Proceed­
ings and Prescribing Preliminary Procedure, 24 F. P. C. 1121 (I960).
^°Ibid., p. 1123.
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would be settled by the Commission itself, opening further ground for 
progress in conference.
Two issues came before the FPC from the Midland prehearing con­
ference on Permian Basin rates. The first of these was the distinction 
between cost data, which the FPC had suggested as relevant to area-price 
determinations, and cost-of-service data. The second was the admissi­
bility of a "savings clause" which would allow a producer to show in 
an individual presentation that the rates suggested by him were reason­
able though they were higher than the established area rates. The FPC 
ruled out cost-of-service data both for individual producers and for 
the producers as a group. The Commission maintained, however, that 
overall cost statistics were essential. It suggested that these data 
be compiled and presented in the aggregate. The Commission deferred 
ruling on the "savings clause." It noted, however, that any attempt on 
the part of an individual company to show the reasonableness of its 
rates could not be based on a cost-of-service presentation because what
it ruled out for the area proceedings it certainly would not allow by
12an individual company.
The Washington continuation of the Permian Basin prehearing
conference began on April 12, 1961, after the Commission's position on
cost-of-service information had been made known. A representative
committee was formed to explore possible courses of action because of
the complexity of the subject matter and the unwieldiness of the full
conference. The smaller group failed to make significant headway and
13the meetings recessed on the afternoon of April 13, 1961. Later a
^^"First Round in Area Pricing Is a Draw," Oil and Gas Journal, 
LIX, No. 9 (March 13, 1961), p. 84.
12Area Rate Proceeding, Docket No. AR61-1; Claude E. Aikman, 
Docket No. G-18466; North Central Oil Corporation (Operator), Docket 
No. CI60-435» Order Ruling Upon Motion Relating To Evidence to Be Con­
sidered in Area Rate Proceeding, 25 F. P. C. 6l4 (1961).
13^"Area Pricing Ground Rules Are Tough to Write," Oil and Gas 
Journal, LIX, No. 16 (April 17, 1961), p. 86.
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formal prehearing conference was held to read into the record the 
decisions reached. There was, of course, little to read in.
The FPC initiated another area rate study, this one covering 
Southern Louisiana, before Examiner Marsh submitted his report on the 
Permian Basin prehearing conference. The Southern Louisiana hearing 
was carried along with the Permian Basin study in .order to gain con­
current experience with two distinct producing regions. It was hoped 
that area-based regulation would be expedited by dual studies without 
the drain on the FPC resources which would have occurred with further*
duplication. The Southern Louisiana area was chosen because of its
IScurrent and future importance as a gas supply region. ^
The first prehearing conference session for the South Louisiana 
region opened on June 26, 1961, in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, with Chief 
Examiner Marsh again in charge. In this proceeding the prehearing con­
ference was limited to consideration of issues surrounding rates for 
initial sales, with the rates for increases under old contracts left to 
a later study. No initial rates for Southern Louisiana had been set 
by the Commission in its Area-Pricing Statement because of pending liti­
gation.^^ The affected parties in South Louisiana were far apart in 
their ideas of appropriate rates for new gas contracts and of procedures 
for determining such rates. In an attempt to achieve some agreement. 
Marsh appointed a representative committee to negotiate informally just 
as he had done in the Permian proceedings. The conference recessed 
with the steering committee unable to resolve the differences which kept 
its members apart. Another steering committee meeting was scheduled
14"Area-Pricing Talks Fizzle," Oil and Gas Journal, LIX, No. 17 
(April 24, 1961), p. 82. Examiner Marsh filed his report to the FPC on 
the prehearing conference on May 26, I96I.
^^ Area Rate Proceeding, Docket No. AR61-2; Aladdin Exploration 
Company, Inc., Docket No. CI61-1564; Amerada Petroleum Corporation, 
Docket No. RI60-18. Order Instituting Rate Proceeding for the Southern 
Louisiana Area, Consolidating Proceedings and Prescribing Preliminary 
Procedure, 25 F. P. C. 942. 942-943 (1961).
^^ Ibid.. pp. 944-945.
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for July 11, 1961, to make another try for a consensus before the
17second round of prehearing conference sessions.
Examiner Marsh circulated his preliminary report on the pre- 
hearing conference to the participants after the adjournment of the 
August sessions in Washington. This report, as reviewed in the Oil 
and Gas Journal, recommended abandonment of the area-price approach. 
Marsh raised two objections: first, the plan was not acceptable under
the Natural Gas Act, and second, even if it were legal, it was unwork­
able in practice. He noted that some of the participants in any 
proceeding would be unwilling to abide with any area price set. These 
participants would then appeal using cost evidence in an attempt to 
overthrow the decision. If such appeals were permitted, producer rate
determination would be back at the case by case level and no procedural
18gains would have been made by adopting the area approach. Marsh 
apparently believed that denial of individual showings of reasonable­
ness of rates was unconstitutional in that it violated the due process 
provision protecting property from confiscation.
The official report Marsh filed with the FPC on August 23,
1961, apparently was considerably toned down as compared to the earlier 
draft. Marsh left out the flat recommendation that area-pricing be 
abandoned, though he continued to call attention to what he termed
"serious questions as to the legality and practicality of the area-.rate 
19determination." Marsh's report was used by the Commission in estab­
lishing temporary rates for the Southern Louisiana region. The 
Commission also determined from this report, and other evidence, that 
the two phase hearings which it had contemplated for Southern Louisiana
17"FPC Asks Help on Gas Pricing for South Louisiana," Oil and 
Gas Journal, LIX, No. 27 (July 3, 1961), p. 80.
18"Marsh Advises FPC to Dump Area Pricing," Oil and Gas Journal, 
LIX, No. 33 (August 14, 1961), p. 84.
1 q
"Don't Count Out Area Gas Pricing Yet," Oil and Gas Journal, 
LIX, No. 35 (August 28, 1961), p. 40. Citing the report to the FPC on 
the South Louisiana area-rate prehearing conference written by Chief 
Examiner Edward B. Marsh.
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were impractical. It scheduled a full prehearing conference on all
20aspects of the rate situation in that area for November 28, 1961.
The Permian Basin area-price hearings proper were initiated 
while the Southern Louisiana prehearing conference was coming to a 
close. The FPC set up the Permian Basin hearings in an order of 
August 2, 1961. This order established a schedule for the presenta­
tion of data to the proceedings, and in an appendix provided a 
questionnaire to be completed by the larger (over two billion cubic 
feet sales per year) producers. A shortened form was to be issued for 
small producers. The FPC noted that two questions seemed to raise the 
most interest during the prehearing conference, namely whether the 
cost data provided would be representative of the firms in the area 
and whether the individual firm data would be available to the public 
and to other parties. The Commission ruled that individual company 
evidence would be made available only to the Commission and to the FPC 
Staff, and that the Staff would compile it for presentation as a com­
posite in the hearings. Once again the Commission ruled against cost- 
of-service showings by individual companies seeking to justify rates 
above those established in area hearings. It deferred final action 
until the regulatory decision was made, but left little doubt that such 
showings would be denied. The presiding examiner was given authority 
to take advantage of the results of the prehearing conferences to mini­
mize the number of questions at issue. He was also authorized to
expedite the hearings in any way which would not jeopardize their
21fairness to all parties.
20Area Rate Proceeding, Docket No. AR61-2; Aladdin Exploration 
Company, Inc.; Docket No. CI61-1564; Amerada Petroleum Corporation, 
Docket No. RI60-18. Order Upon Presiding Examiner's Report Prescribing 
Procedure and Denying Motion, 26 F. P. C. ?23, 724-725 (1961).
21Area Rate Proceeding, Docket No. AR6I-I; Claude E. Aikman, 
Docket No. G-18466; North Central Oil Corporation (Operator), Docket 
No. CI6O-435. Order Requiring that Certain Data Be Filed, Directing 
that Said Data Be Placed in Proper Form and Presented in Evidence, 
Setting Date of Hearing, Prescribing Procedures for Said Hearing and 
Ruling on Motion and Appeal. 26 F. P. C. 247 (1961).
261
The hearings on the area rates for the Permian Basin began in
Washington on October 3> 196l, with Samuel Wenner as hearing examiner.
The Permian Basin hearings continued with first the producers and then
the consumer interests presenting their viewpoints on the general eco-
22nomic issues involved. Cross examination was allowed each party.
The FPC Staff presented its conclusions in November, 1962, more than a
23
year after the beginning of the presentation of the evidence.
The Permian Basin hearing had not arrived at the decision stage 
by the end of 1962. After the decision is rendered by the Examiner the 
matter will come before the Commission itself. Undoubtedly, whatever 
the Commission decides, the Permian Basin area rate determination will 
be carried to the courts for final resolution. The close of 1962 thus 
found the area-price method uncertain both as to its legality and as 
to procedure. In the face of this uncertainty this study turns to the 
major categories of issues that remain to be resolved in arriving at an 
acceptable solution to independent producer gas regulation by the 
federal government.
Issues in Area-Price Formation
.The issues in determining area-prices can be placed in three 
categories: 1) establishing the price differentials between areas and
2) establishing the area boundaries, discussed together, and 3) a prob­
lem of a different order, setting the absolute level of natural gas 
prices in the field. In the discussion that follows the alternative 
principles or criteria are described and a few comments made about each. 
Administrative and legal problems and difficulties are ignored for the 
most part at this level of the discussion. The purpose of this chapter 
is to determine the limits of the area-price approach within which the 
public policy decisions must fall, not to recommend a precise mode of
22"Permian Hearing Told: Gas producers must have incentive,"
Oil and Gas Journal, LIX, No. 42 (October 16, 1961), p. 62.
23"Permian price approach irks producers," Oil and Gas Journal, 
LX, No. 48 (November 26, 1962), p. $2.
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regulation or to predict the outcome of the FPC decision process. One 
operational element cannot be ignored, however, and that is the matter 
of adjustment of the quantities supplied and demanded under the basic 
area-price chosen to fulfill the policy goals. This question has been 
avoided in the formal FPC statements initiating area-price regulation, 
just as it has typically been ignored in discussions of public-utility 
type regulation. Because of the importance of the problem on both prac­
tical and theoretical grounds, however, some economic implications of 
administrative alternatives to bring amounts supplied and demanded into 
equality are considered.
Determination of Area-Price Differentials 
and Area Boundaries
The rationale for pricing on an area basis is that the gas 
industry as a whole is too diverse for one price to be appropriate, but 
that regions or areas are sufficiently homogeneous for successful regu­
lation. This finding sets up two conflicting tensions; if diversity 
is a justification for different treatment of different areas, then all 
diversity justifies some differentiation; if different portions of an 
area are sufficiently homogeneous to justify identical treatment, then 
the homogeneity of the industry justifies identical treatment for all 
producers. Since these conditions cannot be met simultaneously, some 
more or less arbitrary distinction must be drawn between what does and 
does not constitute homogeneity of such scope as to allow identical 
treatment.
It is necessary to specify the conditions which will be con­
sidered relevant for determining both area boundaries and price differ­
entials if the area-price method is used to regulate groups of producers. 
Yet, at the time of this writing, the FPC had made no final decision on 
what it considered to be the area criteria and there was no incontestably 
correct set of such criteria. The effects of different criteria diverge 
considerably. Three alternatives were abstracted in this study to make 
the regulatory choices more clear cut. These alternative approaches to 
area-pricing were the cost-of-production view, the value-to-consuraer
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doctrine, and the historical differential. Each of these is considered 
below.
Cost-of-production based differentials
The cost-of-production based differential is closely related to 
the public-utility approach. The receipts of the producer are presumed 
to depend upon what is expended in the effort to obtain the intended 
result. Therefore price is related to costs undertaken to produce gas. 
Before moving to a further discussion of this basis for differentials, 
it is important to distinguish between costs necessary to the production 
of gas and those which are not resource using in terms of the economy 
as a whole. This distinction separates out scarcity return or rent as 
a special category which is an expense to the producer but not to the 
society. A price based on cost, defined as the financial requirements 
for maintaining actual producers in the industry in the long run, need 
not include any net (rent) return to the owners of reservoir rights. 
Considering the interstate pipeline market specifically, the only 
alternative to interstate sale is the intrastate market, and in the 
reasonable future this alternative is simply not large enough to alter 
interstate sales significantly. Therefore, so long as production 
costs, including exploration and development, are covered, the effect 
of gas price changes on the amount of interstate gas supplied need not 
be significant in the long run because there are no alternatives pre­
ferred to such interstate sales. Before that long run is settled,
however, scarcity rent must be adjusted in the capital structure of the
25industry to the point where it does not influence decisions. Because
24
The intrastate market developed first. Because of the absence 
of interstate transportation costs the rate of gas usage is high intra­
state. While the amount of gas demanded intrastate would presumably 
rise with an increase in intrastate supply, the drop in price required 
to eliminate economic rent to the reservoir owner would certainly not 
be sufficient to increase intrastate consumption enough to significantly 
interfere with interstate delivery capacity. Hence the intrastate mar­
ket is an alternative to any one producer but not to the industry as a 
whole. Estimates of the absolute magnitudes involved depend on unavail­
able data.
25-^ Institutional barriers to reduction of rent return are
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scarcity rent is not an element in the long run cost of production it 
is ignored in the discussion which follows directly below. The 
adjustment of quantities supplied and demanded to price regulation is 
considered in the section on the base price for gas.
There are three major categories of costs to producers which 
are included in both the social and private cost of producing natural 
gas. These are exploration costs, development costs, and the costs of 
producing and gathering gas from established reservoirs. Exploration 
takes place before fields are established within a given region. In 
this sense, then, exploration is an industry-wide cost which cannot 
logically be associated with a given geographical region. Since there 
is no assurance that discoveries are to be made in any one region (for 
there may be no natural gas there to be discovered) arbitrarily grant­
ing differentials between regions on the basis of exploration costs 
would not be logical. Moreover, arbitrary differentials for exploration 
costs would distort economic activity between regions and would only 
coincidentally lead to a desirable allocation of exploration activity.
The cost-of-production method of determining area differentials and 
establishing area boundaries, then, would presumably ignore exploration 
costs. These costs would be compensated by an allowance over and above 
other costs of production. This allowance could be adjusted to bring 
forward the amount of exploration required to obtain sufficient reserves, 
as estimated by the regulatory agency.
significant. Such an adjustment would be made only slowly with the 
transitional burden of reduced price falling most heavily on the 
producers who would be temporarily immobile. A shift toward cash roy­
alty bonuses and cash purchases of reservoir rights would provide more 
flexibility.
The rent received by the owner of the right to exploit the 
natural gas reservoir is at present divided into two categories. The 
first is the customary one-eighth royalty. This return is not subject 
to adjustment downward in the present tradition-bound leasing nego­
tiations. Differential rent is paid through cash leasing bonuses and 
additional participation in production known familiarly in the industry 
as "over-ride." The basic royalty, being nonmarginal, could be reduced 
or eliminated by regulation without disturbing the resource rationing 
function of differential rent.
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Cost of development
The costs of development of given quantities of natural gas 
reserves depend on three factors. The costs associated with the dif­
ferences between these factors would give rise to a portion of the 
price differential based on cost-of-production. The depth of the wells 
drilled, the deliverability of each well, and the number of wells per 
given quantity of reserves were the cost factors selected for treat­
ment in this study. The depth of the wells depends, obviously, on how 
far below the surface of the earth the gas lies. The deeper the well, 
the higher the costs of drilling, both in total and in average cost per 
foot drilled. The depth of the reservoir depends on the field char­
acteristics, and since these are geological variables they are
independent of and only coincidentally consistent with political or
2 6geographical boundaries. A given geographical area of significant 
size would include reservoirs of vastly different depths, while wells 
and fields of the same depth are scattered throughout the nation. While 
the average depth of fields within a political subdivision may be either 
higher or lower than the average depth in another subdivision, that 
average says nothing about the individual fields within those regions 
which combine to establish that average. This fact is especially 
obvious when multi-strata reservoirs are discovered under one surface.
What is true of well depth is also true of the other reservoir 
characteristics which affect well deliverability. Such matters as 
permeability of the producing structure and bottom hold pressure vary 
from field to field on geological, not geographical grounds. The number 
of wells for each quantity of reserves is partially a function of state 
regulation of production to protect correlative rights and to conserve 
the physical gas. As such, state regulation, in so far as it was con­
sistent within political or administrative boundaries, would promote
26It is important not to lose sight of the further fact that 
considerable difference between wells exists even within a common reser­
voir. The amount of producing strata, the position with reference to 
the trap, and the permeability of the producing horizon can all affect 
the costs of producing a given quantity of gas from different wells 
penetrating the same horizon.
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similarity between contiguous reservoirs. Some regulation agencies, and 
among them those in the two largest producing states, Texas and Louisi­
ana, determine spacing for wells, however, on the basis of depth and 
expense of production. In so far as this policy is followed, spacing 
would be tied to depth which is tied to geological factors rather than 
to political or administrative areas.
Costs of production and gathering
' The third cost of making gas available for interstate transmis­
sion is associated with the production and gathering process. These 
costs per unit of gas, holding other factors constant, would be inversely 
correlated with the volume of gas per well, the density of wells, and 
the gas pressure and other delivery conditions in the field. The greater 
the production from a well, the greater the amount of gas for the 
basically fixed amount of well upkeep expense. Similarly, the more con­
centrated the production owned by one set of interests the shorter the 
gathering facilities essential to prepare it for input into the inter­
state pipelines. Likewise, the greater the gas pressure in the well 
the smaller the amount of supplementary compression required to achieve 
pipeline pressures. One further matter which indirectly affects produc­
tion and gathering costs is whether the gas is associated with liquids 
as casinghead gas. Casinghead gas sources produce intermittently and 
in smaller quantities, typically, than gas wells. For these reasons, 
casinghead gas has a higher cost of production and handling than gas 
well gas. Any impurities in gas would also present extra costs to the 
producer.
The costs of production and gathering of gas are primarily asso­
ciated with the reservoir characteristics from which the gas is produced, 
as can be seen from the items mentioned above. Just as in the costs of 
development, these production and gathering costs depend for the most 
part on geology rather than geography. Therefore, neither political sub­
divisions nor other sizeable surface areas would likely group together 
reservoirs homogeneous with respect to the factors which determine the 
cost of production and gathering of gas.
26?
Conclusions on area-price based on 
costs-of-production
The cost-of-production criteria for differentiation between 
areas require that cost homogeneity exist within areas and diversity 
between them. Because of their nature, exploration costs were elimi­
nated from consideration in this regard. The other significant 
production costs were found to depend primarily on reservoir charac­
teristics which, while perhaps not distributed randomly with reference 
to geography, are not distributed consistently with surface boundaries 
either. Hence if an area is to contain no greater diversity within it 
than there is between it and any contiguous area, as one possible
measure of homogeneity, the number of reservoirs or sub-reservoirs
27within an area will likely be few. More explicitly, geographically 
defined area designation and price differentials based on costs-of- 
production would likely require so many administrative areas as to 
sacrifice the administrative and economic values of the area method, or 
else would involve averages that covered up far more diversity than 
they expressed. In the latter case, area-pricing would give windfall 
gains to low cost fields within an area, while causing abandonment of 
high cost fields which would be produced if located in areas with 
which they had more in common.
Once appropriate area boundaries were established, the determina­
tion of rate differentials based on the cost of production would pose 
no significant conceptual problem. The establishment of areas, however, 
cannot be accomplished without sacrifice of either equity or adminis­
trative ease. One possible method of promoting more equity at a minimum 
sacrifice of ease would be to utilize predetermined factors to compensate 
for certain conditions such as reservoir depth. This direction is not 
explored further, however, because it reopens the objection which was a
27The required degree of homogeneity within and heterogeneity 
without an area of course determines the possible size of areas and the 
number of areas required. The desire for few areas for administrative 
purpose conflicts with the large number of areas required for equity 
among producers and consumers. No resolution of this conflict is 
possible; compromise is necessary.
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strong motive for the area-price method in the first place. This was 
that a multiprice system for the identical commodity, natural gas, under 
identical conditions, led to a misallocation of resources. Another 
type of area differential, that based on value rather than on cost, 
takes up this very issue.
Value-to-consumer based differentials
The second possible determinant of area boundaries and area dif­
ferentials would be the value-to-consumer. Using this criterion the 
gas price for a given production area would depend upon the cost of 
making gas from that area available to consumers at the point of con­
sumption. There are three major elements which determine the value to 
the consumer of a given unit of natural gas at the consuming end of pro­
duction and gathering operations. The first of these is its location 
with respect to the consumer; the second is the nature of the processing 
required; and the last is the delivery conditions over time.
Elements influencing value-to-consumer
The ultimate consumer must pay for the service of transporting 
natural gas from the point it enters the transmission line until it 
reaches the burner tip. The length of the journey is the major factor 
in establishing the cost of this transportation. Therefore the value 
of a unit of gas is inversely related to distance from the ultimate 
consumer by a factor determined by unit-distance transportation costs. 
Gas transmission facilities are also fixed in space and therefore can­
not be moved in search of new reserves. A new deposit of natural gas 
near an existing pipeline which has excess throughput capacity would be 
worth more to the ultimate consumer than would that same field the 
same distance from the consumer but isolated from an existing transpor­
tation route. Therefore, the value of reserves depends somewhat on 
the historical accident of pipeline location. Finally, the economics 
of pipeline transportation are such that the larger the throughput 
desired the cheaper the unit costs of transportation, within very large 
limits. Therefore the value of a reserve is higher per unit if there
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is a high deliverability in the immediate vicinity or where the pipe­
line can be routed in such a way as to achieve such a throughput.
The less processing required of gas the higher its value to the 
ultimate consumer because the less expense is left after the gas begins 
its journey at the conclusion of gathering. So long as "pipeline 
quality" gas is considered specifically, there is not much difference 
involved in processing charges. Pipeline quality gas presumes a mini­
mum standard of purity and also a given pressure at the end of the 
gathering lines. Inferior reservoir gas is either raised to standard 
by. the producer or gatherer or it is transferred to the pipelines at a 
price differential sufficient,to cover the cost of raising it to that 
standard. In either case, the gas would be valued consistently with 
other gas used by the ultimate consumer. For this reason, it would be 
more satisfactory to consider processing differentials as part of the 
producing and gathering cost of gas than as influences on the value of 
a particular reservoir to the consumer.
The final element determining value to the ultimate consumer is 
tied in with costs of making the gas available over the long run. The 
greater the deliverability of gas over time, the lower the unit amorti­
zation charge for necessary transportation facilities. Therefore the 
consumer would value a large and long lived reserve dedicated for life 
higher than a reserve having opposite characteristics.
Area boundaries and price differentials: 
value-to-consumer factors
The factor of geographical location which influences the value 
of gas to the consumer depends on the relationship between the location 
of the consumer and his pipeline input terminal and the location of the 
particular natural gas deposit. Consequently, the value to be ascribed 
to the gas depends on the consuming region to which it is dedicated.
The region to which it is dedicated in the case of previously developed 
and connected reservoirs is already determined and therefore the histor­
ical accidents of past development would determine the relative value 
to particular consuming regions of given gas supplies. The value of
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these gas supplies can be presumed to reflect the economic and technical 
conditions of the planning period but not of any later time.
With reference to undedicated reserves, their value to a par­
ticular consuming region can be ascertained with some degree of accuracy 
on the grounds of such determinable characteristics as distance and 
available transportation. This does not in any way similarly establish 
a value to the abstraction called the gas consuming public of the 
United States, however. Gas consumers as a whole are found throughout 
the United States, and for each sub-group of the gas consuming public, 
location will dictate a different value for any given undedicated gas
28reserve. Therefore, while conceptually location is one of the deter­
minants of the value of a given gas reservoir to consumers, practically, 
unambiguous estimation of that value breaks down because of the two- 
dimensional character of the relationships between gas supply and gas 
consumption areas.
Geographical location factors are singularly adapted to the area 
approach to regulation. The consideration which influences the valu­
ation of the gas, location, is also the matter which distinguishes an 
area from other areas and from the surrounding territory. Therefore 
while disagreement could exist as to the size of an area, and while a 
greater homogeneity could be established by making areas smaller rather 
than larger, by its nature area regulation is suitable for dealing with 
locational differentials.
While the drawing of area boundaries is adapted to the loca­
tional element of the value-to-consumer rationale for area regulation, 
the determination of area differentials without specifying the consumer 
to which the gas is to flow is not. With respect to a given production 
area each group of consumers is likely to be a different distance away 
and to have a different set of alternative supply regions. The differ­
ential which would express the appropriate values for two reserves 
would differ for different consumers in different locations unless there 
was a coincidental relationship between the consumers and the producing
the absence, always, of compensating differences in loca­
tion.
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regions. Therefore, no consistent valuation of location can be made 
without considering the consumers who are to receive the gas. An area- 
price established on grounds of value-to-consumer would differ for 
different consumers and therefore could not be determined unambiguously.
The geographical distribution of the major gas reserves moving 
interstate makes a modification of this approach possible with a limited 
sacrifice of clarity and equity. The Southwestern gas supply region is 
made up of five bordering states in the south-central portion of the 
nation. The major gas regions within these states are arranged in a 
roughly symmetrical, fan-shaped pattern with the South Texas deposits 
forming the handle of the fan. Ignoring markets within the region, 
consuming areas are basically located "outward" from all producing por­
tions of the region. Value for each reservoir could therefore be 
determined in comparison with other reservoirs which lay on the same 
line from the base of the producing region to the consuming district 
in the same sector of the extended "fan." This geographic arrangement 
of the industry makes it possible to assign producing areas to consum­
ing districts on a nonarbitrary basis for purposes of calculating 
reasonable locational differentials. No large interstate markets are 
located between production regions to complicate the valuation. The 
proper locational differential for value-to-consumer area-price would 
thus be such as to offset the transportation cost between any given 
producing area and the outermost production in the ray of the "fan" 
leading to the consuming district served. With this modification, the 
area-price system based on locational advantage to consumers can oper­
ate with only minor violations of equity in interregional gas sales.
For the markets within the region, and for producing areas outside it, 
the appropriate differential is indeterminate. Therefore, large changes 
in the industry, such as gas discoveries outside the region or cross- 
regional transportation caused by an imbalance between amount demanded 
and amount supplied in one ray of the consuming— producing arc, would 
create value-to-consumer inconsistencies if differentials were based on 
location.
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The nature of the processing required to bring gas to pipeline 
standards is, as mentioned before, a responsibility of the producers 
either directly or through appropriate price differentials. These 
differentials can be considered as an influence on the value of gas to 
the consumer, if convenient, and can be averaged easily on an area 
basis.
Area differentials due to value-to-consumer differences in 
delivery conditions over time are difficult to assess. Individual 
reservoirs, as noted in the section on costs of production, vary on 
such matters as deliverability and size. The differences between gas 
fields are not necessarily distributed consistently in terms of surface 
boundaries. Area boundaries, however drawn, would not necessarily 
encompass fields with similar conditions unless the areas were limited 
by geological data as well. The geological nature of developed reserves, 
since they are bounded by no tendency to avoid discrete jumps, make the 
determination of boundaries a compromise between the desire for homo­
geneity within the areas and the requirement for areas of sufficient 
scope to yield administrative gains. Once area boundaries were estab­
lished, there would be little difficulty in determining compensatory 
differentials for delivery conditions over time so long as average 
results were taken as a proper representation of the diversity which 
existed within the area. Neither processing expense nor delivery con­
ditions, however, are well suited for any type of area-based regulation, 
including that based on value-to-consumers.
Historical price differentials
Different gas supply areas sometimes receive different prices 
for identical gas because of conditions, such as time of development, 
which surrounded the industry during the time when the price pattern was 
set. Under other decision conditions the relative price patterns would 
differ from the historical pattern. The differentials originating under 
prior conditions cannot be defended for preservation into the indefinite 
future on historical grounds alone without acceptance of the resulting 
costs of resource misallocation and loss of equity.
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The relationship between the variable factors under present 
conditions, of course, might argue for maintenance of historic differ­
entials. For example, if the existing transportation facilities connect 
consuming and producing regions which would not be connected if the 
decision were to be made under present conditions, but if by ignoring 
sunk cost gas can be supplied more cheaply through those facilities 
than it could be supplied through new facilities, the differential would
rest on sound economic grounds. From this example it can be seen that
maintenance of historical differentials in the value of gas between 
different supply areas on the grounds that those differentials are his­
torical makes no economic sense. But the optimum distribution of gas
reserves among consumers may well result in maintenance of some historic 
differentials for economic reasons.
Determination of the Basic Area-Price for Gas
The gas price to which differentials are to be applied on an 
area basis must be determined whatever the accepted rationale for those 
differentials. The base price chosen influences both the policy and 
the administrative portions of regulation. This price affects the 
distribution of income between the producers and the consumers with each 
unit of gas produced or consumed. Moreover, the price of gas, abstract­
ing from area differentials, is part of the resource allocating matrix. 
In addition to being one of the variables determining the consumption 
level for gas and competing fuels the price of gas is also one of the 
factors responsible for establishing price and output levels in the 
factor and final product markets. Rates of development and depletion 
of natural gas reserves similarly depend in part on the base price of 
gas.
The base price of gas which satisfies one of the three policy 
parameters chosen could differ from that which satisfies another. If 
this were the case in practice, and if base price level alone were 
depended upon for the substance of industry regulation, then goal con­
flicts would result. The evaluating agency, however, can choose a base 
price which is optimal as measured by joint maximizing criteria unless
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lexicographie ordering is present. This choice would compromise esti­
mates of the price for gas to fulfill each regulatory goal on a weighted 
basis according to the relative importance of those goals. In the 
absence of restricting legislation, these estimates rest solely on the 
judgments of the administrators as to the relative importance of alter­
native ends under great uncertainty. Economic analysis as such, then, 
can only suggest directions of effects and results, it cannot reach 
substantive conclusions as to an appropriate base price for gas under 
area-price regulation.
Application of the Basic Area-Price for Gas,
Some Implications
Policy implications of substantive choices in regulation are 
considered further in a later section of this chapter. Before continu­
ing to a policy evaluation of the area-price method, however, a 
digression to consider administrative implementation of area-price 
regulation is required for reasons of clarity. As noted above, formal 
discussions of gas regulation have tended to avoid the quantitative 
adjustment implications of regulation in the emphasis on alteration of 
income distribution. There are several possible reasonable interpreta­
tions of this administrative neglect. These include a short run view 
of the industry, which reflects high inelasticity of demand and supply; 
a presumption that regulation, reducing price, would bring the industry 
toward equilibrium by eliminating excess capacity and expanding the use 
of gas; and the popular conception that gas supply, if not demand, is 
not related to price because of the accidental or by-product nature of 
reservoir discovery. The high proportion of fixed factors in the indus­
try has lent credence to analysis based on a short run view of the 
industry which takes the industry structure as given. Moreover, the 
earlier pattern of industry development was one of both excess capacity 
and all but accidental reservoir discovery in that the costs of discovery 
were not correlated with recent high returns. Hence considerable scar­
city and opportunity rent has characterized the industry. When the 
institutionally established minimum rental relationship is added to these
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factors, the practice of ignoring the requirements for adjusting quanti­
ties supplied and demanded under regulation becomes more understandable.
The presence of the above elements in the industry, however, has 
frequently led to a failure to consider the existence of extensive and 
intensive marginal production. The effect of an administered price in 
the gas industry, whether socially or privately established, in the long 
run rests both on income distribution and on the level of output and 
consumption. The effect on the first of these is implicit in the aims 
of regulation, but the effect of the second can conflict with the orderly 
operation of the regulated industry. The discussion below isolates the 
effect of regulation on the amounts supplied and demanded.
Basic area-price and the amounts of 
gas supplied and demanded
The base price selected under area-price regulation determines
the amounts of gas supplied and demanded in the industry, if the influ-
29ence of income redistribution is ignored. The possible contrast 
between the area-price set by administrative action and the equilibrium 
price formed in a hypothetical perfectly functioning market is illus­
trated in Figure 5 below. Given the supply and demand functions shown
Ph
Figure 5- Area-price and quantities of gas supplied and demanded. 
29It is assumed that interarea differentials are applied and 
have created a single market by establishing essentially homogeneous 
production and consumption sectors.
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by the solid lines S and D, at price P^ , quantity is both demanded
and supplied. If price P^were designated the basic area-price, the
quantity of gas producers wished to sell would exceed the quantity 
consumers wished to purchase. Opposite results would follow from sub­
equilibrium price P^ .
Quantities supplied and demanded could be brought into balance 
at nonequilibrium prices, whether higher or lower, only through admin­
istrative or other action bringing shifts in either the effective supply 
or demand functions. Because of the similarity and essential simplicity 
of the relationships, for space reasons only one type of adjustment is 
considered in the discussion which follows. The reduction of amount 
demanded was selected as the example to be used in this explanation
because it coincides with goal parameters which are widely held at
30present. Three general methods of restricting demand were selected 
to illustrate the adjustment alternatives available. These methods are 
treated separately in the discussion which follows, but they are not 
mutually exclusive and could be used together to form a multilevel 
attack on imbalance between desired gas output and consumption. Because 
of the lack of public discussion of administrative aspects of this 
issue, more detail is presented than the actual importance of the matter 
to the main current of this study would justify.
Direct end-use control
Direct control and specific restriction of the consumption of 
natural gas by uses is closely related to some elements of previously 
accepted public policy. End-use control can be based either on blanket 
prohibitions of certain types of use or on specific cases; each method 
has been used by the FPC and other agencies in the past. A well defined
30Reduction in amount demanded is consistent with the proximate 
goal of lower use rates for gas which in turn depends on further value 
factors. A lower use rate could be instituted through alteration of the 
supply function as well. The choice of operating on the demand side was 
made in this discussion because of the similarity between this action 
and the more common proposals usually discussed under the heading of 
direct end-use control.
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use restriction policy has not been developed, however, by the FPC. 
Whatever the method used, restriction of the possible uses for natural 
gas would act to reduce the demand for natural gas in the field. It 
would serve to ration the available gas among the potential consumers 
where regulation reduced the amount of gas supplied below the amount 
demanded. The total effect of end-use control would depend on the type 
of uses restricted and on whether the restriction were limited either 
geographically or to interstate sales. Since the rationale for end-use 
control is to increase the total economic contribution of the reserves 
over their lifetimes, it is likely that the restriction would fall most 
heavily on the so-called inferior uses of gas. To the extent that this 
policy was successfully pursued, the restriction on demand would serve 
to make the lower part of the demand curve inelastic. A schematic 
representation of the application of this policy is demonstrated in 
Figure 6, where the conditions in Figure 5 are joined by demand curve
Figure 6. Area-price, direct end-use control, and quantities of 
gas supplied and demanded.
(dashed line) showing the demand for gas after the institution of end- 
use controls. Area-price is now established as the equilibrium price 
with an output level of Qg because of the administrative actions of the 
regulatory agency in shifting the gas demand function.
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Private, non-price gas rationing
The second possible way to bring amounts of natural gas supplied 
into equality with amounts demanded is to rely on unofficial, non-price, 
market rationing. Even if no regulatory action is taken the gas avail­
able will flow to some consumers and others will be left without gas— the 
gas will be allocated in some manner. A black market might, of course, 
create rough price rationing through the back door which would be con­
sistent with market oriented welfare maximization._ Otherwise decisions 
might rest on such economically, though perhaps not socially, irrelevant 
factors as historical accident or timing. In a private industry, how­
ever, random allocation is inherently unstable and some economic priority 
system based on unregulated, non-price compensation would likely develop. 
A portion of the quantitative imbalance between amount supplied and 
amount demanded would likely disappear because of contractual obligations 
and the fixed nature of much gas investment. If gas is not available, 
potential consumers do not long remain in the consumption market but 
instead shift to other energy sources and make long term capital invest­
ments and commitments consistent with the shifts. The gap between the 
amounts of gas demanded and supplied at a subequilibrium area-price 
might be closed, then, in a combination of three ways in the absence of 
formal rationing. These factors are illustrated in Figure 7- The
P
P
P
Figure ?. Area-price, private, non-price gas rationing, and 
quantities of gas supplied and demanded.
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reduction in demand for gas caused by the irreversible (in the short 
run) shift of consumers to alternate energy sources is depicted by 
demand curve which illustrates that both high value and lower value 
potential users of natural gas leave the market. The increase in the 
established area-price through black market and non-price compensa­
tion of producers is shown by price P^ . The quantities supplied and 
demanded at price P^ are still not in equilibrium, however, and 
therefore gap "g" exists to be bridged by various noneconomic alloca­
tive factors. The reduction of high value uses of gas because of 
shifts out of the industry and the existence of gap "g" indicate that 
private, non-price, gas rationing among consumers does not lead to 
efficient utilization of the gas produced.
Market adjustment through commodity 
taxation
A third method of restricting consumption of natural gas to the 
quantity that would be produced at the desirable area-price would be 
through a unit tax on consumption. Used in conjunction with a fixed 
area-price, such a tax would reduce the consumption of gas without 
affecting the quantity of gas supplied or the amount of income received 
by the producers as set by the chosen basic area-price. The reduction 
in consumption due to the tax wedge would depend on the elasticity of 
the demand for gas and the amount of the tax. In Figure 8 below the
Figure 8. Area-price, unit consumption tax, and quantities of 
gas supplied and demanded.
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total market demand for gas is shown by D. The imposition of a unit 
tax equal to the vertical distance between D and reduces the demand 
for gas impinging at the field level to D, At the established area- 
price the quantities supplied and demanded are equal. Because the 
tax restricts consumption according to choice of consumers given the 
market conditions with tax, the tendency over the long run would be to 
allocate gas only to the highest value uses. Rigidities and technical 
considerations would, of course, prevent full realization of this 
tendency.
The market for gas is both differentiated and separable, and 
different portions of it exhibit different elasticities of demand. This 
fact complicates the administration of a unit tax as a consumption reduc­
ing mechanism. Consider the case where there are two distinct gas 
markets, X and Y, with X having the more elastic demand. Figure 9 demon­
strates this market situation, using the same market supply and demand
Pe
Qdy Qdx Qd
Figure 9. Area-price and quantities of gas supplied and 
demanded in distinct gas markets.
data found in Figure 5* A uniform unit tax placed on all consumers 
would reduce consumption in both market X and in market Y, but because 
of the greater elasticity of demand in X the drop would be greater pro­
portionately there. If the area-price were enforced as a price rather 
than merely as a ceiling, so that all tax would be completely shifted
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forward to the consumers remaining in the market, the conditions depicted 
in Figure 10 would result. The quantity of gas consumed in each market 
is represented by the intersection of the price line and the individual 
demand curves.
Qdt
Figure 10. Area-price with unit consumption tax and quantities 
of gas supplied and demanded in distinct gas markets.
Policy implications of methods to 
alter gas consumption
Direct end-use control by administrative action requires the 
agency to immerse itself in the details of the gas consuming industries 
to arrive at decisions which will fulfill 'the applicable public policy 
goals. This task would be formidable, and even with the best of admin­
istration the complexities of applying necessarily crude criteria to 
actual situations would lead to confusion, controversy, and failure to 
make maximizing decisions. Direct end-use control would, however, allow 
the agency more precision in restricting consumption than would any 
other method. Moreover, it would permit recognition of special social 
costs and social benefits of gas usage and thereby potentially might 
increase social welfare in the present as well as over time as compared 
with market or other gas rationing. Similarly, direct controls could 
operate more rapidly and more surely than forms of control relying on 
voluntary adjustment over time. The FPC has used end-use criteria in
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granting certificates of convenience and necessity in the past. A dis­
cretionary authority to be exerted in clear cases of conflict between 
social and private interest would, for these reasons, likely have a 
place in consumption restriction whether primary reliance were placed 
on this method or not.
Private, non-price rationing of gas among consumers desiring to 
purchase more gas at the area-price than the amount forthcoming from 
suppliers would tend to result in a gas allocation which would have no 
necessary economic rationale. The excess demand continuously hanging 
over the market would not be an incentive to production or marketing 
efficiency, and would tend as well to reward illegal or uneconomic 
behavior. The absence of formal action to restrict supply would, how­
ever, give a greater appearance of laissez faire. If the disadvantages 
of market imbalance were not obvious, a laissez faire allocation policy 
would likely lead to less public concern than would direct government 
direction of consumption.
The restriction of consumption through the use of a commodity 
unit tax wedge would fulfill the subsidiary goals of consumption effi­
ciency through use of private market allocation. Allocation of gas 
strictly on the basis of price would allow the market forces to restrict 
consumption to the highest value uses before lower value uses were 
served. Efficiency in consumption allocation would therefore result. 
Some imperfections, however, would be tied into the gas consumption 
pattern in the short run because of the long adjustment period in the 
gas industry.
The use of a unit tax to adjust consumption patterns would mini­
mize the direct incursion of the regulatory agency into the operations 
of the industry. Given the chosen area-price, the agency would only 
have to select the tax per unit which would restrict consumption to 
available supply. The impersonal operation of market allocation would 
remove the danger of special interest rulings.
Tax restriction of consumption would shift incomes from consumers 
to government (and ultimately to the generality of taxpayers) by raising 
prices paid and reducing consumption. Insofar as the reduction in the
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consumption of gas brings the gas use rate into harmony with the maxi­
mizing social use rate over time, the additional price paid by gas 
consumers through the unit tax would bring social cost into equality 
with social benefit from gas consumption. In effect, the price of gas 
with tax would equal the alternative cost of consuming gas in the pres­
ent. Indeed, the need to restrict consumption to fulfill the public 
policy goals expressed through the selected area-price implies the 
previous existence of a subsidy to consumers based on too low an esti­
mate of the value of future gas consumption. Hence the use of a unit 
tax as a means of reducing gas consumption would serve to enhance both 
the social equity and the economic efficiency of the allocation of gas 
among alternative uses. The adjustment of tax rates and area-prices 
over time, and shifts in geographical and other production and use pat­
terns would complicate this method of restricting consumption. Hence 
plans for changes in values should be considered along with the develop­
ment of administrative techniques for adjusting quantities supplied and 
demanded.
Conclusions on the policy and administrative 
role of the basic area-price
The basic area-price to which interarea differentials are applied 
is crucial to the area-price method. It is this price which is the 
determinant of intersector income distribution and of the use rate of 
gas. In addition, however, it is the focus of conflicts in goals. If 
field sales regulation alters industry conditions beyond mere elimination 
of market imperfections some method of balancing output and consumption 
is required. The discussion above, abstracting from other problems, 
considered methods of making one type of such an adjustment, a restric­
tion on consumption. Other directions of adjustments, for example more 
rapid use of natural gas, would differ only in application. The admin­
istration of this policy does not seem to exhibit unmanageable difficulty 
or expense, but whether the expense is too great depends on the evalu­
ation of advantages to be gained.
An administrative issue of some importance arises from the 
particular nature of the structure of present and prospective gas industry
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regulation authority. The jurisdiction of the FPC is limited to 
certain interstate gas sales. Yet any regulation of prices and quan­
tities can ignore the effect of nonjurisdictional sales only at the 
risk of great inequities and losses of effectiveness of the policy.
Two types of nonjurisdictional sales are of greatest importance in 
this regard, direct industrial sales (not for resale) by producers, 
and intrastate sales. These gas submarkets taken as a whole would 
almost certainly exhibit higher demand elasticity than the interstate 
market as a whole. It is obvious, then, that restrictions on consump­
tion which were not uniformly applied to these outlets would alter the 
intended effect of regulation and jeopardize its very purpose. Hence 
the issue of regulatory scope must be resolved before administrative 
application of gas regulation is possible.
The central emphasis of this study, of course, is on the evalu­
ation of the public-utility and area-price approaches to field market 
regulation. The administrative issue of a means to facilitate accom­
plishment of an element of regulation is essentially peripheral to the 
major task. In the more central matter of evaluation of area-price 
regulation the question of output— consumption balance is ignored, 
except for the aspect of adjustment resulting from moving toward market 
equilibrium without either excess profits or consumer surplus. The 
difference between nonequilibrium adjustment of quantities demanded 
and supplied, and elimination of extra-normal gains through regulation 
occasionally gives rise to apparent regulatory inconsistencies. For 
example, it might be said that a given price change under regulation 
would alter the quantity supplied in one case but not in another. If 
the dual role (use rate determination and income redistribution) of the 
basic area-price is kept in mind, however, the confusion between these 
two aspects of regulation should be minimized for the reader.
Public Policy Evaluation of the Area-Price Method
Regulation of the field sales of natural gas by independent pro­
ducers for resale in interstate commerce has been evaluated in this work 
in terms of the three public policy goals summarized under the headings
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maximum economic welfare, appropriate income distribution, and the pro­
motion of the national interest in the use rate of the resource. The 
remainder of this chapter is devoted to evaluating the area-price method 
in terms of whether it is suitable for fulfilling these public policy 
goals both separately and jointly, ignoring administrative and legal 
issues.
Complications in evaluation arise because the area-price method 
is not a formula such as the public-utility method and therefore is not 
set and definite in its application. The FPC has not settled on the 
precise way in which a permanent area-price will be established nor has 
it decided upon the criteria by which differentials and area boundaries 
are to be determined. There is no obvious or generally understood 
formula to be applied. For this reason analysis of the ability of the 
area-price method to satisfy public goals is limited to the general 
nature of the method and to alternatives where they may be abstracted 
from the range of choice available to a regulatory agency or to Congress. 
In line with this restriction, each of the policy goals is related 
first to the general nature of the area-price method and then the effect 
of the alternative approaches to the differentials and the area bounda­
ries is noted.
Area-Price Regulation and Maximum 
Economic Welfare
Economic welfare, as it is defined in this study, depends on the 
efficient use of resources, as measured by the private market, neglect­
ing the distribution of income. An evaluation of the efficiency promoted 
by a given method of regulation depends on its effect on three levels 
of operations. These are the operation of the production and gathering 
facilities, the making of exploration and development investment deci­
sions, and the consumption of the natural gas produced. The area-price 
method can be evaluated in general in terms of the first of these levels, 
but different ways of establishing area boundaries and differentials 
influence the latter two.
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Area-price regulation and production 
and gathering efficiency
Under area-price regulation the price for a given amount of 
natural gas in any one field does not depend on the costs of producing 
and gathering that gas. The producing and gathering firm sells the 
gas for the area-price and is allowed to retain all the margin between 
the costs of producing the natural gas and total revenue. All savings 
through higher efficiency, then, go to the firm and do not result in 
cheaper gas for consumers. Under these conditions there is every 
incentive for the firm to reduce costs in order to enlarge profits.
Hence the area-price method of regulation enlists the profit motive on 
the side of greater producing and gathering efficiency.
The area-price method, as it is presumed to operate, makes no
allowance for costs experienced by an individual firm even if these
31costs are higher than the area-price set. No firm is allowed to vary 
price on the grounds that, at the area-price, losses occur. The pro­
ducer whose costs exceed the area-price, no matter what the reason, is 
forced to either adjust to the price discipline or leave the industry. 
Conversely, some resources, including superior managerial talent, are 
encouraged to be more fully utilized in the industry. For these rea­
sons there is a tendency for area-pricing to upgrade the productivity 
of resources engaged in production and gathering operations and there­
fore to fulfill the public policy goal of maximizing the efficiency with 
which resources are used to satisfy wants, once investment decisions 
have been made.
31Whether this matter will conflict with the constitutional 
bar against confiscation is not at issue at this point. The minority 
in the case which gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to comment on 
the area-price decision held that the FPC in the use of this method was 
going to be squeezed between setting a price which would be confiscatory 
against some producers while yielding others more than a reasonable 
profit. Wisconsin v. Federal Power Commission, 83 S.Ct. 1266, 1284- 
1285.
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Area-price regulation and exploration 
and development efficiency
Investment in the natural gas production industry, to fulfill 
the criterion of efficiency, would be allocated to exploration and 
development in the areas where the greatest value, measured in con­
sumption, would be obtained for the smallest expenditure. Unlike 
production and gathering operations, investment in exploration and 
development requires interarea allocation. The factors which influence 
the area boundaries and the area differentials influence investment 
decisions as well, and therefore an evaluation of area pricing requires 
an evaluation of the alternative methods of establishing those area 
differentials. Since historical price differentials and area boundaries 
do not necessarily reflect current economic conditions, this source of 
differentiation is ignored in the discussion.
Cost-of-production based differentials
Price differentials based on cost-of-production of given areas, 
if successfully applied, would make the potential gas producer indiffer­
ent as to exploration and development activity between areas exhibiting 
a similar degree of certainty of obtaining a given quantity of reserves. 
This would be true so long as the market conditions were such that gas 
priced so as to cover costs would find a suitable outlet. To maximize 
profit the producer would, however, attempt to select the subregion, no 
matter what the area, which would have the lowest total cost relative 
to its respective area. This location only accidentally would coincide 
with the location where the exploration and development investment 
would likely bring the highest value output at the lowest expense. A 
price based on the cost-of-production within an area, however the 
boundaries were drawn and whatever the general level of gas prices, 
would not serve to fulfill the public policy goal of maximum efficiency 
in the allocation of exploration and development investment.
Value-to-consumer based differentials
The social end sought through the natural gas industry is the 
production of value, measured by value in use, not the production of
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natural gas. Efficiency in the allocation of resources within the 
industry requires that the end of consumption be the benchmark against 
which costs are measured. To the end that welfare be maximized, invest­
ment in exploration and development of natural gas should be allocated 
between areas on the basis of its marginal productivity in alternative 
uses. To fulfill this criterion all prospective investment outlets 
must be exhausted in turn, descending from highest to lowest value pro­
duced for each unit of total expenditure. To accomplish this allocation 
through the mechanism of free factor choice an’ incentive is required 
that will direct private activity to the areas of greatest benefit to 
the public. Differentials between homogeneous regions based on the 
value of a unit of production in each region to the consumer would 
encourage natural gas exploration and development in a pattern reflect­
ing the maximizing allocation of investment. Maximum welfare would 
require, in allocating exploration and development investment between 
areas, that the area differential and the criteria used in determining 
homogeneity be based on value-to-consumer rather than cost-of-production. 
In sum, the ability of the area-price method to fulfill the public policy 
goal of maximum efficiency in the allocation of investment depends on 
the choice of the value-to-consumer basis for price differentials.
Area-price regulation and the 
efficiency of consumption
Efficiency in the consumption of natural gas requires that gas 
be consumed up to the point where the value of an additional unit of gas 
to consumers is just equal to the value to them of other uses of the 
resources required to obtain the gas. Regulation altering the equilib­
rium price of gas in the field necessarily interferes with maximization 
of consumption efficiency if the full resource cost of the gas is 
reflected in the price. Since there is no assurance that the laissez 
faire operation of the industry does fulfill the maximizing conditions, 
no easy generalization about the effect of regulation is possible. In 
the absence of certainty, a first approximation of maximizing alloca­
tion would have as a goal the consumption of gas by users in descending 
order of net value in use of the gas. The area-price approach to
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regulation can be evaluated in terms of the success with which it meets 
this criterion. First the effect of the method as it sets the basic 
price for gas and the price within an area is discussed and then the 
interarea implications are explored.
The basic price for gas and 
intra-area regulation
The basic price for gas to which area differentials are added 
is analogous, with regard to consumption, to the price for gas within 
an area. For this reason the intra-area analysis will be presumed to 
be expanded to the basic price as well in the following discussion.
The single ceiling price within an area allocates gas among con­
suming districts on the basis of economic costs and alternatives, namely, 
the differences in costs of transporting gas from a given area to the 
consuming district. All gas from within an area, then, is made avail­
able to consumers at the same price; no extraneous intra-area factors 
enter in. In this sense the consumers purchasing from within a given 
area are faced with a take it or leave it choice at a price set outside 
the negotiations. The consumers can then adjust their affairs to the 
market price in such a way as to maximize their welfare, and gas will 
go from the reservoir to those who are willing to purchase gas at that 
price to the limits of the deliverability of the reservoir, again at the 
given price.
While the area-price approach avoids irrelevant restrictions on 
consumption of natural gas, and while no direct unneutral allocation 
signals are given by the method (as is the case with public-utility regu­
lation) there is no assurance that optimal allocation of the gas will 
take place. The welfare effects of a subequilibrium area-price for gas 
are indeterminate if excess quantities demanded result. Under some 
circumstances there is no excess amount demanded, however. Price reduc­
tion could rest on excess capacity which had developed because of 
monopoly restraints or contractual obligations. Similarly, return to 
the permanently fixed factors could be squeezed without an output 
response within an area to the extent that this return represented a 
bonus over alternatives which would not be affected by the change in
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prices. A gas source which represented a discrete jump in costs (manu­
factured or imported gas when considering the base price, gas from 
other areas when considering one area) or another source of satisfying 
the functions of gas would be examples of this type. Finally, the unit 
tax on consumption could be used to reduce the amount of gas demanded.
If the subequilibrium area-price were administered to avoid unsatisfied 
demand, no losses in consumption efficiency would be expected. On the 
other hand, there would be no assurance that less valuable uses of gas 
were not served to the exclusion of more valuable uses if the area-price 
were such that it did not bring forth enough gas to satisfy the amount 
demanded at the area-price, after removal of production restrictions. 
Because of the importance of the surrounding factors, and the fact 
that no verified generalizations can be made about them at this time, 
the consumption efficiency of the gas industry subject to a subequilib­
rium area-price cannot be expressly determined.
A price set above equilibrium would result, after long run 
adjustment, in a reduction of consumption that would rest on decreases 
in consumption in the least valuable uses. Area-price regulation would 
fulfill the proximate goal of supplying gas first to those uses where 
its net delivered value exceeded that of all uses not receiving gas. 
Production efficiency, which is not an issue at this point, would possi­
bly suffer at least in the short run. The effect of the intra-area 
price for gas on the total amount of welfare generated by the consump­
tion of gas depends, then, on specific conditions. If excess amount 
demanded resulted from regulation, then maximum satisfaction, measured 
by willingness to pay, would not be guaranteed for the gas consumed.
A price which did not leave excess amount demanded, whatever it would 
do to productive efficiency or to total welfare, would satisfy the con­
dition of efficiency in the long run in determining which consumers 
would obtain a given amount of gas.
Interarea regulation— the price differentials
Efficiency in the distribution of gas between production areas 
and consumption points requires that the marginal utility of a Mcf of
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gas per unit of delivered cost of that gas be equal in all consuming 
32regions. This condition would minimize the monetary cost of a given 
quantity of consumption benefit from the gas delivered. The cost of 
gas to the consumers is the sum of field price and the cost of delivery 
to the distribution mains, in the absence of monopoly or other exac­
tions .
Under regulation on the area-price basis the field price of gas 
is established by administrative decree with private interests adjusting 
their activities to maximize their wellbeing given the established 
price. The variable costs of production are covered at the margin of 
production. The difference between total revenue at the area-price and 
these costs will be taken up by the fixed factors in the long run. Con­
sumption efficiency, as a regulatory goal, requires interarea differ­
entials which fulfill the condition necessary for delivering a particular 
quantity of gas yielding the maximum amount of benefit in consumption 
at a minimum resource cost. To fulfill this condition it is only neces­
sary that the field price for each area reflect fully the relative value 
to consumers of the gas produced from that area. The locational factor 
is used as the example in the analytical model. The value-to-consumer 
method of determining area differentials is discussed first, below, with 
the cost-of-production criterion left to a later point.
Under value oriented regulation the allocation of gas from 
areas to consumers is based on total gas costs. These costs for a given 
volume of gas are lower for consumers near the gas producing region and 
higher for those at a greater distance, but do not vary because of the 
location of the particular producing reservoir within the producing 
region. In the absence of imperfections in the consuming markets, then, 
all consuming regions in the long run face the same benefit cost ratios 
at the margin, measuring benefit in opportunity cost terms. The
32The further requirement that consumers equate the marginal 
utility from the last unit of expenditure for gas to the benefit from 
other purchases is precluded by any regulation which does not instate 
the results of the competitive equilibrium in the economy. The goal 
instituted here is limited to preventing uneconomic allocation between 
consuming districts.
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appropriate interarea differentials are those which make up the cost of
transportation differences between areas on the basis of value to the
33consumer defined in terms of minimum delivery costs.
Going back to the "fan" model of the producing and consuming 
regions of the United States, a consumer is indifferent whether he 
receives gas from the base or the fringe of the ray of the "fan" located 
to serve his region because the area-price differentials balance the 
transportation costs under value-to-consumer determinations. Gas from 
any other ray of the producing region, however, is more expensive to 
deliver when field price is included and therefore is not an economical 
source. The consumer has an incentive, then, to purchase from the reser­
voir closer to him compared to the distance from any other gas source 
to the consumers closer to it. Area differentials based on value-to- 
consumer, considering only location, therefore minimize the social cost 
of delivering gas. Factors other than location affecting the value of 
gas can be placed in the same mold. The functions describing these other 
factors are additive, being reducible to monetary costs, and therefore 
produce no theoretical problems in joint satisfaction.
Actual determination of area-price differentials through the 
value-to-consumer criterion is not the simple matter described in the 
model above. The areas are not as homogeneous as is assumed, traditional 
purchasing patterns are set because of fixed transportation facilities, 
the producing— consuming regions are not so located as to fulfill the 
"fan" analogy perfectly, and the possibilities of adjustment are limited 
because of overlapping decision times. Nevertheless the discussion does 
point out, using transportation distance as an example which could have 
been repeated for the other variables, that value-to-consumer differ­
entials relate production and consumption in a way which contributes to 
welfare maximization because it leads to efficiency in interregional gas 
allocation. Differentials based on cost-of-production, to which we now 
turn, have no such promise.
33Considering here, as in the rest of this example, only the 
location element of the value of a reservoir to consumers.
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An alternative method of establishing differentials between 
areas is on the basis of cost-of-production within those areas. Con­
sumers would have an incentive to obtain gas from the area where the 
sum of costs of production and costs of bringing the gathered gas to 
the burner tip were lowest. The price of gas in the field would be 
set by administrative decree under area-pricing. Under these circum­
stances the consuming region which would get the cheapest gas would be 
determined by noneconomic factors such as development timing and 
accident. There would be no economic pressure exerted to change the 
distribution of gas once it was established because price differentials 
would not shift in response to economic changes in the consuming sector. 
Therefore whatever consumer pattern existed at the initiation of regu­
lation would likely be maintained.
The area source of gas which would minimize delivered gas cost 
to one of the consuming regions would not necessarily be consistent 
with the source— use pattern which would minimize the costs for all 
consuming regions taken together. Take the following synthetic case as 
an example. Consuming region A is nearer high-cost producing area Z 
than to low-cost area X, while consuming region B is nearer low-cost X 
than high-cost Z. The success of A in obtaining a lower delivered gas 
cost (sum of field price and transportation cost) through purchasing 
from X rather than Z is at the expense of B. As a result of A taking 
gas from X, perhaps because of earlier development, B has to look to Z 
which is more distant and has a higher field price than X. While under
free price conditions B would be able to bid X away from A, it could
not if price were not allowed to serve as a rationing device, as it 
would not be under cost-of-production regulation.
The total resource cost of a given quantity of gas consumed in 
both A and B in the example above would be higher by the amount of cross 
hauling if the two potential consuming areas did not use the gas supply
closest to them. The reduction in delivered cost of gas to A is less
than the increase in cost to B because of the costs of cross hauling.
End uses which are not otherwise economic are feasible if A uses gas 
from low-cost X. At the same time, B, relying on Z rather than X as its
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gas source, is unable to satisfy uses for gas which it would be able 
to satisfy if its gas source were X. A shift of gas use from A to B 
results in a reduction of gas used where benefit is just equal to a 
lower price than in region B. Similarly, an increase in gas used in B 
leads to benefit from consumption equal to a price higher than the 
marginal gas cost in region A. Therefore less valuable consumption 
uses of gas are substituted for more valuable consumption and total 
benefit from a given quantity of gas consumed rises if distribution is 
altered. Another way of reaching this same conclusion is by pointing 
out that the benefit/cost ratios considering only necessary costs 
(production plus lowest cost delivery to consumption point for the out­
ermost gas in each region) differ between regions, showing suboptimal 
resource allocation, even if observed benefit/cost ratios are identical.
The foregoing analysis, based on one example, does not imply 
that all interarea differentials based on cost-of-production will neces­
sarily result in reduced efficiency in consumption. It does imply, 
however, that while under perfect adjustments this misallocation would 
not occur under the value-to-consumer method of determining area differ­
entials, it would occur under cost-of-production differentials unless 
it resulted in coincidental value-to-consumer production— consumption 
patterns.
The example used above was highly simplified for explanation 
purposes, but the effect of one region obtaining gas from outside the 
segment of the production area where that gas would come from under 
value oriented price (whether through market operations or by regula­
tion) would be the same whether the interregional pattern was as clear 
cut or not. The method of establishing interarea differentials is there­
fore significant in maximizing the efficiency of consumption of natural 
gas under area-price regulation. The importance of consumption effi­
ciency in maximizing economic welfare is difficult to estimate. No 
gains of great magnitude would be quickly forthcoming no matter what 
the type of regulation because of the resistance to change due to high 
fixed costs. Differentials based on value (in alternative uses) of what 
is removed from the ground rather than on the costs of producing it are
295
consistently more conducive to highest satisfactions for consumers, 
however, regardless of whether the industry is viewed in its exploration 
and development, production, or transportation and distribution phases. 
Use of resources to maximize welfare, ignoring the distribution of that 
welfare, is only one facet of public policy toward the natural gas 
industry. Another aspect of that interest reflects upon the distribu­
tion of that welfare between the producing and consuming segments of 
the industry.
Area-Price Regulation and Appropriate 
Income Distribution
The public policy goal of an appropriate income distribution is 
one of the ends sought through area-price regulation of the natural 
gas industry. While both consumers and producers can be made to under­
stand the desirability of lowering the costs of making gas available 
to the ultimate consumer, the issue of income distribution between them 
is a matter of irreconcilable conflict. Appropriate income distribu­
tion rests on values which are outside scientific inquiry, and no 
verifiable decision can be made as to the gas rates which would guaran­
tee such a distribution. Regulation techniques can be judged, however, 
on their ability to institute whatever distribution commends itself to 
the properly constituted authorities. In this section, the area-price 
approach is analyzed alone. The use of a unit tax on consumption to 
balance the desired use rate along with an area-price which would 
restrict rent return to the factors has already been discussed as an 
administrative expedient. The following discussion does not deal with 
this alternative, or other supplements to area-price regulation, because 
of the desire to focus on the area-price method at its simplest. In the 
discussion below consumers and producers are presumed free to react to 
price regulation. The nature of their reaction is predicated on maxi­
mizing behavior.
One impact of price changes in the industry is the alteration 
in the quantities of gas which will be supplied and demanded in the long 
run. Redistribution of income through nonmarginal taxes or subsidies
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can take place without affecting amounts supplied and demanded, but all 
other shifts will disturb industry equilibrium unless administrative 
countervailing pressures are employed. The durable nature of consumer 
and producer investment delays response to area-price changes, but the 
process of adjustment continues until some resolution of conflicting 
tendencies is secured. In this portion of this study changes in the 
distribution of income between producing and consuming regions will be 
understood as changes in the distribution of ihcome between consumers 
and producers active in the industry both before and after adjustments 
to regulation are made. The gains and losses of those entering or 
leaving the industry because of price changes are real, but cannot be 
measured or even estimated satisfactorily because of the inaccessibility 
of a measure of the value of alternatives foregone. The analysis which 
follows abstracts from the output— consumption balance question dis­
cussed above.
Gross transfers of income, neglecting benefit, depend on the 
elasticity of demand for gas between the area-price established and the 
prior price. If the demand for gas as a whole (considering all con­
sumers whose rates are changed, and assuming that the rate changes are 
made so as to maximize producer income) is inelastic, an increase in 
price will transfer money from the consumers to the producers. If the 
demand for gas as a whole is elastic, an increase in price would trans­
fer gross income from the producing to the consuming sector. The 
opposite holds, of course, for price decreases. This gross measure of 
income change is not meaningful in welfare terms because the costs of 
the new condition, both in consumption and in production, are ignored.
Response to area-price regulation 
affected by industry conditions
The response of amount supplied and amount demanded to price 
changes is sometimes affected by conditions which have some claim for 
special consideration. Among these are monopoly and monopsony, the 
method of determining the royalty interest, and nonmaximization at the 
time of regulation. The last of these elements can be explained briefly
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within the general maximization framework as the result of short-run 
conditions (production, transportation, or distribution bottlenecks, as 
examples) or noneconomic factors such as regulation.
Monopoly and monopsony have been explored in several studies, 
the results of some of which are summarized above in Chapter V. For 
the most part, the writers consulted agreed that monopoly was negli­
gible. The quasi-monopoly return to producers, which has rested on the 
immobility of implanted gas transportation facilities, has been some­
what counterbalanced by the long term contracts at stable prices 
negotiated by some gas purchasers. In the first instance, the producers 
have been able to obtain and maintain supra-normal return when they have 
controlled the only gas supplies within easy reach of pipelines. The 
limit to such return has depended upon the capital cost of developing 
another gas source, which varies, of course, in each case. The pipeline 
purchasers have obtained gas far below the cost of alternative supplies 
when long term contracts without price flexibility have held the price 
of gas in the field at levels representative of a different period in 
industry development. Regulation which would replace these nonrepre­
sentative prices with area-prices developed on some industry-wide basis 
would bring about a change in the distribution of income and a change 
in the amount of gas demanded and supplied. Whether that change would 
be toward or away from the equilibrium which would have existed in the 
absence of imperfections in the market depends on the particular case.
Area-price regulation raises interesting questions with regard 
to the royalty interest in gas production, especially as regards income 
distribution and the amount of natural gas supplied. The royalty 
interest historically has not exhibited enough flexibility to assure 
that it covered only the cost of alternatives. The basic royalty, the 
one-eighth of production value payment, is a matter of tradition in the 
industry and is generally not considered negotiable as a minimum. Some 
flexibility is preserved for better-than-average production prospects 
by means of the leasing bonus and royalty overrides, but this is not 
adequate to cover the range of variation existing. For example, since 
the royalty is pure rent owners of drilling rights for land with
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marginal possibilities theoretically should obtain only enough return 
to make them indifferent as to whether exploratory drilling took place. 
Yet the one-eighth royalty holds whatever the prospects. This share 
could be reduced at the margin without reducing the quantity of gas 
produced, transferring income to the consumers, or else more gas would 
be produced if this share were available to the producing interests as 
compensation for more risky and less profitable exploration and devel­
opment. The effect of area-price regulation on the distribution of 
income between royalty owners and consumers, and on the amount of gas 
supplied, partially depends, then, on the flexibility of the minimum 
return to royalty holders under area regulation.
Income redistribution among those 
remaining in the industry
The effect of price change on the income of those who remain in 
the industry, both on the production and on the consumption sides, is 
direct and general. That is, as price increases in the field the con­
sumers who continue to purchase the same quantity of gas will pay a 
greater amount than they did before the price change, ceteris paribus, 
and the income of the producing interests remaining in the industry will 
increase compared to the income under the lower prices if the same 
quantity of gas is sold by these producers. The area-price method is 
capable of great flexibility in adjusting the amount of this change by 
increasing or decreasing the basic area rate itself. The distribution 
of the changes within the sectors, however, is not uniform. This 
unequal impact of income shifts depends only partly on the method by 
which area differentials are established. The refinements necessary for 
adjustment to the method of determining area differentiation are noted 
following an examination of the general impact of area-pricing on income 
distribution.
Income distribution effect of price 
changes on consumers and producers
Residential consumers (persons purchasing fuel for own use) of 
natural gas provide the most straightforward case of income
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redistribution due to regulation. The higher the price of gas to resi­
dential consumers, the lower the total quantity of goods and services, 
including gas, which they can purchase; the lower the price to them, the 
greater the possible purchase of gas and other commodities. The price 
of gas delivered to ultimate consumers thus has a direct and immediate 
effect on their real standard of living. It is impossible to specify 
the amount of impact on residential consumers associated with a change 
in gas field prices, however, because such a change in the field might 
change the delivery costs and either be offset or magnified in its 
eventual effect on consumers. The demand of residential consumers for 
natural gas is more inelastic than that of other consumers. Any price 
change has, it follows, a larger proportionate and volume effect on 
the nonresidential consumers who consume about three-quarters of the 
total gas consumed. The changes in total gas demanded, including both 
residential and nonresidential uses, due to price changes in the field 
would possibly affect transportation and distribution costs per unit 
because of the scale economies involved. Since the transportation and 
distribution of gas are generally regulated on a cost-of-service basis, 
any cost changes supposedly find their way into the delivered price of 
gas. Hence the residential price of gas will be influenced by these 
secondary cost changes as well as by the field price changes themselves. 
Because the magnitude of the secondary changes cannot be estimated, the 
extent of the effect on consumer income of a given field price change 
cannot be predicted without study on a case by case basis.
The nonresidential consumers would be subject to the same modi­
fications of transportation costs due to quantity changes as would the 
residential consumers. Several other possible factors also could alter 
the effect of a change in field price on their incomes. The nonresi­
dential consumers, having a more elastic demand for gas, are probably 
sheltered from an increase in the price of gas more than are residential 
consumers, and would probably receive a larger proportionate share of 
any price decreases that resulted from regulation. The share of the 
field price changes, and of costs of delivery per unit of gas, would be 
divided according to conditions in each consuming area, including the
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influence of the regulatory agency. Assuming that some portion of the 
total net income change is not passed on to the residential consumers, 
that portion could either be absorbed by the transportation and distri­
bution firms, could accrue to the nonresidential consumer, or could be 
shifted forward to customers of the consumer or could be shifted back­
ward to the suppliers of other factors to the gas using firm. Because 
of regulation, the electric generating plants, for example, would pass 
most of any price change on to customers. Determination of the net 
distributional effect, whether by income group or class of consumer, 
of gas price changes in the field cannot be made, therefore, without 
an intensive study which would also entail considerable estimation.
Income shifts from price changes are more clear-cut on the 
producing level. In the long run the effect of regulation would be on 
the fixed factors, not on the mobile factors which are able to shift 
in response to best profit opportunities. In the short run the con­
tractual residual claimants would be forced to accept most of the. 
variation in return. These claimants are primarily the ownership 
interests in producing operations and those, like the royalty holders, 
whose incomes are tied to these operations. The length of the long 
run would differ according to the type of activity considered, but 
marginal shifts would be effective in initiating adjustment even while 
the mass of the industry was still geared to the previous conditions.
In general, regulation would bear most heavily on the reservoir inter­
ests, including both the royalty interests and the producing owners of 
reservoir rights.
Income distribution effect of the method 
of calculating area differentials
Alteration of the method of calculating area differentials 
increases or decreases the quantity of income redistributed among differ­
ent groups of consumers and producers. For example, if the cost-of- 
production method were adopted the consumers receiving their gas from 
low cost, high value-to-consumer areas would be benefited as contrasted 
with those consumers who received gas from high cost, low value-to- 
consumer regions. The distribution of income between classes of
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consumers, such as residential and nonresidential users, might also be 
affected by the area differentials selected. At the production level, 
the cost-of-production method would aid a firm which had low costs but 
was in a high cost area, while the same firm would be worse off under 
value-to-consumer regulation if it were in a low value-to-consumer 
region.
Either method of calculating the area differential could result 
in the desired amount of redistribution because it is the base price 
itself which is the income shifting factor. Gross shifts between the 
producing and the consuming regions are not, however, the only goal in 
income redistribution policy. There is a general desire to shift income 
in such a way as to have the least possible effect on welfare maximizing 
production patterns. Because of the correlation between cost-of- 
production regulation and income between areas, the cost-of-production 
method could be used with more precision to limit rent return and to 
prevent confiscation than could the other method. Through the cost-of- 
production method price variation between areas could be controlled to 
increase the chance of keeping active the desired amount of production. 
At the same time, however, the cost-of-production method would not 
encourage efficiency in resource use nor could it be used to adjust the 
flow of gas to consuming areas in a manner designed to maximize consumer 
welfare. Neither possible way of determining area differentials is 
capable of the variety of adjustments theoretically possible through 
case by case regulation. Area regulation to alter the distribution of 
income also, of course, affects the rate of gas consumption.
Area-Price Regulation and the Promotion 
of the National Interest
The national interest in the allocation of natural gas over time 
to maximize social benefit from it can be fulfilled through field price 
regulation on an area basis. The amount of natural gas consumed and 
the amount of natural gas exploration and production are both influenced 
by the single variable of price. An increase in gas price would at the 
same time reduce amount demanded and increase the amount supplied. The
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opposite results would follow from a reduction in the base price of 
gas. Area prices set by the regulatory authority therefore determine 
the quantity of gas which individuals and firms wish to discover, pro­
duce, and consume, and hence can dictate an allocation of gas over 
time. The emphasis in this section is on the limits of control over 
the amount of gas produced and consumed; balance between desired output 
and consumption, an administrative matter, is discussed elsewhere.
The area-price method of regulation by itself can restrict the 
use rate of gas but in the long run cannot increase it beyond the 
quantity associated with the competitive equilibrium in the industry. 
Whatever the direction of the deviation from this equilibrium, if it 
could be maintained by administrative action, its existence would in 
the long run reduce the quantity of gas utilized. As illustrated in 
the left graph of Figure 11, at a price above competitive equilibrium, 
P^ , the producers would desire to produce a greater amount of gas, Q^ ,
Pa
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Figure 11. Non-equilibrium area-price and restriction of amount 
of gas produced or consumed.
thao the consumers wished to purchase, Q^ , and the lack of a market for 
the gas would limit sales and ultimately restrict production. In the 
other direction, price P^  ^in the right graph would bring forth a greater 
amount demanded, Q^ , than there was gas, Q^ , to match the desired pur­
chases. Some increase in gas use through price regulation would be
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possible if pre-regulation market imperfections had previously held 
consumption down. The short run impact of regulation could be in any 
direction. Given the length of the adjustment period in the natural 
gas industry, and the flexibility of some of the factor returns, the 
region of price influence on depletion of gas would in practice be 
larger than would be expected from the discussion above.
The method of determining area differentials would have one 
major effect on the availability of natural gas over time. If the 
cost-of-production method of determining area differentials were used, 
the production from high cost areas would be increased at the expense 
of production from low cost regions. The cost-of-production method 
would therefore keep some sub-marginal (under different regulatory 
criteria) operations in production at the expense of rent returns in the 
more efficient lower cost reservoirs. The proportion of actual hydro­
carbon produced relative to the quantity originally in place in the 
sub-marginal reservoirs would be increased. The amount of gas avail­
able over time, defined solely as the quantity remaining in the earth 
in economically producible form given present technology, would rise 
as a result. The sub-marginal reservoirs, which would not likely be 
re-entered after once being abandoned, would produce more gas, and the 
other reserves of natural gas, ceteris paribus, would remain as eco­
nomically attractive as before. The social cost of this additional 
producible capacity would be higher costs of production and lower 
utilitization of the gas in the present. The effect on total social 
welfare over time would depend on such unknown economic factors as 
developments in production technology and availability of gas substitutes 
in the future. Value-to-consumer differentials would reflect the cur­
rently efficient allocation of resources. They would lead to earlier 
abandonment of marginal reserves compared to cost-of-production differ­
entials. Thus while alternative methods of establishing differentials 
could be used to arrive at a given use rate of gas over time, the 
ultimate physical recovery and the cost of obtaining the gas would differ 
according to the method chosen.
3 0 4
Summary of the Ability of the Area-Price Method 
to Fulfill Specified Regulatory Goals
Evaluation of the public policy potential of the area-price 
method was approached above on a goal by goal basis. A summary of these 
results points up the exceptions to the general conclusion that the 
method can be used to maximize public policy goals taken separately.
Two aspects of the area-price method were distinguished above, the base 
price or intra-area regulation, and the interarea differentials.
The single area-price within a production area establishes the 
necessary conditions for maximum economic welfare in production. Com­
modity based regulation of all similar products places cost discipline 
on producers and on those making exploration and development decisions 
within an area. No price signals leading to inefficient use of natural 
gas by consumers are given by area regulation itself. The area method, 
as analyzed, is capable of changing the distribution of income among 
those remaining in the industry. Administrators using the area-price 
method alone, however, do not have a means of reconciling the gains or 
losses in wellbeing to those moving into or out of the industry because 
of changes induced by regulation. Finally, the use rate of gas over 
time was found in this model to be subject to administrative control 
through the area-price method, but only if the desired change required 
a movement toward laissez faire equilibrium or toward a consumption 
level below that equilibrium.
Two methods of determining differentials between areas were 
considered in this evaluation. It was found that the value-to-consumer 
method fulfills the efficiency criterion while the cost-based area 
differential does not. At the same time, however, the cost-based area 
differential is capable of more precise income redistribution between 
the producers and the consumers because it is directly keyed to covering 
costs in the field and returning no more than a specified but flexible 
level of profit on production and gathering operations. The cost-based 
method is capable of eliminating the gains and losses from nonrecurring 
or random conditions. There would be no means of controlling these
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elements under the value-to-consumer method. There is no obviously 
correct choice between the different income distribution effects of the 
alternative means of calculating area differentials. With reference 
to the issue of gas availability over time, the cost-based differential 
leads, following the discussion above, to greater production from 
marginal reservoirs at the expense of efficiency in the use of resources 
other than gas in place. Both types of differential would be consist­
ent with allocation of gas over time toward less use in the present 
because the instrument for this purpose is the basic area-price.
Whatever the success of the area-price method when dealing with single 
goal maximization, however, effective public policy demands the recon­
ciliation of all three goals for an optimum solution to gas field price 
regulation.
The Area-Price Approach and Joint Satisfaction 
of Field Price Regulation Goals
Joint complete satisfaction of each of the three goals of regu­
lation in the natural gas industry is required for an unreserved positive 
judgment on the efficacy of the area-price approach. Such a judgment 
could be expected only if the goals were a part of a central unifying 
system relating the fulfillment of all goals to one another. The three 
goals considered in this study, maximum private economic satisfactions 
indicated through consumer choice, appropriate income distribution 
between the gas producing and the gas consuming segments of the economy, 
and the proper allocation of gas over time to maximize total social 
welfare, do not represent such a system.
Regulation capable of compromising conflicting goals so as to 
arrive at an optimum for the total function is the best alternative to 
the perfection which is denied natural gas field price regulation. Regu­
lation, if it is to be preferred to laissez faire, must enhance the 
total social welfare as defined by the prescribed evaluating agency.
The evaluation and quantification of potential gains and losses has as 
a necessary condition regulation which makes predictable changes in the 
variables whose welfare results are to be optimized. Two matters are
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reflected in the evaluation of a regulatory method which meets the 
basic test of sufficient flexibility to consider the primary public 
policy goals. The first is the qualitative effect of the method itself 
and the other is the effect of any particular values for the goals to 
be sought, the substance of the regulation.
Area-price regulation as a method
In the regulation of the price of natural gas in the field the 
area-price method, as a method, does not necessarily conflict with the 
selected goals of public policy except that some sacrifice of either
distributional precision or production efficiency is required according
to the area differential criterion chosen. The use of the value-to- 
consumer method of determining area differentials, while leading to an 
efficient allocation of resources, does not allow as much flexibility 
in adjusting the distribution of income as does the cost-of-production 
method of providing for differentials. For example, windfall profits 
or losses are not considered. While cost-of-production differentials 
make more redistribution possible with less confiscation and/or rent 
return, they also provide less incentive for efficiency in the alloca­
tion of resources. Since one criterion for differentials must be 
chosen, the sacrifice of fullest satisfaction of one of two goals is 
necessary if the area-price method is to be used alone. For reasons 
of conciseness, only one method for arriving at area differentials is 
used as a basis for the evaluation of the area-price method below.
The value-to-consumer method was selected as the vehicle for the remain­
ing discussion of area-pricing. The cost-of-production criterion can 
be substituted with some alterations in the analysis.
Ignoring this exception, the area-price method is not incon-
-îij,
sistent with the selected public policy goals.^ The area-price for
34
Always with the provision that the effect of regulation 
which does not merely correct market imperfections is to alter the 
consunption patterns of consumers so that the ideal welfare maximizing 
allocation of resources is not possible. This is the necessary result 
of regulation of whatever type which changes the quantity of gas con­
sumed. This matter is discussed further below.
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gas which would maximize welfare from one goal, taken alone, would not 
necessarily maximize welfare from the other two. The reconciliation 
of these conflicting values is required for successful regulation.
The substance of area-price regulation
The substance of area-price regulation lies in the actual prices 
chosen to maximize social welfare. Selection of a maximizing basic 
price and set of price differentials implies an ability to measure in 
common units the effect of each price and set of differentials on the 
satisfaction of each of the public policy goals. It further requires 
that the effects of these prices on the different goals in terms of wel­
fare be additive rather than exclusive, which implies in turn that the 
decision making agency must be capable of estimating the effect on total 
social welfare of small changes in the relative maximization of each 
goal.
A small change in area-price can have three results, holding 
other factors constant, whether estimates of welfare changes from price 
changes are possible or not. These possibilities are net contributions 
to welfare from each of the variables, net reductions in welfare from 
each of the variables, or mixed gains and losses in welfare from the 
variables. The first two conditions are not optimal because some fur­
ther change must lead to greater total welfare. The third condition, 
of course, might or might not be the optimum, given that decision matrix. 
For the third condition, if the net effect on welfare of a small change 
in price were other than zero, further change in the appropriate direc­
tion would lead to greater welfare. Conceptually, however, total 
welfare is open-ended as to influences, and therefore greater welfare 
might be obtained from some totally different regulatory method. Hence, 
in an absolute sense, the superiority of a given regulatory decision 
cannot be demonstrated. Within the circumscribed limits of control by 
area-price alone, however, the lack of net gain from any change in price 
establishes the optimum solution.
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The area-price and maximum economic 
welfare
The general model described in the above paragraph can now be 
applied to the particular elements of area-price determinations, 
neglecting the interarea differentials. The goal of efficiency is 
neutral to quantitative changes in price under the area-price method. 
There are two exceptions to the neutrality of the substance of area- 
price regulation to the efficiency of production and consumption. The 
first of these exceptions is the violation of consumer sovereignty by 
the unneutral consumption effects of regulation. This issue has been 
ignored through most of this study because it is an inevitable result 
of any price, however determined, which is not the product of adjust­
ment to a competitive equilibrium with all the highly abstract 
maximizing conditions implied by that state. Accepting these criteria, 
however, the nearer the area-price to the equilibrium price the greater 
the consumer satisfactions, given the further assumption that other 
segments of the economy are similarly competitive.
An excess amount of gas demanded provides the second possible 
exception to efficiency in allocation under area regulation. With 
excess amount demanded, price does not necessarily allocate gas only to 
those consumers who are able to outbid other potential purchasers. At 
the same time, of course, lower value uses are not positively promoted 
by this regulation. Use of the unit commodity tax or other adminis­
trative devices along with area-price regulation could resolve this 
difficulty. With these two limitations, then, the efficiency goal of 
public policy would be consistent with any prices selected for income 
redistribution or use rate allocation purposes.
The area-price; alteration of income 
distribution and use rate over time
Income redistribution and changes in the use rate of natural 
gas, after allowing for all adjustments to regulation, depend on the 
area rate established. A satisfactory regulatory method would have to 
enable the decision makers to attain the selected policy goals whatever 
the quantitative value assigned to income distribution or to use rate.
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The decision maker conceptually could seek two directions of movement 
from laissez faire equilibrium for each of the goals. These possible 
four directions of movement, with their corresponding directions of 
rate changes, are listed in four statements below;
1. Income redistribution toward the producer— above competitive 
laissez faire equilibrium rates
2. Income redistribution toward the consumer— below competitive 
laissez faire equilibrium rates
3. Higher present use rate of gas— impossible of attainment with 
rate changes from competitive equilibrium rates
Lower present use rate of gas— either above or below competi­
tive laissez faire equilibrium rates
Statement three describes a goal which cannot be met through 
area-price regulation alone. If higher present use is sought by the regu­
latory agency another method of regulation must be used. Any regulation 
depending on price changes in the long run will decrease production and 
consumption either by lowering the amount of gas supplied to the market 
or by lowering the amount consumed, as the analysis related to Figure 11 
above demonstrated. Therefore, in the absence of another element to 
regulation suçh as perhaps a negative commodity unit tax, the fulfill­
ment of statement three must be interpreted as the competitive equilibrium 
price, or else laissez faire. Therefore one effect of any regulation 
will be to reduce output and consumption in the long run. This would be 
interpreted as an addition to social welfare as identified by the 
evaluating agency if reduction were desired, or as a reduction in social 
welfare if it were not.
The other three statements can be positively fulfilled by regula­
tion which shifts price away from the established equilibrium. In the 
natural gas industry a lower current use rate of natural gas is consist­
ent with both an increase in rates and a decrease in rates. Therefore, 
reduction in use of gas is consistent with both income redistribution 
toward producers (statement one) and redistribution toward consumers 
(statement two). The maximizing price for both goals can therefore be 
on the same side of the laissez faire equilibrium price. No neutralizing
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effect between goal maximizing rates need result from compromise of these 
two goals because the direction from equilibrium for both is, or can be, 
the same. ^
The difference from the laissez faire equilibrium price which 
would fulfill the individual goals need not be the same just because the 
direction of the difference is the same under most circumstances. For 
example, with a laissez faire price of twenty cents per Mcf, the price 
which would best satisfy the use rate goal might be eighteen cents per 
Mcf while the best price from the income distribution standpoint might 
be fifteen cents per Mcf. The price which would be optimal would lie 
between the maximizing price for each, in a position dictated by the 
relative importance of the different goals. Given a common measure of 
welfare gains and losses from each goal, this optimal position would of 
course be at that price where no change could bring a net gain. Ignor­
ing the efficiency criterion, then, the area-price method could be used 
to establish a field price for gas which would maximize welfare as 
defined in terms of satisfying given goals.
Area-price and total welfare 
maximization
The efficiency criterion must be readmitted to consider the 
exception to the general conclusion of area-price efficiency maximization. 
A price chosen for its income distribution and use rate maximization 
effect which was below the laissez faire equilibrium would not assure 
that high value uses would receive gas to the exclusion of inferior uses. 
The inefficient allocation of gas among consumers is only a possibility, 
not a necessity, but would require some consideration in arriving at an
35The only exception to this statement would involve movement 
away from the laissez faire price but toward the long run competitive 
price. If this sort of movement is possible there can be an increase 
in consumption at the same time that there is a change in the distribu­
tion of income. Similarly, there can be changes in the distribution 
of income without shifts in the quantity consumed so long as the dis­
tribution shifts result in counterbalancing movements around the long 
run competitive equilibrium. The possibility of neutralizing changes 
exists, then, but is not highly important in quantitative terms.
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optimal price in the sub-equilibrium range. The effect of this vari­
able, if conditions were such that it came into play, would be to sway 
the Commission toward rate changes in the direction of laissez faire 
equilibrium because the mere possibility of inefficiency would change 
the maximizing estimate of the optimum area-price.
The area-price method, to summarize its positive capacity, is 
such that the three goals of maximum economic welfare, appropriate 
income distribution, and the national interest in the allocation of gas 
over time can be considered jointly. The optimal basic field price for 
natural gas on the area basis, along with the appropriate differentials 
between areas and the area boundaries to which those differentials are 
to be applied, can be determined to the extent that satisfactions from 
the fulfillment of each of these goals can be reduced to a common 
denominator and measured. Whatever the substance plugged into the 
general public interest framework selected for this study, the regulatory 
agency can reach an area-price which it can unambiguously designate as 
optimum.
The major limitation to area-price regulation as a means of 
expressing the total social interest is the inability to reflect the 
losses or gains sustained by consumers because of the alterations in 
the choice conditions between gas and other goods. Since variables out­
side the industry are not reflected in the decision data, the gains 
(losses) from additions to (reductions of ) consumption of gas compared 
to other goods cannot be included directly. They can be implanted 
arbitrarily into the formula solution arising from the area-price to 
make it conform to the wider social interest, but only at the cost of 
dilution of the quantitative anchors which led to the designated field 
price in the first place.
The Area-Pricing Approach and the Question of:
"What is Maximized?"
Throughout this portion of the discussion it has been assumed 
that the regulatory agency knew what ends it sought and that the only 
issue was a means to attain these ends. Strictly speaking this is the
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only situation which is amenable to analysis. The source of the values 
which are to be implemented and the values themselves are beyond 
discussion unless the opinions and values of the present writer are 
interjected. Given a social welfare function, including its substance 
as well as its form, predictions and prescriptions of the type found in 
this study are possible which will enhance its fulfillment. But there 
is no way to demonstrate that another social welfare function would not 
be preferable to the first. Portions of the discussion in Chapter VI 
above were centered on this topic. At that place the only indication 
of a way out of value judgments implemented by political power was the 
concept of the self-validating social welfare function presented by 
Rothenberg. This concept might hold promise for a consensus in the 
regulation of the natural gas industry. The public-utility approach 
of cost-based regulation has, in fact, historically enjoyed a popu­
larity of this order. It must be remembered, however, that no matter 
how careful the balancing of costs and benefits from regulation, the 
basis for decision is still in the values of the regulatory agency, 
and is not to be found in some scientific interpersonal measure of 
total social welfare.
The area-price approach to the regulation of the sales for 
resale in interstate commerce of the independent producer is only one 
method of regulation. It exists alongside the public-utility approach 
discussed in Chapter VII. The sole issue for public policy is not the 
ability or inability of a given form of regulation to allocate resources 
in an industry. Nor is it to arrive at an optimum solution to achieve 
a particular social welfare function. The basic issue is obtaining the 
regulatory method which not only makes possible a proximate optimum 
solution to given policy goals, but which also fulfills the criterion 
of being better than all other alternatives, if the costs of regulation 
are included. The study of the regulation of the natural gas industry 
has led us to the point where some tentative conclusions on this last 
and most important point are possible.
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the federal regulation of the sale for resale 
of natural gas in interstate commerce presented above was designed to 
test the hypothesis that alternative methods of regulation could be 
evaluated on grounds of their gross consistency with certain predeter­
mined goals in public policy. The results of this study supported the 
hypothesis because it was found that, conceptually, different regula­
tion methods were able to fulfill the goals chosen with different 
degrees of success.
Two positive regulatory methods were selected for the examina­
tion, the public-utility method and the area-price method. These 
methods were chosen from among the possibilities because of their 
relevance to current public policy discourse. The particular goals 
were selected because they coincided roughly with commonly held values. 
The evaluation of goal fulfillment potential in absolute terms resulted 
in a finding that the area-price method was capable of meeting the 
basic criteria established by the goals selected but that the public- 
utility method was not. The conclusions reached in this study spanned 
two levels of analysis. The first was directed to an evaluation of 
alternative regulatory methods, the results of which have a direct and 
immediate practical interest. At a higher level of abstraction, some 
tentative conclusions were drawn as to the applicability of the analyt­
ical methods used in this study to other public policy problems.
Conclusions on Regulation of Field Sales of Natural Gas
The findings of this study in determining the most desirable 
method of regulating the field sales of natural gas in interstate
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commerce provide some suggestions directly applicable to current public 
policy discussion. While the more general economic issues were consid­
ered above, the administrative implications of alternative regulation 
methods were reserved for discussion at this point. Another matter 
taken up below is the use of a unit tax on consumption in conjunction 
with the area-price method. It was found to offer advantages over the 
area-price approach used alone. The final practical conclusion on gas 
field price regulation within the current political structure was that 
the FPC, to be effective at its task, must assume responsibility for 
development and application of policy within the general framework of 
Congressional sanction.
Comparison of the Public-Utility and Area-Price Methods 
of Regulation on the Operational Level
The two major alternative regulation devices, the area-price 
approach and the public-utility approach, were outlined and analyzed 
above in Chapters VII and VIII. In those chapters the major emphasis 
was on the ability of the particular method to adjust certain factors 
leading to fulfillment of the goals of regulation selected. In the 
comments below the methods are compared in their satisfaction of admin­
istrative and procedural criteria to determine whether the conclusions 
drawn in the goal-satisfaction context would be voided in the applica­
tion of the methods to the industry. Value-to-consumer differentials 
and boundaries are presumed in this comparison; the other variants of 
the area-price approach are ignored.
Regulation method and joint satisfaction 
of multiple goals
The first criterion against which the competing systems are com­
pared is the ability to simultaneously satisfy the three policy goals. 
Preliminary comments on this criterion were offered in earlier chapters 
along with the analysis of the competing methods. The public-utility 
approach is designed to prevent exploitation of the consuming public by 
a producer insulated from meaningful competition. Traditionally it has
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been used to adjust the distribution of income between the producing 
and consuming sectors of an industry. Its operation is limited to 
adjustments among gas users and producers; no opportunity exists within 
public-utility procedures to reflect values not represented by produc­
ing or consuming interests. Moreover, such factors as industry 
efficiency and the effect of regulation on the use rate of a deplet- 
able resource over time are necessarily extraneous to deliberations 
within the public-utility formula. They are not, however, isolated 
from side effects of policies designed merely to alter the distribution 
of income. Yet the nature and desirability of the side effects, being 
unintended and unplanned, cannot serve as decision constraints. The 
impact of the public-utility approach on variables making up the 
accepted social welfare function would bear no necessary relation to 
the direction of change leading to joint goal satisfaction.
The area-pricing method can be used to consider explicitly all 
the selected regulatory goals. The efficiency criterion is sustained 
because of the qualitative manner in which area-price regulation 
affects industry operations. In so far as conflicts exist between 
income distribution effects and use rates of natural gas, these con­
flicts can be compromised according to relative importance of the two 
goals and the maximizing area-price which would satisfy each. While 
the area-price method does not promise at all times to yield a solution 
which would correspond to the individual optimum price for both factors, 
a price could be chosen which would be optimal in the sense that any 
movement from that price would bring a net loss in welfare based on the 
values of the administrators. These results depend, of course, on the 
ability of the regulators to estimate both the goal satisfying prices 
and the relative importance of the goals. While in a practical sense 
the estimates would necessarily be crude, their crudity would be pre­
ferred to the absence of even such crude estimates under public-utility 
regulation.- -
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Regulation method and changing 
conditions
One criterion for effective industry regulation is the ability 
to respond to altered conditions without loss of effectiveness in fur­
thering the goals sought. Both the mere passage of time and unpredict­
able developments alter the socially desirable performance of a 
regulated industry such as natural gas production. For example, over 
time the quantity of natural gas in the ground will be reduced though 
the state of the industrial arts might change to the point where the 
economically available supply of gas might actually increase. Consump­
tion patterns will change in response to altered resource patterns and 
demographic profiles. Similarly, events in competing and complementary 
industries might bring sudden shifts in the gas decision parameters.
If regulation is to make its greatest contribution to the use of 
resources to bring maximum want satisfaction it must react appropriately 
to these and other altered conditions.
The public-utility method of regulation is essentially backward 
looking and historical in nature. No response to prospective changes 
in industry conditions is possible within the formula, nor is the method 
even capable of adjusting immediately to current conditions. Its 
response is geared instead to the present of a past which formed the 
record on which current regulatory decisions are made. The area-price 
method of regulation, on the other hand, is not tied to a given formula. 
It not only can react to changes, but can anticipate them as well. A 
hypothetical case can be used to demonstrate the difference in stimulus 
response of the two methods. Assume that a breakthrough in the costs 
of alternate sources of energy occurs which would make the gas industry 
obsolete. Under the public-utility method of regulation no change 
would occur in the established price of gas because the only factors 
which affect the price set on public-utility grounds are the cost of 
service and the rate of return to be earned by the operating firm. (In 
the decreasing cost portions of the industry the price might actually 
rise.) The gas would continue to be sold at its previous price, then, 
and the new industry would be encouraged to enter the fuels market.
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displacing the high cost gas and bringing rapid scrapping of the fixed 
gas investment of producers, transporters, and consumers. Under the 
area-pricing approach, however, when the cost breakthrough for the com­
peting fuel was accepted, the future value of gas reserves and of 
facilities for gas production, transportation, and consumption would 
be written off. With the writing off of the future value of alternative 
uses of the commodity natural gas and of the gas facilities the appro­
priate price for gas would fall to the current marginal cost figure.
At this lower cost a larger portion of the effective life of the facili­
ties and reserves would be utilized and the invasion by the alternate 
energy source would be delayed. Hence a greater total benefit would be 
derived from the sunk resources in the natural gas industry and total 
welfare would be increased in so far as additional gas would be consumed 
at its true alternative resource cost. Because the area-price method 
is not restricted to a formula the substance of which is established by 
historical data, the administrative agency following this method is 
capable of adjusting to anticipated shifts in decision parameters and 
is not the captive of possibly irrelevant constraints. On grounds of 
adaptability, therefore, the area-price method is more satisfactory than 
the public-utility method in regulating the dynamic natural gas produc­
tion industry.
Regulation method and maximum firm self 
determination with social control
The greater the range of decisions over which the individual 
firm has control the more satisfactory the regulatory method if the 
requisite degree of social control can be maintained. Five reasons can 
be distinguished for wishing to minimize the role of the regulatory 
agency in operating industry decisions.
The first of these is that regulation of operations which 
includes review and initiation of action by the regulatory agency is 
expensive. Detailed reporting requirements, inspection activities, and 
supervision of routine operations raise the costs to both the super­
visory agency and the supervised. Secondly, the lower the decision
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level the greater the information and specialization which can be 
devoted to a particular job. Hence the expectation would be that 
decentralization of authority would lead to better, wiser, and more 
efficient operations so long as the decentralization was not carried 
beyond the point where fragmentation of authority brought scale dis­
economies into play. Given a distribution of authority whereby a 
central agency made the industry decisions fraught with social 
interest, the operation of market discipline would assure reasonably 
desirable long run operations. The third reason for maximizing firm 
autonomy is that only through the diversity which would result would 
the full benefit of industrial initiative be secured. Experimentation 
is necessary for development of an industry, and that experimentation 
is fostered by incentives under which success is rewarded and failure 
punished. Minimum social interference with an industry consistent with 
the necessary assurances that the public interest be served not only 
opens the way for experimentation, but provides the incentive for it 
as well.
Two final reasons for maximizing firm self determination rest 
on the general presumptions for laissez faire. The greater the range 
for market decisions rather than authoritative decisions the less the 
probable sacrifice in welfare through unintended disruption of inci­
dental economic elements. The relationships between economic variables 
are complex and devious; all of them cannot be considered directly by 
any administrative agency. Adjustments to regulatory changes made by 
individual economic decision centers could thus be expected to more 
nearly approach the welfare maximizing solution than would attempts at 
detailed social control of essentially peripheral matters. Private 
profit oriented actions, within a framework molding results to the 
desired pattern, would likely, then, yield an outcome socially preferred 
to that which could be instituted by direct regulatory measures. Along 
this same line, but on another tack, the traditional role of government 
in the United States has been popularly conceived as one of minimum 
intervention in private decision making. Whatever the merit of this 
view, it is widely held and a regulatory method which would minimize
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the apparent direct regulatory activities of an agency for social con­
trol would be better received than one which would require a greater 
amount of such activity. For these reasons, then, the regulatory method 
which would impinge the least on the business decision process would 
be preferred to its alternative, and in this regard the strategic 
nature of the social control would be of less significance than its 
obviousness and its quantity.
The public-utility method and firm 
self determination
The public-utility method of regulation would require direct 
incursion of government into the operations of firms in the natural gas 
production industry. Each price set for gas must be set on a firm by 
firm basis and a different price must be set wherever conditions of 
sale differ. Since cost data are determining in each case, detailed 
examination of the operations and results of each firm is required for 
effective application of this method. Decisions on prices the firm is 
allowed to charge must be made, then, through a central agency which has 
both the information and the authority to formulate acceptable prices. 
Because of a combination of complexity of the task, difficulty of inter­
pretation, and rigidity of method the opportunity for disagreement is 
large and hence judicial and other review is necessary before decisions 
are final. The encouragement to review procedures leads to further 
expenditures of time and resources and further incursions of the regu­
lating process into the operations of the firm when the public-utility 
method is used.
Additional administrative activity accompanies regulation 
through the public-utility method because of the necessity for super­
vision to prevent service deterioration. There is little profit spur 
to full development of market potential if rates are based on costs and 
return is limited and somewhat protected through regulation. The firm 
has little stimulus for efficiency or for provision of adequate consumer 
service. Supervision of operations in the form of reviews of expendi­
tures and initiation of service therefore follows public-utility type 
regulation designed to prevent exploitation of consumers.
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The final factor by which the public-utility method of regula­
tion impinges on the operation of individual firms is through the 
feedback effect of the regulation itself. The firm recognizes that its 
actions in the present will affect its revenues in the future in a way 
determined by the public-utility regulation device. Therefore present 
operating and investment decisions are judged by the firms in terms of 
their regulatory, not economic, implications. The mere presence of firm 
oriented regulation therefore distorts the decision making process away 
from the efficiency goal because firm profits depend on factors other 
than provision of efficient service to consumers.
The area-price method and firm 
self determination
Area-price regulation with value-to-consumer differentials 
requires administrative decisions on a different level than those fol­
lowing from the public-utility process. Area-price regulation exerts 
social control by altering strategic economic relationships to which 
private elements in the industry voluntarily conform. Firm by firm 
supervision is avoided, yet the social interest influences the distri­
bution of income between sectors and the use rate of gas over.time.
The nature of the operations required to institute area-pricing 
minimizes the necessary firm— agency interaction. Cost of production 
of natural gas enters into calculations only in estimating amounts 
supplied at various prices and in viewing alternative distributions of 
income. In no case is knowledge of the cost experienced by an individual 
firm necessary to the regulation process. Firm profits are likewise 
irrelevant to the determination of the base price, except as they are 
a factor in the income distribution and gas supply variables.
Commodity oriented industry contol provides an automatic profit 
incentive to the producing firm to maintain the most efficient and market- 
satisfying operations possible within economic limits. Since profits 
are tied directly to performance, the firm has an internal spur to 
socially desirable activity, obviating the need for direct supervision 
to secure similar response. Regulation feedback arising directly from
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public-utility type regulation is avoided in that social control is 
divorced from the individual firm. Because the firm cannot signifi­
cantly alter the industry values on which the regulatory parameters are 
set, it will look to enhancement of its own profit within the given 
framework. Profit is again, then, wedded to action which fulfills the 
general welfare.
The area-pricing method of regulation, in summary, leaves the 
firms with greater perceived autonomy than does the public-utility 
method, with no necessary sacrifice in social control. As the comments 
at the beginning of this section demonstrate, the advantages of the 
"one big decision" type regulation are all but obvious. The area-price 
approach to gas field sales regulation fulfills this administrative 
criterion better than the public-utility method, even if the differences 
in ability to achieve the substantive goals of regulation are ignored.
Regulation method and firm or area 
centered regulation
As contrasted to the general nature of the goals of regulation, 
some activity is directed more to the individual firm or production 
area than to the commodity or the industry as a whole. Income redis­
tribution and production restriction are examples of policies which 
lead to firm centered regulation. The values leading to the goal of 
redistribution of income rest in some part on the judgment that what­
ever the nature of industry-wide profits, individual firms should not 
receive supra-normal returns because of fortuitous circumstances. 
Similarly, it is sometimes felt that firms should not be driven out of 
business and supply restricted because of high cost conditions in 
particular reservoirs where there is some socially defensible reason 
to maintain production. These elements of "just price" can be expressed 
only through specific action on the individual firm level. Regional 
monopoly based on location or other restrictions on entry into the 
industry also requires firm centered policies if regulatory goals are to 
be fulfilled.
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The public-utility approach to regulation is well suited to 
taking elements affecting the individual firm and individual gas consump­
tion area into consideration because the data of regulation and the 
direct impact of decisions are limited to the firm and its customers. 
While the cost-based approach cannot provide a broad view of regulatory 
issues, at the same time it can be applied precisely within its opera­
tional ambit. Area-price regulation using cost-based differentials 
approaches the specificity of the public-utility approach in redistrib­
uting income, though its orientation is to the gas production region 
rather than to the firm. As area-price with value-to-consumer differ­
entials completely ignores the individual firm or area production costs 
and profits, it is completely unsuited for any regulatory task where 
particular cost or "just price" matters are important. To the. extent 
that regulation variations by cost are both desirable and significant, 
then, the public-utility method of regulation is superior to the area- 
price method.
Regulation method and administrative 
certainty
Certainty, stability, and predictability are desirable elements 
of any social control of industry. If the private sector can plan with 
some degree of certainty that there will be no changes in the outward 
conditions which influence decisions then the regulation can be absorbed 
as an element of the decision matrix along with other industry facts. 
Legal issues are also more easily resolved if there is a body of deci­
sions following essentially the same administrative law. Similarly, 
under established patterns of regulation a smaller degree of latitude 
is left to the administrators and therefore there is less opportunity 
for both disagreement and dissatisfaction with decisions made. Certainty, 
stability, and predictability, then, are characteristics to be desired 
in the social control of an industry. In a dynamic industiy, on the 
other hand, administrative flexibility is also desirable.
The public-utility approach to gas field sales regulation pro­
vides stable and predictable regulation, whatever the desirability of
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the decisions reached. This method is based on well settled principles 
and has been approved through judicial review. The procedures may well 
be time consuming and complex, but they can be settled with adequate 
administrative effort. Its administration depends on application of a 
given formula to the particular data observed in each case. Issues of 
interpretation arise, but they are circumscribed in nature and in prac­
tice reflect only minor differences in substance. All parties to 
regulation can predict within a given range of certainty the outcome of 
regulatory procedures using the method.
The area-pricing approach, on the other hand, is highly flexible. 
There is no established procedure and no certain administrative tech­
niques which afford the cachet of tradition to decisions made under the 
area-price heading. Great latitude js therefore given to administrative 
agencies in determining the goals for natural gas production and use, 
and even more discretion is granted in administering the area-price and 
the price differentials in order to attain these goals. Similarly, 
changes over time which affect the substantive goals of regulation or 
affect the variables controlled to reach those goals would evoke unpre­
dictable reactions from the administering agencies because of the absence 
of already determined decision parameters. While the flexibility of the 
area-pricing approach to social control of the field sales of natural 
gas has advantages in serving the total interest, this very adaptability 
leaves the industry and its consumers unable to plan on regulatory 
stability or to predict response to given variations in significant 
elements. On these practical grounds, then, the area-pricing approach 
is inferior to the mere application of the public-utility formula to 
the data of industry experience.
Regulation method; conclusions on effective 
regulation at the operational level
Conflict exists among some of the elements by which the effec­
tiveness of regulation on the operational level is judged. For example, 
while administrative certainty is valued, at the same time the ability 
to respond appropriately to changing conditions is likewise desired. 
Complete fulfillment of all criteria is therefore foreclosed because
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the criteria themselves are to some extent in conflict. It is only 
within the limits of the possible, then, that regulatory methods can be 
meaningfully judged.
The area-pricing approach with value-to-consumer differentials 
meets the operational tests of making joint goal maximization possible, 
adapting to changing conditions, and maximizing firm self determination. 
The area-pricing method fails at firm-centefed regulation. While the 
area-pricing approach can be stabilized, the flexibility of the method 
and the discretion left to the administrators violates what is gener­
ally thought of as administrative certainty. The firm by firm cost 
approach typical of the public-utility method is consistent with these 
latter two criteria but does not adequately provide for other adminis­
trative desiderata. A choice between the two methods on these grounds, 
then, can only come as the relative importance of the five subsidiary 
criteria are assayed. These comparisons are foreign to analysis and 
can only take place within the evaluative process itself. The opera­
tional evaluation of the two regulatory methods must be joined to the 
substantive results of the rest of this study to provide a complete 
picture of the choice between area-price and public-utility regulation.
The Commodity Unit Tax as a Supplement 
to Area-Price Regulation
The use of a uniform unit tax on consumption as a supplement to 
the area-price method of regulation was suggested to bring the amount 
of gas supplied and demanded into equality at the chosen area-price.^
It was noted above that this commodity imbalance was encountered when­
ever different economic results were imposed on unchanged conditions.
^The uniform unit tax on consumption was first discussed in 
Chapter VIII above where the operation of tax was described. As con­
ceived, the tax might be either positive or negative (a consumption 
subsidy) according to the direction of movement desired for the demand 
schedule. A reduction in demand (a positive tax) was used as the 
illustrative example discussed here on grounds that private costs of 
production were not indicative of the alternative costs of current con­
sumption compared to future consumption, at least in the probable view 
of regulatory authorities.
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The matter is not unique, then, to area-price regulation, though per­
haps it is more obviously a problem with this method than with cost-based 
regulation. Three methods of dealing with the expected commodity 
imbalance from regulation were presented above. The first two of these, 
direct end-use control and private, nonprice gas rationing, were found 
to be capable of adjusting amounts supplied and demanded but at a greater 
economic and administrative cost than the unit tax method. Conclusions 
concerning use of a unit tax are summarized in the paragraphs below.
A unit tax on consumption could bring the marginal private costs 
of current gas consumption into equality with the marginal social cost 
of current gas consumption (including the alternative of future con­
sumption). If a positive tax were indicated, the shift upward of the 
experienced price of gas to consumers would restrict gas use. At the 
same time, the area-price relevant to the suppliers could be estab­
lished at the level necessary to bring forth a quantity of gas equal to 
the desired consumption level. Hence the unit tax in conjunction with 
the area-price could bring amounts supplied and demanded into equality 
at a field price which would reflect the private costs of production 
and at a consumption price that would reflect the social costs of con­
sumption. Without the unit tax supplement to area-price regulation, 
compromise between the goals of appropriate income distribution and
desired use rate of natural gas is inevitable unless a single area-price
2
coincidentally fulfills both goals. The use of a unit tax severs the 
connection between the quantity of gas consumed and the area-price 
received by the producers. The independence of quantity consumed and 
field price allows the regulating agency to maximize the satisfaction 
of both substantive goals and therefore raises the potential gains from 
regulation.
The use of the unit tax on gas consumption to adjust amounts 
supplied and demanded does not conflict with efficient allocation of
2
This compromise is possible, while not optimal, under area- 
price regulation. A price can be selected and verified (given value 
judgments) to bring greater total welfare than another price. Such 
verification is impossible using the cost-based method of regulation.
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either natural gas or production factors. The reliance on market allo­
cation enhances higher value uses of gas and lower cost production.
The willingness of one consumer to pay a higher price than a potential 
consumer will pay indicates, presumably, a higher short run contribu­
tion to economic welfare of the gas to the one than to the other. Over 
time, as all costs became variable for both the consumer and the pros­
pective consumers, the assumption could be extended to the conclusion 
that gas would flow to higher long run economic uses as well. Similarly, 
mobile production resources would migrate to least cost operations.
This shift of productive factors in response to market pressure would 
tend toward efficiency in the producing sector of the industry. Hence 
the commodity unit tax as a supplement to area-price regulation would 
not upset the efficiency goal of gas regulation.
The unit tax on natural gas consumption does not inject addi­
tional regulatory supervision into the operations of producers or 
consumers of natural gas. In the nature of the control exerted, the tax 
on consumption is much like the area-price itself. The regulator 
selects a tax rate and the consumers are allowed to adjust to it in any 
way they see fit, just as producers adjust to the externally imposed 
area-price. No direct administrative link (except enforcement) is 
required between regulator and regulated and thus the administrative 
advantages of the area-price method are retained with the addition of 
the commodity tax supplement. The coverage of the consumption tax and 
the area-price itself, however, raises some economic questions. Gross 
distortions of consumption and production in the industry would result 
if some production and consumption were regulated while other production 
and consumption was not. Just this condition exists given the currently 
circumscribed jurisdiction of federal regulation under the Natural Gas 
Act. Since a statutory provision alone is involved, extension of 
federal control to intrastate production and consumption would not 
require a basic revision in national policy. It would require, however, 
a shift in the role of the FPC, the gas regulating agency under current 
legislation.
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The Role of the FPC in Gas Sales Regulation
The traditional role of the independent regulatory commission 
has been to use its administrative and technical skills to apply settled, 
invariant policy to specific circumstances. This description applies 
to some of the functions of the FPC. It has become obvious over the 
course of this study, however, that regulation of the sale of gas for 
resale in interstate commerce requires a different and broader role from 
the regulating agency if effective regulation is to be achieved. Even 
presuming that the general nature of regulatory goals is derived from 
the social consensus, three functional levels of gas industry regulation 
remain. First, the relative importance and substantive content of each 
goal selected must be determined. Secondly, the means to express these 
values must be found, and finally, the administration of the regulation 
decided upon to bring about the desired ends is necessary. The conclu­
sion that the necessary role of the FPC includes policy as well as 
administrative functions, that is the first two above as well as the 
third, rests on the essential nature of gas regulation and on the prac­
tical alternatives available.
Policy matters in gas regulation 
at the field level
The substantive content which goes into the goals for regulation, 
and the regulatory procedures which express that content, are policy 
matters in regulation. The goals of regulation cut across value lines 
in evoking policy decisions. The appropriate use rate for gas cannot 
be derived from analysis, though some contribution can be made in making 
costs of any action explicit. Similarly, regulation requires a decision 
as to the amount of passively derived income which will be allowed to 
accrue to the owners of rights to produce natural gas in the_field. 
Further, while there is no goal conflict over the issue of increased 
welfare through greater efficiency, its achievement raises the issue of 
the desirable rapidity and nature of the adjustment from one pattern of 
resource production and use to another. Any shift in production and use 
will lead to windfall gains and losses. The disruption resulting from
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these changes is a cost of the gains received from greater efficiency. 
The specific policy and value decisions in industry regulation must be 
made by the regulatory agency, whether or not the framework of regula­
tion is based on social consensus.
Actual gas regulation, whatever the method used, consists in 
the end of altering both gas price and quantities produced and consumed. 
The alteration may be achieved by either direct or indirect methods, 
but it is present if social control goes beyond mere policing of market 
determined agreements. Administration of this control in the interest 
of attaining given goals for the natural gas production and sales 
industry requires flexibility at the policy level. That is, the appro­
priate measures to fulfill the given goals could not necessarily be 
derived from the application of pre-established procedures to changing 
conditions. A change in industry or economy conditions can be expected 
to disrupt the relationships between critical variables if multidimen­
sional substantive goals are sought. Thus new procedures as well as 
new price— quantity measures would be required if the maximum satis­
faction of the joint goals were obtained under changed conditions. The 
conclusion follows, then, that to assure effective social control of 
field sales of natural gas more regulative flexibility is needed than 
can be built into predetermined reactions to anticipated stimuli. The 
authority to alter procedure and policy is therefore necessary to secure 
even predetermined and settled goals. Methods and procedures cannot, 
then, be set up and blindly applied over time with a reasonable expecta­
tion that their application will lead to the ends desired.
Governmental level and regulatory role
The regulation of the field sales of natural gas for resale in 
interstate commerce in the United States conceptually is divided into 
four functional levels. The highest level might be termed the social 
consensus, the explicit or implicit expression of the sovereignty of the 
citizenry. The second level molds this consensus into a specific goal 
structure. Conversion of accepted goals into specific regulatory meas­
ures designed to achieve the stated goals is the third functional level
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in the exertion of social control. Finally, the administration of 
regulatory measures at the industry level brings the policy determina­
tions to bear on individual firms and consumers. The allocation of 
responsibility in the United States governmental structure has been 
traditionally conceived to place the policy making function in the hands 
of Congress and to restrict the independent regulatory commissions to 
an administrative and quasi-judicial, but not policy making, role.
Given the nature of the type of gas industry regulation considered in 
this study, however, the conclusion is reached that Congress is practi­
cally, if not conceptually, incapable of satisfactorily providing the 
policy direction required.
The second and third functional levels described above are 
policy making in nature and hence would rest on Congress under the tra­
ditional division of authority and responsibility. The selection of 
goals and the relative importance which is attached to each of those 
goals in conflict situations is a matter within Congressional competence. 
The goals themselves are not likely to shift markedly over reasonable 
periods of time, and the Congress is the body with the responsibility 
of reflecting the consensus of the electorate from which basic values 
flow. The task of expressing the general goals of the community is 
likewise a task which would not require either technical knowledge of 
the industry regulated nor detailed and continuing study beyond the 
limits of Congressional resources.
The actual balance between conflicting goals and the maximizing 
content to be placed in each, however, is less suited to Congressional 
determination. The interactions between goals and between actions in 
one portion of the economy and those in another are exceedingly complex 
and important. Full understanding of these relationships requires 
detailed consideration of an enormous range of material. The Congress, 
faced with its myriad responsibilities, must allocate its limited capac­
ity for decision making to those matters with a higher priority on its 
attention. The shifts in conditions accompanying the passage of time 
reinforce this restraint on detailed Congressional determination of 
goal content. The gas industry changes, as does the rest of the economy.
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A mutual adjustment of dynamic factors is therefore required for effec­
tive regulation. The determination of proximate goals in gas industry 
regulation, then, is a constant process and Congress is not equipped or 
able to devote continuing attention to this one problem among the many 
reaching its attention. In summary. Congress, while it can influence 
the specific content of the goals sought for the general welfare, and 
while it can retain a passively permissive control over those decisions, 
cannot specify the content of regulatory goals.
The third function of regulation is the creation of methods
which, when applied, yield the desired ends. Because of the nature of
regulation of the field sales of natural gas, the conclusion was drawn 
above that methods of regulation must be flexible. The choice of meth­
ods of regulation requires familiarity with special factors in industry 
operation as well as a clear conception of the ends sought. In the 
practical sense. Congress is unable to provide the expert knowledge 
necessary to formulate regulatory methods for any one time, and is cer­
tainly unable to revise periodically the methods of regulation to provide 
the requisite flexibility. For these reasons these policy matters can­
not be left to the traditional policy making level of government in the
United States, the legislative branch.
The discussion above points to, the conclusion that the Congress 
is not capable of making all policy decisions with reference to natural 
gas industry regulation. The options remaining, if this conclusion is 
accepted, are inferior regulation through Congressional policy forma­
tion to the best of its ability, a policy making role for the FPC, or 
no regulation at all. If the option of effective regulation is chosen, 
and it would be following the value judgments underlying the assumptions 
accepted in this study, the role of the FPC could be divided into its 
administrative and its policy functions. The Commissioners would 
operate at the policy level and the Staff would administer accepted poli­
cies. Congress could retain its power of review at its own initiative. 
While this arrangement would to some degree alter the traditional 
division of authority among governmental levels in the United States, 
it would not void the substantive goal of maintaining responsible and
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responsive social control over economic activities peculiarly affected 
with the public interest.
Substantive Conclusions on Federal Regulation of Sales 
for Resale of Natural Gas in Interstate Commerce
The major substantive finding of this study is that the area- 
price method of federal regulation of the field sales for resale of 
natural gas in interstate commerce more nearly fulfills the selected 
public policy goals than does the public-utility method. In some 
particulars, however, the method as proposed by the FPC in the current 
proceedings is not optimal. The public-utility approach is unsatis­
factory in absolute terms as well. It is further concluded that the 
choice between laissez faire and area-price regulation rests on esti­
mates of costs and benefits not susceptible to analytical resolution.
The comparative analysis of regulatory methods was limited to the three 
alternatives (area-price, public-utility, and laissez faire) to which 
most public attention has been given, and the range of these conclusions 
is therefore likewise restricted.
The second substantive finding is that effective regulation 
must consider both the quantitative and the price effects generated in 
the industry. The uniform tax on consumption is suggested as a supple­
ment to the area-price approach. It is concluded that this combination 
would most efficiently and satisfactorily adjust the quantitative and 
price elements of regulation. The third substantive conclusion from 
this study is that the role of the FPC must be enlarged to include 
explicit policy formation on both the ends and means levels. Inferior 
regulation results if the Commission is not allowed to exercise its 
competence in this way.
The final conclusion on a substantive matter is that federal 
regulation of the natural gas industry at the field sales level would 
not be maximally effective unless FPC jurisdiction were widened to 
include intrastate sales and direct industrial sales interstate. Of 
the two, the latter is the most important. Area-price regulation can 
be administered over the current FPC jurisdiction, but marginal
332
distortion of the producing and consuming portions of the industry will
result. The present distribution of jurisdiction between the federal
and the state governments has no necessary economic justification, what­
ever its political rationale. No apparent Constitutional obstacles to 
wider federal jurisdiction exist, though such an expansion of jurisdic­
tion would require statutory revision.
Conclusions on the Approach Followed in This Study
This study of the federal regulation of the field sales of 
natural gas was designed to test the hypothesis that a formal analytical 
approach to public policy could yield useful results. The specific task 
set in this work was to determine if it were possible to select goals 
for natural gas industry regulation and then to evaluate regulatory 
policy options on grounds of success in fulfilling these goals. The 
previous section reports the success in fulfilling this aim. The range 
of possible disagreement in policy formation in the natural gas industry 
was reduced and social welfare was potentially enhanced by the applica­
tion to this problem of the techniques described above.
The hypothesis that formal analysis could yield conclusions 
useful in policy formation was not rejected by the findings of this 
study. Throughout the study the evaluation rested on nonquantified 
parameters to heighten the level of abstraction and to minimize the 
impact of any specific assumptions introduced. The level of abstraction 
attained by this restraint justified the subsidiary conclusion that the 
finding did not depend on specification of the content of the quanti­
tative goals chosen. The formal demonstration of this result, if
verified in subsequent research, reduces by a significant degree the 
indeterminacy of the regulatory process.
The goals selected were crucial to the results obtained in this
study. The findings in this study do not preclude the rejection of the
hypothesis if other goals are selected or if other methods of regulation 
are considered. Such rejection in other instances would threaten only 
the scope of the applicability of these techniques, however, not the
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advantages from their use in specific cases. The similarity of the 
process of regulation, whatever the method, and the qualitative resem­
blance of different goals, argue that further research would support 
the finding that an appropriate approach would allow value-free choice 
between alternative means of accomplishing predetermined public policy 
goals.
The conclusions reached in this study lead to two broad areas 
of further research, the first related to natural gas field sales regu­
lation and the second to the general nature of regulation by independent 
commission. Empirical verification of the substantive conclusions 
reached in this study is the most immediate subject for further exami­
nation. If quantified content were assumed for the regulatory goals, 
a determination could be made as to whether the area-price approach 
would result in the desired level of gas consumption, the selected inter- 
sector distribution of income, and the lowest resource cost per unit of 
consumer satisfaction. A similar study with different regulatory goals 
would test the general applicability of the techniques used but could 
neither support nor threaten the substantive conclusions reached above. 
Such research is needed, to expand the verified range of applicability 
of formal analysis of field sales regulation by means of these compara­
tive techniques. By the same token, the testing of different possible 
methods with either the same or different goals is required before the 
full benefits in public economic policy formation can be derived from 
this study.
The crisis in regulation by the independent commission was 
remarked upon in Chapter I. The conclusions reached in this study sug­
gest that further research of a similar type would add to the understand­
ing of commission regulation in industries of a different nature. For 
example, it appears that one of the causes of the breakdown in FPC regu­
lation of the sales of natural gas at the field level was the lack of 
a clear conception of the goals sought by regulation. The specific 
formulation and statement of goals in this study resulted in restricting 
the areas of disagreement over methods of achieving the ends in view.
Once goals were specified for the other regulatory agencies the
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administrative problems which currently appear unsolvable might similarly 
prove amenable to efficient and value-free resolution. Another finding 
of this study, that effective regulation of the gas industry requires 
the FPC to take an active policy making role, might have wide applica­
tion. As the historical and institutional material found in Chapters V, 
VII, and VIII implied, the ambiguous role orientation of the FPC has led 
to confused and conflicting action which has not been efficiently 
directed to a given end. Greater administrative flexibility was also 
indicated as a need if adjustments were to keep up with the changes in 
the regulated industries. Research such as that suggested above would 
complement this study and would further test the general applicability 
of the conclusions reached here.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A
VALUE OF NATURAL GAS BY USES, UNITED STATES, 
SEIfCTED YEARS, 1933-1960®
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Consumption Uses 1933 1938 1945 1948 1952 1954 1956 1960
Value at wellhead 97 114 191 333 624 883 1,084 1,790
Value In consumption 368 501 835 1,193 2,527 3,205 4,025 6,270
Domestic and commercial 252 329 513 727 1,641 2,072 2,592 4,000
Domestic 210 273 415 585 1,347 1,692 2,126 3,209
Commercial 43 56 98 142 294 378 465 791
Industria l 116 171 322 466 886 1,135 1,433 2,270
F ie ld  use 29 30 40 61 115 121 149 220
Carbon black manufacture 4 3 10 23 20 18 19 20
Other in d u str ia l uses 
(resid ual) 83 138 272 382 751 996 1,265 2,030
®Data taken from Minerals Yearbook, various years, and rounded to nearest m illion d o lla rs .
TABLE B
QOAHTITï OF NATURAL GAS MARKETED, SHIPPED INTERSTATE, AND IN PROVED RECOVERABLE RESERVES, 
FOR THE UNITED STATES, THE SOUTHWESTERN REŒEON, AND FIVE SOUTHWESTERN STATES,
SELECTED YEARS, 1933-1960®tb 
(BILLION CUBIC FEET)
Geographic Area 1933 1938 1945 ’ 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 i 960
United States
Marketed production 1,556 2,296 3,918 6,282 8, 013e 8,742® 10,082® 11, 030® 12, 771®
Interstate shipments 
Proved recoverable
347 637 1,106 2,544f 3,794g 4,662k 5,628 6,342 7,544
reserves c c 147,789 185,593 199,716 211,711 237,775 254,142 263,759
Southwestern Region
Marketed production c 1,555 2,862 5,017 6,711 7,428 8,717 9,649 11,139
Interstate shipments 
Proved recoverable
232 427 873 2,222 3,409 4,319 5,090 5,678 6,735
reserves c c 126,677 163,353 177,182 187,324 212,597 226,778 235,411
Kansas
Marketed production 42 75 146 364 412 412 526 562 634
Interstate shipments 
Proved recoverable
22 39 80 228 287 327 424 424 505
reserves c c 13,251 13,791 14,194 15,758 17,566 20,234 19,620
Louisiana
Marketed production 198 284 543 812 1,237 1,399 1,886 2,452 2,988
Interstate shipments 
Proved recoverable
87 138 229 396 694 560 1,150 1,626 2,232
reserves c c 19,849 28,533 31,4528 36,7808 45,0548 55,U2d 63,386^
New Mexico
Marketed production c 51 103 213 359 449 626 761 799
Interstate shipments 
Proved recoverable
6 19 36 87 203 325 448 573 615
reserves 0 c 5,170 6,991 14,039 17,241 23,473 21,180 13,604
Oklahoma
Marketed production 246 263 358 482 554 616 679 696 824
Interstate shipments 
Proved recoverable
16 29 122 200 228 288 316 694 431
reserves c c 10,080 11,634 11,765 12,396 13,775 15,207 17,311
Texas
Marketed production 476 882 1,711 3,126 4,148 4,551 5,000 5,178 5,893
Interstate shipments 
Proved recoverable
102 201 406 1,311 1,998 2,420 2,752 2,700 2,952
reserves c c 78,307 102,904 105,733'^ 103,129*^ 112,729^^ 115,788(1 119,4898
^Data taken from Minerals Yearbook, various years, and rounded to nearest b illion  cubic feet.
^Volumes of gas in reserve are reported at a pressure base of 14.63 pounds per square inch at a standard 
tençerature of 60 F.
cConsistent data not available.
^Includes offshore reserves.
®Marketed production includes gas either sold or consumed by producer, including losses in transportation, 
amounts added to storage, and in^oreases in gas in pipelines. Definition not given before 1952.
^Includes exports : 23 b illion  cubic feet to Mexico; 3 b illion  cubic feet to Canada.
^Includes exports; 23 b illion  cubic feet to Mexico; 6 b illion  cubic feet to Canada.
blncludes exports: 22 billion cubic feet to Mexico; 6 b illion  cubic feet to Canada.
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TABLE C
MARKETED PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF NATURAL GAS BY STATES, 1933, 1938, 1946, 1954, AND 1960^
(BILLION CUBIC FEET)
1933 1938 1946 1954 I960
Produc- Consump­ Produc- Consump­ Produc- Consunp- Produc- Consump­ Produc­ Consump­
state tion tion tion tion tion tion tion tion tion tion
Alabama 7.5 14.8 45.4 .1 139.6 .1 184.1
Alaska b b . « . . « « ,, . . .2 .2
Arizona , . 2.5 • • 2.7 • . 24.2 . . 75.6 . . 135.5
Arkansas 8.3 22.8 11.3 34.8 45.2 87.7 33.5 192.4 55.5 216.5
California 259.8 259.8 315.2 315.2 488.0 487.9 507.3 934.0 517.5 1,311.3
Colorado 2.4 15.9 1.9 19.2 6.7 40.4 45.7 126.0 107.4 207.6
Connecticut • • . . . , . , 11.4 28.5
Delaware # • . . • • « , . . « • • • 3.0 9.0
D istrict of
Columbia 2.0 3.8 . . 7.4 • • 14.3 18.1
Florida • « .5 1.5 b 7.1 23.2 137.9
Georgia • • 4.5 • • 14.8 . . 36.7 # # 132.1 182.1
Idaho • • . . » • « • • . • • • • « « 22.0
Illin o is 1.6 33.3 1.2 66.5 17.2 124.3 9.5 391.4 ii.7 536.5
Indiana 1.5 6.0 1.3 26.7 1.1 40.2 1.0 116.3 .3 212.9
Iowa • • 11.4 • , 20.1 . . 33.2 • • 119.9 187.1
Kansas 41.6 57.0 75.2 86.1 165.7 175.8 412.4 283.6 634.4 372.3
Kentucky 31.4 13.2 46.2 15.4 70.4 29.5 72.7 110.0 75.3 159.7
Louisiana 197.8 115.8 283.9 162.3 525.2 331.4 1,399.2 636.7 2,988.4 947.9
Maryland • • .7 • • 1.2 . . 2.8 1.4 35.0 4.1 64.9
Massachusetts # # • • • • • • . • « , 35.5 77.9
Michigan 1.5 1.5 10.2 24.7 20.9 69.3 7.0 188.9 20.8 368.5
Minnesota • • 3.5 . . 14.6 . . 37.6 « • 115.1 179.8
Mississippi 8.7 5.8 13.7 12.8 7.2 41.8 140.4 136.8 172.5 188.9Missouri .7 27.6 1.4 42.5 b 74.3 b 188.3 .1 261.4
Montana 14.4 12.24 21.2 18.2E 30.7 28.2 30.3 40.6 33.4 54.6
Nebraska • 10.3 # . 17.5 • • 33.6 6.8 93.2 15.3 139.0Nevada • • * . # . # • • • • . , 1.0 12.4
New Hançshire . 1.1 2.9New Jersey • • • . . • • • • • • • • 65.7 • « 139.3
New Mexico 19.1 13.1 50.7 32.9 119. 3h 85.7 449.3 177.2 798.9 266.4
New York 6.9 19.9 39.4 48.0 5.1 32.9 2.6 225.8 5.0 419.5
North Carolina • « . . « , . , # , 9.4 45.4
North Dakota . . 1.0 .1 1.5 .3 2.5 1.1 4.8 19.5 17.3Ohio 47.9 92.8 35.3 108.0 61.6 188.5 28.8 442.5 36.1 698.6
Oklahoma 245.8 242.5 263.2 244.2 381.0 246.0 616.4 328.0 824.3 383.0
Oregon • e # # e e e e . . • • . . « . 30.9
Pennsylvania 63.6 73.6 76. 5e 96.3 92.4 158.6 146.0 353.2 113.9 520.8
Rhode Island . . « • . • • , . . , , , . 4.4 11.8
South Carolina . . • • • • . . , « . . . 16.6 a , 58.5
South Dakota b 3.3 10.0 5.4 . . 7.5 b 15.6 24.5
Tennessee b 7.4 b 14.0 b 24.3 .1 114.9 .1 155.6
Texas 475.7® 412.4 882.5^ 729.6 l,776.lJ 1 , 366.5 4 , 551.2 2, 198.2 5, 892.7 2,981.2
Utah b 5.9 4.3 11.7 4.3 15.7 16.0 41.1 51.0 75.7
Virginia • # .2 .6 b 2.1 1.4 35.6 2.2 66.2
Washington .1 .1 .1 .1 . . . . • • 64.9
West Virginia 100.7 42.2 134.3 57.5 179.0 100.7 191.6 138.8 208.8 180.0
%sconsin • • . . . . .1 . , 39.3 * , 90.6
Wyoming 25.8 3.4 26.7 18.7 33.3 23.1 71.1 36.7 186.6 59.6
Total 1 , 555.5 1 , 553.4 2, 295.6 2, 294.1 4 , 030.6 4 , 013.0 8 ,742.5 8,402.9 12,771.0 12, 509.4
*Data taken from Minerals Yearbook, various years, and rounded to nearest one hundred million cubic feet. 
Production conçrises gas either sold or consumed by producer, including losses in transmission, quantities added to 
storage, and increases of gas in pipelines. I t  includes deliveries in other states. Consunption includes volume of 
natural gas idiich is  distributed as a cosçonent of mixed gas, including receipts from other states.
bLess than 50 million cubic feet.
^Includes 2,089 million cubic feet piped to Mexico.
(^Includes 83 million cubic feet piped from Canada.
^Includes 60 million cubic feet piped to Canada.
^Includes 911 million cubic feet piped to Mexico.
^Includes 372 million cubic feet piped ffom Canada.
hinoludes 3*315 million cubic feet piped to Mexico.
llncludes 180 million cubic feet piped to Canada.
jIncludes 14,160 million cubic feet piped to Mexico.
TABI£ D
SOURŒS AND USES OF NATURAL GAS, THE UNITED STATES INDUSTRY,
SELECTED YEARS. 1929-1960^
(BILLION CUBIC FEET)
Item 1929 1933 1938 1945 1948 1952 1954 1956 1960
Proved recoverable
reserves b b b :147,789 173,869 199,716 211,711 237,775 263,759
Gross withdrawals b b 3,048 5,902 7,178 10,273 10,985 12,373 15,088
From gas w ells b b 1,567 3,888 4,589 6,839 7,466 8,306 10,853
From o i l  w ells b b 1,481 2,014 2,590 3,433 3,519 4,066 4,234
D isp osition  of gas
Marketed production b b 2,296c 3,919 5,148 8,014 8,742 10,082 12,771
Repressuring b b 102 1,062 1,221 1,411 1,519 1,427 1,754
Vented and wasted b b 636d 896 810 849 724G 861 563f
Consumption b 1,553 2,294 3,900 4,945 7,614 8,373 9,707 12,509
R esidentia l 3608 283 368 607 896 1,622 1,894 2,328 3,103
Commercial b 86 114 230 323 516 585 717 1,020
Industrial 1,557 1,184 1,812 3,063 3,726 5,476 5,924 6,662 8,386
Selected  Indu stria l uses
F ield  use 705 494 659 917 1,022 1,484 1,457 l,4 2 lh 1,778
Carbon black manufacture 261 187 325 432 441 368 251 243 198
Fuel use (including  
e le c tr ic  u t i l i t y ) 145 88 153 1,714 2,224 3 ,624 i 4 ,2 l6 i 4,9991 6,409
E le c tr ic  u t i l i t y  p lants 113 103 171 326 478j 910J l,1 6 6 j 1,239J l,7 2 5 j
VjO
®Data taken from Minerals Yearbook, various years, and rounded to nearest b i l l io n  cubic fe e t .  
bConsistent data not a v a ila b le .
cIncludes q u an tities  used in  repressuring, stored in  ground, lo s t  and wasted.
^Includes gas blown to the a ir , shrinkage at natural gas p lan ts and transm ission lo sse s  but not 
d irect waste on producing properties.
^Includes gas blown to a ir  but does not include d irect waste on producing properties except 
where data are a v a ila b le .
^Does not include undisclosed fig u res .
8Includes commercial, separate figu res not a v a ila b le .
^9,883 m illio n  cubic fe e t  included in f ie ld  use to avoid d isc losu re; included in  carbon black
to t a l .
^Partly estim ated: Includes d irect waste on producing properties and residue blown to the a ir .
^Figures include some manufactured gas. Natural gas portion i s  included in "other in d u str ia l
fu e l."
TABLE E
QUANTITY AND PRICE OF PETROLEUM DISCOVERED, PRODUCED, AND ADDED TO RESERVES,
1920, 1925, AND 1930-1960
Quantity in Thousands of Barrels^ Average Price Per Barrel of Crude Oil at the Well^
Years
Physical
Discovery^
Amount Added 
Production to ReservesC
United
States Texas California Oklahoma Louisiana
1920 942,929 442,929 500,000 $3.07 $3.24 $1.73 $3.36 $3.15
1925 1 ,763,743 765,743 1,000,000 1.68 1.81 1.42 1.97 1.60
1930 1 ,298,011 898,011 400,000 1.19 .99 1.20 1.29 1.12
1931 251,081 851,081 (600,000) .65 .51 .72 .66 .65
1932 85,159 785,159 (700,000) .87 .83 .81 .90 .85
1933 605,656 905,656 (300,000) .67 .56 .83 .66 ,61
1934 1,085,065 908,065 100,000 1.00 .95 .92 1.02 .97
1935 1 , 219,596 . 996,596 223,000 .97 .94 .82 1.02 .99
1936 1 ,763,087 1 , 099,687 663,400 1.09 1.05 1.01 1.12 1.06
1937 3, 721,532 1,277,664 2,443,868 1.18 1.16 1.02 1.24 1.21
1938 3,054,064 1 , 213,186 1,840,878 1.13 1.13 1.03 1.20 1.16
1939 2,399,122 1 , 264,256 1 ,134,866 1.02 .99 1.02 1.04 1.05
1940 1 ,893,350 1,351,847 541,503 1.02 1.00 .97 1.04 1.04
1941 1 ,968,963 1,404,182 564,781 1.14 1.12 1.04 1.13 1.14
1942 1 ,878,976 1 , 385,479 493,497 1.19 1.17 1.03 1.19 1.19
1943 1,484,786 1 , 503,427 (18,641) 1.20 1.21 1.05 1.19 1.22
1944 2,067,500 1,678,421 389,079 1.21 1.21 1.06 1.23 1.22
1945 2,110, 299® 1 ,736,717® 373, 582® 1.22 1.21 1.06 1.27 1.23
1946 2 ,658,062 1,726,348 931,714 1.41 1.41 1.23 1.44 1.45
1947 2,464,570 1 , 850,445 614,125 1.93 1.95 1.72 1.92 2.01
1948 3 ,795,207 2,002,448 1 ,792,759 2.60 2.61 2.42 2.58 2.68
19^ 49 3,187,845 1,818,800 1 ,369,045 2.54 2.59 2.26 2.56 2.65
a
1950 2 , 562,685 1 ,943,776 618,909 2.51 2.59 2.16 2.57 2.65
1951 4 ,413,954 2,214,321 2 ,199,633 2.53 3.76 2.54 2.57 2.65
1952 2 ,749,288 2 , 256,765 492,523 2.53 3.76 2.55 2.56 2.64
1953 3 , 296,130 2, 311,856 984,274 2.68 2.73 2.49 2.56 2.81
1954 2 , 873,037 2 , 257,119 615,918 2.78 2.84 2.55 2.70 2.93
1955 2 , 870,724 2,419,300 451,424 2.77 2.84 2.50 2.79 2.93
1956 2 ,974,336 2, 551,857 422,479 2.79 2.83 2.62 2.78 2.93
1957 2,424,800 2,559,044 (134,244) 3.09 3.11 3.05 3.03 3.23
1958 2,608,242 2 , 372,730 295,512 3.01 3.06 2.90 2.96 3.26
1959 3 ,666,745 2,483,315 1 ,183,436 2.90 2.98 2.55 2.92 3.16
i 960 2 , 365,328 2,471,464 (106,142) 2.88 2.96 2.46 2.92 3.14
^Data for 1920-1957 from American Petroleum Institu te, Petroleum Facts and Figures. Centennial Edition,
1959. (New York: American Petroleum Institu te, 1959)» P» 62. Sources cited were American Petroleum Institute ^
for I937-I957 data and Bureau of Mines for data prior to 1937* The series for production differed slightly  in 
the two sources. Data for I958-1960 from American Petroleum Institu te, Petroleum Facts and Figures. 1961 (New 
York: American Petroleum Institu te, I96I ) ,  p. 46, citing the American Petroleum Institu te.
hincludes reserves added through discoveries of new fie ld s or new pools in old fie ld s as well as revision 
of previous estimates and extensions to new fie ld s.
cAmount added to reserves calculated as the difference between physical discovery and production for each 
year. Difference shown in parentheses when production exceeded discoveries.
D^ata for I92O-I958 from American Petroleum Institute, Petroleum Facts and Figures: Centennial Edition.
1959 (New York: American Petroleum Institu te, 1959), pp. 46-47, citing Bureau of Mines. Data for 1958-1960 from
American Petroleum Institu te, Petroleum Facts and Figures. 1961 (New York; American Petroleum Institu te, I96I ) ,  
p. 39, citing the Bureau of Mines. Data for I96O prelim inary;all others fin a l. Prices reported are average 
prices for field-run crude produced within the geographic areas noted. As such, prices reflected other changed 
conditions as well as price trends.
eBeginning with 1946, only crude o il is  included. Prior to 1946 some condensate was included.
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TABLE F
FREQUENCY OF MONTH TO MONTH CHANGES IN CRUDE OIL PRICES, NEGLECTING 
SIGN, JANUARY, 1913 THROUGH SEPTEMBER, 1933 AND OCTOBER, 1933 
THROUGH DECEMBER, I960 IN DOLLARS PER BARREL^
Month
to
Month
Change®
January, 1913 through 
September, 1933
Frequency Total Change
October, 1933 through 
December, I960®
Frequency Total Change
.00 176 .00 260 .00
.02 1 .02 0 .00
.03 0 .00 1 .03
.04 1 .04 0 .00
.05 4 .20 1 .05
.07 0 .00 1 .07
.08 1 .08 0 .00
.09 1 .09 0 .00
.10 6 .60 4 .40
.12 0 .00 1 .12
.15 5 .75 0 .00
.16 1 .16 0 .00
.19 2 .38 0 .00
.20 3 .60 2 .40
.23 1 .23 0 .00
.25 17 4.25 4 1.00
.26 1 .26 0 .00
.28 1 .28 0 .00
.30 11 3.30 0 .00
.34 1 .34 0 .00
.35 2 .70 0 .00
.36 1 .36 0 .00
.39 2 .78 0 .00
.40 1 .40 0 .00
.45 1 .45 0 .00
.50 5 2.50 1 .50
.60 1 .60 0 .00
.75 1 .75 0 .00
1.00 1 1.00 0 .00
Total 248 19.12 275 2.57
Observations for 1913-1958 taken from data found in American 
Petroleum Institute, Petroleum Facts and Figures, Centennial Edition, 
1959 (New York: American Petroleum Institute, 1959)» P» 375- Authori­
ties cited: U.S. Geological Survey, Platt's Oil Price Handbook and
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TABLE F - Continued
Oiltnanac. Data for 1959-1960 from American Petroleum Institute, 
Petroleum Facts and Figures, 1961 Edition (New York: American Petro-
leum Institute, 1961), p. 226. Authority cited: Platt's Oil Price
Handbook and Oilmanac. The Centennial Edition refers to "Oklahoma- 
Kansas 36-degree to 36.9-degree gravity crude." The 1961 Edition 
refers to "Oklahoma 36-degree to 36.9-degree gravity crude," but the 
same prices held in 1951 and 1958, for which references were available 
from both sources, and therefore the difference in definition 
apparently did not upset the comparability of the series.
b.’changes with no observations either period were omitted.
c„
'The period of stability during World War II, from December, 
19^ 2, through February, 1946, was ignored to eliminate the effect of 
direct price regulation.
TABLE G
VALUE ÛF NATURAL GAS AT WELLHEAD AND IN CONSUMPTION, BY STATES, 1933, 1938, 1946, 1954, AND I960®
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
1933 1938 1946 1954 . . ... i 960
State
Well­
head
Consulta­
tion
Well­
head
Consulta­
tion
Well­
head
Consulta­
tion
Well­
head
Consulta­
tion
Well­
head
Consulta­
tion
Alabama 2.2 3.9 10.2 b 48.9 b 96.4
Alaska b b . . . « . . . . • • b b
Arizona . , .6 . . 3.8 . . 7.3 • . 27.5 • • 57.5
Arkansas .5 5.0 .5 6.7 1.1 12.1 1.8 37.0 6.6 88.9
California 16.7 74.5 21.8 88.2 36.1 143.8 104.5 377.2 138.2 729.4
Colorado .1 5.5 .1 7.0 .3 12.4 4.0 42.1 12.8 78.5
Connectd-cut « . » • • • 25.8 . . 43.0
Delaware • • . . • » « « , * « • 4.0 « « 9.8
District of 
Columbia 1.6 2.8 5.2 18.7 26.9
Florida • « .2 » , .4 b 1.4 b 4.8 b 69.7
Georgia • e 3.0 • • 5.7 • • 12,8 « • 48.3 . . 111.7
Idaho • * * * • • . . , • • • • • • * . . 11.8
Illinois .1 26.8 b 37.0 1.0 54.9 1.3 213.4 1.5 401.6
Indiana .4 2.6 .2 8.4 .1 20.2 b 76.1 .1 133.2
Iowa • • 3.5 » « 7.3 . . 12.8 • # 52.4 . . 105.2
Kansas 2.5 15.1 3.2 19.0 8.3 32.9 43.7 73.6 74.2 114.4
Kentucky 4.0 5.8 5.6 6.8 10.4 12.5 16.6 45.0 18.4 88.8
Louisiana 6.1 12.5 9.7 19.9 18.6 32.3 124.5 98.4 511.0 215.3Maryland * « .5 ■ • .9 • , 2.1 .3 43.4 1.1 88.6
Massachusetts • • • • 1.0 « « • • 64.2 . , 132.4
M3chigan .2 .6 • • 22.8 2.7 48.8 1.3 155.6 4.4 294.7
Minnesota • • 1.0 # . 7.0 « • 13.0 • • 59.4 « . 118.2
Mississippi .4 1.8 .7 3.5 .3 10.0 11.7 33.0 32.4 68.3
Missouri .1 12.5 .1 6.1 b 31.0 b 87.8 b 147.4
Montana .6 3.4 .9 4.9 1.4 7.7 2.1 15.1 2.4 22.7
Nebraska « • 3.6 * , 6.2 11.2 1.0 40.0 2.7 66.1
Nevada • • * e # . . # . . # # • • 1.0 9.0
«
New Hanqpshire • • • # . . . . « • . . . . 2.2 4.7
New Jersey « • • # • • . . • • • • # # 93.5 • . 205.6
New Mexico .5 1.5 .8 3.5 1.7 7.5 35.0 25.9 85.5 53.4New York 1.9 13.2 5.7 20.3 1.4 24.7 1.0 287.1 1.5 532.6
North Carolina , « • » b , , 7.0 33.5North Dakota • # .4 b .6 b 1.0 .1 2.4 2.2 6.8
Ohio 8.2 U3.7 5.9 53.9 11.3 98.4 6.1 265.8 8.5 491.6Oklahoma 9.5 20.3 5.2 20.1 12.3 29.7 43.1 64.4 98.1 100.1
Oregon s • * • * • • • . . , , . . 23.0
Pennsylvania 15.1 34.2 13.9 41.0 23.5 69.3 43.6 239.2 36.2 418.0
Rhode Island *, • * * . . . . . . . . . . 12.3 19.2South Carolina . • . . « . b . . , , 10.6 34.1
South Dakota b 1.2 b 1.8 . , 2.7 b 7.4 14.8
Tennessee b 2.8 b 4.4 b 8.0 b 46.5 b 81.3
Texas 11.3 46.1 19.8 55.4 53.6 107.7 386.9 296.3 665.9 577.6Utah b 1.6 .1 2.6 .2 5.0 2.3 16.2 9.2 33.8Virginia • • .2 . . .6 b 2.0 .4 33.7 .6 68.4Washington b .1 b .1 . . . . 40.4
West Virginia 18.1 43.7 17.5 15.3 26.7 27.5 45.6 49.8 54.7 97.1Wisconsin » « « • . . . . .1 , , 44.0 89.6Wyoming .8 2.0 .8 2.8 1.3 4.2 6.0 8.7 21.8 14.6
Total 97.1 368.1 113.6 500.6 212.3 882.4 775.0 3 , 205.4 1 ,790.0 6 , 269.7
^ata taken from Minerals Yearbook, various years, and rounded to nearest $100,000. All consunçtion figures 
include natural gas mixed with manufactured gas.
o
^ess than $50,000.
TABLE H
AVERAGE VALUE OF ONE THOUSAND CUBIC FEET OF NATURAL GAS IN THE UNITED STATES,
SELECTED YEARS, 1929-1960^
(CENTS)
Consumption Uses 1929 1933 1938 1945 1948 1952 1954 1956 1960
Value at wellhead 
Value in consumption
8.2 6.2 4.9 4.9 6.5 7.8 10.1 10.8 14.0
Domestic and commercial 62.0 68.4 68.3 61.2 59.6 76.8 83.5 85.1 97.0
Domestic b 74.0 74.2 68.3 65.3 83.1 89.3 91.3 103.4
Commercial b 49.8 49.2 42.4 44.0 57.0 64.7 64,9 77.5
Industrial b 9.8 9.4 10.5 11.3 16.2 19.2 21.5 27.1
Field use b b b b b b b 10.5 12.4
Carbon black manufacture b 2.0 0.9 2.3 4.7 5.5 6.9 7.7 10.0
BData taken from Minerals Yearbook, various years. "Natural gas" includes the natural gas
O s
which is distributed as a component of mixed gas. 
^Consistent data not available.
